Shockley et al v. Board of Education for Union County, Tennessee et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER that the Defendant's motion to strike 17 is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant' s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 7 is DENIED. Signed by District Judge Karen K Caldwell on 7/18/13. (ADA)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
KNOXVILLE DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 13-38-KKC
O.J., by her next friend and mother,
TRACY SHOCKLEY, and TRACY SHOCKLEY
V.
PLAINTIFFS,
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
BOARD OF EDUC. FOR UNION COUNTY, TENNESSEE, and
TENNESSEE DEPT. of EDUCATION,
**********
DEFENDANTS.
Pending before the Court is a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim filed by the
Defendant Tennessee Department of Education and a related motion to strike. For the following
reasons, the Court will grant the motion to strike (R. 17) and deny the Tennessee Department of
Education’s motion to dismiss (R. 7).
BACKGROUND
This matter arises from a dispute regarding an Individual Education Program (IEP)
provided at a public elementary school in Union County, Tennessee for O.J., an eight year old
child with a speech language disorder called childhood apraxia. Defendant Board of Education
for Union County is a public school district and Local Educational Agency (LEA).
The
Tennessee Department of Education is the State Education Agency (SEA). In March 2007, the
LEA determined O.J. to be a “child with a disability” within the meaning of Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3). In April 2012, an IEP team meeting
was held to discuss changes in O.J.’s IEP, including a reduction in speech therapy with a contract
provider, for the 2012-2013 school year. O.J.’s mother, Plaintiff Tracey Shockley, requested an
impartial due process administrative hearing before the SEA and objected to a separate speech
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language evaluation of O.J. conducted by an outside expert witness prior to the hearing. After an
administrative hearing was held in September 2012, an administrative law judge issued a
decision in favor of the local education agency that Plaintiffs now appeal.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
To avoid a 12(b)(6) dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The court must view the allegations in the complaint in
the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, treating all well-pleaded facts as true, but need not
accept bare legal conclusions as definitive. See Tackett v. M&G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d
478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009)). Based
on this standard, the court addresses the Defendant Tennessee Department of Education’s
challenge that the Complaint fails to state a claim because it does not assert any actions taken by
the Defendant that constitute a violation of the IDEA.
II. MOTION TO DISMISS
As a threshold matter, the Court will grant the Defendant’s motion to strike the supplemental
response filed by the Plaintiffs. According to Eastern District of Tennessee Local Rule 7.1
explaining the standard motion practice, “[n]o additional briefs, affidavits, or other papers in
support of or in opposition to a motion shall be filed without prior approval of the Court[.]”
Here, the Plaintiffs did not seek leave of court to file an additional styled response and merely
seeks to have another bite at the apple to argue in support of their position. Accordingly, the
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Court will grant the Defendant’s motion to strike and address only the three standard pleadings:
the motion to dismiss, the response, and reply brief.
Here, the Defendant makes a broad argument that all of the causes of action asserted are
against the co-defendant Union County and that there are no allegations that the Tennessee
Department of Education violated any of Plaintiff’s rights under the IDEA. In support, the
Defendant argues that with the exception of systemic violations, which are not alleged here, that
a state department of education is never a proper or necessary party to an appeal of an
administrative decision in an IDEA case. See Fetto v. Sergi, 181 F. Supp.2d 71-72 (D. Conn.
2001). In response, Plaintiffs argue that as the SEA, the Defendant is responsible for ensuring
that the local Union County board complies with the IDEA to ensure that O.J. receives a “free
appropriate public education” and that federal funds are properly allocated to facilitate
compliance with the IDEA. The Court agrees with the Plaintiffs that the facts alleged in the
Complaint, when taken as true, state a valid cause of action against the State Educational
Agency, the Tennessee Department of Education.
The IDEA requires that states provide “[a] free appropriate public education . . . to all
children with disabilities residing in the State[.]” 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1). It is not contested here
that O.J. is a child with a disability and thus entitled to a free appropriate public education. The
SEA “means the State board of education or other agency or officer primarily responsible for the
State supervision of public elementary and secondary schools[.]” 20 USC § 1401(a)(32). LEA
“means a public board of education or other public authority legally constituted within a State for
either administrative control or direction of, or to perform a service function for, public
elementary or secondary schools in a city, township, school district, or other political subdivision
of a State[.]” Id. § 1401(a)(19). “The responsibility for ensuring that disabled students receive a
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free appropriate public education lies with the state educational agency (SEA).” Ullmo v.
Gilmour Acad., 273 F.3d 671, 679 (6th Cir. 2001); 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (a)(11).
Contrary to the Defendant’s argument, as the SEA it is responsible for ensuring that
Plaintiff O.J. receive a free appropriate public education under the IDEA. The IDEA does not
“explicitly state which governmental entity courts should hold liable for particular violations[.]”
John T. ex rel. Robert T. v. Iowa Dep’t of Educ., 258 F.3d 860, 864-65 (8th Cir. 2001). Sixth
Circuit case law explains that as an SEA, it may be held liable for failure to ensure compliance
with the IDEA. See Ullmo, 273 F.3d at 679 (citing St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd. v. Louisiana,
142 F.3d 776, 784 (5th Cir. 1998) (“The language and structure of the IDEA suggest that either
or both entities [the SEA or LEA] may be held liable for the failure to provide a free appropriate
public education[.]”)). Although Ullmo is distinguishable from this case because it concerned a
private educational facility that received federal funds, the case is still good law and therefore
controlling.
The Defendant asks the court to add an additional requirement arguing that the SEA can
only be liable for systemic violations citing Fetto v. Sergi, 181 F. Supp.2d 53, 72 (D. Conn.
2001). However, as the Defendant concedes, this is not binding authority in the Sixth Circuit.
Further, other Circuits support a broader view that an SEA may be held liable for more than just
systemic violations. See Gadsby v. Grasmick, 109 F.3d 940, 952-53 (4th Cir. 1997)(holding the
SEA is ultimately responsible for the provision of a free appropriate public education and may be
held liable for the state’s failure to assure compliance with IDEA); John T. ex rel. Robert T., 258
F.3d at 865-66 (8th Cir. 2001)(noting the IDEA places a supervisory responsibility on state
agencies). On the facts of this case and in this Circuit, the Defendant as the SEA can be held
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liable if it does not ensure that the local educational agency provides a free appropriate public
education. Accordingly, the Defendant Tennessee Department of Education is a proper party.
CONCLUSION
IT IS ORDERED that the Defendant’s motion to strike (R. 17) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim (R. 7) is DENIED.
Dated this 18th day of July, 2013.
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