Crumpley v. Anderson County, Tennessee (PLR1)

Filing 68

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER; Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's FMLA claims 14 , 34 is DENIED. Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Title VII claim and § 1983 claim 16 is DENIED as moot. Defend ants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's state law claims 21 is DENIED. Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's request for punitive damages 18 , 32 is DENIED. Defendants' motion to stay/dismiss the action against David Crowley 12 , 36 is GRANTED to the extent that this action is stayed against David Crowley until May 2, 2016, at which time the stay will be lifted. The motion to dismiss David Crowley as a party defendant is DENIED. Signed by District Judge Pamela L Reeves on 2/16/16. (ADA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE

LISA CRUMPLEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
ANDERSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE,
And DAVID CROWLEY,
Defendants.

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No. 3:14-CV-559-PLR-CCS

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiff, Lisa Crumpley, brings this action against her former employer,
Defendant Anderson County and David Crowley, under the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA), the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the
Tennessee Human Rights Act (THRA), and the Tennessee Public Protection Act (TPPA),
for damages resulting from her unlawful termination and to remedy violations of the
wage provisions of the FLSA.
I. Factual Background
The facts are taken from Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint [R. 26]. Crumpley was
employed by Anderson County from 1995 until her termination on October 9, 2014. She
was initially hired as a School Resource officer in the Sheriff’s Department. In 2004, she
transferred to the Department of Public Works, and became certified to perform
residential and commercial inspections.

Her normally scheduled shift was Monday

through Friday, 8:00 a.m. until 5:00 p.m. She was a non-exempt, hourly employee.
Crumpley states she seldom received a duty-free meal period and she frequently worked
at home after 5:00 p.m. She avers she was not paid for all hours worked or an overtime
premium for all hours worked over 40 hours in a workweek.
David Crowley was hired in September 2012 to be the Director of the Department
of Public Works. Crumpley avers that Crowley was never certified to perform any
inspections; nevertheless, Crowley performed inspections without being certified and
ordered Crumpley to sign his inspection reports, which she refused to do.
In 2013, Crumpley was contacted by the State Fire Marshal and asked about
Crowley’s qualifications to perform building inspections. Crumpley cooperated with the
State Fire Marshall, answered his questions, and referred him to other individuals to
provide more information. The State Fire Marshal’s office performed an audit on the
Department and Crowley in February 2013. After the audit, the State of Tennessee
Department of Commerce and Insurance ordered Crowley to stop performing inspections
until he became properly certified.
Anderson County Mayor Terry Frank called Crumpley to the HR office and asked
her if she had given anyone information about Crowley performing inspections.
Crumpley told Mayor Frank that she “answered the state’s questions and referred them to
you” for further information.
Crumpley was subsequently contacted by the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation
(TBI), which was conducting an investigation into Crowley’s activities. Crumpley met
with a TBI agent on two occasions and cooperated in the investigation. Crumpley states
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that after Crowley learned of the TBI investigation, he harassed her and set out on a plan
to terminate her in retaliation for her refusal to participate in his illegal activities and for
her participation (whistleblowing) in the state’s investigation.

Due to Crowley’s

harassment/retaliation, Crumpley developed a serious health condition which required
treatment by a doctor and incapacitated her for 3 days. She advised the County’s Human
Resources Director Cathy Best on October 3, 2014, that she needed to take FMLA leave.
Crumpley also notified Crowley of her need for leave due to her health condition. Best
told Crumpley to bring in a doctor’s statement, and Best would help Crumpley fill out the
FMLA paperwork. Crumpley returned to work on October 6, but went home sick due to
stress. She was out October 7 and 8, and provided notice to the County.
On October 7, 2014, Crowley was indicted by the Anderson County grand jury for
conducting illegal inspections. Crowley was notified of the indictment on October 8 and
arranged to surrender to law enforcement authorities the next day October 9.
On October 9, prior to his surrender to authorities, Crowley sent a text to
Crumpley asking her to call him. She returned his call and Crowley terminated her
employment with Anderson County. Crumpley received a copy of her Separation Notice
on October 15, 2014, stating that she was terminated for “Insubordination.”
Crowley openly told people he wanted only men working full time in the
Department. He told Crumpley that he would only hire a “man” for a vacant Codes
Officer position to replace a female who had just left. After terminating Crumpley,
Crowley replaced her with a male employee.

