Murray v. Williams et al (TV3)
Filing
74
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: Plaintiffs are hereby ORDERED, within twenty-one (21) days from the date of this order, to show cause why the case against defendants Michelle Rios, Tennessee Department of Children's Services, and Denise Butler should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. Signed by Chief District Judge Thomas A Varlan on 3/22/16. (c/m) (JBR)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
LORETTA MURRAY, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
FRANK WILLIAMS, et al.,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
No.:
3:15-CV-284-TAV-HBG
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
The matter is before the Court on the following motions: (1) the Motion to
Dismiss filed by defendants Mark N. Foster, Dennis Miracle, and Glenda Faye Miracle
[Doc. 12]; (2) the Motion to Dismiss filed by defendant Rochelle Oldfield [Doc. 17]; (3)
the Motion to Dismiss filed by defendants Tywanna Walker and Frank Williams [Doc.
40]; (4) the Motion to Dismiss filed by defendants Michael Murphy and Vicky Murphy
[Doc. 46]; (5) the Motion to Dismiss filed by defendants Vicky Murphy and the Roane
County Emergency 911 Center [Doc. 48]; (6) the Motion to Dismiss filed by defendants
Mitchell Grigsby, Lucy Guy, Emily Hardin, Michael Murphy, and Roane County [Doc.
51]; (7) the Answer to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Supplement filed by plaintiffs,
which the Court interprets as a Motion to Amend the Pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 15(a) [Docs. 58, 59]; (8) the Motion to Strike Supplement filed by
defendants Mark Foster, Dennis Miracle, and Glenda Faye Miracle [Doc. 60]; (9) the
Motion to Strike Reply to Response filed by defendant Rochelle Oldfield [Doc. 61]; (10)
the Motion to Dismiss Defendants’ Motion to Strike filed by plaintiffs [Doc. 63]; (11) the
Motion to Strike Supplement filed by defendants Mitchell Grigsby, Lucy Guy, Emily
Hardin, Michael Murphy, and Roane County [Doc. 66]. The Court has reviewed the
responses and replies to the pending motions [Docs. 14, 34, 53, 54, 55, 57, 58, 63, 64, 65,
68].
For the reasons that follow, the Court will: (1) grant the Motion to Dismiss filed
by defendants Mark N. Foster, Dennis Miracle, and Glenda Faye Miracle [Doc. 12]; (2)
grant the Motion to Dismiss filed by defendant Rochelle Oldfield [Doc. 17]; (3) grant the
Motion to Dismiss filed by defendants Tywanna Walker and Frank Williams [Doc. 40];
(4) grant the Motion to Dismiss filed by defendants Michael Murphy and Vicky Murphy
[Doc. 46]; (5) grant the Motion to Dismiss filed by defendants Vicky Murphy and the
Roane County Emergency 911 Center [Doc. 48]; (6) grant the Motion to Dismiss filed by
defendants Mitchell Grigsby, Lucy Guy, Emily Hardin, Michael Murphy, and Roane
County [Doc. 51]; (7) grant the Motion to Amend the Pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 15(a) filed by plaintiffs [Docs. 58, 59]; (8) deny the Motion to Strike
Supplement filed by defendants Mark Foster, Dennis Miracle, and Glenda Faye Miracle
[Doc. 60]; (9) deny the Motion to Strike Reply to Response filed by defendant Rochelle
Oldfield [Doc. 61]; (10) deny the Motion to Dismiss Defendants’ Motion to Strike filed
by plaintiffs [Doc. 63]; and (11) deny the Motion to Strike Supplement filed by
defendants Mitchell Grigsby, Lucy Guy, Emily Hardin, Michael Murphy, and Roane
County [Doc. 66].
2
I.
Background1
Plaintiffs filed a lengthy complaint accompanied by voluminous exhibits.2 Their
grievances appear to be centered around four subjects: (1) the outcome of a state-court
litigation involving the real property rights of plaintiffs Loretta and Bobby Murray, (2)
the fact that plaintiff Billy Murray’s son has been taken into custody by the Tennessee
Department of Children’s Services, (3) the arrest of plaintiff Bobby Murray, and (4) the
dispatch of an emergency vehicle in response to a fire at plaintiff Billy Murray’s home
[Docs. 6, 59].
Plaintiffs Bobby and Loretta Murray were involved in a real property dispute with
defendants Dennis and Glenda Faye Miracle in Roane County Chancery Court case
number 16543 [Id.].
