Hill et al v. Blount County Schools et al (TV1)

Filing 46

MEMORANDUM and ORDER in which the following action is taken: 1. Defendants' motions to dismiss the claims of Chi Hill and Jim Hill as Next Friend of S.H. [R. 36, 38] are GRANTED; Chi Hill and Jim Hill are DISMISSED as party pla intiffs; and S. Hill is SUBSTITUTED as party plaintiff in this action. 2. All claims brought by Chi Hill and Jim Hill individually are DISMISSED as untimely. 3. Defendants' motions to dismiss [R. 20, 23] are GRANTED as follows: a. Blount County Schools is DISMISSED as a party defendant. b. Blount County is DISMISSED as a party defendant. c. Rob Britt, individually and in his official capacity, is DISMISSED as a party defendant. d. Steve Lafon, individually and in his official capacity, is D ISMISSED as a party defendant. e. Cassandra Dowd, individually and in her official capacity, is DISMISSED as a party defendant. f. Rob Clark, individually and in his official capacity, is DISMISSED as a party defendant. g. Dr. Jane Morton, individual ly and in her official capacity, is DISMISSED as a party defendant. h. Dr. Alisa Teffeteller, individually and in her official capacity, is DISMISSED as a party defendant. 4. Plaintiffs' state law claims for negligent hiring; intentional/neglige nt infliction of emotional distress; violation of the Tennessee Constitution; and violation of Tennessee statutory law are DISMISSED, without prejudice. 5. Plaintiff's motion to amend their Complaint is DENIED. Signed by District Judge Pamela L Reeves on February 19, 2015. (AYB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE

CHI HILL and JIM HILL, Individually and on
Behalf of S.H., a minor, and DALTON HILL,
Plaintiffs,
v.
BLOUNT COUNTY SCHOOLS, ROB BRITT,
STEVE LAFOT, CASSANDRA DOWD,
ROB CLARK, BLOUNT COUNTY BOARD
OF EDUCATION, DR. JANE MORTON,
DR. ALISA TEFFETELLER,
BLOUNT COUNTY, and
WILLIAM BLOUNT HIGH SCHOOL,
Defendants.

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No.: 3:14-CV-96-PLR-HBG

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiffs have brought this action alleging racial discrimination at William Blount
High School in violation of federal and state law. The federal claims are brought under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (Title VI), and under the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The state law claims are for negligent hiring and

retention; intentional/negligent infliction of emotional distress; and a statutory claim
under Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-6-4501, et seq.
The Complaint makes general factual allegations about the treatment of S.H. and
Dalton Hill while enrolled at William Blount High School. Dalton Hill attended William
Blount High School 9th Grade Academy during the 2009-2010 school year and then

transferred to Hardin Valley Academy in 2012. The Complaint avers that S.H. is a junior
at William Blount High School and attended the William Blount High School 9th Grade
Academy during the 2010-2011 school year. Plaintiffs allege a pattern of discrimination
that occurred in the years 2009 through 2011, but do not mention any specific acts
occurring after 2011.
This matter is before the court on various motions filed by defendants:

(1)

defendants’ motions to dismiss [R. 20, 23], and (2) defendant’s motions to dismiss, or in
the alternative to substitute parties [R. 36, 38].

I. Standard for Motion to Dismiss
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) sets out a liberal pleading standard. Smith
v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 576 n.1 (6th Cir. 2004). Rule 8(a)(2) requires only “‘a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in
order to ‘give the [opposing party] fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Detailed factual allegations are not required,
but a party’s “obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires
more than labels and conclusions.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action will not do. Id. Nor will an “unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully harmed me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). A
pleading must instead “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
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“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will [ultimately] . . .
be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” A court considering a motion to dismiss may begin by
identifying allegations that, because they are mere conclusions, are not entitled to the
assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the complaint's framework, they
must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations,
a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise
to an entitlement to relief. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948.

