Camp et al v. Jones et al (PLR2)
Filing
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MEMORANDUM AND OPINION - Signed by District Judge Pamela L Reeves on 2/03/2015. (KMK, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NORTHERN DIVISION AT KNOXVILLE
Rick Camp, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Knox County, Tennessee, et al.,
Defendants.
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No.:
3:14-CV-257-PLR-HBG
Memorandum Opinion
On June 20, 2013, deputies from the Knox County Sheriff’s Department, with a warrant,
attempted to arrest Jordan Camp. When they arrived at the home where he was staying, Mr.
Camp, who was intoxicated and suffered from depression and bipolar disorder, barricaded
himself inside the back bedroom and claimed he had a gun and was going to commit suicide.
The deputies withdrew from the home and called for backup.
The Sheriff’s department
dispatched a SWAT team and negotiator. The SWAT team entered the home and established a
staging area in the kitchen. After a period of negotiations, for reasons unstated in the complaint,
officers shot Mr. Camp through the bedroom door, killing him. His family and estate brought
this lawsuit against Knox County, the Sheriff’s Department, the Sheriff, and numerous officers.
The defendants have moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Because
the complaint does not include factual allegations to support its conclusory and formulaic
recitations of the elements of their causes of action, the plaintiffs’ claims will be dismissed.
I. Background
On June 20, 2013, Knox County Sheriff’s deputies went to the home of John Casey with
a warrant to arrest Jordan Camp. When Deputy Chris Allison located Mr. Camp, he barricaded
himself inside the back bedroom of the mobile home. Mr. Camp claimed he had a gun and was
going to commit suicide. Deputy Allison withdrew from the mobile home, secured the front
door, and called for assistance from the other deputies. Sergeant Phil Dalton and Lieutenant
Brian Williams arrived and positioned themselves at the back door. Sergeant Dalton began
negotiating with Mr. Camp while they awaited the SWAT team’s arrival.
When defendant Greg Faulkner arrived on the scene, he took over negotiations. The
SWAT team entered the mobile home and established a staging area in the kitchen. According
to the complaint, the SWAT team entered the mobile home after a security perimeter had been
established around it, and due to the mobile home’s location, Mr. Camp did not present any
immediate danger to a third party at that time.
The defendants allegedly knew or had reason to believe Mr. Camp suffered from mental
health issues, including bipolar disorder and depression, 1 and at some point during the
negotiations, Mr. Camp informed the defendants that he had ingested numerous illegal drugs and
was intoxicated. Later while Mr. Faulkner was negotiating with Mr. Camp, “one or more
members of Defendant Knox County Sheriff’s Department” furnished alcohol to Mr. Camp.
Eventually, without explaining what event or catalyst triggered it, the complaint states
that deputies fired their weapons at the closed door behind which Jordan Camp was standing.
The officers discharged a total of 47 rounds, striking Mr. Camp in the face, chest, abdomen, and
back, killing him. Some of the defendants initially reported that Mr. Camp fired his weapon at
1
Nowhere in the complaint does it explain how the defendants would have known about Mr. Camp’s mental health
issues. It simply alleges that the defendants knew or should have known about them.
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them, but the complaint asserts that Mr. Jordon never fired his weapon.
Following these events, the Knox County Sheriff’s Office of Professional Standards
interviewed the SWAT team members, including Defendants Black, Dalton, Grimes, and
Lubienski. At Black, Lubienski, and Grimes’ interviews, each of which lasted less than ten
minutes, the defendants claimed Jordan Camp fired first. On September 23, 2013, the Knox
County Sheriff’s Office determined that Mr. Camp did not discharge his weapon. None of the
defendants were re-interviewed after the Sheriff’s office made this determination. Finally, the
Office of Professional Standards’ Investigative Findings did not include any reference to the
officers giving Mr. Camp alcohol.
On June 15, 2014, Rick and Cindy Camp filed a complaint as parents and next of kin. On
July 27, 2014 they amended their complaint.
The amended complaint asserts claims for
wrongful death, constitutional deprivations, conspiracy, intentional inflection of emotional
distress, assault and battery, and negligence.
II. Standard of Review
Rules 8(a) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require the complaint to
articulate a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). This
requirement is met when “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)
requires the court to construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept all
the complaint’s factual allegations as true, and determine whether the plaintiff can prove no set
of facts in support of the plaintiff’s claims that would entitle the plaintiff to relief. Meador v.
