Baker v. ASSA - Abloy, Inc. et al (TV2)

Filing 40

MEMORANDUM OPINION: The Defendants motion [Doc. 34 ] is GRANTED and the Plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED with prejudice. An appropriate Order shall enter. Signed by Magistrate Judge H Bruce Guyton on 2/23/16. (JBR) Modified to reflect c/m on 2/23/2016 (JBR).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE

DONNIE RAY BAKER,

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Plaintiff,
v.
ASSA- ABLOY, INC, et al.,
Defendants.

No. 3:15-CV-145
(GUYTON)

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This case is before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 636(c), Rule 73(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the consent of the parties, for all further proceedings,
including entry of judgment [Doc. 15].

Before the Court is the Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment [Doc. 34]. The Plaintiff filed a Response in opposition [Doc. 36], and the
movants filed a reply [Doc. 37]. For the reasons set forth more fully below, the Defendants’
motion [Doc. 34] will be GRANTED.
I.

Relevant Facts
The established and undisputed facts in this case are as follows. The Plaintiff, Donnie

Ray Baker (”Baker”) is a former employee of Yale Security, Inc. (“Yale”), a manufacturer of
door locks and hardware. Baker was employed by Yale in approximately 1988. In 1992, Baker
suffered an on the job injury which caused him to miss approximately three years of work.
When Baker finally was released to return to work, with restrictions, there were no jobs he could

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perform. Yale terminated Baker’s employment on May 1, 1996. Baker accrued 7.75 years of
credited service for retirement benefit purposes.
In February 1997, Baker sued Yale in this Court, asserting claims for discrimination on
the basis of disability. Later that year, the parties entered into a settlement agreement to resolve
the case. The Settlement Agreement and Release was signed by Baker on August 21, 1997.
Mr. Baker received $2,000.00 payment. In exchange, he agreed to dismiss his lawsuit against
Yale and to release all claims against Yale. The release paragraph includes a broad release of all
claims, except that both parties agreed:
that this release shall not be construed as a release by Baker of any
legal rights he has or might possess under the Employment
Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., as
amended, pertaining to his statues [sic] as a participant in a
retirement plan maintained, operated and/or sponsored by Yale
Security.
Following the August 1997 settlement, Baker attempted to claim retirement benefits
under Yale’s retirement plan. Yale informed Baker that he had 7.75 years of credited service,
which was less than the 10 years necessary for him to qualify for disability retirement benefits.
Baker, however, continued to seek retirement benefits, including disability retirement benefits.
No benefits were granted to him, because Yale had determined that he was not eligible. In 2000,
ASSA-Abloy purchased Yale, and ASSA-Abloy remains the parent company of Yale. The
Defendant, Barbara Cran (“Cran”), is the Manager for Benefits Administration for ASSA-Abloy.
In 2014, Baker began a series of communications with Cran, again requesting retirement
benefits and disability retirements benefits. Specifically, Baker requested a one-time special
lump-sum payment of all of his vested pension. Cran granted this request by letter dated

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October 27, 2014. Cran calculated Mr. Baker’s entitlement to benefits under the terms of the
plan based on his 7.75 years of credited service with Yale. As a result, Baker was entitled to a
lump-sum payment of $16,714.81 for pension benefits. Cran presented this to Baker as a full
and final settlement of his claim for pension benefits under Yale’s plan, and Baker accepted it as
such. Cran, however, denied Baker’s request for disability retirement benefits on the ground
that Baker had 7.75 years of credited service, not the ten years required for those benefits.
Baker challenges the Defendant’s position that he has 7.75 years of credited service.
Baker claims that when he was hired by Yale in 1988, Jack Atkins, then the vice president of
Human Resources for Yale, made an oral agreement with Baker that if Baker would cross a
union picket line, Baker simply would be given 16 years of additional seniority for retirement
benefit purposes, even though he did not actually work those years. Cran refused to allow Baker
an additional 16 years of credited service, as there was no documentation of such and, in any
event, the retirement plan based credited service on actual hours of service with Yale Security.
Baker presents two documents in support of his claim that at the outset of his
employment he was “gifted” 16 years of credited service: his termination letter, and an Annual
Statement of Credited Service from 1988-1989. There are two versions of the termination letter.
The version of the termination letter on which Baker relies includes the following sentence:
“Due to sixteen years seniority Yale Security, Inc., gave you, you are entitled to Disability
Retirement Benefits.” The original version of the termination letter, however, does not include
the above-quoted sentence, which Defendants claim was inserted by Baker after receipt, on the
second page between the last two paragraphs. There also are two versions of the Annual
Statement of Credited Service from 1988-1989. The Annual Statement of Credited Service on
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which Baker relies indicates that the “Total Years of Credited Service for Vesting as of 1-31-88
to 01-31-89” is 16.0 years and the “Total Years of Credited Service for Pension Accrual As of
01-31-88 to 1-31-89” is 16.4 years. By contrast, however, the original Annual Statement of
Credited Service does not include any reference to 16 years of credited service. The original
document has only .4 years of credited service. Defendants assert that Baker simply added a
“16” in front of that number sometime after his receipt of the document.
II.

