Garduno Guevara v. Soto Soto (TV2)

Filing 5

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, The parties are ORDERED to appear for a ( preliminary injunction Hearing set for Tuesday, 1/12/2016 02:00 PM in Courtroom 4 - Knoxville before Chief District Judge Thomas A Varlan.) Defendant Alm a Soto Soto is hereby TEMPORARILY ENJOINED as follows: Defendant shall not take any action to remove the child from the jurisdiction of this Court. This temporary restraining order shall expire within fourteen days of this order, unless, prior to t hat time, the order is extended upon good cause shown, the parties consent to a longer period, or the hearing is continued upon good cause shown and the order is extended until the time of such hearing. This temporary restraining order shall be bin ding on the parties to this action, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of this order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2). The Court DIRECTS the United States Marshals Service to personally serve a copy of this order upon defendant. Signed by Chief District Judge Thomas A Varlan on December 29, 2015. (JAN, )(CC hand delivered to USMS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
EUGENIO GARDUNO GUEVARA,
Plaintiff,
v.
ALMA SOTO SOTO
Defendant.

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No.: 3:15-CV-548-TAV-CCS

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
This matter is before the Court on plaintiff Eugenio Garduno Guevara’s Verified
Petition for Return of Child to Mexico and for Immediate Issuance of Show Cause Order
to Respondent [Doc. 1]. In this motion, plaintiff requests the Court to issue an immediate
order prohibiting his child from being removed from this Court’s jurisdiction, pending a
full evidentiary hearing on plaintiff’s petition [Id. ¶¶ 30–34]. Plaintiff also seeks for the
Court to issue an order directing defendant and the child to appear before the Court for an
expedited hearing on the merits of plaintiff’s petition [Id.].
I.

Background
This litigation relates to the alleged wrongful retention of plaintiff’s child

(hereinafter “the child”) in the United States by the child’s mother, defendant Alma Soto
Soto [Doc. 1]. Plaintiff states that he, defendant, and the child are all citizens of Mexico
[Id. ¶ 5]. When the child was born in Queretaro, Mexico in October 2010, plaintiff and
defendant were living together but were not married [Id. ¶¶ 6, 7]. They lived in Coroneo,
Guanajuato, Mexico until March 2013, when plaintiff and defendant separated [Id. ¶ 8].

At that time, defendant and the child moved approximately twenty minutes away from
plaintiff’s house to Michoacán, Mexico to live with defendant’s parents and maternal
grandmother [Id. ¶ 9]. From March 2013 until April 13, 2013, plaintiff “regularly
visited” the child during the week and on weekends, and provided defendant with
“financial support and groceries for the child” [Id. ¶ 10].
On April 13, 2013, defendant picked up the child from plaintiff’s home, and from
that time plaintiff has been unable to find or reach defendant or the child [Id. ¶ 11].
Plaintiff alleges he went to plaintiff’s residence to find her, and tried to call her cell
phone, but to no avail [Id. ¶¶ 12–13]. Thereafter, plaintiff initiated proceedings in
Coroneo, Guanajuato, Mexico, filed a police report in Michoacan, Mexico, and attempted
to obtain assistance from the Mexican government in locating defendant and the child [Id.
¶¶ 14–16].
In July 2014, plaintiff alleges he located defendant and the child in Wichita Falls,
Texas with defendant’s brother, after he saw a photo of defendant and her brother at
Wichita Falls Park on Facebook [Id. ¶ 17]. In April 2015, plaintiff filed an Application
for Return of the Child with the Mexican Central Authority, and the United States
Department of State wrote a letter to defendant, asking her to voluntarily return the child
to Mexico [Id. ¶¶ 18–19]. Plaintiff states that, upon information and belief, defendant did
not respond to this letter [Id.].
On May 28, 2015, defendant filed a Petition to Determine Custody in the Juvenile
Court for Knox County, Tennessee [Id. ¶ 20, Doc. 1-9]. The United States Department of
State subsequently sent a letter to the presiding judge in that case to inform the judge that
2

Article 16 of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980,

T.I.A.S. No. 11670 (July 1, 1988) (hereinafter “Hague

Convention”), described infra Section III, does not permit courts to decide on the merits
the rights of custody until it has been determined that the child should not be returned to
Mexico under the Hague Convention [Docs. 1 ¶ 21, 1-10].
Plaintiff then filed a verified complaint in this Court on December 11, 2015,
asserting a cause of action under the Hague Convention, in which he ultimately seeks for
the child to be returned to Mexico [Doc. 1]. In his verified complaint, plaintiff also
requests the Court to grant a temporary restraining order (hereinafter “TRO”), preventing
defendant from leaving the Court’s jurisdiction with the child, and an order directing
defendant and the child to appear before the Court for an expedited hearing on the merits
of plaintiff’s petition for return of the child [Id. ¶¶ 30–33]. Summons was issued as to
defendant on December 11, 2015, but has not been returned executed.
II.