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II. Standard for Motion to Dismiss
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
requires the court to construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
accept all the complaint’s factual allegations as true, and determine whether the plaintiff
undoubtedly can prove no set of facts in support of the plaintiff’s claim that would entitle
plaintiff to relief. Meador v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 902 F.2d 474, 475 (6th Cir.)
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 867 (1990). The court may not grant such a motion to dismiss
based upon a disbelief of a complaint’s factual allegations. Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d
1196, 1198 (6th Cir. 1990); Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 377 (6th Cir. 1995) (noting
that courts should not weigh evidence or evaluate the credibility of witnesses). The court
must liberally construe the complaint in favor of the party opposing the motion. Id.
However, the complaint must articulate more than a bare assertion of legal conclusions.
Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434 (6th Cir. 1988). “[The]
complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material
elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.” Id. (citations omitted).
III. FMLA Claims
Defendants move to dismiss Crumpley’s claims for violation of the FMLA on the
basis that her Amended Complaint fails to allege that the County or Crowley did anything
to interfere with or retaliate against Crumpley after she informed HR that she needed to
take FMLA leave on October 3, 2014.

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Crumpley responds that she was terminated 6 days after requesting FMLA leave,
which is sufficient to establish a claim for interference/retaliation under the FMLA on the
basis of temporal proximity. The Court agrees.
A plaintiff states a claim for retaliation under the FMLA by showing that (1) she
was engaged in a statutorily protected activity, (2) her employer knew that she was
exercising her FMLA rights, (3) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) a
causal connection existed between the protected activity and the adverse employment
action. Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co., 681 F.3d 274, 283 (6th Cir. 2012). To
establish a claim for FMLA interference, a plaintiff must show (1) she was an eligible
employee, (2) the defendant was an “employer” as defined under the FMLA, (3) she was
entitled to leave under the FMLA, (4) she gave the employer notice of her intention to
take leave, and (5) the employer denied or interfered with the employee’s FMLA benefits
to which she was entitled. Wallace v. FedEx Corp., 764 F.3d 571, 585 (6th Cir. 2014).
Defendants challenge only the last element of each claim – that there was a causal
connection between Crumpley’s protected activity and the alleged retaliation/interference
with her entitlement to FMLA benefits.
The Amended Complaint states that due to the harassment and stress Crowley put
her under, Crumpley developed a serious health condition. She advised the County and
Crowley on October 3 that she needed to take FMLA leave. Crumpley returned to work
on October 6, but went home sick due to stress. She remained out of work on October 7
and 8. Crowley was indicted by the Anderson County grand jury on October 7. On
October 9, Crowley terminated Crumpley’s employment with Anderson County. The
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Court finds that the temporal proximity between the time Crumpley requested FMLA
leave and her termination only days later is enough, along with the other allegations in
her Amended Complaint, to state claims for FMLA retaliation and interference.
Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss Crumpley’s FMLA claims will be denied.
IV. Title VII and § 1983 Claims
Defendants move to dismiss Crumpley’s claims brought under Title VII for sexual
discrimination and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for First Amendment harassment/retaliation
because Crumpley did not attach a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC allowing her to
commence an action in court.

