State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Dunlap et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION. The Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 18] is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court SHALL ENTER judgment in favor of State Farm finding that there is no coverage available to Shaun Dunlap under State Farm Policy Policy No. A51273642J for the accident that occurred on July 7, 2012. Thereafter, the Clerk of Court is ORDERED to CLOSE this case. Signed by Magistrate Judge H Bruce Guyton on 7/3/14. (JBR)
UNITED STATE DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
v.
GEORGE DUNLAP, JUDY DUNLAP, and
SHAUN DUNLAP,
Defendants.
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No. 3:13-CV-23-HBG
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This case is before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Rule 73(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the consent of the parties, for all further proceedings,
including entry of judgment [Doc. 14].
I.
BACKGROUND
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, (“State Farm”), is a mutual
automobile insurance company with headquarters and principal place of business in
Bloomington, Illinois, but is qualified to, and doing business in the State of Tennessee.
Defendants George Dunlap and Judy Dunlap are husband and wife, and Defendant Shaun
Dunlap is their son. All three Defendants reside together in the same house and are citizens of
Blount County, Tennessee.
State Farm issued a policy of automobile liability insurance to named insured George
Dunlap of Maryville, Tennessee, Policy No. A51273642J for a term of six months beginning
January 25, 2012 insuring a 2008 Ford F-150 pickup truck, (“the Policy”). The Policy had
applicable liability limits of $50,000 per person, $100,000 per accident and $25,000 for property
damage. The policy included various other coverages – specifically, $5,000 worth of medical
payments coverage.
The first week in July 2012 Amanda Robertson asked her friend Shaun Dunlap to house
sit a residence located in Maryville, Blount County, Tennessee, (“the Residence”), including
feeding and taking care of two dogs at the residence, while Amanda Robertson and a friend went
to a Robertson family vacation on San Padre Island, Texas. The Residence was actually owned
by Jerry Dale Robertson (“Mr. Robertson”) and Sherry Ann Robertson (“Mrs. Robertson”),
Amanda Robertson’s parents. Mr. and Mrs. Robertson were temporarily residing in Texas and
had left Amanda in charge of the property.
Shaun Dunlap had known Amanda Robertson for several years. Shaun Dunlap lived with
the Roberts for a period during 2007, and he had house sat the residence on numerous previous
occasions. Shaun Dunlap was never granted permission by Amanda Robertson or by her parents
to operate any motor vehicles owned by members of the Robertson family. Moreover, Shaun
Dunlap had never driven any motor vehicle owned by a member of the Robertson family.
Shaun Dunlap drove his 2006 Pontiac Grand Prix automobile to the Residence to begin
his house sitting assignment. Shaun Dunlap’s Pontiac automobile had formerly been insured by
State Farm, but the State Farm coverage on the Pontiac had been cancelled for non-payment of
premiums on January 19, 2012.
At approximately 1:21 p.m. on July 3, 2012, Shaun Dunlap texted Amanda Robertson,
saying: “[By the way] if your car needs gas I’m happy to go fill it up[, laugh out loud].” [Doc.
19-1 at 5]. There is no dispute that this text message is a reference to the 2012 Cadillac CTS
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automobile Amanda left at the Residence. Amanda responded shortly thereafter by saying
“Haha[]. It’s full. Thanks. :) .” [Id.]. Dunlap responded, “Ok. Just trying to be helpful.” [Id.].
Both Amanda and Shaun have testified that the exchange and the suggestion that Shaun use the
automobile was a joke. [Doc. 19-1 at 2; Doc. 41-1 at 18].
At approximately 3:00 a.m. on Saturday, July 7, 2012, Shaun Dunlap received a call from
a friend who was in need of a ride home. Shaun Dunlap states that he attempted to leave the
Residence in his Pontiac automobile, but he was having trouble with the transmission of that
vehicle and was unable to get it into reverse. with the keys on the kitchen counter. Keys to a
2011 Ford Ranger pickup truck, (“the Truck”), owned by Amanda’s parents, were in a kitchen
cabinet. Shaun Dunlap drove the Truck and left the Residence to pick up his friend.
