Taylor v. Kidwell
Filing
87
MEMORANDUM OPINION in support of the following Order dismissing these actions. Signed by District Judge R Leon Jordan on 8/10/15. (c/m) Associated Cases: 3:13-cv-00369-RLJ-HBG, 3:13-cv-00370-RLJ-HBG, 3:13-cv-00371-RLJ-HBG, 3:13-cv-00372-RLJ-HBG(ADA)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE
RONALD TAYLOR,
Plaintiff,
v.
BRADLEY KIDWELL,
Defendant.
RONALD TAYLOR,
Plaintiff,
v.
JASON STOKES,
Defendant.
RONALD TAYLOR,
Plaintiff,
v.
RICHARD SCARBROUGH,
Defendant.
RONALD TAYLOR,
Plaintiff,
v.
JASON LAWSON,
Defendant.
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No. 3:13-CV-369
No. 3:13-CV-370
No. 3:13-CV-371
No. 3:13-CV-372
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court for consideration of Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment. 1 [doc. 73] For the reasons stated herein, and by operation of a contemporaneously
1
Defendants’ document is styled as a Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) or a Motion for Summary
Judgment. As to some of the Plaintiff’s allegations, the Defendants’ supporting brief argues only for summary
judgment under Rule 56, and moreover, addresses evidence outside the pleadings, including depositions and
discovery materials. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 12(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court treats
filed Order the Defendants’ Motion will be GRANTED and this case will be DISMISSED.
Plaintiff, Ronald Taylor, acting pro se, filed action against four employees of the Clinton
Police Department, Officer Bradley Kidwell, Officer Jason Lawson, Sergeant Jason Stokes, and
Chief of Police, Richard Scarbrough. Plaintiff filed separate actions against each of the
Defendants. This Court consolidated the complaints and designated the above-styled case (no.
3:13-cv-369) as the lead case. All docket references herein are to the lead case.
Mr. Taylor alleges that the defendants harassed and conspired against him through
multiple incidents beginning in 2011. Defendants identify seven individual incidents:
First, Mr. Taylor alleges that, sometime in 2011, Officer Kidwell and Officer Lawson
responded to Mr. Taylor’s complaint that someone was causing damage to his property. This
encounter ended with the officers threatening to incarcerate him if he attempted to press charges
against the alleged vandal.
Second, he alleges that an incident occurred when Mr. Taylor attempted to file a formal
complaint over the Officer Kidwell’s and Lawson’s conduct. He claims that Sergeant Stokes,
who took the report, was uncivil toward him and threatened to incarcerate him if the report
contained falsities.
Third, Mr. Taylor claims that Officer Kidwell appeared at his home unprompted in May
2012 and shouted at him in a threatening manner, evidently in retaliation for Mr. Taylor’s having
filed the earlier complaint against him. When he attempted to file a second complaint against
Officer Kidwell, he was prevented from doing so by Chief Scarbrough, who allegedly stated that
he was aware of Officer Kidwell’s unprompted stops at Mr. Taylor’s home. Mr. Taylor
the Motion as a motion for summary judgment with regard to the claims on which additional proof is submitted and
those for which Defendants argue under the summary judgment standard.
attempted to file a complaint against Chief Scarbrough with the city manager, Richard Houck. It
is unclear from Plaintiff’s complaint whether this attempt was successful.
Fourth, Mr. Taylor alleges that he attended a city council meeting and accused Roger
Houck of failing to protect him from the harassment. Following that, he implies that city police
officers retaliated by knocking on his door the next day and informing him that he violated a city
ordinance regarding “junk cars.” It is unclear whether Mr. Taylor received any citation from the
incident.
Fifth, he claims that Officer Stokes arrested him, apparently for domestic violence,
following an incident at his mother’s home involving his adult niece and nephew, who he claims
had a history of burglarizing and assaulting his mother. Mr. Taylor claims that he was attempting
to protect his mother from them during one such episode and had not been violent towards
anyone. The incident resulted in his being jailed and denied prescription medication for 48
hours. 2
Sixth, he claims that he attended a city council meeting in January 2013 and that Roger
Houck, city manager, acknowledged that he was aware that police officers were harassing Mr.
Taylor, but refused to take action. He claims that other city councilmen concealed the
harassment, but does not identify specific persons or conduct.