Plaintiff’s Claims
The Plaintiff objects to only having been given 7.75 years of credited service, as this

resulted in a lower lump-sum payment and in the denial of Disability Retirement benefits.
Baker asserts that these actions are grounds for a breach of contract claim and a disability
discrimination claim.
III.

Standard of Review
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), summary judgment is proper if Athe pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.@ The burden of establishing there is no genuine issue of material fact lies upon the
moving party. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330 n.2 (1986). The court must view the
facts and all inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587. To establish a genuine issue as to the
existence of a particular element, the non-moving party must point to evidence in the record upon
which a reasonable jury could find in its favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

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248 (1986). The genuine issue must also be material; that is, it must involve facts that might
affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Id.
The judge=s function at the point of summary judgment is limited to determining whether
sufficient evidence has been presented to make the issue of fact a proper jury question, and not to
weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, or determine the truth of the matter. Id. at
249. Thus, A[t]he inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the
need for trial B whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be
resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either
party.@ Id. at 250.
IV.

Analysis of Claims

A.

Breach of Contract Claim

Baker claims that Defendants have breached the 1997 Settlement Agreement and
Release by not allowing him to participate in Yale Security’s retirement plan. The Court,
however, agrees with the Defendants that a breach of contract claim based on the denial of
benefits under an ERISA plan is preempted by ERISA. See Gordon v. Barnes Pumps, Inc., 999
F.2d 133, 137 (6th Cir. 1993); Harper v. Occidental Petroleum Servs., Inc., 111 F.3d 131, at *2
(6th Cir. 1997).

Accordingly, the Court must dismiss Baker’s breach of contract claim.

Hutchison v. Fifth Third Bancorp., 469 F.3d 583, 584 (6th Cir. 2006) (affirming dismissal of
breach of contract claim because it was preempted by ERISA).
B.

Settlement Agreement and Release

Moreover, Baker bases his breach of contract claim on one sentence in the

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Settlement Agreement and Release, which simply provides that the broad release of all claims
does not affect any right he might have under ERISA.
[t]he parties agree that this release shall not be construed as a
release by Baker of any legal rights he has or might possess under
the Employment Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §
1001 et seq., as amended, pertaining to his statues [sic] as a
participant in a retirement plan maintained, operated and/or
sponsored by Yale Security.
The Court finds that this provision does not confer on or grant to Baker any right with
respect to participation in Yale Security’s retirement plan. The provision states only that the
release of claims does not operate to bar any claims that Baker has or might in the future have
under ERISA because of his status as a participant in Yale Security’s retirement plan.
Therefore, based on this language, Defendants’ benefits decisions concerning Baker do not
constitute a breach of the Settlement Agreement.
Moreover, Baker’s breach of contract claim rests on his allegation that he has been
prohibited or prevented from participating in the plan:
Q. Okay. Go back to Exhibit 1, which is your complaint - A. Okay.
Q. - - Page 5 of 9.
A. Okay.
Q. You note in here, starting at the top, that Barbara Cran denied
you the extra credited service and disability retirement benefits - A. From the - Q. - - and she gave you the onetime lump-sum offer of sixteen
thousand seven hundred fifteen dollars ($16,715).

