Williamson v. Ray et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: Plaintiff's application to proceed without prepayment of fees is GRANTED. Nonetheless, because Plaintiff is an inmate, he is ASSESSED the filing fee of three hundred and fifty dollars ($350). The C lerk is DIRECTED to mail a copy of this order to the custodian of inmate accounts at the institution where Plaintiff is now confined. The Clerk is also DIRECTED to furnish a copy of this order to the Court's financial deputy. Signed by District Judge Pamela L Reeves on 2/22/16. (c/m to Plaintiff and WTSP Inmate Accounts. Copy forwarded to Court financial deputy) (JBR)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
JEREMIAH WILLIAMSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
DAVID RAY, et al.,
Defendants.
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No. 3:15-CV-466-PLR-CCS
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
The Court is in receipt of a pro se prisoner’s civil rights complaint and application to
proceed in forma pauperis. Jeremiah Williamson (“Plaintiff”) brings this civil rights complaint
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against David Ray, Wayne Lee, and Larry Martin. Also before the
Court is Plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel [Doc. 7] and motion for leave to amend complaint
[Doc. 8].
I.
Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis [Doc. 2]
On December 23, 2015, the Court allowed Plaintiff additional time in which to submit
supporting documents for his application to proceed in forma pauperis based on his recent
transfer to Bledsoe County Correctional Complex. On January 12, 2016, Plaintiff provided the
necessary documentation of his trust fund account needed to complete his application.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s application to proceed without prepayment of fees is GRANTED.
Nonetheless, because Plaintiff is an inmate, he is ASSESSED the filing fee of three hundred and
fifty dollars ($350). McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 607 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on
other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). The custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust
account at the institution where he now resides shall submit, as an initial partial payment,
whichever is the greater of: (a) twenty percent (20%) of the average monthly deposits to
Plaintiff’s inmate trust account; or (b) twenty percent (20%) of the average monthly balance in
his inmate trust account for the six-month period preceding the filing of the complaint. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)(A) and (B). Thereafter, the trust account custodian shall submit twenty
percent (20%) of Plaintiff’s preceding monthly income (or income credited to his trust account
for the preceding month), but only when such monthly income exceeds $10.00, until the full
filing fee of $350 has been paid to the Clerk’s Office. McGore, 114 F.3d at 607.
Payments should be sent to: Clerk, USDC; 800 Market Street, Suite 130, Knoxville,
Tennessee 37902.
To ensure compliance with the fee-collection procedure, the Clerk is
DIRECTED to mail a copy of this order to the custodian of inmate accounts at the institution
where Plaintiff is now confined. The Clerk is also DIRECTED to furnish a copy of this order to
the Court’s financial deputy. This order shall be placed in Plaintiff’s prison file and follow him
if he is transferred to another correctional institution.
I.
Screening the Complaint
Under the PLRA, district courts must screen prisoner complaints and sua sponte dismiss
those that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim for relief, or are against a defendant
who is immune. See, e.g., Benson v. O'Brian, 179 F.3d 1014 (6th Cir. 1999).
In screening Plaintiff’s complaint, the Court bears in mind that pro se pleadings filed in
civil rights cases must be liberally construed and held to a less stringent standard than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Still, the pleading
must be sufficient “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), which simply means that the factual content pled by a
plaintiff must permit a court “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
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misconduct alleged,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at
556).
The “facial plausibility” standard does not require “detailed factual allegations, but it
demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. at 678
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The standard articulated in Twombly and Iqbal
“governs dismissals for failure to state a claim under [28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A]
because the relevant statutory language tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6).” Hill v. Lappin,
630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010).
For the purpose of screening the complaint in its entirety, the Court will first address
Plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint.
II.
Motion to Amend Complaint [Doc. 8]
Plaintiff seeks leave to file an amended complaint, but the motion filed is ambiguous as
to Plaintiff’s requested changes. In his motion, Plaintiff “requests leave to file an amended
complaint adding to the complaint” [Doc. 8 p. 1]. His sole statement supporting his request
argues that “[t]he [P]laintiff in his original complaint named David Ray, Defendant” [Id.].
Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to amend its pleading
“once as a matter of course” within twenty-one days after service or twenty-one days after
service of a responsive pleading or a Rule 12(b)(e) or (f) motion, whichever is earlier. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(A)(B). The docket reflects the motion to amend was not filed within the time
limits set out in the Federal Rules. Additionally, the Court finds that Plaintiff failed to comply
with the Local Rules of the Eastern District of Tennessee. Local Rule 15.1 requires that “[a]
party who moves to amend a pleading shall attach a copy of the proposed amended pleading to
the motion. Any amendment to a pleading…shall…reproduce the entire pleading as amended
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and may not incorporate any prior pleading by reference.” E.D. Tenn. L.R. 15.1. Any amended
complaint must be complete in itself without reference to his original complaint, as the original
complaint will be superseded by the amended complaint. Here, Plaintiff failed to attach a
proposed amended complaint to his motion.
The Court finds Plaintiff’s motion to be unclear and is unable to determine Plaintiff’s
requested changes to his original complaint. Further, based on Plaintiff’s failure to follow both
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of the Eastern District of Tennessee,
the Court finds Plaintiff’s motion to amend [Doc. 8] is not well-taken and is DENIED.
III.
Plaintiff’s Factual Allegations
On September 15, 2015, Plaintiff filed a grievance with the Claiborne County Justice
Center complaining that religious services are being held in the area of general population rather
than a separate designated forum [Doc. 1 p. 3]. Plaintiff argues that these services “disrupt the
normal pod activity” and “are offensive to those who do not wish to participate” [Id.].
Defendant Martin responded to the grievance by explaining that religious services are
provided for each pod and that if Plaintiff does not wish to attend these services he should retreat
to his cell [Id. at 4].
On September 17, 2015, Plaintiff filed another grievance based on Defendant Martin’s
response [Id.]. Plaintiff complained that even in his cell, he is still able to hear the religious
services [Id.]. Plaintiff further complained that his due process was being violated because there
is no appeal process in place for grievances at Claiborne County Justice Center [Id.].
Plaintiff states that he signed a document stating that if he does not wish to hear or
participate in the religious services offered in his pod, he could inform a correctional officer at
the commencement of the service and will be taken to booking until its completion [Id.]. On
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September 18, 2015, Plaintiff filed a third grievance complaining of the inconvenience caused by
being placed in booking for the duration of the religious service [Id.]. Plaintiff asserts that this
attempted resolution inconveniences his “telephone use, television programs, exercise workouts,
etc.” [Id.].
Moreover, in his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he was “jumped and beaten up by
several inmates” suffering head and face injuries [Id.]. He was taken to the hospital for treatment
twenty-four hours after the alleged beating because the nurse could not be reached to approve the
request prior to that time [Id.]. Plaintiff informed Sgt. Teresa Cloud that he wanted to file
criminal charges against the assailants and was given a piece of notebook paper and clipboard to
write down his statement [Id. at 5]. Plaintiff complains that he has not been interviewed by a
detective concerning the altercation nor has anyone been charged [Id.].
On September 28, 2015, Plaintiff was transferred to the Union County Jail with no
explanation for such transfer [Id.]. Then, on October 10, 2015, Plaintiff was transferred back to
the Claiborne County Justice Center [Id.].
Plaintiff believes that his safety and rights are not of any importance to the Claiborne
County Justice Center and requests that this Court allow a jury to decide what relief should be
sanctioned [Id. at 6].
A.
Defendants David Ray and Wayne Lee
No allegations of wrongdoing have been made against Defendants David Ray or Wayne
Lee. In his complaint, Plaintiff identified Defendant Ray as the Claiborne County Sheriff and
Defendant Lee as the Chief Deputy at Claiborne County Justice Center [Doc. 1 p. 3]. Perhaps,
Plaintiff has named these individuals as defendants under the theory that they act as supervisors
at the Claiborne County Justice Center, and therefore, responsible for properly managing the
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staff and the operations at the jail. However, § 1983 liability must be based on more than
respondeat superior, or a defendant’s right to control employees. Taylor v. Migh. Dep’t of
Corrs., 69 F.3d 76, 80-81 (6th Cir. 1995). Though respondeat superior does not provide a valid
basis of liability, Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981), Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362
(1976), Plaintiff can still hold Defendants Ray and Lee liable if he can demonstrate that they
implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the alleged wrongdoing of any of
their subordinates, Leach v. Shelby Cnty. Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241, 1244 (6th Cir. 1989), but these
Defendants cannot be held liable for a mere failure to act. Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 899
(6th Cir. 2002) (“Supervisory liability under § 1983 does not attach when it is premised on a
mere failure to act; it ‘must be based on active unconstitutional behavior’” (quoting Bass v.
Robinson, 167 F.3d 1041, 1048 (6th Cir. 1999))).
Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants Ray or Lee knew of the complained allegations
of civil rights violations. There is nothing from which to conclude Defendants Ray or Lee
condoned any subordinate’s alleged actions or failure to act on any risks to Plaintiff’s health,
safety, or well-being caused by the purported treatment during confinement.
Accordingly,
Defendants Ray and Lee are, therefore, DISMISSED as parties in this suit.
B.
Disturbance of Normal Pod Activity
Based on the facts alleged, Claiborne County Justice Center neither forces inmates to
attend religious services nor restricts any rights of inmates to hold their own religious beliefs.
The Court deduces that Plaintiff’s complaints are based on the mere inconvenience caused by
these services rather than the services themselves.
As a result of his grievances filed, Plaintiff was provided, and signed, a document
allowing him to go to booking rather than be in the same vicinity of the religious services taking
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place in his pod. Plaintiff complains that the services disrupt his use of phones, television, and
his ability to exercise, because during the time the services take place, he has to go to booking in
order to avoid hearing the program.
The Court finds that none of the complained of
inconveniences amount to a constitutional violation.
In the First Amendment context “prisoners have no per se constitutional right to use a
telephone.” Dotson v. Calhoun Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 2008 WL 160622, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Jan.
15, 2008) citing United States v. Footman, 215 F.3d 145, 155 (1st Cir. 2000). See also Valdez v.
Rosenbaum, 302 F.3d 1039 (holding that there is no First Amendment right to telephone access,
instead there is a First Amendment right to communicate with persons outside of prison walls,
and “[u]se of a telephone provides a means of exercising this right”); Washington v. Reno, 35
F.3d 1093, 1100 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that “an inmate has no right to unlimited telephone
use”). “[A] prisoner’s right to telephone access, if any, is subject to rational limitation based
upon legitimate security and administrative interests of the penal institution.” Arney v. Simmons,
26 F.Supp.2d 1288, 1293 (D. Kan. 1998) (citing Washington, 35 F.3d at 1100). “[D]ecisions
made by prison officials regarding prison administration are entitled to significant deference.”
Shue v. Herring, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73400, at *17-18 (M.D. N.C. Jan. 12, 2006) (citing Bell
v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979)). Here, Plaintiff does not allege that he is unable to use the
phone, but merely that using the phone during this time would be disturbed by the ongoing
service. Plaintiff also fails to allege any named Defendant personally responsible for the lack of
access to use the phone.
Similarly, there is no constitutional right to television while incarcerated. Rawls v.
Sundquist, 1996 WL 288622 (M.D. Tenn. 1996) aff’d, 1997 WL 211289 (6th Cir. 1997) citing
Dede v. Baker, 1994 WL 198179 at *2 (6th Cir. 1994); Temple v. Dahm, 905 F.Supp. 670, 674
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(D. Neb. 1995) (“Plaintiff has no right to view television as arising from the Constitution.”);
Glasshofer v. Jefes, 1989 WL 95360 at *2 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (“No court has recognized a federal
constitutional right to the usage of radio and television by inmates.”); Lester v. Clymer, 1989 WL
66621 at *2 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (“While it is not a subject of frequent litigation, it is nevertheless
established that prisoners have no constitutional right to television.”).
Plaintiff has further failed to establish that he has a constitutional right to exercise during
the time of the alleged disturbance. An inmate has a constitutional right to maintain their health,
but limitations on an inmate’s ability to exercise only implicate that right when the limitations
are so severe that “movement is denied and muscles are allowed to atrophy.” Harris v. Fleming,
839 F.2d 1232, 1236 (7th Cir. 1988). Where the inmate retains the ability to retain physical
fitness through alternative means, such as by jogging in place, or doing aerobic exercises or
pushups, this concern is not implicated. Id; Poco v. Hompe, 2003 WL 23185882, at *11-12
(W.D. Wis. 2003). Although Plaintiff may prefer to work out at that specific time, nothing in
Plaintiff’s complaint suggests that he is unable to exercise, or deprived of the right to exercise,
only that he chooses not to exercise during the time the alleged disturbance takes place.
As such, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims regarding the disturbance of his normal
pod activity are found to be a mere inconvenience rather than constitutional violations, and will
be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted.
C.
Due Process
Plaintiff states that he lacked the ability to appeal his denied grievances because no such
appeal process is in place at Claiborne County Justice Center. Plaintiff alleges that the lack of
appeal process is a violation of his due process.
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However, prisoners do not possess a constitutional right to a prison grievance procedure.
