Seals v. Johnson
Filing
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MEMORANDUM AND OPINION finding that the Respondents 6 motion todismiss will be GRANTED, and Petitioners 1 petition for a writ of habeas corpus [Doc. 1] DISMISSED as time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The Court finds tha t Petitioner has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right because jurists of reason would not disagree about the correctness of the Courts procedural ruling concerning the timeliness of the petition. Signed by District Judge Pamela L Reeves on 3/31/2015. (c/m)(MGM)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
PHILLIP DOUGLAS SEALS,
Petitioner,
v.
DEBRA JOHNSON, Warden,
Respondent.
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No.: 3:14-CV-208-PLR-HBG
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2254, brought by Tennessee inmate, Phillip Douglas Seals (“Petitioner”).
Petitioner
challenges his 2006 Anderson County, Tennessee conviction by a jury for two counts of
premeditated first degree murder, and two counts of felony murder (the trial court
merged Petitioner’s felony murder convictions into the two convictions for premeditated
first degree murder) [Doc. 1]. For these offenses, Petitioner received concurrent life
sentences.
Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss the petition in which she argues that
the petition is time-barred under § 2244(d)(1) [Doc. 6]. In support of her motion,
Respondent has submitted a brief and the state court record. Petitioner has responded
to Respondent’s motion, seemingly arguing that he is entitled to equitable tolling
because he was delayed from receiving relevant documents from his trial counsel, and
he has diligently pursued his rights as is evidenced by his eleven-claim habeas petition
[Doc. 7].
For the reasons explained below, Respondent’s motion will be GRANTED and
Petitioner’s petition will be DISMISSED as time-barred.
I.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On January 9, 2009, Petitioner’s convictions were affirmed on direct appeal by
the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals (“TCCA”). State v. Seals, No. E2007-02332CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 55914 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 9, 2009). On May 26, 2009, the
Tennessee Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s application for permission to appeal. Id.
at *1.
Petitioner did not file a petition for writ of certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court.
Petitioner next challenged his conviction under the Tennessee Post-Conviction
Procedure Act. Petitioner’s post-conviction petition was dismissed after a hearing, and
the TCCA affirmed the post-conviction court’s dismissal. Seals v. State, No. E201200702-CCA-R3-PC, 2013 WL 1187929 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 21, 2013).
The
Tennessee Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s application for permission to appeal on
July 10, 2013. Id. at *1. Petitioner next filed this petition for federal habeas relief on
May 21, 2014.
II.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), codified in
28 U.S.C. § 2241 et. seq., imposes a statute of limitations to govern the filing of an
application for a federal writ of habeas corpus.
The limitations statute provides, in
relevant part, that:
A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for
a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to
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the judgment of a State Court. The limitation period shall
run from the latest of --(A) The date on which the judgment became final by the
conclusion of direct review . . .
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). However, the time “during which a properly filed application
for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent
judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation . . ..”
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).
Here, Petitioner pursued a direct appeal, including an application for permission
to appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court. As noted, the Tennessee Supreme Court
denied the application on May 26, 2009. Ninety days later—i.e., August 24, 2009, when
the time expired for Petitioner to seek review of the state court’s decision in the United
States Supreme Court, Petitioner’s conviction became final and the AEDPA one-year
clock began. See Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327 (2007) (acknowledging that direct
review under § 2244(d)(1)(A) includes review of a state conviction by the Supreme
Court); Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 524 (2003) (finding that if no petition for
certiorari is filed, the judgment becomes final upon expiration of the 90-day period for
seeking certiorari review in the Supreme Court).
The AEDPA clock, triggered on August 24, 2009, was paused on June 3, 2010,
when Petitioner filed his state post-conviction petition.
Petitioner’s AEDPA clock
remained tolled until Petitioner’s application for permission to appeal was denied by the
Tennessee Supreme Court on July 10, 2013.