Defendant Mark Foster represented Dennis and Glenda Faye
Miracle in the action [Id.]. Defendant Frank Williams presided over the case in his
capacity as Roane County Chancellor [Id.]. Defendant Denise Butler was Bobby and
Loretta Murray’s attorney during this real property action [Id.].
Plaintiffs allege
generally that defendants Frank Williams, Denise Butler, Dennis Miracle, and Glenda
1
For the purposes of the motions to dismiss, the Court takes plaintiffs’ factual allegations
as true. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (noting that “when ruling on a
defendant’s motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all factual allegations contained in the
complaint” (citations omitted)).
As addressed herein, the Court will grant plaintiffs’ motion to amend the pleadings
[Docs. 58, 59], and considers the supplemental pleadings when summarizing the background of
the case.
2
The Court notes that plaintiffs filed a thirty-five page complaint of unnumbered factual
assertions, attached seventy-five pages of exhibits to the complaint, and filed an additional
pleading with further allegations [Docs. 6, 59].
3
Faye Miracle conspired together to ensure that plaintiffs Bobby and Loretta Murray
would lose the case [Id.].
Plaintiffs allege that defendant Williams violated their rights by refusing to recuse,
screaming at plaintiffs in the courtroom, insulting plaintiffs in the courtroom, withholding
evidence, and not swearing in witnesses [Id.]. Plaintiffs assert that defendant Foster
engaged in malpractice during the action and that both he physically assaulted and spit on
plaintiff Bobby Murray [Id.]. With respect to defendant Dennis Miracle, plaintiffs allege
that he routinely spies on neighbors, he has previously shot at plaintiffs, he films
plaintiffs regularly, and he has stalked plaintiffs repeatedly [Id.]. Plaintiffs allege that
defendant Glenda Faye Miracle accompanies Dennis Miracle while he commits these
wrongdoings [Id.].
Plaintiffs assert that defendant Denise Butler took money from
plaintiffs and then acted contrary to plaintiffs’ wishes [Id.].
Plaintiffs also discuss the circumstances surrounding the Tennessee Department of
Children’s Services taking custody of plaintiff Billy Murray’s son [Id.]. Plaintiffs allege
that defendants Michael Murphy, Vicky Murphy, Tywanna Walker, Michelle Rios,
Rochelle Oldfield, Emily Hardin, Lucy Guy, Mitchell Grigsby, and the Tennessee
Department of Children’s Services were all involved in a conspiracy to take the child
away from Billy Murray [Id.].
Defendants Michael and Vicky Murphy are involved in a court adoption action in
Roane County Chancery Court concerning Billy Murray’s son [Id.].
The son was
initially placed in foster care with the Murphys by the Tennessee Department of
4
Children’s Services [Id.].
Defendant Tywanna Walker, employee of the Tennessee
Department of Children’s Services, was involved in the case in her capacity as a caseworker [Id.]. Plaintiffs assert that Walker spoke to the child’s mother and convinced her
to give up parental rights [Id.]. Defendant Rochelle Oldfield was the court-appointed
guardian ad litem for the minor child, and plaintiffs allege that she forced the child’s
mother to give up her parental rights [Id.]. Plaintiffs allege that defendant Emily Hardin,
a court clerk, issued a false court order in this case [Id.]. Plaintiffs assert that defendants
Michael and Vicky Murphy, a Roane County sheriff’s deputy and a 911 dispatcher
respectively, took actions (or inactions) in their respective employment capacities solely
to further their interest in the adoption proceedings [Id.].
Plaintiffs also allege that there was a conspiracy to have plaintiff Bobby Murray
falsely imprisoned for false charges of murder [Id.]. Defendant Mitchell Grigsby was the
officer that arrested plaintiff Bobby Murray, and plaintiffs allege that the warrant he
executed was supposed to be for someone else [Id.]. Plaintiffs assert that Grigsby caused
his partner to act wrongfully toward plaintiff Bobby Murray [Id.]. Plaintiffs state that
defendant Lucy Guy, acting as a court clerk, issued a wrongful warrant [Id.].
The last event that plaintiffs’ complaint appears to center on is the dispatch of an
emergency vehicle to plaintiff Billy Murray’s home [Id.]. Plaintiffs allege that defendant
Vicky Murphy delayed the dispatch of a fire truck to Billy Murray’s home because she
was involved in the adoption of his child [Id.]. Consequently, they state that as a result of
Murphy’s negligence, Billy Murray’s home burned down [Id.].