2
The Court notes that Mr. Taylor mentions a prior incident, in which Sergeant Stokes
and other officers responded to an incident at a house he rented to his mother. Mr. Taylor states
that his niece and nephew were burglarizing his mother’s home and Officer Stokes refused to
order them to leave the property at Mr. Taylor’s request, based upon the niece and nephew’s
claims that they lived there. Officers eventually ordered them to leave. Mr. Taylor does not
allege how this incident violated his rights and the Court does not view a factual dispute that was
ultimately resolved in Mr. Taylor’s favor as rising to the level of a civil rights violation.
Seventh, he alleges that he was harassed in traffic by Officer Lawson, who detained him
for no reason. Mr. Taylor made attempted a citizen’s arrest, which was unsuccessful. He then
followed Officer Lawson to the police station and alleges that Sergeant Stokes refused to allow
him to make a complaint against Officer Lawson.
Plaintiff’s complaint also makes multiple references to other city officials who have not
been named as defendants, including other police officials, city councilmen, and employees of
the District Attorney’s office. Plaintiff complains that the officers’ conduct was in violation of
his constitutional rights and filed action against each of them on June 4, 2013. Although Mr.
Taylor does not specifically identify his legal theories, the gravamen of his complaint is that his
constitutional rights were violated. His claims therefore sound in 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which
affords a right of action to persons whose federal rights are violated by defendants acting under
color of state law.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
I.
Summary Judgment Standard
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is
appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Canderm Pharmacal, Ltd. v.
Elder Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 862 F.2d 597, 601 (6th Cir. 1988) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).
The moving party may discharge its burden by demonstrating that the non-moving party has
failed to establish an essential element for which he or she bears the ultimate burden of proof at
trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The moving party need not support its
motion with affidavits or other materials negating the opponent’s claim. Celotex Corp.,477 U.S.
at 323. Although the moving party has the initial burden, that burden may be discharged by a
“showing” to the district court that there is an absence of evidence in support of the non-moving
party’s case. Celotex Corp., 477 at 325 (emphasis in original).
After the moving party has carried its initial burden of showing that there are no genuine
issues of material fact in dispute, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to present specific
facts demonstrating that there is a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). In order to defeat the motion for summary judgment, the
non-moving party must present probative evidence that supports its complaint. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). The non-moving party’s evidence is to be believed,
and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in that party’s favor. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at
255. The court determines whether the evidence requires submission to a jury or whether one
party must prevail as a matter of law because the issue is so one-sided. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S.
at 251-52.
Plaintiff did not file an explicit response to the Defendants’ Motion. However, Plaintiff did
file a document in response [doc. 79] to video evidence that the Defendants submitted in
conjunction with their Motion, and his argument in that document touches the issues raised in
Defendants’ Motion. Because Plaintiff is acting pro se in this matter, the Court will construe his
filing as a response to the Defendants’ Motion to the extent that it is applicable. The Motion is
therefore ripe for adjudication.
As to the arguments that are not explicitly opposed in Plaintiff’s response, this fact alone
does not entitle the Defendants to summary judgment. The Court must still examine the
Defendants’ motion to determine if they have met their initial burden of showing that there are
no material issues of fact and they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Carver v. Bunch,
946 F.2d 451 (6th Cir. 1991).
II.
Statute of Limitations
Defendants argue that the statute of limitations bars any claim related to incidents that
occurred more than one year prior to the commencement of this action. Claims brought pursuant
to § 1983 are characterized as personal injury claims and are governed by the relevant state’s
statute of limitations for such claims. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 280 (1985) (superseded by
statute as to claims arising under laws enacted after 1990 as stated in Jones v. R.R. Donnelley &
Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369 (2004)). Tennessee’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions is
one year from the date that the cause of action accrued. Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104. While state
law determines the applicable limitations period, federal law sets the “accrual” date as the date
on which the plaintiff knew or had reason to know of his injury. See McCune v. City of Grand
Rapids, 842 F.2d 903, 905 (6th Cir. 1988) (citing Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 272 (6th
Cir.1984)).
Mr. Taylor filed his complaint against the Defendants on June 4, 2013. Therefore, any
claims arising prior to June 4, 2012 are barred by the one-year statute of limitations for § 1983
actions. The first incident, when Officer Kidwell and Officer Lawson refused to take action
against someone allegedly causing damage to Mr. Taylor’s property and threatened him with
incarceration should he attempt to press charges, occurred in 2011. The second incident, when
Mr. Taylor alleges he was prevented from lodging a complaint against Officers Kidwell and
Lawson occurred at or near the same time, also in 2011. The third incident, when Officer
Kidwell allegedly entered his property without cause and acted in a threatening manner toward
him, occurred in “late [M]ay of 2012.” Plaintiff’s complaint does not name a date for the seventh
incident, but he testified during a deposition that it occurred on or about February 1, 2012. Other
than an infringement of his rights, Plaintiff does not identify any injury he suffered as a result of
the first, second, third, and seventh incidents, and his immediate attempts to take action and file
complaints show that Mr. Taylor was aware of the alleged rights violations as they occurred.