II. Motions to Dismiss, or in the Alternative to Substitute S.H. as Party Plaintiff
Defendants move to dismiss the claims of Chi Hill and Jim Hill as Next Friend of
S.H., a minor, or in the alternative, move to substitute S.H. as plaintiff to her claims. In
support of their motion, defendants state that S.H. was a minor when this lawsuit was
filed. However, S.H. reached eighteen (18) years of age on August 20, 2014, and is no
longer a minor. Further, S.H. graduated from William Blount High School on May 20,
2014. Therefore, defendants assert that Chi Hill and Jim Hill no longer have standing to
sue in behalf of their daughter in a representative capacity as Next Friends and Parents.
In the alternative, defendants move to substitute S.H., now an adult, as the real party in
interest.
The enactment of Tenn. Code Ann. § 1-3-113(a) completely emancipated
individuals over eighteen years of age from the control of their parents. Garey v. Garey,
482 S.W.2d 238, 241 (1958). Where emancipation of a minor is complete, the parent’s
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right to maintain an action for loss of services due to injuries is cut off. Memphis Steel
Constr. Cov. v. Lister, 197 S.W. 902 (Tenn. 1917). No Tennessee case has recognized a
parental cause of action for loss of society and companionship of an emancipated adult
child. Morris v. State, 21 S.W.3d 196, 200 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1999). Moreover, a plaintiff
has no right to sue in his own behalf for the deprivation of the civil rights of his or her
children. Meador v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 860 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir. 1988).
Because S.H. is no longer a minor nor under any legal disability under Tennessee
law, her parents have lost all rights or standing to bring this lawsuit as Next Friends. This
necessitates the removal of Chi Hill and Jim Hill as the persons bringing the claims in
behalf of their emancipated daughter. Therefore, the claims of Chi Hill and Jim Hill
brought in behalf of S.H. must be dismissed, unless a substitution of the real party in
interest occurs.
Defendants do not dispute that the applicable statute of limitations as to the claims
of S.H. has not run.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-304 provides a one year statute of

limitations for a cause of action for personal injuries in Tennessee. Tenn. Code Ann. §
28-1-106 provides that S.H. has until her 19th birthday in which to sue for a claim which
arose while she was a minor.

Assuming that S.H. wishes to continue the lawsuit,

substitution of S.H. as the “real party in interest” is appropriate. Plaintiffs do not dispute
the fact that S.H. is no longer a minor as defined by Tennessee law. Plaintiffs have cited
no authority contrary to that provided by defendants that once a person under disability at
the time suit was filed, is no longer under disability, the status of Next Friend goes away,
leaving as the only remaining real party in interest, the now adult S.H. Accordingly,
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defendants’ motions to substitute S.H. as the real party in interest, is GRANTED, and S.
Hill is SUBSTITUTED as party plaintiff in this action.
Next, the court will address the defendants’ motions to dismiss the individual
claims of Chi Hill and Jim Hill.

III. Individual Claims of Chi Hill and Jim Hill
A plaintiff “generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot
rest his claim on the legal rights or interests of third parties.” Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S.
286, 292 (1999). Specifically, the Sixth Circuit has held that a parent may not bring a §
1983 claim or an Equal Protection Clause claim as an individual for any alleged violation
of his or her child’s constitutional rights because such action is “entirely personal to the
direct victim of the alleged constitutional tort.” Jaco v. Bloechle, 739 F.2d 239, 241 (6th
Cir. 1984); Claybrook v. Birchwell, 199 F.3d 350, 357 (6th Cir. 2000); Robinson v. City
of Memphis, 340 F.Supp.2d 864, 872 (W.D.Tenn. 2004).
In addition, there is no consortium or loss of services claim of a parent under Title
VI or § 1983 for the personal injury to a child. See Kinzer v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville,
451 F.Supp.2d 931 (M.D.Tenn 2006). Accordingly, all claims brought by Chi Hill and
Jim Hill, Individually, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (Title VI), and under
the Equal Protection Clause for the alleged deprivation of their children’s civil rights are
DISMISSED.
Next, any individual federal claims or state law claims brought by Chi and Jim
Hill are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The Supreme Court has explained
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that, where a federal statute does not provide a statute of limitations period, the district
courts are to apply the relevant state law statute of limitations. Johnson v. Railway
Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 462 (1975). Tennessee law provides that a civil
rights action must be brought within one year from the date the cause of action accrued.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(3). Therefore, a Title VI claim must be brought within
one year from the time the cause of action accrued. Simmons v. Middle Tennessee State
University, 1997 WL 400105 at *2 (6th Cir. 1997). The statute of limitations for a cause
of action under § 1983 and the Equal Protection Clause is governed by the state personal
injury statute of limitations. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989); Lyons v.
Metro Gov’t of Nashville, 416 Fed. Appx. 483, 491 (6th Cir. 2011). Therefore, the statute
of limitations for a cause of action under § 1983 and the Equal Protection Clause arising
in the State of Tennessee is also one year. Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(3); Roberson
v. Tennessee, 399 F.3d 792, 794 (6th Cir. 2005); Dellis v. Corrs. Corp. of Amer., 257
F.3d 508, 511 (6th Cir. 2001).
All allegations in plaintiffs’ Complaint concern the school years from 2009
through 2011. The complaint was not filed until March 11, 2014. Because this is almost
three years after any alleged events occurred, any claims brought by Chi and Jim Hill for
violation of their civil rights, or for tort claims under Tennessee state law, are untimely
and are DISMISSED.

