Heyward v. CDM Smith, Inc. et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Pamela L Reeves on 8/5/15. (JBR)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NORTHERN DIVISION AT KNOXVILLE
Cassie Heyward,
Plaintiff,
v.
CDM Smith, Inc. a/k/a Camp
Dresser & McKee, Inc., and URS
CH2M Oak Ridge, LLC a/k/a UCOR,
Defendants.
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Case No.: 3:13-CV-645-PLR-HBG
Memorandum Opinion
Plaintiff Cassie Heyward was terminated from her position with CDM Smith, a
government contractor, in June 2012. Mrs. Heyward filed the present lawsuit on October 23,
2013, alleging her termination was the result of unlawful race and age discrimination. In an
opinion entered October 3, 2014, the Court dismissed several of Ms. Heyward’s claims under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). [R. 17]. This matter now comes before the Court on
two summary judgment motions filed by the defendants. [R. 25, 27]. The defendants assert that
the plaintiff cannot present a prima facie case of discrimination. The Court agrees. For the
reasons discussed below, the defendants’ motions for summary judgment will be granted.
i.
Summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is proper “if
the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the
burden of establishing that no genuine issues of material fact exist. Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett,
477 U.S. 317, 330 n.2 (1986); Moore v. Philip Morris Co., Inc., 8 F.3d 335, 339 (6th Cir. 1993).
All facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587
(1986); Burchett v. Keifer, 301 F.3d 937, 942 (6th Cir. 2002). Courts may not resolve genuine
disputes of fact in favor of the movant. Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 1863 (2014) (vacating
lower court’s grant of summary judgment for “fail[ing to] adhere to the axiom that in ruling on a
motion for summary judgment, the evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all
justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Once the moving party presents evidence sufficient to support a motion under Rule 56,
the nonmoving party is not entitled to a trial merely on the basis of allegations. Celotex, 477
U.S. at 317. To establish a genuine issue as to the existence of a particular element, the
nonmoving party must point to evidence in the record upon which a reasonable finder of fact
could find in its favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The genuine
issue must also be material; that is, it must involve facts that might affect the outcome of the suit
under the governing law. Id.
The Court’s function at the point of summary judgment is limited to determining whether
sufficient evidence has been presented to make the issue of fact a proper question for the fact
finder. Id. at 250. The Court does not weigh the evidence or determine the truth of the matter.
Id. at 249. Nor does the Court search the record “to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue
of fact.” Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (6th Cir. 1989). Thus, “the inquiry
performed is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is a need for a trial – whether, in
other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of
fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at
250.
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ii.
The United States Department of Energy’s East Tennessee Technology Park in Oak
Ridge, Tennessee (“ETTP”) was previously used to produce enriched uranium for atomic
weapons and nuclear power. Nuclear and hazardous waste clean-up at ETTP and throughout
Oak Ridge has been ongoing for decades. Numerous government contractors have performed
work at ETTP and Oak Ridge over the years. Cassie Heyward, who is African American, began
working for a Lockheed Martin at Oak Ridge in 1989 as an administrative assistant. In the late
1990s, when the Department of Energy (the “DOE”) awarded its prime contract at ETTP to
Bechtel Jacobs, Ms. Heyward transitioned from Lockheed Martin to Bechtel Jacobs. At that
time, she worked as a section secretary, and was responsible for overseeing three other
secretaries in her division. Ms. Heyward continued to work for Bechtel Jacobs for some time,
and in late 2006, she became a purchasing specialist.
In 2011, UCOR took over for Bechtel Jacobs as the DOE’s prime contractor. Part of
UCOR’s business model, referred to as “staff augmentation,” involved outsourcing many
positions that were previously performed in-house by Bechtel Jacobs.
The outsourced
employees worked for subcontractors who supplied the employees to UCOR at specific fixed
rates. Staff augmentation apparently allows UCOR to quickly adjust its workforce levels to meet
the changing demands of its contract with the DOE. Accordingly, when UCOR took over for
Bechtel Jacobs, Cassie Heyward and other Bechtel Jacobs employees transitioned not directly to
UCOR, but instead became employees of subcontractors. CDM, one of those subcontractors,
became Ms. Heyward’s employer. CDM provided a total of 48 non-technical, administrative
employees to UCOR.
