Swanson v. Summit Medical Group, PLLC (TV1)
Filing
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MEMORANDUM AND OPINION - Signed by Chief District Judge Thomas A Varlan on 5/28/14. (KMK, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
HELEN CORFAIA SWANSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
SUMMIT MEDICAL GROUP, PLLC,
Defendants.
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No.: 3:14-CV-39-TAV-HBG
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This civil action is before the Court on Defendant’s Partial Motion to Dismiss
[Doc. 13]. Defendant, Summit Medical Group (“Summit Medical”), moves the Court,
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to dismiss plaintiff’s
claims under Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 50-1-101 et seq., 50-701 et seq., 50-1-801; plaintiff’s
claim for punitive damages under the Tennessee Human Rights Act (the “THRA”); and
plaintiff’s request for liquidated damages for failure to state a claim for which relief can
be granted.
Plaintiff responded in opposition to defendant’s motion and in the
alternative, requested leave to amend her complaint pursuant to Rule 15 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure [Doc. 15]. For the reasons stated below, and after considering
the relevant law, the Court will GRANT defendant’s motion to the extent explained in
this memorandum opinion and allow plaintiff leave to amend her complaint in a manner
that is not inconsistent with this opinion.
I.
Background1
Summit Medical provides primary and ancillary health care, as well as laboratory
services, throughout East Tennessee [Doc. 1 ¶ 8]. Plaintiff, an African American female,
was employed with defendant’s Fort Loudon, Tennessee office (the “Loudon Office”) as
a floater beginning on December 13, 2010 [Id. ¶¶ 8–10]. Plaintiff’s job “required her to
‘fill-in’ where ever she was needed,” allowing her to interact with most of the doctors and
staff at defendant’s Loudon Office [Id. ¶¶ 12–13].
Plaintiff alleges that from the
beginning of her tenure, she “suffered harassment at the hands of Dr. Randall Morton, the
managing physician at the Loudon office” [Id. ¶ 14]. According to plaintiff, Dr. Morton
constantly belittled her by yelling at her in the presence of her peers and patients and by
blaming scheduling mix-ups on her even though she was not the only person scheduling
his appointments [Id. ¶¶ 15–16]. Plaintiff reported Dr. Morton’s harassment to her
supervisor, Jack Cross, who then reported Dr. Morton to defendant’s human resources
department [Id. ¶¶ 17–18]. Plaintiff also alleges that Dr. Morton made a remark to Jack
Cross “about ‘those people,’ referring to African-Americans” [Id. ¶¶ 19–20]. Plaintiff
further alleges that after she reported Dr. Morton, she was informed that she would not
receive a pay raise for 2013, and she was told that this was because “Dr. Morton refused
to sign off on the budget which would allow her to get a raise” [Id. ¶¶ 21–22].
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For the purposes of a motion to dismiss, the Court takes plaintiff’s factual allegations as
true. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (noting that “when ruling on a defendant’s
motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all the factual allegations contained in the
complaint.” (citations omitted)).
2
Plaintiff filed her first complaint with the Tennessee Human Rights Commission
(the “THRC”) in July 2012 [Id. ¶ 23]. Plaintiff states that Dr. Morton also received
complaints for sexually inappropriate conduct toward other employees which were
reported to defendant’s human resources department [Id. ¶¶ 24–26]. Plaintiff believes
that it was because of these complaints that Dr. Morton was terminated in November
2012 [Id. ¶ 27].
Plaintiff alleges that all the other employees blamed her for Dr. Morton’s
termination [Id. ¶ 28].
Particularly, plaintiff alleges that Dr. Morton’s partner, Dr.
Walter, blamed her for Dr. Morton leaving and, therefore, retaliated against her [Id. ¶ 29].
Plaintiff asserts that she was scheduled to have an annual evaluation in December 2012,
which would have determined whether she would receive any pay raise [Id. ¶¶ 30–31].
Dr. Walter, however, instructed plaintiff’s supervisor to postpone the evaluation even
though “[m]ost of the employees received their evaluations on time” [Id. ¶¶ 32–33].
Plaintiff also alleges that she received a written reprimand on December 27, 2012, for a
comment she had made [Id. ¶ 35]. Plaintiff claims that she was told the reprimand was
because of her tone, and because others could hear her [Id. ¶ 36]. Plaintiff believes,
however, that no one could hear her and no one except the front supervisor, who wrote
her up, complained [Id. ¶¶ 37–38]. According to plaintiff, another employee, Nikita
Rodrigues, who is Caucasian, “yelled in the front office about a patient matter” and left
the work place without permission but was not written up immediately [Id. ¶¶ 41–44].