Standard of Review
In deciding whether to grant a temporary restraining order, the Court must

consider: (1) the likelihood that plaintiff “will succeed on the merits of the claim;” (2)
whether plaintiff will “suffer irreparable harm without the grant of the extraordinary
relief;” (3) whether granting an injunction “will cause substantial harm to others;” and (4)
“whether the public interest is advanced” by issuing an injunction. United States v.
Edward Rose & Sons, 384 F.3d 258, 261 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Washington v. Reno, 35
F.3d 1093, 1099 (6th Cir. 1994)). The Sixth Circuit has cautioned that these factors
should be balanced, and are “not prerequisites that must be met.” Id.
3

Procedurally, a court may issue a temporary restraining order without notice to the
opposing party only if “specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show
that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the
adverse party can be heard in opposition,” and “the movant’s attorney certifies in writing
any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be required.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 65(b).
Rule 65(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also provides that a TRO may
be issued “only if the movant gives security in an amount that the court considers proper
to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully
enjoined or restrained.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c). While the Sixth Circuit has stated a district
court “errs when it fails to expressly consider the question of requiring a bond when the
issue has been raised,” it has also found that a court has no mandatory duty to impose a
bond as a condition for issuance of injunctive relief. NACCO Materials Handling Grp.,
Inc. v. Toyota Materials Handling USA, Inc., 246 F. App’x 929, 952 (6th Cir. 2007)
(alterations, quotation marks, and citations omitted). Thus, if the Court finds injunctive
relief appropriate, the Court must address whether a bond is needed, but it need not
require one.
III.

Analysis

Plaintiff’s verified complaint arises under the International Child Abduction
Remedies Act (“ICARA”), 22 U.S.C. §§ 9001–9011 (2015), 1 which is a codification of
the Hague Convention. March v. Levine, 249 F.3d 462, 465 (6th Cir. 2001). The Hague
1

Formerly codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601–11610 (2000).
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Convention attempts to “protect children internationally from the harmful effects of their
wrongful removal or retention and to establish procedures to ensure their prompt return to
the State of their habitual residence, as well as to secure protection for rights of access.”
Hague Convention, pmbl.; March, 249 F.3d at 465. The Hague Convention’s objectives
are “to secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed or retained in any
Contracting State” and “to ensure that rights of custody and of access under the law of the
Contracting State are effectively respected in the other Contracting States.”

Hague

Convention, art. 1; McKie v. Jude, No. CIV. A. 10-103-DLB, 2011 WL 53058, at *4
(E.D. Ky. Jan. 7, 2011). Mexico and the United States are signatories to the Hague
Convention. Basil v. Ibis Aida de Teresa Sosa, No. 8:07-CV-918-T-27TGW, 2007 WL
2264599, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 6, 2007).
Pursuant to the ICARA, plaintiff must demonstrate by a preponderance of the
evidence that his child was “wrongfully removed or retained in breach of his custody
rights under the laws of the Contracting State” in which the child “habitually resided”
before he was removed or retained. 22 U.S.C. § 9003(e)(1); Hague Convention, arts. 3,
12; March, 249 F.3d at 465–66.