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Cabinet for Human Resources, 902 F.2d 474, 475 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 867
(1990).
The court may not grant a motion to dismiss based upon a disbelief of a complaint’s
factual allegations. Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1198 (6th Cir. 1990); Miller v. Currie,
50 F.3d 373, 377 (6th Cir. 1995) (noting that courts should not weigh evidence or evaluate the
credibility of witnesses). The court must liberally construe the complaint in favor of the party
opposing the motion. Id. However, the complaint must articulate more than a bare assertion of
legal conclusions. Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.3d 434, 436 (6th Cir.
1988). “[The] complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the
material elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.” Id. (citations omitted).
III. Discussion
A. Knox County Sheriff’s Office and Official Capacity Claims
The federal district courts in Tennessee have consistently held that sheriff’s departments
are not proper parties to §1983 suits. See Mathes v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and
Davidson County, 2010 WL 3341889, at * 2 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 25, 2010) (collecting
cases); Moore v. Chattanooga Police Dep't, 2008 WL 3896114, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 19,
2008) (“The Chattanooga Police Department is not a municipality but is merely a municipal
agency or department of the City of Chattanooga rather than a separate legal entity.”).
Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ claims against the Sheriff’s Office will be dismissed.
Claims against an individual in their “official” capacity are the equivalent of suits against
the government entity. Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994). In cases where a
plaintiff has sued the sheriff and sheriff’s officers in their official capacities in addition to suing
the county itself, the official capacity claims are redundant. See Newby v. Sharp, 2012 WL
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1230764, at *3-4 (E.D. Tenn. April 12, 2012) (collecting cases and dismissing official capacity
claims as redundant). Because the plaintiffs in this case have asserted constitutional claims
against the officers in their official capacities and have asserted the same constitutional claims
against Knox County, the official capacity claims are redundant and will be dismissed.
B. Sheriff J.J. Jones
The complaint asserts claims against Sheriff Jones in his “official” capacity; however, the
caption of the case indicates that he has been sued in his “individual” capacity. (R. 3, Page ID
71, 73). The distinction is not important for the purpose of ruling on the present motion to
dismiss because the plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against Sheriff Jones in either an
official or individual capacity. It is well established that respondeat superior is not a basis for
imposing §1983 liability. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (“vicarious
liability is inapplicable to ... § 1983 suits”); Taylor v. Michigan Dep't of Corrections, 69 F.3d 76,
80–81 (6th Cir. 1995). A supervisor cannot be held liable under § 1983 unless the plaintiff
demonstrates that the supervisor actively encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or
directly participated in it in some way. Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984).
The only allegations regarding Sheriff Jones are found in paragraph 21 of the amended
complaint where the plaintiffs allege that “Defendant J.J. Jones was the Sheriff and the policy
maker of the Knox County Sheriff’s Department.” (R. 3, Page ID 77). There are no facts or
even allegations pled in the amended complaint to support any claims of wrongdoing on the part
of Sheriff Jones.
Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ federal claims against Sheriff Jones will be
dismissed.
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C. Clyde Owen and Tom Cox
Apart from naming Clyde Owen and Tom Cox as defendants, the amended complaint
asserts no allegations whatsoever regarding these two defendants’ involvement in Mr. Camp’s
death. Moreover, the plaintiffs did not contest dismissal of the claims against Mr. Owen and Mr.
Cox in their response. The plaintiffs’ federal claims against them will be dismissed.
D. Greg Faulkner and Brint Gibson
The amended complaint likewise fails to state any viable federal claims against Greg
Faulkner or Brint Gibson. The plaintiffs do not allege that either of these defendants shot Mr.
Camp or that either of these defendants even fired their weapons. Instead, the plaintiffs’ claims
against Mr. Faulkner are based on the fact that unnamed officers supplied Mr. Camp with
alcohol during the negotiations. Their claims against Mr. Gibson are based on his instructing the
SWAT team to enter the mobile home and establish a staging area in the kitchen. Neither of
these claims can survive a motion to dismiss.
Causation is an essential element of all the plaintiffs’ claims. To maintain an action, a
plaintiff must allege a causal connection between the alleged injury and the conduct complained
of. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Put another way, “the injury has
to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant.” Id. (internal quotations and
citation omitted).