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IV. Motion to Dismiss by Blount County Schools
Defendants assert that Blount County Schools is not an entity subject to suit.
Defendants are correct in that assertion. The operation of the county school system in
Blount County is by the Blount County Board of Education, the statutory entity pursuant
to Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-2-203, and its duly elected Board of Education. See Tenn. Code
Ann. § 49-6-201. Accordingly, Blount County Schools will be DISMISSED as a party
defendant.

V. Motion to Dismiss by Blount County
Defendants assert that the only involvement Blount County has with regard to the
Blount County Board of Education is the funding of budgets and bonding for schools as
set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-2-101. Duties and powers of the local administration
of the schools in Blount County are reposed in the local board of education. See Tenn.
Code Ann. §§ 49-2-201 et seq. Moreover, plaintiffs’ Complaint contains no allegations
that Blount County took any actions with regard to either plaintiff in 2009-2011.
Accordingly, Blount County will be DISMISSED as a party defendant.

VI. Motions to Dismiss by Defendants in Their Official Capacity
Defendants, Rob Britt, Steve Lafon, Cassandra Dowd, Rob Clark, Dr. Jane
Morton, and Dr. Alisa Teffeteller, move to dismiss the claims against them in their
official capacity. When a government defendant is sued in his or her official capacity,
the court must proceed as if the plaintiff has in fact sued the governmental entity itself, in
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this case the Blount County Board of Education. Kentucky v. Grams, 473 U.S. 159, 165
(1985); Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471 (1985); Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs. of
City of New York, 463 U.S. 658, 690 n. 55 (1978). In order to prevail, plaintiffs must
demonstrate that the violation of their constitutional rights resulted from acts representing
official policy or custom adopted by the Blount County Board of Education. The Board
of Education is a defendant to this action. Accordingly the claims against Rob Britt,
Steve Lafon, Cassandra Dowd, Rob Clark, Dr. Jane Morton, and Dr. Alisa Teffeteller in
their official capacity must be DISMISSED.