At approximately 6:30 a.m. on Saturday, July 7, 2012 Shaun Dunlap was operating the
Truck (with no one else in the vehicle) proceeding generally south on Highway 321, also known
as Wears Valley Road, in Sevier County, Tennessee. Mr. Dunlap apparently fell asleep, crossed
the center line, and struck a 2011 Honda Civic automobile owned and operated by Ashish
Dembla. There were three other occupants of the Dembla vehicle, Kanika Dembla, Sat Pal
Dembla, and Anjali Dembla. Ashish Dembla and his parents Sat Pal Dembla and Anjali Dembla
were killed in the accident and Kanika Dembla seriously injured.
In relevant part, the Policy provided:
LIABILTY COVERAGE
…
Insured means:
1.
you and resident relatives for:
…
b. the maintenance or use of:
(1) a non-owned car; or
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(2) a temporary substitute car;
…
4.
any other person or organization vicariously liable for the use of a vehicle
by an insured as defined in items 1., 2., or 3. above….
[Doc. 20-1 at 5-6]. The definitions section of the Policy states:
Non-Owned Car means a car that is in the lawful possession of you or
any resident relative …”
Temporary Substitute Car means a car that is in the lawful possession
of the person operating it and that:
1. replaces your car for a short time while your car is out of use due to
it:
a. breakdown;
b. repair;
c. servicing;
d. damage; or
e. theft; and
2. neither you nor the person operating it own or have registered.
If a car qualifies as both a non-owned car and a temporary substitute
car, then it is considered a temporary substitute car only.
[Id. at 4-5]
At no time prior to the events of July 7, 2012 had Shaun Dunlap ever driven any vehicles
owned by the Robertsons. Shaun Dunlap had never requested permission to operate any vehicles
owned by members of the Robertson family, and in particular, he had never requested permission
to operate a vehicle owned by Mr. Robertson. Conversely, Mr. Robertson never told Shaun
Dunlap that he could not operate the Truck or any other vehicle.
Finally, the motor-vehicle registration tags for the Truck had expired prior to July 7,
2011.
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II.
POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
State Farm moves the Court to enter judgment in its favor pursuant to Rule 56 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It maintains that Shaun Dunlap was not in lawful possession
of the Truck at the time of the accident, and as a result, the Policy does not afford coverage for
any injuries or damages sustained in the accident. State Farm argues that the Court must afford
the terms used in the Policy their plain and ordinary meaning. Specifically, State Farm maintains
that the term “lawful” must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. State Farm argues that
Shaun Dunlap’s use of the Truck was not lawful, because during his possession of the Truck,
Shaun Dunlap committed the tort of conversion, committed the tort of trespass to chattels,
violated Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-14-106 (unauthorized use of vehicles), and violated
Tennessee Code Annotated § 55-4-101(a) (expired motor-vehicle registration).
Intervening Defendant Kanika Dembla responds in opposition to the request for summary
judgment and maintains that Shaun Dunlap was in lawful possession of the Truck at the time of
the accident. Dembla agrees that the sole issue presented in this case is whether Shaun Dunlap
was in lawful possession of the Truck at the time of the accident, but Dembla maintains that
there is a genuine issue of material fact and law, because the Robertsons did not tell Shaun
Dunlap that he could not use the truck and because Dunlap felt he had implicit permission to use
the Truck. Dembla contends that the expired registration does not render Dunlap’s possession
unlawful because neither Mr. or Ms. Robertson or Dunlap knew at the time of the accident that
the tags were expired.
Defendant Shaun Dunlap has adopted the position of Intervening Defendant Kanika
Dembla.