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A. Yes, sir.
Q. And she said that you had the right to request review of that
denial. Right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you request review of that denial?
A. That’s where I went and I filed - - it said I had a hundred and
eighty days to request to be filed by the 6th of - - 27th of ’15; and,
by union book, I filed a federal suit. That’s where I filed this
complaint April the 1st of ’15.
Q. So this complaint is your attempt to request review of that
denial. Correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And, on down the page, five lines up from the bottom, you said
you filed this civil suit for, in part and in whole, breach of contract
and for discrimination against the disabled. Right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And we’ve talked about the breach of contract. That is the
breach of the settlement agreement.
A. Right.
Q. Right? What is the discrimination against the disabled?
A. I have got a dis - - the disability. They refused for three years to
- - to do anything besides deny me an opportunity to do a job in the
- - in the - - in the company for - - when Dr. Wallace released me
to go back to work, I was under the intentions of good faith to
being put on one of the jobs that - - with my restrictions that I
could do.
And, at the time, there was brass machining, which I was told I had
to wait for an opening. I filed, through the union, to transfer to a
drill press job or brass machining, a job that would fit my
restrictions, which I was denied on the letter, if there was a job, I
still wouldn’t have it, or they wouldn’t put me in it and. . .
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Baker’s claim must fail because it is factually inaccurate. Baker received a $16,714.81
lump-sum payment, which he accepted as full and final settlement of his claim for pension
benefits under Yale Security’s retirement plan. Baker actually concedes that he has been granted
all benefits to which he was entitled based on his 7.75 years of credited service:
Q. Let me ask - - let’s go back to Exhibit 8, and let me ask you a
couple more questions on it. So, if you flip to the third page of
Exhibit 8 - A. Okay. Third, second - - third page.
Q. You see where it says: “Not eligible. Had less than ten years of
service”?
A. Right. Like in - Q. Right?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. And, if you flip to the fourth page on the pension data record
that you were talking about - A. Right.
Q. - - in 1988, it has you point-four years of credited service.
Correct?
A. That’s what it says right there, yeah.
Q. That’s what it says.
A. “For your accumulated credit service, point-four.”
Q. Not sixteen-point-four.
A. There, then, that is going to Exhibit 7, Paragraph 4: “While all
efforts have been made to report information accurately, the

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accumulation and calculation of data and information can be
wrong.”
Q. But you - A. But it never - Q. But listen. On this pension data record, it has point-four for
1988. Correct?
A. That’s what it says on the paper here, yeah.
Q. And, if you flip to the very last page, the left-hand side of the
page, about a quarter of the way down, it says: “Service at Term:
Seven-point-seven-five.” Isn’t that correct?
A. Yeah. To the right side, it says: “Seven-point-seventy-five.”
Q. Uh-huh. And that is how many years of service that Ms. Cran
concluded you had in 2014. Correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And that’s how many years of service that Williams Holdings
concluded you had in the letter that’s Exhibit 7. Correct?
A. Of which - - yeah. They’ve got down - - they marked through
the fifty-five, straight up sixty-five; and then: “Must have ten years
of service to collect age sixty-two.” It only has
seven-point-seven-five, but - Q. So let me go back to Exhibit 6, which is Ms. Cran’s letter.
A. Let me put this-away. Okay? I’m with you.
Q. Exhibit 6.
A. Okay.
Q. That’s Ms. Cran’s letter from 2014. The second page, after the
Number 3, that full paragraph, beginning with the word: “Under.”
A. Yes, sir.
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Q. She says: “Under the terms of the plan, you cannot receive any
credited service that is not based on your actual hours of service
during your period of Yale Security employment.” Do you have
any reason to believe that that is not what the plan document says?
A. Well, I have not reason to believe that that’s what their plan
document says, but of what - - how would I say this? The Plaintiff,
or Donnie R. Baker, received or I was told would receive and - the benefits. And, as of their records, I’m treated as just a normal
person, fired - - or terminated, I mean. I don’t - Q. So, according to the company’s records - A. - - the ASSA ABLOY’s manager of benefits administration’s
records.
Q. Yes.
A. Okay.
Q. According to those records - - which, we believe, have you at
seven-point-seven-five years of credited service. Right?
A. Right.
Q. Then you’ve gotten everything you’re entitled to under the plan
if you only had seven-point-seven-five years. Is that correct?
A. I’m not figuring it that way. I mean, it’s - - I shouldn’t - - it
seven-point-five, with the way she figures. With just a normal
person, with normal retirement benefits, that would be what they
came up with, yes.
* * *
Q. But my question is, assuming it was only
seven-point-seven-five, assuming they were right - - and I know
you say they’re wrong - - but assuming they were right, then
you’ve gotten everything you would have been entitled to under the
plan as an employee with seven-point-seven-five years of credited
service.
A. As a regular employee.
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In summary, while Baker may allege that he was simply given, orally, 16 years of credited
service at the beginning of his employment, he was not prohibited from participating in the
retirement plan. Defendants have not breached the Settlement Agreement and Release. Baker
received the lump sum retirement plan payment for which he negotiated and for which he
released the Defendants. Baker and Yale Security, Inc., are the only parties to the Settlement
Agreement and Release.1
C.