Accordingly, the Defendants have met their burden of showing that there are no undisputed facts
and that the incidents alleged cannot form the basis of a § 1983 claim. Defendants are entitled to
judgment as a matter of law as to any claims based on the first, second, third, and seventh
incidents described in Mr. Taylor’s complaint. These claims will be DISMISSED.
III.
Mr. Taylor Failed to Link Any Party Defendant to Incidents Four and Six
Defendants next move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims as to incidents four and six under
Rule 12(b)(6). When reviewing a motion for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the court must construe the complaint in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true.
Grindstaff v. Green, 133 F.3d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing Meador v. Cabinet for Human
Resources, 902 F.2d 474 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 867, 111 S.Ct. 182, 112
L.Ed.2d 145 (1990)). The court does not have to accept as true legal conclusions or
unwarranted factual inferences, Morgan v. Church's Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10 (6th Cir.
1987), and may dismiss a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) "only if it is clear that no relief
could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations."
Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984).
Incidents four and six are very similar. In both instances, Plaintiff alleges that he attended
a city council meeting and confronted Roger Houck about his being harassed by the police. Mr.
Houck and his fellow councilmen refused to intervene against the harassment. Incident four
alleges that unidentified city police officers, including an “Officer Black” came on to his
property the day following the city council meeting to either enforce or warn Mr. Taylor that he
was in violation of an ordinance regarding “junk cars.”
Mr. Taylor does not state in any comprehensible way how his rights were violated in
these events. Rather, he asserts an unsupported conclusion that the council members’
“complacency” amounts to a crime and that he finds it “odd and suspicious” that officers would
harass him for “such a petty thing as my car not being pretty enough for this neighborhood[.]”
Moreover, however, Plaintiff fails to make any allegation that any of the movants were involved
in either event. Because the Court cannot enter a judgment against a non-party, even if all of
Plaintiff’s allegations are true, he has failed to state any cognizable legal claim against on which
relief can be granted as to any Defendant in this suit. The movants have met their burden of
showing that there are no disputed facts and that they are entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law on these claims. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss will be GRANTED.
IV.
Incident Number Five
Plaintiff’s most serious allegations regard Incident Five, when he was arrested following
a domestic dispute between himself, his niece, Stephanie Taylor, his nephew, Andrew Taylor,
and his mother, Patricia Yeatman on September 26, 2012. As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff does
not allege that either Chief Scarborough or Officer Kidwell were in any way involved in this
incident. Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants Scarborough and Kidwell as to his arrest and
detainment are therefore DISMISSED.
As to Sergeant Stokes and Officer Lawson, Mr. Taylor claims that Stokes unlawfully
arrested him following an incident at his mother’s house. Plaintiff alleges that his niece and
nephew were assaulting Ms. Yeatman in her home and that he was attempting to protect her. He
claims that Stokes, who responded to the incident, conspired with his niece and nephew to
fabricate charges against him and wrongfully arrested him for domestic assault. Officer Lawson
transported Mr. Taylor to the jail. Mr. Taylor alleges that both officers denied him food and
medical care during the arrest and transport. Officer Lawson allegedly instructed jailers to treat
Mr. Taylor harshly. Thereafter, jail officers deprived him of food and medicine. Mr. Taylor is
diabetic and suffers from various medical conditions. He also claims that Sergeant Stokes
intentionally delayed completing paperwork, so that he was held for forty-eight hours rather than
twelve.
The first issue is whether Mr. Taylor’s arrest was unlawful. The Fourth Amendment
secures a person's right to be free from unreasonable seizure. Any arrest requires probable cause.
See Centanni v. Eight Unknown Officers, 15 F.3d 587, 592 (6th Cir. 1994). "[A] warrantless
arrest
must
be
supported
by
the
existence of probable cause of sufficient weight to support a belief that the individual
detained committed a criminal offense." United States v. McNeal, 955 F.2d 1067, 1071 (6th Cir.