ICARA grants state and federal district courts

concurrent jurisdiction over claims arising under the Hague Convention. 22 U.S.C. §
9003(a). It further provides that any court exercising jurisdiction over an action brought
under the ICARA may take actions under federal or state law that it finds appropriate “to
protect the well-being of the child involved or to prevent the child’s further removal or
concealment before the final disposition of the petition.” 22 U.S.C. § 9004. The ICARA
prohibits courts from making a final determination as to the child’s custody; courts
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instead “merely determine[] which nation should hear the underlying custody claim.”
Culculoglu v. Culculoglu, No. 2:13-CV-00446-GMN, 2013 WL 1413231, at *3 (D. Nev.
Apr. 4, 2013) (citing Hague Convention, art. 19).
For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that plaintiff has established each of
the four prongs for substantively granting a TRO. The Court also finds that plaintiff has
satisfied all of the procedural requirements of granting a TRO, pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 65, including establishing why it is necessary to grant this injunction
without notice to defendant and why bond should not be required. In making these
determinations, the Court is not ruling that the child should be returned to Mexico.
Instead, the Court is simply concluding that plaintiff has satisfied the requirements for
granting a TRO that preserves the status quo pending a hearing on plaintiff’s petition.
See Culculoglu, 2013 WL 1413231, at *2 (explaining that granting a TRO simply
preserves the status quo and is not a determination on the merits).
A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
The first prong of the TRO analysis requires plaintiff to demonstrate that his claim
has a likelihood of success on the merits. To state a successful claim under the Hague
Convention, plaintiff must establish that his child was (1) removed or retained away from
the country in which the child was a habitual resident immediately before the removal or
retention; (2) that removal or retention was in breach of plaintiff’s custody rights
pursuant to the laws of the child’s habitual residence; and (3) that at the time his child
was removed or retained, plaintiff was actually exercising his rights of custody. Hague
Convention, art. 3; Culculoglu, 2013 WL 1413231, at *3.
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The Court will first consider whether the child was removed or retained away
from the country in which the child was a habitual resident immediately before the
removal or retention. While the Hague Convention does not define the term “habitual
residence,” the Sixth Circuit has stated that a child’s habitual residence is the country
where, at the time of the removal or retention, “the child has been present long enough to
allow acclimatization, and where this presence has a ‘degree of settled purpose from the
child’s perspective.’” Jenkins v. Jenkins, 569 F.3d 549, 556 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 981, 993 (6th Cir. 2007)).
Here, the facts in plaintiff’s verified complaint demonstrate that he will likely
succeed in establishing that his child habitually resided in Mexico immediately preceding
his removal to the United States. Plaintiff states that he, defendant, and the child are all
citizens of Mexico and lived in Mexico from the time of the child’s birth in October 2010
through April 13, 2013 [Doc. 1 ¶¶ 5–10]. Thereafter, plaintiff was unable to locate
defendant and his child until July 2014, when he learned they may be in Wichita Falls,
Texas [Id. ¶ 17]. Prior to being removed to the United States, plaintiff and defendant
were raising their child in Mexico [Id. ¶ 7]. The Court finds that, because the verified
complaint alleges that the child was born and raised in Mexico prior to being brought to
the United States, plaintiff has demonstrated he will likely succeed in demonstrating that
the child has a “degree of settled purpose” in Mexico, and thus that Mexico was likely the
child’s habitual residence immediately before he was removed to the United States.
Jenkins, 569 F.3d at 556.

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Turning next to whether the removal was in breach of plaintiff’s custody rights
pursuant to the laws of the child’s habitual residence—which the Court will consider as
being Mexico—the Court finds that plaintiff has established he will likely succeed in
demonstrating that he and defendant were jointly exercising custody of the child in
Mexico prior to his removal. Plaintiff sets forth in his verified complaint that Mexican
law follows the doctrine of patria potestas, which is a “series of rights and obligations
recognized by law to the parents . . . in relation to their children . . . in order to care for
them, protect them, educate them and legally represent them” [Doc. 1-11 p. 1]. The Civil
Code for the State of Queretaro, Mexico states that “parental authority/responsibility
(patria potestas) is exerted by both parents” [Doc. 1-11 p. 2]. Article 402 states that
“[w]hen the parents of a child born out of wedlock that were living together separate and
in case the parents cannot agree on the matter, the judge will designate which parent will
exert parental authority/responsibility” [Id.].
In this dispute, it appears that plaintiff and defendant had agreed on both exerting
parental authority after they separated, as it is alleged that plaintiff continued to visit with
the child and provide the child with financial support [Doc. 1 ¶ 10]. Accordingly, absent
a judge establishing which parent will exert parental authority pursuant to Article 402 of
the Civil Code for the State of Queretaro, the Court finds that the allegations in the
verified complaint show that both plaintiff and defendant had custody of the child.
Accordingly, plaintiff has demonstrated that he will likely succeed in establishing that his
child’s retention in the United States is in violation of his right to joint custody of the
child.
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Finally, plaintiff must demonstrate that he will likely be able to establish that at
the time his child was removed to the United States, he was actually exercising his rights
of custody.

Plaintiff alleges that, while the child lived with defendant, plaintiff

“regularly” visited with the child, and provided defendant with financial support and
groceries for the child [Id.]. Plaintiff’s allegations imply that he would have continued to
exercise those rights of custody but for defendant’s allegedly wrongfully removing the
child to the United States. The Court thus finds that plaintiff likely will be successful in
establishing that he was actually exercising his rights of custody at the time the child was
removed to the United States.
B. Likelihood of Irreparable Harm Without Grant of the Requested
Relief
Next, the Court must consider the likelihood that plaintiff will “suffer irreparable
harm without the grant of the extraordinary relief.” Edward Rose & Sons, 384 F.3d at
261.