See Young v. Gundy, 30 F. App’x 568, 569-70 (6th Cir. 2002) (“A grievance appeal does not
implicate the First Amendment right of access to the courts because there is no inherent
constitutional right to an effective prison grievance procedure.”); LaFlame v. Montgomery Cnty.
Sheriff’s Dep’t, 3 F. App’x 346, 348 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that plaintiff’s allegation that jail
staff ignored the grievances he filed did not state a § 1983 claim “because there is no inherent
constitutional right to an effective prison grievance procedure”); Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d
1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that plaintiff’s allegation that the institution’s grievance
procedures were inadequate to redress his grievances did not violate the Due Process Clause and
did not “give rise to a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause”). Further, if the
prison provides a grievance process, violations of its procedures or its ineffectiveness do not rise
to the level of a federal constitutional right. See Walker v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 128 F.App’x
441, 445 (6th Cir. 2005) (“All circuits to consider this issue have . . . found that there is no
constitutionally protected due process right to unfettered access to prison grievance
procedures.”); Argue v. Hofmeyer, 80 F. App’x 427, 430 (6th Cir. 2003) (stating that “there is no
inherent constitutional right to an effective prison grievance procedure”).
Even if a grievance system was constitutionally guaranteed, Plaintiff has not shown how
the lack of a grievance process directly affected his “ability to bring his claim before any court.”
Coleman v. Governor of Michigan, No. 09-1139, 413 F. App’x. 866, 874-875 (6th Cir. 2011)
(citation omitted).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim regarding the lack of ability to appeal a denied grievance
will be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.
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D.
Deliberate Indifference
Plaintiff claims to have suffered head and face injuries as a result of being “jumped” by
several inmates [Doc. 1 p. 4]. Plaintiff complains that he waited twenty-four hours before
receiving any medical attention.
Although Plaintiff does not complain of any specific
constitutional violation, the Court interprets Plaintiff’s argument to claim deliberate indifference
to his medical needs.
The thrust of Plaintiff’s claim is that he received inadequate medical attention because he
was made to wait twenty-four hours after he requested medical treatment to receive any medical
attention. However, the only remaining defendant in this case is Defendant Martin who is a jail
administrator at Claiborne County Justice Center and was not mentioned in Plaintiff’s allegations
regarding medical treatment. Without any factual allegations against Defendant Martin, the
Court cannot make a logical connection to Defendant Martin’s involvement in Plaintiff’s
medication treatment.
Notwithstanding, the Constitution is transgressed when a prison official is deliberately
indifferent to an inmate’s serious medical needs. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); see
also Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993) (finding that “the treatment a prisoner receives
in prison and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth
Amendment”). An Eighth Amendment claim is composed of two parts: an objective component,
which requires a plaintiff to show a “sufficiently serious” deprivation, and a subjective
component, which requires him to show a sufficiently culpable state of mind - one of deliberate
indifference. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 and 842 (1994).
An inmate “who suffers pain needlessly when relief is readily available has a cause of
action against those whose deliberate indifference is the cause of his suffering.” See Berryman v.
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Rieger, 150 F.3d 561, 566 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing Boretti v. Wiscomb, 930 F.2d 1150, 1154-55
(6th Cir.1991)); see also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103 (“[T]he denial of medical care may result in
pain and suffering which no one suggests would serve any penological purpose.”). However,
where a prisoner receives some medical care and the dispute is over its adequacy, no claim has
been stated. Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n.5 (6th Cir. 1976). By the same token, a
difference of opinion between medical care providers as to appropriate treatment for an inmate’s
ailment does not present a constitutional controversy. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06; see also
Keeper v. King, 130 F.3d 1309, 1314 (8th Cir.1997) (finding that a disagreement between prison
physician and physician who originally prescribed medications is not of constitutional
magnitude).
Where a prisoner alleges that he has been denied medical care, the objective factor is
satisfied by a condition which amounts to a serious medical need. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104.
Here, because Plaintiff has failed to identify his alleged medical condition, he has failed to
satisfy the first element of an Eighth Amendment medical claim. Plaintiff’s complaint negates
any inference that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical need, as it
cannot be concluded that he has described a sufficiently serious medical need. Plaintiff merely
states that he sustain injury to his head and face but provides no description whatsoever of his
alleged injury or the alleged altercation with other inmates. These complaints simply do not rise
to the level of a serious medical need for purposes of constitutional analysis. Thus, under these
circumstances, Plaintiff cannot state a cognizable § 1983 claim that Defendants were deliberately
indifferent to his serious medical needs.