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Ms. Heyward was placed in UCOR’s procurement department, where her work consisted
of overseeing fixed-cost contracts, rental agreements, purchasing cards, and service contracts.
Ms. Heyward worked on a team with five other purchasing specialists. Their supervisor, Lynn
Humphreys, was responsible for Ms. Heyward’s day-to-day supervision. She established Ms.
Heyward’s schedule, assigned her work, and generally oversaw Ms. Heyward’s daily activities.
As a closure contractor, UCOR’s contract with the DOE required it to work toward
finishing remediation and cleanup at ETTP. By accomplishing cleanup and remediation work,
UCOR was reducing the amount of work left to do. As the scope of the remaining work
diminished, UCOR’s staffing needs likewise diminished.
UCOR, therefore, had ongoing
reductions on force. Between December 6, 2011, and March 19, 2015, a total of 196 workers
were terminated from their positions at ETTP as a part of UCOR’s ongoing reduction in force
(the “RIF”).
In May 2012, in a company-wide e-mail, UCOR’s president explained that, as UCOR
completed projects at Oak Ridge and their personal requirements decreased, it was necessary “to
reduce personnel and realign the workforce to achieve the appropriate staffing levels to meet
business goals . . . within budget.” In implementing the RIF, UCOR took efforts to streamline
procedures and tasks so that it could eliminate certain positions. Ms. Heyward’s supervisor, Ms.
Humphreys, was asked to recommend one position for elimination from her team of six
purchasing specialists. Ms. Humphreys performed a review of her team and concluded that Ms.
Heyward, while a hard worker, lacked the skillset, analytical abilities, communication skills, and
technical competency possessed by her co-workers, and therefore was unable to handle (without
assistance and instruction) the more complex contracts that her co-workers were able to handle.
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In her declaration, Ms. Humphreys emphasized that she did not consider age, race, sex, or
number of years’ experience in evaluating her team.
Based on her recommendation, UCOR informed CDM that Ms. Heyward’s position as a
staff augmentation employee for UCOR at ETTP had been eliminated. On May 30, 2012, Ms.
Heyward met with Steve Wood, her CDM manager, and he told her that her position was being
eliminated as part of the RIF at UCOR. After she left, Ms. Heyward’s work was distributed
amongst the remaining five team members. Because her position was eliminated as part of the
RIF, UCOR did not hire anyone else to replace Ms. Heyward.
iii.
Because Ms. Heyward has not alleged any direct evidence of age or race discrimination,
she must establish a prima facie case, which would then shift the burden to the defendants to
articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for her termination. McDonnell Douglass
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973).
To establish a prima facie case of race
discrimination under Title VII or 42 U.S.C. § 1981, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) she is a
member of a protected group; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; (3) she was
qualified for the position; and (4) she was replaced by a person outside a protect class or was
treated differently from similarly situated members of the unprotect class. Michael v. Caterpillar
Fin. Servs. Corp., 496 F.3d 584, 593 (6th Cir. 2007); Dews v. A.B. Dick Co., 231 F.3d 1016,
1020-21 (6th Cir. 2000) (standard for Title VII claims is “equally applicable” to claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1981).
To prove a prima facie case of age discrimination, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she suffered an adverse
employment action; (3) she was qualified for the position; and (4) she was replaced by a younger
person. The fourth element of both tests is modified in work-force-reduction cases to require the
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plaintiff to show “additional direct, circumstantial, or statistical evidence tending to indicate that
the employer singled out the plaintiff for discharge for impermissible reasons.” Slapak v. Tiger
Management Group, LLC, 594 F. App’x 290, 295 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Barnes v. GenCorp.,
896 F.2d 1457, 1465 (6th Cir. 1990)); LaGrant v. Gulf & Western Mfg. Co., Inc., 748 F.2d 1087,
1090-91 (6th Cir. 1984) (age discrimination).