With respect to Mr. Faulkner, the misconduct alleged is that, “[u]pon
information and belief, one or more members of the Defendant Knox County Sheriff’s
Department furnished alcohol to Mr. Camp during the negotiation with Defendant Faulkner.”
(R. 3, Page ID 79-80). At the time the alcohol was given to Mr. Camp, the defendants knew Mr.
Camp had a gun and was threatening to commit suicide. (Id. at Page ID 80). Giving Mr. Camp
alcohol during the negotiation, the plaintiffs contend, was “unreasonable and unnecessary and
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showed a reckless disregard for Jordan Camp’s life.” (Id.) But the plaintiffs fail to tie the
furnishing of alcohol to any of the injuries alleged—there are simply no allegations that the
furnishing of alcohol in any way contributed to Mr. Camp’s death. Because the plaintiffs’
amended complaint fails to allege a causal connection between Mr. Faulkner’s alleged
misconduct and any of the plaintiffs’ injuries, their federal claims against Mr. Faulkner will be
dismissed.
The plaintiffs’ claims against Mr. Gibson are based on his and the SWAT team’s entry
into the mobile home. Instead of a Fourth Amendment unreasonable search and seizure claim,
the plaintiffs, citing Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189
(1989), assert liability based on the “state-created danger” doctrine. 2 According to the plaintiffs,
Mr. Camp was effectively seized and in police custody once they surrounded the mobile home.
When Mr. Gibson allegedly failed to provide for Mr. Camp’s safety, the plaintiffs aver that he
violated Mr. Camp’s Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. This argument, while novel, is
not persuasive.
Deshaney and its progeny concern the government’s duty to protect individuals from
third parties while incarcerated, institutionalized, or similarly restrained. Deshaney, 489 U.S. at
200. Deshaney liability is appropriate in situations where “the State by the affirmative exercise
of its power so restrains an individual’s liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself, and
at the same time fails to provide for his basic human needs—e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical
care, and reasonable safety.” Id. at 199-200. Such liability is inapplicable to the present case
where law enforcement officers were undisputedly attempting to make a lawful arrest, and had
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The plaintiffs’ response does not appear to dispute the defendants’ right to enter the mobile home to serve an arrest
warrant. Such an entry does not give rise to a Fourth Amendment claim. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,
603 (1980).
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not placed Mr. Camp in custody such that he could not provide for his own basic human needs
(including his own safety).
Alternatively to their Deshaney argument, the plaintiffs contend that Mr. Gibson helped
create a danger that led to the death of Mr. Camp. They cite Koulta v. Merciez, 477 F.3d 442,
445 (6th Cir. 2007), for the proposition that a plaintiff may bring a “state-created danger” claim
by showing: (1) an affirmative act by the state that created or increased the risk that the plaintiff
would be exposed to an act of violence by a third party; (2) a special danger to the plaintiff
wherein the state’s actions placed the plaintiff specifically at risk; and (3) that the state knew or
should have known its actions endangered the plaintiff. The plaintiffs cannot satisfy the first
requirement. There is no allegation that the state placed Mr. Camp at risk to an act of violence
by a third party. The danger was created by Mr. Camp when he barricaded himself in the
bedroom of the trailer with a loaded weapon—not by Mr. Gibson or the members of the SWAT
team who were attempting to make a lawful arrest, with a warrant, of an armed, intoxicated, and
suicidal suspect. Additionally, there were no third parties present. The proper analysis of the
plaintiffs’ claims is the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard, and the plaintiffs have
pled no facts in support of the conclusion that the officers’ actions were constitutionally
unreasonable or even negligent. The federal claims against Mr. Gibson and Mr. Faulkner will be
dismissed.
E. Greg Black, Phil Dalton, Mitch Grimes, Jason Lubienski, and James Page
These are the five defendants who shot Mr. Camp. There is no dispute that they shot
him; however, nothing in the amended complaint supports the conclusion that these officers
acted unreasonably in doing so. Originally the amended complaint alleged that “[n]o deputy
identified a specific deadly threat before discharging their weapons,” but the plaintiffs have
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subsequently withdrawn that allegation. (R. 50, Notice of Withdrawal, Page ID 196). Without
it, all that remains is a complaint specifically identifying an armed, intoxicated, mentally ill
individual who barricaded himself inside the bedroom of a mobile home and threatened suicide
when the police (with a warrant) attempted to arrest him. After engaging in negotiations with
Mr. Camp, for reasons not alleged in the amended complaint, the officers fired upon Mr. Camp,
killing him. Nothing in this sequence of events supports the conclusion that the police used
unreasonable force. The plaintiffs have not identified any law for the proposition that deadly
force is presumed unreasonable. They appear instead to be asking the Court to speculate as to
the reason the police took the actions they took. Speculation is not an endeavor in which this
Court will engage. The plaintiffs have not met their burden of alleging facts to support the
conclusion that these officers’ actions were unreasonable.