5
Plaintiffs bring this suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of protections
guaranteed to them by the First, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the
Constitution [Id.]. Plaintiffs also appear to be alleging other various federal and state-law
claims against certain defendants [Id.]. Plaintiffs filed suit against Frank Williams,
Denise Butler, Mark Foster, Dennis Miracle, Glenda Faye Miracle, Michelle Rios,
Tywanna Walker, Rochelle Oldfield, Emily Hardin, Lucy Guy, Michael Murphy, Vicky
Murphy, and Mitchell Grigsby in their individual and professional capacities [Id.].
Plaintiffs also assert claims against Roane County and Roane County Emergency 911
Center [Id.].
II.
Motion to Amend the Pleadings3
Plaintiffs filed an “Answer to Defendants Motion to Dismiss” on August 17, 2015,
and within it reference an “Addendum” to the complaint, also filed on August 17, 2015
[Docs. 58, 59]. The Court will construe these documents as a motion to amend the
pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a).
A party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within twenty-one days
of serving it, or the earlier of twenty-one days of a defendant filing a responsive pleading
or serving a motion under Rule 12 (b), (e), or (f). Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). “In all other
3
While the motions to dismiss were filed before the motion to amend, motions to amend
shall be freely granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. Moreover, granting a motion to dismiss before
addressing a pending motion to amend can be an abuse of discretion. Thompson v. Superior
Fireplace Co., 931 F.2d 372, 374 (6th Cir. 1991). The Court, therefore, first addresses the
motion to amend.
6
cases, a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or
the court’s leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
“The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Id. Leave is
appropriate “[i]n the absence of . . . undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part
of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed,
undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or]
futility of the amendment.” Leary v. Daeschner, 349 F.3d 888, 905 (6th Cir. 2003)
(quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)) (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also Courie v. Alcoa Wheel & Forged Prods., 577 F.3d 625, 633 (6th Cir. 2009).
“Amendment of a complaint is futile when the proposed amendment would not permit
the complaint to survive a motion to dismiss.” Miller v. Calhoun Cnty., 408 F.3d 803,
817 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Neighborhood Dev. Corp. v. Advisory Council on Historic
Pres., 632 F.2d 21, 23 (6th Cir. 1980)).
Here, plaintiffs filed the motion to amend within twenty-one days of several
defendants filing a responsive pleading under Rule 12(b). Plaintiffs filed their motion to
amend on August 17, 2015 [Docs. 58, 59], which falls within twenty-one days of the
filing of motions to dismiss by the following defendants: Tywanna Walker and Frank
Williams, filed August 4, 2015 [Doc. 40]; Michael and Vicky Murphy (individually),
filed August 5, 2015 [Doc. 46]; Vicky Murphy (in her professional capacity) and Roane
County E. 911 Center, filed August 6, 2015 [Doc. 48]; Mitchell Grigsby, Lucy Guy,
Emily Hardin, Michael Murphy (in his professional capacity), and Roane County, filed
7
August 11, 2015 [Doc. 51]. Plaintiffs, therefore, amended their complaint as a matter of
course. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1).
Furthermore, the Court does not find delay, bad faith, or dilatory motive on the
part of plaintiffs, nor does the Court find that plaintiffs have repeatedly failed to cure
deficiencies by amendments previously allowed. Finally, there is no indication that
granting plaintiffs’ motion would result in undue prejudice to defendants. Accordingly,
plaintiffs’ motion to amend will be granted.
III.
Motion to Dismiss Defendants’ Motion to Strike
Plaintiffs filed a motion to strike [Doc. 63], in which plaintiffs move this Court to
disregard the motion to strike filed by defendants Mark Foster, Dennis Miracle, and
Glenda Faye Miracle [Doc. 60]. In support, plaintiffs argue that the motion should be
stricken because defendant Mark Foster filed the motion on behalf of himself as well as
defendants Dennis Miracle and Glenda Faye Miracle.
Mark Foster is representing himself in this action and the Miracles. On July 20,
2015, plaintiffs filed a motion to disqualify Mark Foster as counsel for Dennis Miracle
and Glenda Faye Miracle [Doc. 16]. On August 18, 2015, defendants Mark Foster,
Dennis Miracle, and Glenda Faye Miracle filed a motion to strike plaintiffs’ “addendum”
[Doc. 60], with Mark Foster as the undersigned counsel. On August 24, 2015, plaintiffs
filed a motion to strike defendants’ motion [Doc. 60] because the Court had not yet given
Mark Foster leave to represent Dennis or Glenda Faye Miracle. On September 15, 2015,
8
Magistrate Judge Shirley issued a memorandum and order denying plaintiffs’ motion to
disqualify counsel [Doc. 70].