1992) (emphasis in original). As long as there is probable cause to make an arrest, a
warrantless arrest does not violate the Fourth Amendment. U.S. v. Strickland, 144 F.3d 412,
415 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing Criss v. City of Kent, 867 F.2d 259, 262 (6th Cir. 1988)).
However, an arrest without probable cause does violate the Fourth Amendment. Crockett
v. Cumberland Coll., 316 F.3d 571, 580 (6th Cir. 2003).
Defendants argue that there was probable cause to arrest Mr. Taylor for domestic assault.
Tennessee law defines domestic assault as intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causing injury,
fear, or offensive physical contact to any person related to the offender by blood or marriage.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-111. There is no question that Stephanie Taylor is Mr. Taylor’s niece.
Stokes submitted an affidavit [doc. 74] attesting that Ms. Taylor reported to Stokes that Mr.
Taylor had shoved her to the ground. His affidavit further states that Ms. Taylor showed visible
injuries consistent with her account, that she signed a voluntary statement, and that he
photographed her injuries. Ms. Taylor’s statement [doc. 79-1] states:
I was standing in front of the hallway and Ronald Taylor was threatening
me and telling me that he was going to hurt me if i didn’t leave or move from the
house then he pushed me down and hurt my elbow and foot. This occurred at 211
Ridgeview Dr. 9-26-12 about 4:30pm
Defendants also submitted three discs containing audio recording of the incident
[Manually filed Exhibits A, C-1, C-2. The videos corroborate Officer Stokes’s account that
Stephanie Taylor reported to him that Mr. Taylor had shoved her (Manually Filed Exhibit C-1 at
16:51:24-16:51:40; 17:12:33-17:12:55). She further expressed a desire to press charges, told
Stokes that she had been injured in the incident, and stated that she was in fear of Mr. Taylor.
(Manually Filed Exhibit C-1 at 17:13:40 – 17:15:20).
Plaintiff’s response, liberally construed, is that there was not probable cause to arrest him
because his niece and nephew were the actual criminals. Specifically, he alleges they were
burglarizing his mother and that the officers authorized the burglary. Regardless of whether the
evidence shows any such thing, which it does not, the officers’ failure to arrest the younger
Taylors for alleged crimes against Mr. Yeatman does not equate to a violation of Mr. Taylor’s
constitutional rights and does not preclude a finding of probable cause to arrest and detain him.
Mr. Taylor also argues that his niece and nephew were lying to Stokes about the events
that had transpired. Much of the discussion on the audio recording is evidence of the poor
relationship between Ms. Yeatman, Stephanie Taylor, and Andrew Taylor. There is also
considerable on-scene dispute as to whether Mr. Taylor intentionally shoved Ms. Taylor or if he
acted in Ms. Yeatman’s defense. In short, the audio makes clear that the accounts given to the
officers conflicted with regard to Mr. Taylor’s actions and intent. However, conflicting stories
do not preclude probable cause for arrest, and it is not necessary for an officer to obtain airtight
evidence that a suspect committed a crime before he can be detained; if either were so,
warrantless arrests would rarely be constitutional. Therefore, the veracity of Ms. Taylor’s
statements is irrelevant, as is the question of whether the evidence was sufficient to convict Mr.
Taylor of domestic assault, or even whether an assault actually occurred at all. The only relevant
question is whether officers had probable cause to believe that an assault had occurred. United
States v. McNeal, 955 F.2d at 1071. The Court finds that they did. There is no dispute that an
incident occurred and that there was some physical contact between Mr. Taylor and his niece.
She reported to Officer Stokes that Mr. Taylor intentionally shoved her and that she was afraid of
him. She further represented that she was injured, however slightly, and produced physical
evidence of her injury. That is more than sufficient evidence to support a belief that Ms. Taylor
had been assaulted. Mr. Taylor’s poor health at the time of the arrest has no bearing on whether
there was probable cause to arrest him, nor does the litany of other circumstances that Mr. Taylor
argues in his response (e.g., that his nephew was high during the incident, that Ms. Taylor’s
children were distracting during the incident, that Officer Stokes smiled during the incident). Mr.
Taylor’s claims that he was unlawfully arrested will be DISMISSED.
Mr. Taylor next argues complains that he was denied access to food and to his necessary
medication during his detainment. To begin, any treatment that Mr. Taylor while he was detained
in the Anderson County jail is not a proper basis for claims in this suit. Mr. Taylor may have a
claim against someone, but he was not in the custody of any defendant named in this action
during that time. The only possible grounds for such a violation as to these Defendants are
allegations that he was denied necessary care during his arrest and transport.