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In its reply, State Farm argues that the single post-accident conversation between Shaun
Dunlap and Mr. Robertson conveyed Mr. Robertson’s unequivocal condemnation of Dunlap’s
unauthorized use of the Truck and Dunlap’s remorseful acknowledgement that he should not
have taken the truck. State Farm maintains that text messages exchanged between Amanda
Robertson and Shaun Dunlap discussing Dunlap using Amanda’s automobile, which both treated
as a “joke,” are instructive. State Farm argues that Shaun Dunlap was not authorized to use
Amanda’s car and was certainly not authorized to use the Truck, which was owned by Mr.
Robertson.
III.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is proper “if
the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the
burden of establishing that no genuine issues of material fact exist. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 330 n. 2 (1986); Moore v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 8 F.3d 335, 339 (6th Cir. 1993).
All facts and all inferences to be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
587 (1986); Burchett v. Kiefer, 301 F.3d 937, 942 (6th Cir.2002).
“Once the moving party presents evidence sufficient to support a motion under Rule 56,
the nonmoving party is not entitled to a trial merely on the basis of allegations.” Curtis v.
Universal Match Corp., 778 F. Supp. 1421, 1423 (E.D.Tenn.1991) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at
317). To establish a genuine issue as to the existence of a particular element, the non-moving
party must point to evidence in the record upon which a reasonable finder of fact could find in its
favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The genuine issue must also
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be material; that is, it must involve facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law. Id.
The Court’s function at the point of summary judgment is limited to determining whether
sufficient evidence has been presented to make the issue of fact a proper question for the finder
of fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. The Court does not weigh the evidence or determine the
truth of the matter. Id. at 249. Nor does the Court search the record “to establish that it is bereft
of a genuine issue of material fact.” Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479-80 (6th
Cir. 1989). Thus, “the inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is
a need for a trial—whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can
be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either
party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.
IV.
ANALYSIS
The Policy would cover the accident at issue, if the Truck were either a “non-owned car”
or a “temporary substitute car.” For the Truck to qualify as either a “non-owned car” or a
“temporary substitute car,” Shaun Dunlap was required to be in lawful possession of the
automobile. The undisputed facts of this case demonstrate that Dunlap was not in lawful
possession of the automobile.
As an initial matter, the Court finds that the lawfulness of Shaun Dunlap’s possession is
determined by applying the applicable common laws and statutes to the undisputed facts of this
case. The Court finds that an adjudication of the violation of the various statutes and common
law is not required to find that Dunlap’s possession was unlawful for purposes of the Policy. See
State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 26 Fed. App’x 490 (6th Cir. 2002).
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For the reasons discussed herein, the Court finds that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact in this case, and the Court finds that State Farm is entitled to declaratory judgment
in its favor as a matter of law.
A.
Shaun Dunlap’s Possession of the Truck was Not Lawful because It Constituted the
Tort of Conversion
“The elements of a conversion claim include: (1) an appropriation of another’s tangible
property to one’s use and benefit; (2) an intentional exercise of dominion over the chattel alleged
to have been converted; and (3) defiance of the true owner’s rights to the chattel.” White v.
Empire Exp., Inc., 395 S.W.3d 696, 720 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012) (citing River Park Hosp., Inc. v.
BlueCross BlueShield of Tenn., Inc., 173 S.W.3d 43, 60 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002)). “A wrongful
intent on the part of the defendant is not an element of conversion and, therefore, need not be
proved.” Id. (citing PNC Multifamily Capital Institutional Fund XXVI Ltd. P’ship v. Bluff City
Cmty. Dev. Corp., No. W2011–00325–COA–R3–CV, 2012 WL 1572130, at *22 (Tenn. Ct.
App. May 4, 2012)).
In this case, there is no dispute that Shaun Dunlap appropriated Mr. Robertson’s tangible
property, i.e. the Truck, to the use and benefit of Dunlap. Additionally, there is no dispute that
the appropriation was intentional in that Dunlap intentionally took the Truck, without asking
permission, to run a personal errand. Thus, the Court finds that the first element and second
element of the tort of conversion are fulfilled
With regard to the third element – defiance of the true owner’s rights – the Court finds
that Shaun Dunlap possessed the Truck in defiance of the rights of the true owner, Mr.