The Court notes that plaintiffs provide no authority for the proposition that Mark
Foster could not file a motion on behalf of himself and the Miracles while there was a
motion to disqualify counsel pending. Additionally, Magistrate Judge Shirley ultimately
denied the motion to disqualify counsel. The Court, therefore, does not find grounds to
strike the motion to strike plaintiffs’ “addendum” filed by defendants Mark Foster,
Dennis Miracle, and Glenda Faye Miracle [Doc. 60], and plaintiffs’ motion will be
denied [Doc. 63].
IV.
Motions to Strike Plaintiffs’ “Answer to Defendants Motion to Dismiss” and
“Addendum”
Defendants Mitchell Grigsby, Lucy Guy, Emily Hardin, Michael Murphy, and
Roane County, filed a motion to strike plaintiffs’ answer to defendants’ motion to dismiss
and plaintiffs’ addendum [Doc. 66].
Defendants Mark Foster, Dennis Miracle, and
Glenda Faye Miracle filed a motion to strike plaintiffs’ addendum [Doc. 60].
Defendants Mitchell Grigsby, Lucy Guy, Emily Hardin, Michael Murphy, and
Roane County argue that plaintiffs’ answer to defendants’ motion to dismiss is
“irrelevant, impertinent, and prejudicial to the defendants” [Doc. 67 p. 4]. As noted
herein, however, the Court construes this document as a valid motion to amend.
Plaintiffs note in their response [Doc. 68] that their intent in filing the answer to
9
defendants’ motion to dismiss [Doc. 58] was to move to amend the complaint.4 The
Court, therefore, will not strike plaintiffs’ “Answer to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss”
[Doc. 58] or plaintiffs’ “Addendum” [Doc. 59]. The Court will consider these documents
as part of the record when deciding the motions to dismiss. Accordingly, defendants’
motions to strike will be denied [Docs. 60, 66].
V.
Motions to Dismiss
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) sets out a liberal pleading standard. Smith
v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 576 n.1 (6th Cir. 2004). It requires only “‘a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to
‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original)
(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Detailed factual allegations are not
required, but a party’s “obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’
requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (alteration in original) (quoting
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders
‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (alteration in original) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557)).
4
The plaintiffs urge the Court to “allow the Motion and the Addendum to stand” [Doc.
68 p. 2].
10
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must determine whether
the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. In doing so, the Court “construe[s] the complaint in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept[s] its allegations as true, and draw[s] all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Directv, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476
(6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556). “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief
will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Id. at 679 (citation omitted).
Pro se litigants “are held to less stringent [pleading] standards than . . . lawyers in
the sense that a pro se complaint will be liberally construed in determining whether it
fails to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.” Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108,
110 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); see also Haines
v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Yet, this Court’s “lenient treatment generally
accorded to pro se litigants has limits.” Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir.
1996). “Neither [this] Court nor other courts . . . have been willing to abrogate basic
pleading essentials in pro se suits.” Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989).
For instance, federal pleading standards do not permit pro se litigants to proceed on
pleadings that are not readily comprehensible. Cf. Becker v. Ohio State Legal Servs.
11
Ass’n, 19 F. App’x 321, 322 (6th Cir. 2001) (upholding a district court’s dismissal of a
pro se complaint containing “vague and conclusory allegations unsupported by material
facts”).
Because the Court will grant plaintiffs’ motions to amend the pleadings, the Court
considers the allegations in plaintiffs’ original pleadings as well as the proposed
pleadings in deciding defendants’ motions to dismiss. Upon review of the pleadings, it
appears that plaintiffs’ primary cause of action consists of § 1983 claims against all
defendants. Plaintiffs also contend that various defendants violated other federal and
state laws.
A.
Federal Claims
Plaintiffs allege § 1983 claims against all defendants and federal stalking claims
against defendants Dennis and Glenda Faye Miracle.
1.
Section 1983 Claims
Plaintiffs primarily base their complaint on allegations that defendants violated 42
U.S.C. § 1983. In order to prevail on a § 1983 claim, plaintiffs are required to prove two
elements: (1) they were “deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States,” and (2) they were “subjected or caused to be subjected to this deprivation
by a person acting under color of state law.” Gregory v. Shelby Cty., Tenn., 220 F.3d
433, 441 (6th Cir. 2000).
12
a.