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At this time, 283 days had run on
Petitioner’s one-year limit. 1 “The tolling provision does not . . . ‘revive’ the limitations
period (i.e., restart the clock at zero); it can only serve to pause a clock that has not yet
fully run.” Vroman v. Brigano, 346 F.3d 598, 602 (6th Cir. 2003). As such, Petitioner
had 82 days after July 10, 2013—i.e., until September 30, 2013, to file his federal
habeas Petition. Petitioner did not file his petition until May 21, 2014, 233 days after
the expiration of the AEDPA limitations period. 2 Therefore, since the § 2254 application
was filed after the lapse of the statute of limitations in § 2244(d)(1)(A), it is untimely.
III.
EQUITABLE TOLLING
The one-year statute of limitations in AEDPA is not jurisdictional, and is subject
to equitable tolling. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010); Perkins v. McQuiggin,
670 F.3d 665, 670 (6th Cir. 2012) (limitations statutes do not require courts to dismiss
claims as soon as the “clock has run”) (citations omitted). Whether the statute should
be equitably tolled depends on whether a petitioner shows that: (1) he has been
diligent in pursing his rights; and (2) some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.
Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). The petitioner bears the burden of
showing that he is entitled to equitable tolling. Id. The decision as to whether the
statute of limitations should be equitably tolled must be made on a case-by-case basis.
Cook v. Stegall, 295 F.3d 517, 521 (6th Cir. 2002).
1
Respondent erroneously calculates the elapsed time as 238 days, thus giving
Petitioner 127 days after the AEDPA clock resumed. The Court uses the proper
calculation here, but notes that regardless of which numbers are used, Petitioner’s
federal habeas petition was still filed after the one-year deadline.
2
Petitioner placed his petition in the prison mail room on May 16, 2014.
However, even under the prison mailbox rule, Petitioner’s petition was still filed outside
the applicable limitations period.
4
In his response to Respondent’s motion to dismiss, Petitioner argues that he
suffered delays and communication problems with his state court-appointed attorneys,
and delays as a result of the state’s deliberate efforts to deprive him of his
constitutional rights [Doc. 7].
Particularly, Petitioner argues that he faced
communication issues with his counsel pre-trial, during trial, and post-trial [Doc. 7]. He
also argues that he was prejudiced by the state’s delays during the pendency of his
state post-conviction petition [Doc. 7]. Finally, Petitioner argues that he faced an uphill
battle trying to get his records from his state court-appointed attorneys, and that he
had still not received all his records at the time of filing his federal petition [Doc. 1, at p.
33].
Petitioner’s arguments provide no basis for the application of equitable tolling.
At the outset, Petitioner’s allegations of shortcomings by his counsel and prejudice by
the state do not explain his failure to file a timely federal habeas petition; rather, they
concern the struggles he faced during the pendency of his state proceedings.
Regardless, attorney misconduct can only form the basis of an extraordinary
circumstance allowing equitable tolling where the attorney conduct is so egregious and
fails to satisfy professional standards of care. See Holland, 560 U.S. at 679. Even
further, despite Petitioner’s claim that he was prejudiced by the failure to receive his
state records, his filing this eleven-claim petition indicates otherwise.
Additionally, Petitioner cannot show that he diligently pursued his rights. “Under
long-established principles, petitioner’s lack of diligence precludes equity’s operation.”
Pace, 544 U.S. at 419.
While the diligence required for equitable tolling is not
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“maximum feasible diligence” but, rather, reasonable diligence, Holland, 560 U.S. at
653, Petitioner has not shown reasonable diligence in pursuing his federal habeas
rights. Petitioner does not argue that he did not know the status of his case, or that he
did not know that his state post-conviction case had been completed.
Rather,
Petitioner merely argues that he pursued his case through the state system, which does
not translate to reasonable diligence in pursuing his federal rights. Thus, the Court
cannot find that Petitioner has carried his burden of showing his case is one of the
exceptional ones where equitable tolling is justified.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court will GRANT Respondent’s motion to
dismiss [Doc 6], and Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus [Doc. 1] will be
DISMISSED as time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The Court finds that Petitioner
has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right because
jurists of reason would not disagree about the correctness of the Court’s procedural
ruling concerning the timeliness of the petition. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,
484 (2000); Murphy v. Ohio, 263 F.3d 466, 467 (6th Cir. 2001). Therefore, the Court
will also DENY issuance of a Certificate of Appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253.
ORDER ACCORDINGLY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
NITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
T
S I
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