Rollick v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.

Filing 13

Memorandum Opinion re 8 in support of the following Judgment. Signed by District Judge Pamela L Reeves on 11/14/14. (c/m) (ADA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE

Kimberly Giles Rollick,
Plaintiff,
v.
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No.: 3:13-CV-726-PLR-HBG

Memorandum Opinion

This matter comes before the Court on the defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank’s motion to
dismiss the pro se plaintiff’s complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The plaintiff alleges she took two loans from JPMorgan in the amounts of $191,000
and $55,000. She claims JPMorgan breached their loan agreements by failing to “lend the
plaintiff lawful money of the United States and instead substituted a check with the intended
purpose of circulating it as money.” Additionally, the plaintiff accuses JPMorgan of fraud and
racketeering, usury, and violations of the Truth in Lending Act.

Because the plaintiff’s

complaint fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted, the defendant’s motion to dismiss
will be granted, and the plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed.
I. Standard of Review
Rules 8(a) and 12(b)(6) require the complaint to articulate a plausible claim for relief.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). This requirement is met when “the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556
(2007)). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) requires the court to construe the complaint in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept all the complaint’s factual allegations as true, and
determine whether the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the plaintiff’s claims that
would entitle the plaintiff to relief. Meador v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 902 F.2d 474, 475
(6th Cir. 1990) cert. denied, 498 U.S. 867 (1990).
The court may not grant a motion to dismiss based upon a disbelief of a complaint’s
factual allegations. Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1198 (6th Cir. 1990); Miller v. Currie,
50 F.3d 373, 377 (6th Cir. 1995) (noting that courts should not weigh evidence or evaluate the
credibility of witnesses). The court must liberally construe the complaint in favor of the party
opposing the motion. Id. However, the complaint must articulate more than a bare assertion of
legal conclusions. Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434 (6th Cir. 1988).
“[The] complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material
elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.” Id. (citations omitted).
II. Background
On June 17, 2003, JPMorgan approved the plaintiff for a loan in the amount of $191,000
at a 4.804% annual interest rate. In turn, the plaintiff executed a “mortgage, deed of trust, note,
etc.” [R. 1-1, p. 5]. JPMorgan sent a check to the plaintiff for the money, and she has since
made payments of principal and interest totaling $151,160.94. On January 26, 2005 JPMorgan
entered into a second loan agreement with the plaintiff for $55,000. According to the complaint,
she has made payments of principal and interest totaling $50,971.94 on the second loan.

2

Based on these two loans, the plaintiff asserts the following four legal claims:
1. the defendant breached its contract(s) by “fail[ing] to lend the plaintiff lawful
money of the United States and instead substitut[ing] a check with the intended
purpose of circulating it as money;”
2. JPMorgan and other unnamed parties associated with the writing and processing
of the $191,000 check “are in collusion in using the U.S. Mails and Wire Services
to collect on this unlawful debtm,” and are engaged in a “pattern of racketeering
activity” for which plaintiff seeks “triple damages;”
3. the interest rates charged on both loans is usurious “due to the fact that the actual
amount of lawful money risked by [JPMorgan] in making the loan was less than
10% of the loan’s face value;” and
4. JPMorgan violated the Truth in Lending Act by failing or refusing to disclose that
“Plaintiff was the depositor and that the Defendant(s) risked none of their assets
in exchange, or any assets of other depositors.”
[R. 1-1, p. 6-8]. Based on these allegations, the plaintiff urges the Court to “empanel a Grand
Jury to investigate [JPMorgan] for violations of Federal Antitrust laws and the Federal
Racketeering laws . . . and for conspiracy to violate the plaintiff and other citizens [sic]
Constitutional Rights.” Id. The plaintiff also seeks damages in the amount of $191,000 and
$55,000 for the loans and “three times this amount” in punitive damages. Finally, the plaintiff
asks the Court to declare the loan documents null and void. Id.
III. Discussion
As should be clear from the above description, the plaintiff’s complaint is nonsensical.
Pro se plaintiffs’ complaints are generally held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings

3

drafted by lawyers.” Malone v. Colyer, 710 F.3d 258, 260 (6th Cir. 1983). However, pro se
plaintiffs are not automatically entitled to take every case to trial. Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d
413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996). “The lenient treatment generally accorded to pro se litigants has
limits.” Shirley v. NationStar Mortg., LLC, 2011 WL 1196787, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. March 29,
2011) (citing Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991)).
The plaintiff’s breach of contract claim is without merit. The plaintiff concedes that she
signed the loan documents associated with both loans, that she received a check from the
defendant in exchange, and that she has repaid sizeable portions of both loans. The plaintiff
provides no support whatsoever for her claim that she was not loaned “lawful money of the
United States.” JPMorgan gave the plaintiff a check for the $191,000 loan. Should this not be
“lawful money of the United States,” this Court is at a loss for how JPMorgan could have
satisfied such a requirement short of handing the plaintiff a bag of cash after she executed the
loan documents. 1
A plaintiff who alleges a breach of contract must prove the existence of an enforceable
contract, nonperformance amounting to a breach of the contract, and resultant damages. Id.
(citing BankCorp South Bank, Inc. v. Hatchel, 223 S.W.3d 223, 227 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2006)). The
plaintiff does allege the existence of an enforceable contract, however, she fails to cite any
language in the contract requiring JPMorgan give her “lawful money of the United States,” and
she does not explain why a check would not satisfy such a requirement. Additionally, and
importantly, the plaintiff fails to allege any damages caused by this supposed breach. According
to her complaint, she received the benefit of the loan proceeds, and she has been repaying them

1

The Court also finds itself wondering why the plaintiff waited over eleven years to raise her objection to the form
of JPMorgan’s payment.

4

for several years. What harm befell the plaintiff for receiving a check as opposed to cash is not
explained or explainable. The defendant’s motion to dismiss Count 1 will be granted.
Count 2 broadly and without support alleges that JPMorgan and other unnamed entities
violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).

The plaintiff’s

conclusory statement that the defendant used the U.S. Mail to collect an unlawful debt is
unsupported by any factual allegations to indicate what was fraudulent, incorrect, or misleading
about the debt or the defendant’s collection of the loan payments. Accordingly, the defendant’s
motion to dismiss Count 2 is will be granted.
The plaintiff’s usury claim likewise fails as a matter of law. Under Tennessee law, a
contract is “usurious” when there is any contingency whereby the lender may get more than the
lawful rate of interest. Cumberland Capital Corp. v. Patty, 556 S.W.2d 516 (Tenn. 1977). The
default maximum effective rate of interest in Tennessee is ten percent per year. See Tenn. Code
Ann. § 47-14-103(3). The plaintiff clearly stated that the interest rate charged for the $191,000
loan is 4.8047 %. The plaintiff does not identify the interest rate for the $55,000 loan. In either
case, the plaintiff has failed to allege that the interest rates charged by either loan exceed
Tennessee’s ten percent cap. The defendant’s motion to dismiss Count 3 of the plaintiff’s
complaint will be granted.
Finally, the plaintiff’s Truth in Lending Act claim fails to state a claim for which relief
can be granted. The plaintiff’s allegations do not provide any factual support for the assertion
that the defendant “risked none of their assets in exchange [presumably for the loan], or any
assets of other depositors.” Moreover, the complaint does not explain why the defendant’s risk
associated with the loan is a material fact that must be disclosed. The defendant’s motion to
dismiss Count 4 will be granted.

5

IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, JPMorgan’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [R. 8] is Granted, and this case is
Dismissed.

____________________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

6