Disability Discrimination

Baker contends that the Defendants have subjected him to “discrimination on the basis of
disability” by denying his request for retirement benefits. Essentially, he is asserting that he was
injured on the job and at some point thereafter treated “unfairly” by the Defendants. The
Defendants have raised several grounds upon which this amorphous claim must be dismissed.
1.

Any claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act is barred.
The Court finds that any employment-related disability discrimination claim by the

Plaintiff must be dismissed for the following reasons:
(a) Mr. Baker cannot demonstrate that he filed a Charge of
Discrimination with the EEOC within 300 days of the date of his
termination (May 1, 1996), which is a jurisdictional prerequisite
for filing a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Parry
v. Mohawk Motors of Michigan, Inc., 236 F.3d 299, 309 (6th Cir.
2000).

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It is not material to the Court’s decision that Baker produced versions of his termination letter
and his Annual Statement of Credited Service from 1988-1989 which have been altered from the
originals of those documents. These altered documents, submitted by Baker in support his
claim, are obvious forgeries, not the original documents. However, given the Court’s decision
to dismiss this case, the Court will decline to pursue the imposition of sanctions against this pro
se Plaintiff.
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(b) Even if Baker had filed an EEOC Charge, he did not file this
lawsuit within 90 days from the date on which he received a Notice
of Dismissal and Right to Sue. McGhee v. Disney Store, 53 F.
App’x 751, 752 (6th Cir. 2002).
(c) ASSA-ABLOY and Ms. Cran were not Mr. Baker’s “employer”
and thus he cannot assert a claim against them under the
Americans with Disabilities Act.
(d) In the 1997 Settlement Agreement and Release, Baker
specifically released and gave up any claim that he might have had
under the Americans with Disabilities Act, as follows:
“Baker. . . releases and forever discharges Yale Security. . . from
any and all liability, claims or causes of action which Baker has
now or which may hereafter accrue in connection with or related in
any way to his employment by Yale Security and/or his termination
from employment, including, without limitation, any claims of
discrimination that may be brought pursuant to. . . the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.”
The undisputed facts clearly demonstrate that Defendants are entitled to judgment as a
matter of law on any claim that Baker might be making under the Americans with Disabilities
Act. The bottom line is that Baker has zero factual evidence which would support any claim of
discrimination of any kind. Baker testified as follows:
Q: My question, though, is what makes you think it’s because of
your disability as opposed to some other reason? I know that you
have a disability, and I know that they - - they have denied you
what you think you’re entitled to. I understand those two things.
But what do you have that you think ties those two together, the
disability and the denial of benefits?
A: That ties them together?
Q: Yeah.
A. I’m - - I just wasn’t treated fairly. I mean - - that ties it together.
I was not treated fairly. They didn’t do what should have been done

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of reporting the information of - - coming from Yale Security’s
human resources, going to the ASSA ABLOY retirement plan.
Baker has only a subjective, conclusory belief that disability discrimination occurred.
There is no evidence in the record to connect Baker’s general claim that he was treated unfairly
to any disability.

This is insufficient, as a matter of law, to defeat summary judgment.

Holleman v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., No. 3:09-CV-311, 2011 WL 3876590, at *11
(E.D. Tenn. Sept. 1, 2011) (citing Mitchell v. Toldeo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 585 (6th Cir. 1992))
(“[The] Sixth Circuit has recognized that such conclusory allegations, subjective beliefs, and
inadmissible hearsay do not create genuine issues of material fact that may be used to defeat a
motion for summary judgment.”).
V.

Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Defendants= motion [Doc. 34] is GRANTED and the

Plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED with prejudice. An appropriate Order shall enter.

ORDER ACCORDINGLY:
ENTER:

United States Magistrate Judge

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