The Sixth Circuit has defined a work-force-reduction case as one where “business
considerations cause an employer to eliminate one or more positions within the company.” Id. at
294. If an employee is replaced after termination, then they were not eliminated as part of a
work force reduction, and the fourth prong of the prima facie case is not modified. On the other
hand, where the plaintiff’s work is redistributed among other existing employees already
performing related work, the work-force-reduction modification does apply. Id.
As an initial matter, the defendants do not dispute that Ms. Heyward is a member of a
protected class who was qualified for her job. There is also no dispute that she suffered an
adverse employment action. With those three elements established, we turn to the fourth element
of Ms. Heyward’s racial and age discrimination cases.
There is no question that this is a work-force-reduction case. While Ms. Heyward states
in a conclusory fashion that the RIF was mere pretext for the defendants’ discriminatory actions,
she offers no evidence in the record to counter the fact that UCOR’s business considerations
caused it to reduce its staff. She also does not dispute the fact that her work was redistributed
among the remaining members of her team who were already performing similar work. Finally,
Ms. Heyward does not provide any evidence or even allege that UCOR hired anyone to replace
her after her termination.
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Because this is a work-force-reduction case, Ms. Heyward must submit “direct,
circumstantial, or statistical evidence tending to indicate that her employer singled [her] out . . .
for discharge for impermissible reasons.” Slapak, 594 F. App’x at 295. Ms. Heyward has not
done so. In Ms. Heyward’s only attempt at introducing statistical evidence, she notes that in her
department three individuals were terminated as part of the RIF, all of whom were African
American females over the age of 50. Apart from the limited value of such a small sample size,
narrowly focusing on the procurement department ignores the fact that the RIF was ongoing and
company-wide. In May and June of 2012, a total of 26 individuals were terminated as part of the
RIF. Twenty-one of them were Caucasian, four were African-American, and one was Asian.
The racial makeup of the individuals terminated under the RIF flatly contradicts the plaintiff’s
assertion that African-Americans were singled out for termination. Likewise, Ms. Heyward
readily acknowledges that she was not even the oldest person on Ms. Humphreys’ team. One of
the other five purchasing specialists was older than Ms. Heyward, and that individual was
retained.
Instead of offering direct, circumstantial, or statistical evidence to support her claims, Ms.
Heyward asserts in a conclusory manner that she was at least as well qualified as any of her coworkers who were retained—implicitly arguing that, if her work was good enough, she must
have been terminated for some discriminatory reason.
Even if that reasoning were persuasive,
Ms. Heyward does not offer any evidence in support of it. Instead, Ms. Heyward simply offers
her own personal assessment of her performance, and a plaintiff’s subjective beliefs regarding
her own work quality are insufficient to survive summary judgment. See Mynatt v. Lockheed
Martin Energy Systems, Inc., 271 F. App’x 470, 477-78 (6th Cir. 2008) (“A plaintiff’s contention
that he was better qualified than the workers who were retained is insufficient to establish a
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prima facie case.”).
In fact, “an employee’s evaluation of [her] own performance or
qualifications is irrelevant as a matter of law.” Id. at 478 (citing Wrenn v. Gould, 808 F.2d 493,
502 (6th Cir. 1987).
Because Ms. Heyward disagrees with her supervisor’s assessment of her relative
performance, she reasons that she must have been terminated because of her race or age. Under
Ms. Heyward’s logic, (a) she was terminated, and (b) she is African American and 59 years old,
therefore (c) she was terminated because she is African American or because she is 59 years old.
This Court has rejected such false syllogisms before. See, e.g., Shapira v. Lockheed Martin
Corp., 88 F. Supp. 2d 813, 832 (E.D. Tenn. 1998) (J., Jordon). Such conclusory assertions are
not evidence, and cannot establish a prima facie case.
iv.
Ms. Heyward has failed to point to any evidence in support of her age and race
discrimination claims. Accordingly, she cannot make a prima facie case to put before a trier of
fact. The defendants’ motions for summary judgment [R. 25, 27] are Granted. This matter is
Dismissed in its entirety.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
____________________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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