VII. Motions to Dismiss by Defendants in Their Individual Capacity
Defendants, Rob Britt, Steve Lafon, Cassandra Dowd, Rob Clark, Dr. Jane
Morton, and Dr. Alisa Teffeteller, move to dismiss the claims against them in their
individual capacity.
Paragraph 11 of plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges that:
Wherever this Complaint uses “Defendant(s),” such term collectively refers
to and includes all named Defendants in this lawsuit.”
Defendants assert that there is no designation of which defendant engaged in which
alleged wrongful act or omission. Defendants argue that general allegations, such as
those contained in plaintiffs’ Complaint, are insufficient for civil rights actions. The
court agrees.
In this case, defendants are simply alleged to hold certain positions without any
additional allegations regarding their individual conduct. “Each government official, his
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or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 677; see also Marcilis v. Twn. Of Bedford, 693 F.3d 589, 596 (6th Cir. 2012). As
a result, “damage claims against government officials arising from alleged violations of
constitutional rights must allege, with particularity, facts that demonstrate what each
defendant did that violates the asserted constitutional right. Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d
673, 684 (6th Cir. 2008). “Merely listing names in the caption of the complaint and
alleging constitutional violations in the body of the complaint is not enough to sustain
recovery” against individual actors for alleged constitutional violations. Gilmore v. Corr.
Corp. of America., 92 Fed. Appx. 188, 190 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Frazier v. Michigan,
41 Fed. Appx. 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (affirming dismissal where the plaintiff “failed to
allege with any degree of specificity which of the named defendants were personally
involved in or responsible for each of the alleged violations of his federal rights”).
A plaintiff must “allege that a specific defendant performed a specific act that
suffices to state a [federal civil rights] claim.” Kesterson v. Moritsugu, 1998 WL 321008
at *4 (6th Cir. 1998). Courts appropriately dismiss a complaint where it merely identifies
defendants as holding a particular position without specific allegations concerning acts
performed by each individual defendant “that resulted in a deprivation of [plaintiff’s]
constitutional rights.” Marcilis, 693 F.3d at 605. Simply “lumping all the defendants
together” in each claim and providing no factual basis to distinguish their conduct fails to
satisfy the minimum standard that a complaint gives each defendant fair notice of what
the plaintiff’s claim is and the ground upon which it rests. Id. As to the allegations
related to the Title VI claim, the same general pleading requirements apply as well.
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Additionally, there is no allegation that any defendant acted with “intentional
discrimination” on the basis of race. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280
(2001); see also Lee Testing & Eng’g, Inc. v. Ohio DOT, 855 F.Supp.2d 722 (S.D. Ohio
2012) (dismissing § 2000d complaint for failure to specify what each defendant did
which violated Title VI).
Here, paragraph 16 identifies Rob Britt as the Director of Schools and claims he is
an “official policymaker for the Blount County Schools.” Neither Britt, nor Steve Lafon,
Cassandra Dowd, Rob Clark, Dr. Jane Morton, and Dr. Alisa Teffeteller, are mentioned
by name or title in any factual paragraph of the Complaint. The Complaint fails to allege
any act performed by any of these defendants resulting in the deprivation of any specific
rights under federal law.

The court concludes as to these defendants, plaintiffs’

Complaint fails to satisfy the basic pleading standard set forth in Rule 8(a)(2) because the
Complaint fails to give fair notice of the constitutional claims against each defendant or
the grounds upon which such constitutional claims are based. See Marcilis, 693 F.3d at
605. Where a complaint fails to comply with Rule 8, the district court has the power, on
motion or sua sponte, to dismiss the complaint or to strike such parts as are redundant or
immaterial. Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 86 (2nd Cir. 1995). Accordingly, the court
will DISMISS all federal claims against defendants Rob Britt, Steve Lafon, Cassandra
Dowd, Rob Clark, Dr. Jane Morton, and Dr. Alisa Teffeteller, in their individual capacity,
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Plaintiffs’ remaining state law claims against these defendants will be dismissed
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The court has supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’
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state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). In its discretion, however, the court
may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over supplemental claims if the district
court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c)(3).

The court is dismissing all of the federal claims filed against these

defendants in their individual capacity. In deciding whether to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction, the court must consider the factors of judicial economy, convenience,
fairness, and comity. Musson Theatrical Inc. v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1254-55
(6th Cir. 1996). When all federal claims are dismissed before trial, the balance of
considerations usually weights in favor of dismissing supplemental state law claims
without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Id.; Novak v. MetroHealth Medical
Center, 503 F.3d 572, 583 (6th Cir. 2007); Widgren v. Maple Grove Township, 429 F.3d
575, 586 (6th Cir. 2005); Poteet v. Polk Cnty., 2007 WL 124089 (E.D. Tenn. 2007).
After considering the factors of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity in
the present case, the court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ state law claims against these defendants.
Therefore, all state law claims asserted against these defendants in their individual
capacity, are DISMISSED, without prejudice.

VIII. State Law Claims Against the Blount County Board of Education
The plaintiffs’ state law claims against the Blount County Board of Education will
also be dismissed. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) provides that district courts may decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims, when they raise novel or
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complex issues of state law or, in exceptional circumstances, there are compelling
reasons for declining supplemental jurisdiction.

The Tennessee Governmental Tort

Liability Act (TGTLA) was passed in 1973 to govern claims against governmental
entities, such as political subdivisions of the state, including but not limited to, any
municipality, metropolitan government, county, utility, school district, nonprofit
volunteer fire department, etc., or any instrumentality of government created by any one
or more of the herein named local governmental entities or by Act of the General
Assembly. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-102(3). The TGTLA is a comprehensive scheme
which governs tort actions against governmental entities, including the Blount County
Board of Education. See Cruse v. City of Columbia, 922 S.W.2d 492, 496 (Tenn. 1996).
The GTLA provides in pertinent part: “[t]he circuit courts shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over any action brought under this chapter . . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20307. This expresses a clear preference from the Tennessee legislature that claims under
the TGTLA be handled by state courts. Gregory v. Shelby County, 220 F.3d 433, 446
(6th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, this court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over the plaintiffs’ state law claims brought against the Blount County Board of
Education for negligent hiring and retention, negligent infliction of emotional distress,
and any claim arising under Tennessee’s Constitution or statutes; therefore, these claims
will be DISMISSED, without prejudice.