Robertson.
Specifically, the possession defied Mr. Robertson’s right to possession of the
property, by taking the truck without ever receiving permission to do so. Moreover, Dunlap
defied the true owner’s rights by taking the truck despite Amanda Robertson’s earlier indication,
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via text message, that Dunlap driving the automobiles at the home was not within the scope of
his permission. [See Doc. 19-2 at 5]. Thus, the Court finds that the third and final element of the
tort of conversion is fulfilled.
In so finding, the Court has considered the case law cited by the parties. In particular, the
Court has considered State Farm Automobile Ins. Co. v. Hafley, 1991 S.W. 46696, No. 1388
(Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 8, 1991). The Court finds that Hafley is distinguishable from the instant
case on several key points. First, in Hadley, the owner of the automobile had given the house
sitter permission to drive his automobile at least three prior times. Id. at *3. In the instant case,
there is no allegation that Mr. Robertson ever gave Shaun Dunlap permission to drive the Truck.
Second, in Hadley, the Court of Appeals found that there was no testimony that the owner of the
automobile had ever expressly forbidden the house sitter from using the automobiles. In the
instant case, the Robertsons did not strictly forbid the use, [see Doc. 41-3 at 9], but Amanda
Robertson clearly rebuffed Dunlap’s indication that he would like to drive one of the Robertsons’
other automobiles, [see Doc. 19-2 at 5]. Further, the court in Hadley found that the house sitter
was entrusted to protecting the entire premises and the vehicles. In the instant case, there is no
indication that Dunlap was charged with protecting the vehicles, and to the contrary, the
testimony before the Court is that he was hired to tend to the Robertson pets. [See Doc. 31-2 at
3; Doc. 41-3 at 40].
In addition to the Hafley case being factually incongruent from the instant case, the Court
finds that the Hafley case is not legally persuasive. The Court finds that if the holding in Hafley
were extended beyond its particular factual scenario, it would yield illogical results.
For
example, a person left to occupy a home while caring for household pets could, absent explicit
instructions to the contrary, use a firearm, or even a checkbook, present in the home as the
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person pleased. The Court finds the Defendant and Intervening Defendant’s related position that
Mr. Robertson was required to explicitly state each and every exclusion attendant to Dunlap’s
house sitting position is unpersuasive. It appears the Court is not alone in its perception that
Hafley has little persuasive effect. The Defendants have failed to cite the Court to any case
adopting the holding in Hafley, and the Court’s own search has not yielded any cases adopting
the holding in Hafley.
Accordingly, even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving
parties, the Court finds that Shaun Dunlap committed the tort of conversion through his
possession of the Truck. The Court finds that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
with regard to Dunlap’s conversion, and the Court finds as a matter of law that Dunlap was not
in lawful possession of the Truck. Because Dunlap was not lawfully in possession of the Truck,
there is no basis for finding overage under either the “non-owned car” or “temporary substitute
car” provisions of the Policy.
B.
Shaun Dunlap’s Possession of the Truck was Not Lawful because It Constituted the
Tort of Trespass to Chattel
A trespass to chattel or personal property occurs where there is an intentional use or
interference with personal property that is in the possession of another without justification. See
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 217; 75 Am. Jur. Trespass § 11 (2014).1
Because the tort of trespass to chattel is so similar to the tort of conversion, the Court
incorporates its findings above, see supra at § IV-A. The Court finds that Shaun Dunlap
intentionally used the Truck in interference with Mr. Robertson’s rights as its owner. The Court
finds that, because Mr. Robertson did not cede his possession of the truck to Dunlap, as part of
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Tennessee common law recognizes the tort of trespass to chattel. See AmSouth Bank v. Trailer Source, Inc., 206
S.W.3d 425, 430 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006). However, Tennessee courts have not discussed the elements of the tort at
any length, and thus, the Court relies upon the treatises cited herein.