Official Capacity
Pursuant to federal law, “[a]n official capacity claim filed against a public
employee is equivalent to a lawsuit directed against the public entity which that agent
represents.” Claybrook v. Birchwell, 199 F.3d 350, 355 n.4 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985)).
Roane County, Tennessee, is a
defendant in this action and has thus received notice of the claims against it. The Court,
therefore, finds it appropriate to dismiss plaintiffs’ official capacity claims against Emily
Hardin, Lucy Guy, Michael Murphy, Mitchell Grigsby, and Vicky Murphy because they
are all employees of Roane County.
b.
Acting Under Color of State Law
In order to prevail on a § 1983 claim, plaintiffs must allege that they were
subjected to a deprivation of a constitutional right by a person acting under color of state
law. A person acts under color of state law “only when exercising power possessed by
virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the
authority of state law.” Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317–18 (1981) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
(1)
Mark Foster
Plaintiffs allege that Mark Foster acted in ways that upset the plaintiffs in his
capacity as a nongovernmental lawyer representing a private, nongovernmental client in a
land dispute. It is well settled that “a lawyer representing a client is not, by virtue of
13
being an officer of the court, a state actor ‘under color of state law’ within the meaning of
§ 1983.” Id. at 318 (citations omitted).
Plaintiffs also allege that Mark Foster is a Rockwood City judge and mistreated
Jacob Murray in a proceeding [Doc. 6 p. 31–32]. Jacob Murray, however, is not a
plaintiff in this action. Plaintiffs, therefore, have not stated a cognizable claim that Mr.
Foster deprived the plaintiffs of constitutional rights while acting under the color of state
law.
Accordingly, the § 1983 claims against Mark Foster will be dismissed against him
both in his individual and professional capacity.
(2)
Dennis and Glenda Faye Miracle
Plaintiffs do not allege that the Miracles are anything but private citizens who live
near land owned by plaintiffs Loretta and Bobby Murray and that they are litigants in
matters in Roane County Chancery Court against the Murrays. Therefore, the § 1983
claims against the Miracles will be dismissed both in their individual and professional
capacities because plaintiffs have not alleged that the Miracles were acting under color of
state law.
(3)
Michelle Oldfield
As a preliminary matter, Rochelle Oldfield filed a motion to strike [Doc. 61]
plaintiffs’ reply briefs [Docs. 53, 57]. In support, Oldfield argues that plaintiffs did not
comply with Local Rule 7.1(d), which requires a party to seek leave of court before filing
additional briefs, which plaintiffs failed to do. Local Rule 7.1 permits three standard
14
briefs: (1) an opening brief; (2) a responsive brief; and (3) a reply brief. “No additional
briefs . . . or other papers in support of or in opposition of a motion shall be filed without
prior approval of the Court.” L.R. 7.1(d).
The Court, however, is mindful of the well-established tradition that federal courts
treat pro se litigations more leniently than they would parties represented by attorneys.
The Court construes plaintiffs’ additional briefs as motions for leave to file additional
briefs, and the Court will grant the motions. The Court will, therefore, deny defendant’s
motion to strike and will consider the additional briefs [Docs. 53, 57] in deciding the
motion to dismiss.
Plaintiffs allege that Oldfield conspired with other defendants to cause plaintiff
Billy Dean Murray to lose custody of his child, and that she used the power of her
position to illegally gain custody of the child.
Oldfield was acting in her capacity as a guardian ad litem when performing the
alleged actions that plaintiffs assert give rise to a § 1983 claim. Despite being appointed
by a court, a guardian ad litem is not a state actor, because he or she represents the best
interests of the individual, not the state. Bracey v. Barbour, No. 3:12-cv-629, 2012 WL
2395171, at *8 (M.D. Tenn. June 25, 2012) (citations omitted) (declining to find that a
guardian ad litem is a state actor for the purpose of § 1983). Although plaintiffs claim
that Oldfield was not acting in the best interest of the child, and was thus acting outside
the scope of her role as guardian ad litem, at no point do plaintiffs allege that Oldfield
was she representing the interests of the state.
15
Furthermore, persons who are integral parts of the judicial process, including
guardians ad litem, are entitled to absolute immunity from state or federal claims.
Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 345 (1983); Kurzawa v. Mueller, 732 F.2d 1456, 1458
(6th Cir. 1984) (extending immunity to guardians ad litem).
Plaintiffs have not stated a § 1983 claim against Oldfield upon which relief can be
granted.