The plaintiffs’ allegations regarding the number of shots fired do not change the result.
The law is well settled that, “if police officers are justified in firing at a suspect in order to end a
severe threat to public safety, the officers need not stop shooting until the threat has ended.”
Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2022 (2014). The plaintiffs have not alleged that the
officers continued firing after becoming aware that Mr. Camp had surrendered or become
incapacitated.
To the contrary, the amended complaint makes clear that Mr. Camp was
barricaded behind a closed door where the officers could not see him.
Because the plaintiffs withdrew their allegation that none of the officers identified a
specific threat prior to firing, there are no facts alleged from which the Court or a jury could infer
an unreasonable exercise of force. As discussed above, the complaint must articulate more than
a bare assertion of legal conclusions; it must contain either direct or inferential allegations
respecting all material elements. Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy, 859 F.3d at 436. In Scheid,
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the Sixth Circuit explained:
[w]e are not holding the pleader to an impossibly high standard; we recognize the
policies behind rule 8 and the concept of notice pleading. A plaintiff will not be
thrown out of court for failing to plead facts in support of every arcane element of
his claim. But when a complaint omits facts that, if they existed, would clearly
dominate the case, it seems fair to assume that those facts do not exist.
Id. at 437 (quoting O’Brien v. DiGrazia, 544 F.2d 543, 546 n.3 (1st Cir. 1976)). The present
holding is not based on the plaintiffs’ failure to plead some arcane element of their claim; it is
based on their failure to plead facts in support of the very core of their lawsuit—facts indicating
that the use of force against Mr. Camp was unreasonable, reckless, negligent, or in any way
improper. The federal claims against these defendants will be dismissed.
F. Knox County
The plaintiffs’ federal claims against Knox County are based on the County’s alleged
failure to train its officers “as to the proper policies, procedures, practices, or customs as to the
handling of a SWAT stand-off negotiations [sic], including . . . creating a danger, providing a
reasonable level of safety for the decedent . . . , and using excessive force during the seizure.”
(R. 3, Page ID 85).
The Sixth Circuit has held, however, that “a prerequisite of supervisory
liability under § 1983 is unconstitutional conduct by a subordinate of the supervisor.” Cook v.
Bastin, --- Fed. App’x ---, 2014 WL 5472093, at *8 (6th Cir. Oct. 29, 2014) (quoting McQueen
v. Beecher Cmty. Schs., 433 F.3d 460, 470 (6th Cir. 2006)). Because the plaintiffs have failed to
plead any facts in support of their conclusion that any of the officers committed any wrongdoing
that is causally connected to the injuries alleged, there can be no supervisory liability for Knox
County. The plaintiffs’ federal claims against the County will be dismissed.
G. State Law Claims
The plaintiffs’ state law claims will also be dismissed. Title 28 § 1367(c) provides that
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district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims
when they raise novel or complex issues of state law or, in exceptional circumstances,
there are compelling reasons for declining supplemental jurisdiction. The Tennessee
Governmental Tort Liability Act provides in pertinent part: “[t]he circuit courts shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction over any action brought under this chapter. . . .”
Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-307. This expresses a clear preference from the Tennessee
legislature that claims under Tennessee’s Governmental Tort Liability Act be handled by
state courts. Gregory v. Shelby County, 220 F.3d 433, 446 (6th Cir. 2000). Accordingly,
this Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ state law
claims, which are largely governed by the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act.
Those claims will therefore be dismissed with leave to refile in state court.
IV. Conclusion
For the above stated reasons, the defendants’ motions to dismiss [R. 40, 41, 42, 45, and
53] are Granted as follows:
1. the plaintiffs’ federal claims are Dismissed; and
2. the plaintiffs state law claims are Dismissed with leave to refile in state court. 3
____________________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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Sheriff Jones has also filed a motion to correct a typographical error in his motion to dismiss. (R. 47). That
motion is Granted.
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