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the scope of Dunlap’s duties as a house sitter, the interference was an interference with personal
property in the possession of Mr. Robertson. The Court has not been cited to any exigent
circumstances or other justification for the interference, and the Court finds there are no
allegations or evidence of justification for the interference.
Accordingly, even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving
parties, the Court finds that Shaun Dunlap committed the tort of trespass to chattel through his
possession of the Truck. The Court finds that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
with regard to Dunlap’s trespass, and the Court finds as a matter of law that Dunlap was not in
lawful possession of the Truck. Because Dunlap was not lawfully in possession of the Truck,
there is no basis for finding overage under either the “non-owned car” or “temporary substitute
car” provisions of the Policy.
C.
Shaun Dunlap’s Possession of the Truck was Not Lawful because It Violated
Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-14-106
Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-14-106 provides, “A person commits a Class A
misdemeanor who takes another’s automobile, airplane, motorcycle, bicycle, boat or other
vehicle without the consent of the owner and the person does not have the intent to deprive the
owner thereof.”
The Court finds that Shaun Dunlap’s use of the Truck was a violation of § 39-14-106.
There is no dispute that Dunlap took an automobile belonging to another – in this case, Mr.
Robertson. The Court finds that Dunlap did so without the consent of Mr. Robertson. The Court
finds that there is no evidence that Dunlap intended to permanently deprive Mr. Robertson of the
vehicle, and his intent fulfills the requirements of § 39-14-106. The Court finds that the elements
of § 39-14-106 have been fulfilled.
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Accordingly, even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving
parties, the Court finds that Shaun Dunlap’s possession of the Truck constituted a violation of §
39-14-106. The Court finds that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact with regard to
Dunlap’s violation, and the Court finds as a matter of law that Dunlap was not in lawful
possession of the Truck. Because Dunlap was not lawfully in possession of the Truck, there is
no basis for finding overage under either the “non-owned car” or “temporary substitute car”
provisions of the Policy.
D.
Shaun Dunlap’s Possession of the Truck was Not Lawful because It Violated
Tennessee Code Annotated § 55-4-101
Tennessee Code Annotated § 55-4-101 requires that motor vehicles operated in this state
be registered and that the registration be valid. The violation of § 55-4-101 is not dependent on a
specific mens rea or intent.
When Shaun Dunlap drove the Truck on July 7, 2012, the registration of the vehicle had
expired. There is no dispute on this point, nor is there any allegation or evidence to the contrary.
Defendants allege that Dunlap did not know that the registration was expired, but as stated
above, there is no mens rea element found in § 55-4-101 and Defendants have not cited the Court
to any case law that would support reading a mens rea element into the statute.
Accordingly, even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving
parties, the Court finds that Shaun Dunlap’s possession of the Truck constituted a violation of §
55-4-101, because the Truck was did not have a valid registration. The Court finds that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact with regard to Dunlap’s violation, and the Court finds
as a matter of law that Dunlap was not in lawful possession of the Truck. Because Dunlap was
not lawfully in possession of the Truck, there is no basis for finding overage under either the
“non-owned car” or “temporary substitute car” provisions of the Policy.
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V.
CONCLUSION
For all the reasons stated above, the Court finds that State Farm has established that no
genuine issues of material fact exist with regard to this coverage issue, and the Court finds that
State Farm is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the Motion for Summary
Judgment [Doc. 18] is GRANTED.
The Clerk of Court SHALL ENTER judgment in favor of State Farm finding that there
is no coverage available to Shaun Dunlap under State Farm Policy Policy No. A51273642J for
the accident that occurred on July 7, 2012. Thereafter, the Clerk of Court is ORDERED to
CLOSE this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
ENTER:
United States Magistrate Judge
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