Istre et al v. Hensley Partnership et al (TV1)

Filing 18

ORDER denying 11 plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Signed by Chief District Judge Thomas A Varlan on June 2, 2015. (AYB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
PHILIP ISTRE and
WILLIAM CHRETIEN,
Plaintiffs,
v.
HENSLEY PARTNERSHIP and
MARION FRANKLIN,
Defendants.

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No.:

3:15-CV-127-TAV-HBG

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This civil action is before the Court on the Motion for Preliminary Injunction
[Doc. 11]. Defendants filed a response [Doc. 13], plaintiffs replied [Doc. 14], and
defendants filed a supplemental response [Doc. 15]. The Court held a hearing on the
motion and took the matter under advisement. After careful consideration of the record
and the relevant law, the Court finds that the Anti-Injunction Act precludes the Court
from issuing the requested injunction.
I.

Background
Plaintiff Philip Istre is a resident of Sevier County who has multiple sclerosis

(“MS”) [Doc. 1 ¶ 1]. Plaintiff William Chretien is also a resident of Sevier County who
has prostate cancer [Id. ¶ 2]. Plaintiffs allege they are handicapped within the meaning of
the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) [Id. ¶¶ 1–2].

On or about March 4, 2005, plaintiffs entered into a residential lease with
defendant Hensley Partnership for real property located at 428 Keegan Drive, Apartment
#28, Pigeon Forge, Tennessee 37863, for a term of four months [Id. ¶ 9]. According to
plaintiffs, the term of the lease automatically renewed for four-month terms unless
otherwise specified by Hensley [Id.].
On or about July 9, 2013, plaintiffs requested accommodations for Istre’s MS [Id.
¶ 13]. Specifically, plaintiffs asked defendants to designate a handicapped parking spot
in front of the leased premises and provide a ramp permitting ingress and egress from the
leased premises [Id.]. Plaintiffs assert they offered to pay for these expenses [Id.].
Defendants allegedly denied these accommodations on the same day, stating that
plaintiffs could move to an apartment with handicap accessibility when it became
available [Id. ¶ 14]. Plaintiffs assert the accessible apartments have become vacant but
defendants have never offered them to plaintiffs [Id.].
Plaintiffs claim defendants have stated that “the HUD Rules” do not apply to
defendants [Id. ¶ 15]. Even so, Istre told Franklin that he would contact HUD for
assistance [Id. ¶ 16]. The next day, defendants sent plaintiffs a letter, which stated that
“[defendants] have received numerous telephone calls from several tenants . . .
concerning the excessive complaints of racial harassment and harassment. If we have
continued complaints we will be forced to terminate your lease with us” [Id.]. According
to plaintiffs, they have never made racial comments or harassed any tenants [Id.].

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Defendants then attempted to evict plaintiffs [Id. ¶ 17]. By letter dated July 10,
2013, defendants advised plaintiffs they had five days to vacate the unit due to late/nonpayment of rent [Id.]. At the hearing, plaintiffs’ counsel clarified that defendants dropped
this eviction effort. About three months later, on October 22, 2013, plaintiffs requested
handicapped accessible parking again but defendants denied that request [Id. ¶ 18]. Then,
on or about October 31, 2013, plaintiffs requested a ramp, but defendants told plaintiffs
the ramp would have to be removed when not in use [Id. ¶ 19].
Plaintiffs again requested parking in May 2014 [Id. ¶ 20]. Defendants allegedly
accused plaintiffs of having an inoperable vehicle and demanded its removal, threatening
to tow the vehicle at plaintiffs’ expense if it were not removed [Id.]. According to
plaintiffs, at that time, the vehicle’s battery was dead, and defendants treated other
tenants whose vehicles were inoperable differently from plaintiffs [Id.]. Again in the
summer of 2014, plaintiffs requested a ramp and designated handicapped parking [Id. ¶
21]. Defendants denied the request for a ramp but did say they would provide a concrete
bucket handicapped sign [Id.]. Plaintiffs allege that defendants never provided such a
sign [Id.].
On December 18, 2014, Istre notified Marion Franklin, the property manager, that
the tenants in Unit 34 were jumping across the floor twenty-five to thirty times [Id. ¶ 23].
According to plaintiffs, Franklin explained that the jumping was a response to Istre
contacting law enforcement about loud music in the upstairs apartment [Id.]. Plaintiffs

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allege defendants ignored their complaints about loud music and told the tenants to make
as much noise as they wanted until ten o’clock [Id.].
On December 24, 2014, Hensley provided plaintiffs with an eviction notice, which
was signed by Franklin. The notice provided plaintiffs until January 21, 2015, to vacate
the leased premises [Id. ¶ 10].