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Rather, Dr. Walter only eventually wrote up Ms. Rodrigues because of a directive from
the central office [Id. ¶¶ 45–46].
Plaintiff states that her evaluation was supposed to take place on December 13,
2012 [Id. ¶ 47]. After her evaluation was postposed and plaintiff was not given a raise,
plaintiff filed a second complaint with the THRC [Id. ¶¶ 48–49]. Plaintiff eventually
received her evaluation in January 2013, after she had filed the complaint [Id. ¶ 50].
Plaintiff alleges that her supervisor gave her the highest possible scores on the evaluation,
but was instructed to reduce them by Dr. Walter [Id. ¶¶ 51–52].
Plaintiff states that in January 2013, she was given additional work responsibilities
[Id. ¶ 53]. And on February 27, 2013, plaintiff was terminated along with three other
employees [Id. ¶ 54]. The reason plaintiff was given for her termination was “lack of
work” [Id. ¶ 55]. Plaintiff states that she was given a list of positions within Summit
Medical that she could apply for and told that she was available for rehire [Id. ¶¶ 57–58].
Plaintiff states that she applied for several positions but was never rehired [Id. ¶ 59].
Plaintiff believes that the reason she was given for her termination was pretextual
[Id. ¶ 56].
Plaintiff subsequently brought this action alleging discrimination and
retaliatory discharge under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the THRA, and
Tennessee common law wrongful discharge statutes [Id. ¶¶ 60–73].
compensatory damages, liquidated damages, and punitive damages [Id.].
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Plaintiff seeks
II.
Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) sets out a liberal pleading standard, Smith
v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 576 n.1 (6th Cir. 2004), requiring only “‘a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the
[opposing party] fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but a party’s
“obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than
labels and conclusions.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “[A] formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do,” nor will “an unadorned, the-defendant
unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court must construe the complaint
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept all factual allegations as true, draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, and determine whether the complaint
contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a
plausible claim for relief will [ultimately] . . . be a context-specific task that requires th[is
Court] to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679.
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III.
Analysis
Defendant moves for dismissal of plaintiff’s claims under Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 50-
1-10 et seq., Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 50-701 et seq.,2 and Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 50-1-801, to
the extent that plaintiff asserts claims beyond Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304, arguing that
the complaint does not contain sufficient factual allegations to state a claim under the
remaining portions of these statutes [Doc. 13 ¶ 1–4]. Defendant also moves to dismiss
plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages under the THRA on the grounds that they are not
recoverable [Id. ¶ 5]. Finally, defendant argues that plaintiff’s claim for liquidated
damages should be dismissed because the complaint asserts no cause of action that would
entitle her to an award of liquidated damages [Id. ¶ 6].
A.
Plaintiff’s Claims under Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 50-1-101 et seq. and Tenn.
Code Ann. § 50-1-801
Defendant argues that plaintiff’s allegation of violations under Tenn. Code Ann.
§§ 50-1-101 et seq. is a broad reference that makes it unclear which specific statute
plaintiff claims defendant has violated [Id. ¶ 2]. Particularly, defendant argues that
outside of Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304, none of the other statutory provisions are
applicable in this case [Id.]. Defendant also argues that Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-801
does not provide a cause of action; rather, it merely sets forth the burden of proof for
alleging wrongful discharge [Id. ¶ 4]. In response, plaintiff argues that while the other
2
Defendant’s motion for partial dismissal asserts that this appears to be an incorrect
citation and proceeds under the assumption that plaintiff meant to reference Tenn. Code Ann. §§
50-1-701 et seq. Because plaintiff has not opposed this assumption in her response, the Court
will adopt this assumption.
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portions of the statutes referenced in her complaint may not be recovery statutes, they are
relevant to her cause of action because they provide definitions, instructions, and burdens
of proof [Doc. 15]. In the alternative, plaintiff seeks leave to amend her complaint
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 [Id.].
Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 50-1-101 et seq. contains provisions relating to issues such as
employment of illegal aliens, denial of employment because of affiliation with labor
unions or employee organizations, interference with choice of physicians, and volunteer
firefighters. The Court agrees with defendant that most of these statutory provisions are
inapplicable to this case as plaintiff has not pled any facts that would allow relief under
them. Additionally, Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-801 sets forth the burden of proof for
plaintiff’s wrongful discharge claim, but does not in itself provide a cause of action.
Accordingly, to the extent that plaintiff asserts any claims beyond Tenn. Code Ann. § 501-304, defendant’s motion to dismiss will be granted. Plaintiff, however, will be granted
leave to amend her complaint to set out the statutory provisions that govern her claims,
and may include references to any specific statutory provisions that provide relevant
definitions, instructions, and burdens of proof.
B.
