Caldwell v. Freeman (VVV)
Filing
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MEMORANDUM AND OPINION as set forth in following order. Signed by District Judge Pamela L Reeves on 9/23/15. (c/m)(ABF)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
JACKIE M. CALDWELL,
Petitioner,
v.
VICKI FREEMAN, Warden,
Respondent.
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No.
3:14-cv-00332-PLR-CCS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
On July 17, 2014, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging
the legality of her confinement under a judgment of the Campbell County Criminal Court
convicting her of aggravated rape, criminal responsibility for facilitation of rape of a child, and
criminal responsibility for facilitation of criminal attempt to commit aggravated sexual battery
[Doc. 1]. The Court subsequently directed the Warden to respond pursuant to Rule 4 of the rules
governing § 2254 actions [Doc. 3]. Before the Court now is Respondent’s motion to dismiss
Petitioner’s request for federal habeas relief as untimely [Doc. 9].
I.
BACKGROUND
A Campbell County jury convicted Petitioner of aggravated rape, criminal responsibility
for facilitation of rape of a child, and criminal responsibility for facilitation of criminal attempt to
commit aggravated sexual battery. State v. Jackie Caldwell, No. E2008-00307-CCA-R3-CD,
2009 WL 3191706, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 6, 2009), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Mar. 18,
2010). Petitioner was sentenced to an effective term of 22 years’ imprisonment [Doc. 1]. The
Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the judgment on October 6, 2009 and Tennessee
Supreme Court declined review on March 18, 2010. Caldwell, 2009 WL 3191706, at *16.
On October 5, 2010, Petitioner filed a state-based petition for post-conviction relief.
Jackie Caldwell v. State, No. E20120-00085-CCA-R3-PC, 2012 WL 6651216, at *1 (Tenn.
Crim. App. Dec. 12, 2010), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Apr. 10, 2013). The trial court denied
Petitioner’s state-based petition after an evidentiary hearing and, on December 21, 2012, the
Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Id. at *3. The
Tennessee Supreme Court denied permission to appeal on April 10, 2013. Id.
II.
MOTION TO DISMISS
On February 20, 2015, Respondent filed a motion seeking dismissal of Petitioner’s
application for habeas relief, arguing it is time-barred under the 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)’s statute of
limitations [Doc. 11]. Seven months have passed without a response from Petitioner.
The AEDPA contains a one-year statute of limitations governing the filing of an
application for a federal writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The limitations period
starts to run when one of four circumstances occurs: (1) the conclusion of direct review; (2) upon
the removal of an impediment which prevented a petitioner from filling a habeas corpus petition;
(3) when a petition alleges a constitutional right, newly recognized by the Supreme Court and
made retroactive on collateral review; or (4) when a claim depends upon factual predicates which
could not have been discovered earlier through the exercise of due diligence. Id.; see also Isham
v. Randle, 226 F.3d 691, 693 (6th Cir. 2000) (same). The time is statutorily tolled during
pendency of “a properly filed application for state-based post-conviction relief or other collateral
review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim.” Id.
Because Petitioner took advantage of her right to a direct appeal and the Tennessee
Supreme court declined review of that appeal on March 18, 2010, Petitioner’s state-court
judgment “became final” under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), i.e., her AEDPA limitations period
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began to run, on June 16, 2010 after expiration of the 90 day period for seeking a writ of
certiorari in the United States Supreme Court [Doc. 1]. 1 Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522,
527–28 (2003). Absent statutory or equitable tolling, Petitioner’s one-year statute of limitations
would have initially expired on June 16, 2011.
1.
Statutory Tolling
Petitioner filed her state-based petition for post-conviction relief in the Campbell County
Criminal Court on October 5, 2010, 111 days into her AEDPA limitations period. Because
Petitioner filed this state-petition within the original one-year limitations period, her request for
post-conviction relief triggered 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) and tolled the limitations period for the
pendency of that process. See Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2008) (explaining an application is
“‘properly filed’ when its delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable laws
and rules governing filing” and noting relevant rules include those laws proscribing “time limits
upon [the application’s] delivery”). The limitations period resumed 918 days later when the
Tennessee Supreme Court denied review of the state-based petition on April 10, 2013. At that
time, 254 days remained in Petitioners AEDPA limitations period. As a result, Petitioner’s oneyear window expired on December 20, 2013, 254 days after April 10, 2013 and 209 days before
she filed the current petition for federal habeas relief on July 17, 2014.
2.
Equitable Tolling
Despite the failure to trigger 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), the one-year AEDPA statute is not
jurisdictional and remains subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling. Holland v. Florida, 560
U.S. 631, 645 (2010). Petitioner is “entitled to equitable tolling’ only if [s]he shows ‘(1) that
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The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and sentence
on October 6, 2009, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied permission to appeal on March 18,
2010. Under Supreme Court Rule 13.1, Petitioner was required to petition for certiorari in the
United States Supreme Court within 90 days after entry of the order of the Tennessee Supreme
Court. Her conviction became final upon the expiration of that period.
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[s]he has been pursuing [her] rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance . . .
prevented timely filing.’” Id. at 649 (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)).
This doctrine “is applied sparingly,” however, and is typically used “only when a litigant’s
failure to meet a legally-mandated deadline unavoidably arose from circumstances beyond that
litigant’s control.” Vroman v. Brigano, 346 F.3d 598, 604 (6th Cir. 2003). Petitioner bears the
burden of demonstrating cause for equitable tolling. McClendon v. Sherman, 329 F.3d 490, 494
(6th Cir. 2003); see also Griffin v. Rogers, 308 F.3d 647, 653 (6th Cir. 2002) (same).
Nothing in Petitioner’s request for federal habeas relief [Doc. 1] comes close to
demonstrating the extraordinary circumstances necessary to merit equitable tolling of the oneyear AEDPA limitations period. Further, Petitioner has failed to file a response in opposition to
Respondent’s motion.
As such, the Court finds no grounds for equitable tolling exist.
Respondent’s motion to dismiss [Doc. 11] will be GRANTED and Petitioner’s July 17, 2014
petition for federal habeas relief is DISMISSED for failure to comply with 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
III.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, Respondent’s motion to dismiss [Doc. 9] will be
GRANTED and Petitioner’s habeas action will be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
SO ORDERED.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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