As grounds, the final eviction notice provided: (1)

“[l]ate/non-payment of rent;” (2) “[n]on-payment of rent promised to pay by 12/12/14 per
Philip [Istre] $600 w/ late [fee];” (3) “[d]isorderly conduct;” (4) “[h]arassment of
multiple tenants who have in the past occupied WV34, WV35, WV 29, or still do;” (5)
“[r]epeated rule violations;” (6) “[v]andalism – damage to ceiling in kitchen + living area
from broom/mop;” and (7) “refusing pest control + A/C filter change” [Id. ¶ 11 (some
alterations in original)].
On or about January 23, 2015, Hensley filed detainer action in the General
Sessions Court for Sevier County against Chretien and all occupants for possession of the
leased premises [Doc. 11]. Plaintiffs attempted to remove the action to this Court, 3:15CV-62-TAV-CCS, and file a counterclaim and third-party action under the FHA, but
upon motion by defendants, the Court dismissed the counterclaims without prejudice and
remanded the action to state court for lack of jurisdiction. Plaintiffs then commenced this
action and filed a complaint with the Tennessee Human Rights Commission (“THRC”)
[Id.]. The THRC sent a “Refrain Letter” to Hensley, which requested that Hensley
refrain from taking any legal action pending the investigation [Id.].

According to

plaintiffs, defendants did not refrain from taking further legal action but set the detainer
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action for trial on May 11, 2015 [Id.]. The General Sessions Court issued a judgment in
favor of Hensley [Id.]. Under the judgment, Hensley is entitled to possession of the
leased unit and back rent of $3,250 [Doc. 13]. Plaintiffs encountered issues in appealing
the judgment and, on the day of the injunction hearing, filed a petition for writ of
mandamus with the General Sessions Court requesting an order instructing the clerk to
file an appeal [Doc. 14]. Plaintiffs also filed a motion to stay execution of the judgment
[Doc. 15].
In their complaint, plaintiffs assert disability discrimination and failure to provide
reasonable accommodation in violation of the FHA, retaliation in violation of the FHA,
Tennessee common law breach of contract, violation of the Landlord Tenant Act, and
Tennessee common law conspiracy [Doc. 1].

Plaintiffs seek at least $1,000,000 in

compensatory damages and at least $2,000,000 in punitive damages [Id.]. They further
seek attorney’s fees and costs, pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, to be left in the
quiet of their residence, and any other relief the Court deems appropriate [Id.].
II.

Analysis
Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party to seek injunctive

relief if the party believes it will suffer irreparable harm or injury during the pendency of
an action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65. A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy
never awarded as of right.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008).
In determining whether to grant a plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief, the Court
must consider four factors: (1) whether the movant would suffer irreparable harm without
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the injunction; (2) whether issuance of the injunction would cause substantial harm to
others; (3) whether the public interest would be served by the issuance of the injunction;
and (4) whether the movant has demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the
merits. Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov’t, 305 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir.
2002) (citation omitted); accord Tumblebus, Inc. v. Cranmer, 399 F.3d 754, 760 (6th Cir.
2005) (citation omitted). The factors are to be balanced and are “not prerequisites that
must be met.” Certified Restoration Dry Cleaning Network, L.L.C. v. Tenke Corp., 511
F.3d 535, 542 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The Court need not engage in a discussion of the preliminary injunction factors,
however, because the Court finds the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, precludes
the relief requested by plaintiffs. The Anti-Injunction Act provides: “A court of the
United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as
expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or
to protect or effectuate its judgments.” 28 U.S.C. § 2283. Plaintiffs are asking the Court
to stay the proceedings in state court—specifically, to preclude defendants from
executing on the detainer warrant for possession of the leased premises—which is an act
expressly proscribed by the Anti-Injunction Act.
In addition, it does not seem any of the three exceptions set forth in the AntiInjunction Act apply. Both parties agree neither the first nor third exception applies here,
and the Court agrees. See Scherbenske v. Wachovia Mortg., FSB, 626 F. Supp. 2d 1052,
1059 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (noting that there is no federal statute authorizing the Court to
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enjoin a state unlawful detainer action). Regarding the second exception, the injunction
plaintiffs seek is not necessary in aid of the court’s jurisdiction. Courts have applied this
second exception in only two scenarios: “where the case is removed from the state court,
and where the federal court acquires in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction over a case
involving real property before the state court does.”

Martingale LLC v. City of

Louisville, 361 F.3d 297, 302 (6th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).

Neither of these

scenarios exists here, and “courts have consistently held that this exception does not
apply to a request for [an injunction] to enjoin the execution of a state-court
unlawful detainer judgment.” Brinson v. Univ. Am. Mortg. Co., No. G-13-463, 2014 WL
722398, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 24, 2014). See also Gray v. La Salle Bank NA, No. 13-cv03692, 2013 WL 4711672, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2013); Michener v. Wells Fargo
Home Mortg., No. 12-2003, 2012 WL 3027538, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2012).
Accordingly, the Court finds the Anti-Injunction Act applies here and precludes
the requested injunction. See Knoles v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 513 F. App’x 414, 416
(5th Cir. 2013) (affirming denial of TRO where plaintiff sought to enjoin a bank from
“enforcing a valid extant judgment of a Texas court”). And were the Court to consider
the preliminary injunction factors, the Court would note that, despite plaintiffs’ assertions
of irreparable harm, money damages are an available form of relief for plaintiffs’ FHA
claims, see 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(1), and plaintiffs have made little effort in demonstrating
the likelihood of success of their claims.

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III.

Conclusion
For the reasons set forth herein, the Court hereby DENIES plaintiffs’ Motion for

Preliminary Injunction [Doc. 11].
IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ Thomas A. Varlan
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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