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IX. Plaintiffs’ Request to Amend the Complaint
Plaintiffs have alternately asserted that the court should grant them an opportunity
to amend their complaint if the court finds the complaint deficient in that it fails to give
defendants notice of plaintiffs’ claims. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, a
court may grant leave to amend “when justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). Courts
must read Rule 15 in conjunction with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7(b), which
requires that a party make such a request in a motion that states with “particularity the
grounds for seeking the order.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 7(b). The federal courts do not look
favorably upon bare requests for leave to amend in a response to a motion to dismiss
when the requesting party could have filed a proper motion to amend and attached a
proposed amended complaint for consideration by the court. See Evans v. Pearson
Enterprises, Inc., 434 F.3d 839, 853 (6th Cir. 2006); PR Diamonds, Inc. v. Chandler, 364
F.3d 671, 699 (6th Cir. 2004); Begala v. PNC Bank, 214 F.3d 776, 783-84 (6th Cir.
2000); Daugherty v. Graves, 2012 WL 523664 at *3 (E.D. Tenn. 2012);
Techdisposal.com Inc. v. CEVA Freight Mgmt., 2009 WL 4283090 at *4-*5 (S.D. Ohio
2009). As the Sixth Circuit has explained:
Had plaintiffs filed a motion to amend the complaint prior to the court’s
consideration of the motions to dismiss and accompanied that motion with
a memorandum identifying the proposed amendments, the court would
have considered the motions to dismiss in light of the proposed
amendments to the complaint. Absent such a motion, however, defendant
was entitled to a review of the complaint as filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
Plaintiffs were not entitled to an advisory opinion from the court informing
them of the deficiencies of the complaint and then an opportunity to cure
those deficiencies.
PR Diamonds, Inc., 364 F.3d at 699.
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Here, plaintiffs have failed to follow the proper procedure for submitting a motion
to amend their complaint.

Plaintiffs have also not submitted a proposed amended

complaint for review and consideration by the court as required by the Local Rules of the
District. See Local Rule 15.1. Accordingly, because plaintiffs have not complied with
the directive of Rule 7(b) or with the Local Rules, the court will not accept plaintiffs’
alternative argument contained in a response to a motion to dismiss as a proper motion to
amend.

X. Conclusion
In light of the foregoing discussion, the following action is taken:
1.

Defendants’ motions to dismiss the claims of Chi Hill and Jim Hill as Next

Friend of S.H. [R. 36, 38] are GRANTED; Chi Hill and Jim Hill are DISMISSED as
party plaintiffs; and S. Hill is SUBSTITUTED as party plaintiff in this action.
2.

All claims brought by Chi Hill and Jim Hill individually are DISMISSED

as untimely.
3.

Defendants’ motions to dismiss [R. 20, 23] are GRANTED as follows:
a.

Blount County Schools is DISMISSED as a party defendant.

b.

Blount County is DISMISSED as a party defendant.

c.

Rob Britt, individually and in his official capacity, is DISMISSED

as a party defendant.
d.

Steve Lafon, individually and in his official capacity, is

DISMISSED as a party defendant.
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e.

Cassandra Dowd, individually and in her official capacity, is

DISMISSED as a party defendant.
f.

Rob Clark, individually and in his official capacity, is DISMISSED

as a party defendant.
g.

Dr. Jane Morton, individually and in her official capacity, is

DISMISSED as a party defendant.
h.

Dr. Alisa Teffeteller, individually and in her official capacity, is

DISMISSED as a party defendant.
4.

Plaintiffs’ state law claims for negligent hiring; intentional/negligent

infliction of emotional distress; violation of the Tennessee Constitution; and violation of
Tennessee statutory law are DISMISSED, without prejudice.
5.

Plaintiff’s motion to amend their Complaint is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

____________________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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