Accordingly, the § 1983 claims against Oldfield in her individual and
professional capacity will be dismissed.
c.
Immunity from Suit
(1)
Frank Williams
Plaintiffs assert § 1983 claims against Chancellor Frank Williams contending that,
in a chancery court land dispute pending before him, he was biased, he screamed at
Loretta Murray, and he conspired with attorneys involved in the dispute.
It is well established that judges are absolutely immune from liability for judicial
acts committed within their jurisdiction. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9–10 (1991) (per
curiam). This immunity applies “even if a judge acts erroneously, corruptly, or in excess
of his jurisdiction.” Johnson v. Turner, 125 F.3d 324, 333 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing Mireles,
502 U.S. at 11–12). Judicial immunity is only overcome in two circumstances. Mireles,
502 U.S. at 11. Judges are not immune from liability “for non-judicial actions, i.e.,
actions not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity” or actions “taken in the complete
absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. at 11–12.
16
Here, plaintiffs’ allegations against defendant Williams all arise from actions
which were purportedly taken in his judicial capacity, including: being biased, yelling in
the courtroom, not recusing, etc., during the course of a land use conflict between several
of the plaintiffs and the Miracles. Williams was also acting in matters over which he
properly exercised chancery court jurisdiction. In Tennessee, the circuit courts are courts
of general jurisdiction.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-10-101.
The chancery courts have
concurrent subject matter jurisdiction with the circuit courts, in all civil causes of action,
except for a few limited exceptions for cases involving claims for unliquidated damages
which are not implicated in this case. Id. § 16-11-102(a). Williams, therefore, retains
judicial immunity because neither circumstance that can overcome judicial immunity
applies in this case. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11.
Accordingly, plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against Williams will be dismissed against
him in both his individual and official capacity.
(2)
Tywanna Walker
Plaintiffs assert § 1983 claims against Tywanna Walker, employee of the
Tennessee Department of Children’s Services, alleging that she “harangued” a child’s
mother into surrendering her rights, and also that she provided notice of a hearing to
plaintiffs Billy and Loretta Murray, and told them that it was a child-support hearing.
To the extent that Walker’s actions were taken in her capacity as a legal advocate,
she is entitled to absolute immunity. Pittman v. Cuyahoga Cty. Dep’t of Children &
Family Svs., 640 F.3d 716, 724–26 (6th Cir. 2011).
17
Furthermore, the doctrine of
qualified immunity protects a case-worker from liability for a substantive or procedural
due process claim in connection with any alleged misrepresentations unrelated to her role
as an advocate before the juvenile court because the case-worker did not cause the
deprivation of custody of the child. Id. at 726–30. In Pittman, the Sixth Circuit held:
Because the juvenile court has the ultimate decision-making power with
response to placement and custody, it alone could deprive Pittman of his
fundamental right. Therefore, [the case-worker’s] conduct did not violate
Pittman’s substantive due process rights, and she has qualified immunity
against that claim.
Id. at 729. Here, as in Pittman, the custody decision regarding Billy Dean Murray’s child
was perpetuated by the juvenile court, and not by any particular case-worker. Walker is,
therefore, entitled to either absolute or qualified immunity claims against here.
Accordingly, plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against Walker will be dismissed against
her in both her individual and official capacity.
d.
Deprived of a Constitutional Right
Plaintiffs broadly allege that they bring this suit pursuant to § 1983 for violations
of protections guaranteed to them by the First, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth
amendments of the Constitution. Plaintiffs have not identified, in any non-conclusory
manner, how any of the plaintiffs were deprived of any right protected by the
Constitution or federal law due to the actions of the remaining defendants. They allege
generally that a conspiracy existed to deprive plaintiffs of their rights broadly, without
specifying which federal right or rights the defendants allegedly affected, and how.
Conclusory allegations of a conspiracy are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.
18
See Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1538 (6th Cir. 1987) (affirming the dismissal of a
conspiracy claim where the “complaint merely alleged broad conclusory language void of
the factual allegations necessary to support a conspiracy theory”).
In addition to the broad conspiracy claims, to the extent that plaintiffs are alleging
individual claims against defendants, the Court will address the factual allegations
supporting the remaining § 1983 claims that the Court has not already found should be
dismissed on other grounds.
(1)
Emily Hardin
Plaintiffs allege § 1983 claims against defendant Hardin for scheduling a court
date for a custody hearing that plaintiffs disliked. This action alone is insufficient to
establish that defendant Hardin violated any of plaintiffs’ rights protected by the
Constitution or federal law. The Court will dismiss the § 1983 claims against defendant
Hardin.
