Williams v. Claiborne County Jail

Filing 3

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER, tt appears from the application that the Plaintiff lacks sufficient financial resources to pay the filing fee and, thus, his application is GRANTED 1 . Plaintiff has not named suable entities as Defendant s and he has not named any Defendant as being involved in the conduct complained of in this pleading {complaint}. Plaintiff is advised that, unless his amends his pleading within 20 days from the date on this order to correct the highlighted deficiencies, the Court will DISMISS his case for failure to state a claim without further notice to him. Signed by District Judge Pamela L Reeves on 12/5/14. (c/m)(ADA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE

DANNY LYNN WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
v.
CLAIBORNE COUNTY JAIL,
CLAIBORNE COUNTY JAIL STAFF,
and CLAIBORNE COUNTY JAIL
MEDICAL,
Defendants.

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No.: 3:14-CV-557-PLR-HBG

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

The Court is in receipt of a pro se former prisoner's civil rights complaint under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and an application to proceed in forma pauperis. It appears from the
application that the Plaintiff lacks sufficient financial resources to pay the filing fee and,
thus, his application is GRANTED (Doc. 1).
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), district courts must screen
prisoner complaints and sua sponte dismiss those that are frivolous or malicious, fail to
state a claim for relief, or are against a defendant who is immune. See, e.g., Benson v.
O'Brian, 179 F.3d 1014 (6th Cir. 1999).
Responding to a perceived deluge of frivolous lawsuits, and,
in particular, frivolous prisoner suits, Congress directed the
federal courts to review or "screen" certain complaints sua
sponte and to dismiss those that failed to state a claim upon

which relief could be granted, that sought monetary relief
from a defendant immune from such relief, or that were
frivolous or malicious.

Id. at 1015-16 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A)). 1
In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that, while he was confined in the Claiborne
County jail, an officer posted a copy of Plaintiff’s sex offenses in the male maximum
security unit where he was housed.

Thereafter, Plaintiff was approached by seven

inmates, who called him a child molester, encircled him, stomped him in the stomach
until he soiled himself, and pummeled him until his nose was broken and he passed out.
When Plaintiff regained consciousness, the inmates told him that, as a sex
offender, he had to pay rent to them. For the next three days, the inmates took all his
food trays. Plaintiff then sent a letter to an unidentified recipient asking for medical
attention for his broken nose, swollen right eye, urinary incontinence, and severe kidney
pains, all of which resulted from the beating. In the letter, Plaintiff also asked for
assistance in dealing with his fellow inmates’ extortion demands and maltreatment.
However, that same night, the inmates brought his request back to him and warned
him that, as a result of his attempt to snitch on them, his life would be hellish. True to
their threat, they took his food trays for the next two days, until he was so weakened and
debilitated from the lack of nourishment that he started acting “krazy” (sic) and had to be

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Section 1915(e)(2) applies to complaints filed in forma pauperis by prisoners and non-prisoners alike.
McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 609 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v.
Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).

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moved. Even before he was moved, Plaintiff asked officers several times to move him,
so he could explain what was happening to him, but his requests were ignored.
The next day, he was transferred to the Union County Jail.
For the alleged infringement of his rights, Plaintiff seeks to have “something
done” for what he endured, physically and emotionally.
At the outset, the Claiborne County Jail, the first named Defendant, is a building
and not a suable entity under § 1983. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436
U.S. 658, 688-90 & n.55 (1978) (for purposes of a § 1983 action, a “person” includes
individuals and “bodies politic and corporate”); Marbry v. Correctional Medical
Services, 2000 WL 1720959, *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 6, 2000) (“[T]he Shelby County Jail is not
an entity subject to suit under § 1983.”) (citing Rhodes v. McDannel, 945 F.2d 117, 120
(6th Cir. 1991)); Cage v. Kent County Corr. Facility, 1997 WL 225647, *1 (6th Cir. May
1, 1997) (“The district court also properly found that the jail facility named as a
defendant was not an entity subject to suit under § 1983.”). Thus, any allegations
asserted against the Claiborne County Jail fail to state a claim for relief.
Plaintiff has also named the Claiborne County Jail Staff and Medical as
Defendants. These Defendants likewise are not suable parties. See Hix v. Tennessee
Dept. of Corrections, 196 F. App’x 350, 355 (6th Cir. Aug. 22, 2006) (“[W]e conclude
that the defendant medical departments are not ‘persons’ under § 1983."); Horton v.
Hamblen County Jail Medical Staff, 2007 WL 172523, *1 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 18, 2007)
(concluding that the jail medical staff is a non-suable entity under § 1983); Sullivan v.
Hamilton County Jail Staff, 2006 WL 1582418, *3 n. 1 (E.D. Tenn. June 5, 2006) (noting
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that the jail's medical staff and jail staff are subdivisions of the sheriff's department and
not a legal entity subject to being sued) (citing to Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992
(3rd Cir.1973) for its holding that a state prison medical department is not a "person"
under § 1983)); see also Holifield v. Mobile County Sheriff's Dept. of Mobile, 2008 WL
2246961, *5 (S.D.Ala. May 29, 2008) (finding that the Mobile County Jail Medical Unit
was a subdivision of the jail and not a distinct legal entity which could be sued under §
1983).
Likewise, there are problems with the substantive allegations in the complaint.
The first one is that Plaintiff does not allege the date(s) on which occurred the
complained of events. This is important because a defendant cannot be required to
answer to allegations which are not pegged to a specific date. Without this information,
Plaintiff’s contentions are conclusory. Conclusory allegations fail to state a claim for
relief under § 1983. Coker v. Summit County Sheriff's Department, 90 F. App’x 782,
787, 2003 WL 23140066, *4 (6th Cir. Dec. 15, 2003) (finding that bare bones,
conclusory assertions do not suffice to state a cognizable constitutional claim); Morgan v.
Church’s Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir. 1987); Smith v. Rose, 760 F.3d 102,
106 (6th Cir. 1985). Furthermore, stale claims may be subject to dismissal as barred by
the applicable statute of limitation. Berndt v. Tennessee, 796 F.2d 879, 883 (6th Cir.
1986).
The second problem is that Plaintiff has not identified any individual jailer or
health care provider as being involved in the alleged constitutional wrongdoing.
Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the conditions of his confinement implicate the Eighth
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Amendment. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). To establish an Eighth
Amendment claim, Plaintiff must show: (1) that an alleged deprivation is, objectively,
sufficiently serious and (2) that the prison official who caused the deprivation had a
sufficiently culpable state of mind. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
Obviously, absent the identity of the purported malfeasant(s), there is nothing upon which
to find that the individual(s) possessed the requisite state of mind of deliberate
indifference.
Although this Court is mindful that a pro se complaint is to be liberally construed,
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972), Plaintiff has not named suable entities as
Defendants and he has not named any Defendant as being involved in the conduct
complained of in this pleading. Because these deficiencies possibly may be cured by
means of an amended complaint, see LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944 (6th Cir. 2013),
Plaintiff is advised that, unless his amends his pleading within twenty (20) days from the
date on this order to correct the highlighted deficiencies, the Court will DISMISS his
case for failure to state a claim without further notice to him.

ENTER:

_____________________________
PAMELA L. REEVES
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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