At all times relevant to this suit, Mr. Taylor was a pretrial detainee and was entitled to
adequate medical treatment under the Fourteenth Amendment. Watkins v. City of Battle Creek,
273 F.3d 682, 685 (6th Cir. 2001). “To sustain a cause of action under § 1983 for failure to
provide medical treatment, plaintiff must establish that the defendants acted with ‘deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs.’” Id. at 686 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97
(1976)). Discussing the standard for deliberate indifference, the Watkins court stated:
Deliberate indifference is not mere negligence. Deliberate indifference requires
that the defendants knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to
[the detainee’s] health and safety. This standard is subjective. It is not enough that
there was a danger of which an officer should objectively have been aware. The
official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that
a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. If an
officer fails to act in the face of an obvious risk of which he should have known
but did not, the officer has not violated the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments.
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). Review of the audio and video recording
taken from Sergeant Stokes’s cruiser shows that Mr. Taylor informed officers that his medication
was overdue as he was being arrested. Defendants refused to pause the arrest, but stated that Mr.
Taylor could take the medications with him and that they would inform the nurse at the jail.
(Manually Filed Exhibit C-2 17:31:20-17:32:10). Mr. Taylor did not explain why he hadn’t taken
his medication prior to the incident. He did not request food or water. The video footage shows
Mr. Taylor walking upright, and without apparent distress.
Review of the audio and video recording taken from Officer Lawson’s cruiser shows that
Mr. Taylor was in the cruiser for approximately ten minutes. (Manually Filed Exhibit A at
17:32:58–17:43:35). During that time, he informed Officer Lawson that he “was on medication”
and requested water one time. Officer Lawson told Taylor that he did not have any water in the
cruiser but that it would be available at the county jail. (Manually Filed Exhibit A 17:39:40 –
17:40:25). Mr. Taylor did not request food or medication. The video clearly shows that he was
upright, coherent, and alert in the cruiser. He was able to make small talk and to discuss the
incident. Mr. Taylor did not exhibit any visible sign of medical need during transport, nor did he
verbalize one, and he was not deprived of medical treatment.
Furthermore, there is no evidence that Officer Lawson acted with deliberate indifference
to even minor needs. In fact, the video evidence shows that Lawson was sensitive to Mr.
Taylor’s discomfort and attempted to accommodate him multiple times. Officer Lawson turned
on the air conditioner in the vehicle at Mr. Taylor’s request and in response to his complaint that
he “was having trouble breathing … [because] I have pneumonia.” (17:34:32 – 17:35:00).
Officer Lawson assisted Mr. Taylor in exiting the vehicle. He relayed Mr. Taylor’s medical
condition to intake personnel at the Anderson County Jail, stating that he “has a hard time
standing without his cane,” “is on a lot of medication” and “has to have water all the time.”
(Manually Filed Exhibit A 17:48:00 – 17:48:20). Likewise, Mr. Taylor fails to present any
credible evidence that Mr. Lawson ever instructed any person to treat him harshly.
Mr. Taylor’s arguments that his treatment was tantamount to “torture” and “attempted
murder” are wholly without merit. The undisputed evidence shows that there was no obvious or
substantial “risk of serious harm” to Mr. Taylor during his arrest and transport. The Defendants’
actions do not constitute deprivation of necessary medical care, and they did not act with
deliberate indifference toward Plaintiff’s condition. His claims of inadequate medical treatment
will be DISMISSED.
Finally, Plaintiff alleges that his rights were violated because he was detained for fortyeight hours, when he could have been released sooner. The law does not require that a detainee
be released on bond as soon as humanly possible and forty-eight hours is presumptively
reasonable under the Supreme Court case County of Riverside v. McLaughlin. 500 U.S.
44, 56 (“judicial determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a
general matter, comply with the promptness requirement of [the Fourth Amendment].”). Plaintiff
has offered no probative facts to show that his release was unnecessarily delayed in any other
way, and this Court does not give merit to the unsupported statement that Officer Stokes
“refused” to fill out paperwork at the summary judgment phase. Mr. Taylor’s claims that his
forty-eight hour detainment violated his constitutional rights will be DISMISSED.
V.
Qualified Immunity
Finding that the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment will be GRANTED on
other grounds, the Court declines to address the Defendants’ arguments of qualified immunity.
ENTER:
s/ Leon Jordan
United States District Judge
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