(2)
Lucy Guy
Plaintiffs allege § 1983 claims against defendant Guy for refusing to help plaintiffs
and for issuing an illegal warrant. Absent further facts or explanation, this action alone is
insufficient to establish that defendant Guy violated any of plaintiffs’ rights protected by
the Constitution or federal law. The allegation that Guy issued the warrant wrongfully is
conclusory in that plaintiffs do not allege any corresponding facts further explaining the
circumstances that allegedly made the warrant illegal. The Court will dismiss the § 1983
claims against defendant Guy.
19
(3)
Michael Murphy
Plaintiffs allege § 1983 claims against defendant Michael Murphy for taking
custody of Billy Murray’s child. Absent further facts or explanation, this action alone is
insufficient to establish that defendant Murphy violated any of plaintiffs’ rights protected
by the Constitution or federal law. The Court will dismiss the § 1983 claims against
defendant Michael Murphy.
(4)
Mitchell Grigsby
Plaintiffs allege § 1983 claims against defendant Grigsby for complying with an
arrest warrant and confirming that he was arresting the correct person. Plaintiffs make
other allegations regarding wrongful conduct during plaintiff Bobby Murray’s arrest, but
do not attribute any of these actions to Grigsby. Rather, plaintiffs only state that Grigsby
“conspired” with his unnamed partner to harm Bobby Murray. See Gutierrez, 826 F.2d at
1538. Absent further facts or explanation, this action alone is insufficient to establish that
defendant Grigsby violated any of plaintiffs’ rights protected by the Constitution or
federal law. The Court will, therefore, dismiss the § 1983 claims against defendant
Grigsby.
(5)
Vicky Murphy
Plaintiffs allege § 1983 claims against defendant Vicky Murphy for failure to
dispatch a fire truck to plaintiff Billy Murray’s home. Plaintiffs state, in a conclusory
manner, that Murphy did so because she was involved in the adoption of Billy Murray’s
20
son. Absent further facts or explanation, this action alone is insufficient to establish that
defendant Murphy violated any of plaintiffs’ rights protected by the Constitution or
federal law. The Court will, therefore, dismiss the § 1983 claims against defendant
Murphy.
(6)
Roane County
District
Emergency
Communications
Plaintiffs allege § 1983 claims against defendant Roane County Emergency
Communications District for not making a timely dispatch in response to a fire at plaintiff
Billy Murray’s home. Absent further facts or explanation, this action alone is insufficient
to establish that defendant Roane County Emergency Communications District violated
any of plaintiffs’ rights protected by the Constitution or federal law. The Court will,
therefore, dismiss the § 1983 claims against defendant Roane County Emergency
Communications District.
(7)
Roane County
Plaintiffs allege § 1983 claims against Roane County for allowing its officials to
carry out the actions previously discussed herein. A municipality may not be held liable
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents.”
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). “Instead, it is when execution
of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose
edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the
government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Id. Accordingly, to succeed on a
21
municipal liability claim under § 1983, a plaintiff “must demonstrate that the alleged
federal violation occurred because of a municipal policy or custom.” Burgess v. Fischer,
735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694).
Plaintiffs have not pointed to any municipal policy or custom that gave rise to the
alleged deprivation of constitutional rights. The only allegation plaintiffs make against
Roane County is that the municipality allowed its officials to carry out the actions
discussed. Based on this sole allegation, it appears that plaintiffs are attempting to
impose liability based on a theory of respondeat superior, which is improper under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. To the extent that plaintiffs are alleging that
that federal violations occurred because of a municipal policy or custom, plaintiffs’
statements are conclusory because they are not alleging any factual basis for the presence
of a municipal policy or custom in Roane County that “allowed” its officials to commit
constitutional violations.
Accordingly, the § 1983 claims against Roane County will be dismissed.
2.
Federal Stalking
Plaintiffs allege that Dennis and Glenda Faye Miracle “set a pattern of harassment
and set him on a course of conduct that could be construed as Federal Stalking” [Doc. 6].
The federal statute regarding stalking is 18 U.S.C. § 2261A, and it does not contain a
private right of action.
18 U.S.C. § 2261A; see also Hopson v. Commonwealth
Attorney’s Office, No. 3:12CV-744-M, 2013 WL 1411234, at *3 (W.D. Ky. April 8,
2013) (citation omitted) (concluding that there is no private cause of action under 18
22
U.S.C. § 2261A). Accordingly, because federal stalking does not contain a private right
of action, plaintiffs’ claims of federal stalking will be dismissed.
