Brown v. Anderson County Sheriff's Office et al (VVV)

Filing 4

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER the plaintiff is allowed to proceed in this action without the prepayment of costs or fees or security therefor. However, for the reasons stated below, process shall not issue and this action is DISMISSED. Beca use the plaintiff is an inmate in the Knox County Detention Facility, he is herewith ASSESSED the civil filing fee of $350.00, with the custodian of the plaintiff's inmate trust account at the institution where he now resides directed to submit payments as set forth. Signed by District Judge Pamela L Reeves on 12/11/14. (cc Sheriff of Knox County, Tennessee, aKnox County Law Director's Office and Court's financial deputy)(ADA, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE

FRANKLIN EUGENE BROWN,
Plaintiff,
v.
ANDERSON COUNTY SHERIFF'S
OFFICE and ANDERSON COUNTY
JUVENILE JUDGE BRIAN HUNT,
Defendants.

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No.: 3:14-cv-487-PLR-CCS

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

The Court is in receipt of a pro se prisoner's civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and an application to proceed in forma pauperis. It appears from the application
that the plaintiff lacks sufficient financial resources to pay the $350.00 filing fee.
Accordingly, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the plaintiff is allowed to proceed in this
action without the prepayment of costs or fees or security therefor. However, for the
reasons stated below, process shall not issue and this action is DISMISSED.
In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff must establish that he
was deprived of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law. Black v.
Barberton Citizens Hospital, 134 F.3d 1265, 1267 (6th Cir. 1998); O'Brien v. City of
Grand Rapids, 23 F.3d 990, 995 (6th Cir. 1994); Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d
1036, 1042 (6th Cir. 1992). See also Braley v. City of Pontiac, 906 F.2d 220, 223 (6th

Cir. 1990) ("Section 1983 does not itself create any constitutional rights; it creates a right
of action for the vindication of constitutional guarantees found elsewhere.").
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), district courts must screen
prisoner complaints and sua sponte dismiss those that are frivolous or malicious, fail to
state a claim for relief, or are against a defendant who is immune. See, e.g., Benson v.
O'Brian, 179 F.3d 1014 (6th Cir. 1999).
Responding to a perceived deluge of frivolous lawsuits, and, in particular,
frivolous prisoner suits, Congress directed the federal courts to review or
"screen" certain complaints sua sponte and to dismiss those that failed to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted, that sought monetary
relief from a defendant immune from such relief, or that were frivolous or
malicious.
Id. at 1015-16 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A).
Plaintiff filed this action during his confinement in the Anderson County
Detention Facility; he has since been transferred to the Knox County Detention Facility.
The defendants are the Anderson County Sheriff's Office and Brian Hunt, the juvenile
court judge for Anderson County, Tennessee. Plaintiff alleges that the Anderson County
Sheriff's Office failed to transport him to court, despite his being served with a summons,
and that Judge Hunt entered a ruling on a case involving plaintiff's daughter in his
absence, thus denying plaintiff his rights of due process and access to the courts.
The Anderson County Sheriff's Office is not a suable entity within the meaning of
42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994) (a police
department is not an entity which can be sued under § 1983); see also De La Garza v.
Kandiyohi County Jail, 18 F. App'x 436, 437 (8th Cir. 2001) (neither a county jail nor a
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sheriff's department is a suable entity); Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir.
1992) ("[s]heriff's departments and police departments are not usually considered legal
entities subject to suit").
A state judicial officer enjoys absolute judicial immunity from an award of money
damages for past judicial acts on matters that are clearly within the court's jurisdiction.
See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 364
(1978); Mann v. Conlin, 22 F.3d 100, 103-104 (6th Cir. 1994). "The entitlement is an
immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S.
511, 526 (1985). See also Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991). This is true even
where the judge acts "erroneously, corruptly or in excess of jurisdiction." King v. Love,
766 F.2d 962, 965 (6th Cir. 1985). See also Bright v. Gallia County, Ohio, 753 F. 3d
639, 649-50 (6th Cir. 2014) (judge entitled to absolute judicial immunity for actions
taken within the court's jurisdiction even if his actions "were petty, unethical, and
unworthy of his office").
Although this Court is mindful that a pro se complaint is to be liberally construed,
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972), it is quite clear that the plaintiff has not
alleged the deprivation of any constitutionally protected right, privilege or immunity, and,
therefore, the Court finds his claims to be frivolous under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and
1915A. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562 (2007) ("a complaint . . . must
contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements
necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory") (internal quotation marks
omitted; emphasis and omission in original). Therefore, this action is DISMISSED sua
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sponte, as frivolous and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under
§ 1983. The Court CERTIFIES that any appeal from this action would not be taken in
good faith and would be totally frivolous. See Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
Because the plaintiff is an inmate in the Knox County Detention Facility, he is
herewith ASSESSED the civil filing fee of $350.00.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(b)(1)(A) and (B), the custodian of the plaintiff's inmate trust account at the
institution where he now resides is directed to submit to the Clerk, U.S. District Court,
800 Market Street, Suite 130, Knoxville, Tennessee 37902, as an initial partial payment,
whichever is greater of:
(a)

twenty percent (20%) of the average monthly deposits to the plaintiff's

inmate trust account; or
(b)

twenty percent (20%) of the average monthly balance in the plaintiff's

inmate trust account for the six-month period preceding the filing of the complaint.
Thereafter, the custodian shall submit twenty percent (20%) of the plaintiff's
preceding monthly income (or income credited to the plaintiff's trust account for the
preceding month), but only when such monthly income exceeds ten dollars ($10.00),
until the full filing fee of three hundred fifty dollars ($350.00) as authorized under 28
U.S.C. § 1914(a) has been paid to the Clerk. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
The Clerk is DIRECTED to send a copy of this Memorandum and Order to the
Sheriff of Knox County, Tennessee, and the Knox County Law Director's Office to
ensure that the custodian of the plaintiff's inmate trust account complies with that portion
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of the Prison Litigation Reform Act relating to payment of the filing fee. The Clerk is
further DIRECTED to forward a copy of this Memorandum and Order to the Court's
financial deputy.
A separate judgment will enter.

ENTER:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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