Plaintiff’s Claims under Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 50-1-701 et seq.
Defendant next argues that plaintiff has not alleged any facts in her complaint that
would form the basis of an alleged violation under Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 50-1-701 et seq.
[Doc. 13 ¶ 3]. In plaintiff’s response, she failed to address this portion of defendant’s
argument.
Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 50-1-701 et seq. contains the Tennessee Lawful
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Employment Act, which requires employers to obtain and maintain lawful
resident/employment verification information. The Court agrees that plaintiff has not
alleged any facts to show that she is entitled to relief under this statute. Additionally, the
Court notes that plaintiff’s failure to respond to this argument may be deemed a waiver of
any opposition to the relief sought.
See E.D. Tenn. L.R. 7.2; see also Taylor v.
Unumprovident Corp., No. 1:03-CV-1009, 2005 WL 3448052, *2 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 14,
2005) (noting that a responding party waives opposition to an opponent’s argument when
it fails to respond to that argument). Accordingly, the Court will dismiss plaintiff’s
claims under Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 50-1-701 et seq.
C.
Plaintiff’s Claim for Punitive Damages under the THRA
Defendant moves to dismiss plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages arguing that
plaintiff has not stated a claim that would entitle her to punitive damages under the
THRA [Doc. 13 ¶ 5]. Defendant argues that “punitive damages under the THRA are only
available in cases involving discriminatory housing practices and malicious harassment
absent express provision authorizing punitive damages in other areas” [Id. (quoting
Carver v. Citizen Utilities Co., 954 S.W.2d 34, 36 (Tenn. 1997) (internal quotation marks
omitted)]. In response, plaintiff argues that under Tennessee law, a court may award
punitive damages “if it finds a defendant has acted either (1) intentionally, (2)
fraudulently, (3) maliciously, or (4) recklessly” [Doc. 15 (quoting Hodges v. S.C. Toof &
Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 901 (Tenn. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted)].
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While plaintiff is correct in asserting that a court may award punitive damages
where a defendant has acted intentionally, fraudulently, maliciously, or recklessly,
plaintiff fails to address the narrower context of punitive damages under the THRA. In
answering this specific question, the Tennessee Supreme Court has held that under the
THRA, punitive damages are available only in cases involving discriminatory housing
practices and malicious harassment. See Carver, 954 S.W.2d at 36. Under Tennessee
law, a plaintiff alleging malicious harassment must show that defendant acted
maliciously—that is, with ill-will, hatred, or spite, and also “demonstrate that the
perpetrator intentionally intimidated the plaintiff from freely exercising a constitutional
right.” Davidson v. Bredesen, 330 S.W.3d 876, 889 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Levy v.
Franks, 159 S.W.3d 66, 80 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004)); see also Washington v. Robertson
Cnty., 29 S.W.3d 466, 473 (Tenn. 2000) (outlining the standard for malicious harassment
under Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-701).
The Court agrees with defendant that plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts to
establish a claim for malicious harassment, neither is this a claim for discriminatory
housing practices. Therefore, the Court finds that to the extent plaintiff seeks punitive
damages under the THRA, her claims will be dismissed.3
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Plaintiff’s response to defendant’s motion argues that punitive damages are recoverable
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and under Tennessee common law wrongful
discharge. The Court notes that defendant has not argued otherwise and, therefore, does not
dismiss plaintiff’s claims for punitive damages under Title VII or Tennessee wrongful discharge
statutes.
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D.
Plaintiff’s Claim for Liquidated Damages
Finally, defendant moves to dismiss plaintiff’s claim for liquidated damages.
Defendant argues that plaintiff has not asserted any cause of action that would entitle her
to liquidated damages [Doc. 13 ¶ 6]. In particular, defendant asserts that while Title VII
allows a plaintiff to recover back pay, front pay, compensatory damages, and punitive
damages, it does not allow recovery of liquidated damages [Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(g); 42 U.S.C. § 1981a)]. Additionally, defendant asserts that the THRA and Tenn.
Code Ann. § 50-1-304 do not allow recovery of liquidated damages. Plaintiff did not
address this argument in her response to plaintiff’s motion. See E.D. Tenn. L.R. 7.2
(failure to respond to a motion may be deemed a waiver of any opposition to the relief
sought). Accordingly, the Court finds that defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim
for liquidated damages will be granted.
IV.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Court will GRANT Defendant’s Partial Motion
to Dismiss [Doc. 13] in part, to the extent explained in this memorandum opinion, and
GRANT plaintiff’s request for leave to amend her complaint, but plaintiff may amend
the complaint only in a manner consistent with this opinion.
ORDER ACCORDINGLY.
s/ Thomas A. Varlan
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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