Defendant’s motion was filed prior to the filing of

Crumpley’s Amended Complaint which includes as an attachment, a Notice of Right to
Sue issued by the EEOC on January 15, 2015 [R. 26]. Accordingly, defendants’ motion
to dismiss the Title VII claim and § 1983 claim for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies will be denied as moot.
V. State Law Claims
Defendants move to dismiss Crumpley’s state law claims alleging violations of the
THRA and the TPPA, because her state law claims predominate over her federal claims;
therefore, the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state
claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
28 U.S.C. § 1367 provides district courts with supplemental jurisdiction over state
law claims “so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they
form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States
Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Here, Crumpley’s state law termination claims and
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her federal claims are closely intertwined and form part of the same case or controversy.
Moreover, where adjudication of the state law claims “will likely require the same
witnesses, evidence, and determination of the same or similar facts as the adjudication of
the federal claims, the state law claims cannot be said to predominate over the federal law
claims.” See Brusco v. Cnty of Montgomery, 2011 WL 3021526 (M.D.Tenn. July 21,
2011) (finding that it would be wasteful for common issues to be adjudicated in both state
and federal court). At this point in the litigation, the Court cannot find that judicial
economy would be served by dismissing Crumpley’s state law claims, and defendants’
motion will be denied.
VI. Punitive Damages Claim
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages on the grounds
that damages under the TPPA are tied to the limitations on nonpecuniary awards under
the THRA. Because punitive damages are not available under the THRA, defendants
assert Crumpley’s claim for punitive damages must be dismissed.
Crumpley responds that whether punitive damages are available under the TPPA
is a question that has not yet been settled by Tennessee courts. Crumpley acknowledges
that the THRA has never provided for punitive damages, but states that in Coffey v. City
of Oak Ridge, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 564, the Tennessee Court of Appeals found that
“the issue of punitive damages when a suit is brought under the TPPA has not been
addressed by the courts and is an issue of first impression.” Id. at 18. The Tennessee
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to defendants, and
found the issue of punitive damages pretermitted.
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Because punitive damages under the TPPA have not been foreclosed by the
Tennessee courts, defendant’s motion to dismiss this claim will be denied.
VII. Motion to Stay/Dismiss David Crowley
Last, Defendants move to stay the action against Crowley, or, in the alternative,
dismiss Crowley as an unnecessary party. In support of the motion, defendants state that
on October 7, 2014, Crowley was indicted by an Anderson County grand jury alleging
violations of Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-120-113, and the criminal trial is scheduled for April
27, 2016. Defendants state the allegations of Plaintiff’s civil complaint overlap the
criminal indictments.

Crowley has a Fifth Amendment right not to be deposed or

otherwise testify, and he cannot be compelled to produce documents or other items and
tangible things in violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege.

In the alternative,

Defendants move to dismiss Crowley as an unnecessary party in this action, stating that
because Anderson County is also named as a party defendant, Plaintiff’s claims can move
forward without Crowley as a named defendant.
Plaintiff responds that Crowley’s ability to defend himself in the criminal action
will not be hampered by his participation in the civil case, and defendants’ motion to stay
should be denied.
Whether to stay a civil action pending resolution of a parallel criminal prosecution
is not a matter of constitutional right, but rather, one of court discretion, that should be
exercised when the interests of justice so require. United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 12
n. 27. A district court should stay a civil action only upon a showing of “special
circumstances,” so as to prevent the defendant from suffering substantial and irreparable
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prejudice. Securities and Exchange Com. v. First Fin. Group of Texas, Inc., 659 F.2d,
660, 668 (5th Cir. 1981). Here, Crumpley participated in an investigation of Crowley by
the TBI, and she may be called as a witness in the criminal case. The Court finds that a
limited stay as to Defendant Crowley until the criminal trial takes place on April 27, 2016
is appropriate. The stay does not apply to Defendant Anderson County, and the County
will fully comply with discovery during the stay. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to
stay will be granted, as modified.
VIII. Conclusion
In light of the foregoing discussion, the following action is taken:
1.

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s FMLA claims [R. 14, 34] is

DENIED.
2.

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Title VII claim and § 1983 claim

[R. 16] is DENIED as moot.
3.

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claims [R. 21] is

DENIED.
4.

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages [R.

18, 32] is DENIED.
5.

Defendants’ motion to stay/dismiss the action against David Crowley [R.

12, 36] is GRANTED to the extent that this action is stayed against David Crowley
until May 2, 2016, at which time the stay will be lifted. The motion to dismiss David
Crowley as a party defendant is DENIED.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
A S S
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