B.
State-Law Claims
As the Court has previously noted, plaintiffs’ pleadings are long and difficult to
decipher. To the extent that plaintiffs are alleging state-law claims5 against defendants
that will be dismissed upon entry of this order, the Court will decline to exercise
continuing “pendent” or supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ state-law claims
against those dismissed defendants.
While the Court has broad discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) to dismiss or to
retain jurisdiction over pendent state-law claims under the circumstances presented by
this case, “[o]rdinarily, where all federal claims have been dismissed, federal courts
should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims.” Reynosa v.
Schultz, 282 F. App’x 386, 390–91 (6th Cir. 2008); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
Having found the federal claims should be dismissed, pursuant to § 1367(c), the Court
will decline to exercise continuing supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ state-law
claims against Frank Williams (in his individual and professional capacity), Mark Foster
(in his individual and professional capacity), Dennis Miracle (in his individual and
professional capacity), Glenda Faye Miracle (in her individual and professional capacity),
Roane County, Tywanna Walker (in her individual and professional capacity), Rochelle
5
Plaintiffs appear to be alleging various claims of malpractice, assault, negligence,
among other state-law claims, against various defendants [See Docs. 6, 59].
23
Oldfield (in her individual and professional capacity), Emily Hardin (in her individual
and professional capacity), Lucy Guy (in her individual and professional capacity),
Michael Murphy (in his individual and professional capacity), Vicky Murphy (in her
individual and professional capacity), Mitchell Grigsby (in his individual and
professional capacity), and Roane County Emergency 911 Center.
VI.
Conclusion
For these reasons, the Court GRANTS the Motion to Amend the Pleadings
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) filed by plaintiffs [Docs. 58, 59],
DENIES the Motion to Strike Supplement filed by defendants Mark Foster, Dennis
Miracle, and Glenda Faye Miracle [Doc. 60], DENIES the Motion to Dismiss
Defendants’ Motion to Strike filed by plaintiffs [Doc. 63], DENIES the Motion to Strike
Supplement filed by defendants Mitchell Grigsby, Lucy Guy, Emily Hardin, Michael
Murphy, and Roane County [Doc. 66], GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss filed by
defendants Mark N. Foster, Dennis Miracle, and Glenda Faye Miracle [Doc. 12],
GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss filed by defendant Rochelle Oldfield [Doc. 17],
DENIES the Motion to Strike Reply to Response filed by defendant Rochelle Oldfield
[Doc. 61], GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss filed by defendants Tywanna Walker and
Frank Williams [Doc. 40], GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss filed by defendants Michael
Murphy and Vicky Murphy [Doc. 46], GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss filed by
defendants Vicky Murphy and the Roane County Emergency 911 Center [Doc. 48], and
24
GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss filed by defendants Mitchell Grigsby, Lucy Guy, Emily
Hardin, Michael Murphy, and Roane County [Doc. 51].
Accordingly, all claims against the following defendants are hereby DISMISSED:
Frank Williams (in his individual and professional capacity), Mark Foster (in his
individual and professional capacity), Dennis Miracle (in his individual and professional
capacity), Glenda Faye Miracle (in her individual and professional capacity), Roane
County, Tywanna Walker (in her individual and professional capacity), Rochelle Oldfield
(in her individual and professional capacity), Emily Hardin (in her individual and
professional capacity), Lucy Guy (in her individual and professional capacity), Michael
Murphy (in his individual and professional capacity), Vicky Murphy (in her individual
and professional capacity), Mitchell Grigsby (in his individual and professional capacity),
and Roane County Emergency 911 Center.
Upon the Court’s review of the record of this case, this civil action was filed on or
about July 7, 2015 [Doc. 6]. The record reflects that defendants Michelle Rios and the
Tennessee Department of Children’s Services were served on July 15, 2015 [Docs. 30,
33]. These defendants have not filed a response to the complaint and plaintiffs have not
sought default judgment nor taken any other action against these defendants. Further, the
record contains no evidence that plaintiffs have achieved service of process on defendant
Denise Butler. Accordingly, plaintiffs are hereby ORDERED, within twenty-one (21)
days from the date of this order, to show cause why the case against defendants Michelle
25
Rios, Tennessee Department of Children’s Services, and Denise Butler should not be
dismissed for failure to prosecute. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Thomas A. Varlan
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
26
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?