Accordingly, apart from Plaintiff’s failure to name a defendant liable for his alleged lack
of medical care, Plaintiff also failed to establish he had a serious medical condition. Therefore,
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Plaintiff’s delayed/inadequate medical care claims will be DISMISSED as frivolous and for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
E.
Retaliation
The Court assumes that Plaintiff’s statements regarding his transfer to a different facility
after he filed multiple grievances allude to a claim of retaliation by prison officials.
Prisoners retain their First Amendment rights “not incompatible with their status as
prisoners, ‘or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.’” Jones v.
Caruso, 569 F.3d 258, 267 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 832 (1974)).
One of the rights retained by inmates is the First Amendment right to file grievances against
prison officials without retaliation for supposed misconduct. Smith v. Campbell, 250 F.3d 1032,
1037 (6th Cir. 2001). “Retaliation by public officials against the exercise of First Amendment
rights is itself a violation of the First Amendment.” Zilich v. Longo, 34 F.3d 359, 364 (6th Cir.
1994). “[A]n act taken in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutionally protected right is
actionable under § 1983 even if the act, when taken for a different reason, would have been
proper.” Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 681-82 (6th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted).
A prisoner states a retaliation claim if he pleads and proves that: (1) he engaged in
protected conduct, (2) an adverse action was taken against him which would deter a person of
ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in such conduct, and (3) the adverse action was
motivated by the protected conduct. Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999).
Clearly, Plaintiff was engaged in protected conduct by filing a grievance, but Plaintiff has
not provided evidence to show an adverse action or a retaliatory animus on the part of
Defendants. The Court does not see any adverse action involved in Plaintiff’s placement at
Union County Jail for less than one month before returning to Claiborne County Justice Center.
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The Sixth Circuit has “repeatedly held that transfer from one prison to another prison ‘cannot
rise to the level of an adverse action because it would not deter a person of ordinary firmness
from the exercise of his First Amendment rights.” Smith v. Yarrow, 78 Fed. App’x. 529, 543 (6th
Cir. 2003). Thus, the mere transfer to a different prison, without more, is not an adverse action.
Siggers-El v. Barlow, 412 F.3d 693, 701 (6th Cir. 2005).
Plaintiff’s allegations are also
insufficient to satisfy the third requirement that the adverse action was motivated, at least in part,
by the protected conduct. In fact, Plaintiff’s vague, factually unsupported, allegation that he was
transferred to Union County Jail with no explanation as to why the transfer occurred, fails to
name or even identify as a prison official the person or entity involved in the decision to transfer
him.
All claims of retaliation by Plaintiff lack factual support and are conclusory. Conclusory
allegations will not support a § 1983 claim. Harden-Bey v. Rutter, 524 F.3d 789, 796 (6th Cir.
2008) (“[I]n the context of a civil rights claim . . . conclusory allegations of unconstitutional
conduct without specific factual allegations fail to state a claim.”) (citing Lillard v. Shelby
County Bd. of Educ.,76 F.3d 716, 726 (6th Cir. 1987)); Nafziger v.McDermott Int’l, Inc., 467
F.3d 514, 520 (6th Cir. 2006) (observing that “the court is not required to create a claim for the
plaintiff[]”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Cline v. Rogers, 87 F.3d 176, 184
(6th Cir.1996) (instructing courts not to suppose a plaintiff would be able to show facts not
alleged or that a defendant has violated the law in ways not alleged).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s retaliatory transfer claim will be DISMISSED for failure to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted.
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IV.
Motion to Appoint Counsel [Doc. 7]
Plaintiff has requested that the Court appoint counsel for him in this matter based on “his
lack of knowledge and experience in the legal field” [Doc. 7 p.1]. However, this Court’s
resolution of Plaintiff’s § 1983 complaint renders his request for counsel moot. Accordingly, the
motion to appoint counsel [Doc. 7] is DENIED as moot.
V.
Conclusion
In light of the above law and analysis, the Court finds Plaintiff’s motion for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. 2] is GRANTED, motion to amend his complaint [Doc. 8] is
DENIED, and motion to appoint counsel [Doc. 7] is DENIED as moot.
The Court further finds that Plaintiff’s contentions fail to state § 1983 claims against
Defendants, and therefore, this case will be DISMISSED sua sponte in its entirety under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A.
The Court has carefully reviewed this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) and hereby
CERTIFIES that any appeal from this decision would not be taken in good faith. See Fed. R.
App. P. 24(a).
AN APPROPRIATE ORDER WILL FOLLOW.
___________________________________
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT
A S S
C
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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