Plaintiff alleges that, without warning, defendant suddenly stopped returning

plaintiff’s phone calls and moved out of defendants’ mother’s house in April 2013 [Doc.
1 ¶¶ 12–13]. Despite plaintiff’s attempts, he could not locate defendant until July 2014
[Id. ¶ 17].
Based upon the allegations in the verified complaint, the Court finds there is a risk
that defendant could continue to conceal the child’s location, and thus plaintiff will likely
be irreparably harmed in the absence of the requested relief to maintain the status quo.
See Culculoglu, 2013 WL 1413231, at *5 (holding that plaintiff would likely suffer

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irreparable harm without a TRO because defendant had previously concealed the location
of plaintiff’s children from plaintiff).
C. Whether a TRO Will Cause Substantial Harm to Others
The Court must next consider whether granting an injunction “will cause
substantial harm to others.” Edward Rose & Sons, 384 F.3d at 261. This factor requires
the Court to determine if the balance of equities tips in plaintiff’s favor. Culculoglu,
2013 WL 1413231, at *5. The Court has already determined that there is a risk that
defendant could conceal the child’s location before the petition is adjudicated. See supra
Section III.B. Plaintiff also has stated that defendant filed a Petition to Determine
Custody in the Knox County Juvenile Court, implying that defendant is residing in Knox
County [Docs. 1 ¶ 20; 1-9]. Accordingly, the Court finds that issuing a TRO will not
impose a substantial hardship on defendant by requiring her to stay within the Court’s
jurisdiction, and the risk of defendant concealing the child’s location before resolution of
this petition outweighs any such potential injury she may suffer. See id. (holding that
because a TRO “merely maintains the status quo” during the pendency of the petition,
and defendant resides in the Court’s jurisdiction, the Court is able to conclude that the
balance of equities tips in plaintiff’s favor).
D. Whether Issuing a TRO will Benefit the Public Interest
Finally, the Court must consider “whether the public interest is advanced” by
issuing an injunction. Edward Rose & Sons, 384 F.3d at 261. This factor requires the
Court to “consider whether there exists some critical public interest that would be injured
by the grant of preliminary relief.” Culculoglu, 2013 WL 1413231, at *5 (quoting
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Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir. 2011)). The
Sixth Circuit has characterized the Hague Convention as requiring “not only expeditious
action by courts under article 11, . . . but use of ‘the most expeditious procedures
available.’” March, 249 F.3d at 474 (citing Hague Convention, art. 2). In fact, even the
ICARA contemplates the Court issuing emergency orders to preserve the status quo in
these cases. See 22 U.S.C. § 9004 (granting courts jurisdiction to take measures “to
protect the well-being of the child involved or to prevent the child’s further removal or
concealment before the final disposition of the petition”). Accordingly, the Court finds
that the public interest would not be injured by issuing injunctive relief in this case.
IV.

Procedural Requirements for a TRO
Prior to granting a TRO, the Court must find that notice to the defendant is not

required. 2 The Court notes that defendant does not have notice of plaintiff’s request for a
TRO, as summons was issued to defendant on December 11, 2015, and has yet to be
returned executed.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b), to issue a TRO without notice,
the Court must find that the specific facts in plaintiff’s verified complaint “clearly show

2

The ICARA provides that notice shall be given “in accordance with the applicable law
governing notice in interstate child custody proceedings.” 42 U.S.C. § 9003(c). In the United
States, the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (“PKPA”) and the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act (“UCCJA”) govern the notice requirements of interstate child custody
proceedings. Lawrence v. Lewis, No. 1:15-CV-191, 2015 WL 1299285, at *2 n.4 (S.D. Ohio
Mar. 23, 2015); Klam v. Klam, 797 F. Supp. 202, 205 (E.D.N.Y 1992). Pursuant to the PKPA,
“[b]efore a child custody or visitation determination is made, reasonable notice and opportunity
to be heard shall be given.” 28 U.S.C. 1738A(e). As other courts have found, however, “nothing
in the statute appears to prevent a temporary restraining order without notice that maintains the
status quo as to physical custody where such an order is otherwise appropriate under Rule
65(b).” Lawrence, 2015 WL 1299285, at *2 n.4.
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that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the
adverse party can be heard in opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). The Court has already
determined that plaintiff may suffer irreparable injury if the Court does not maintain the
status quo until plaintiff’s petition is adjudicated fully. See supra Section III.B. The
same reasoning applies for why plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury before defendant
can be heard in opposition, as there is a risk that defendant could, again, conceal the
child’s location. Id. For these same reasons, notice would defeat the purpose of the relief
plaintiff seeks. See Lawrence, 2015 WL 1299285, at *4 (finding that notice was not
required because of the risk that respondent would attempt to evade the court’s order by
leaving the jurisdiction).
Rule 65(b) also requires that “the movant’s attorney certifies in writing any efforts
made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be required.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
65(b). Other courts that have considered the issue have found that notice is not required
when plaintiff establishes a risk of immediate and irreparable injury, even if plaintiff’s
counsel does not appear to have certified in writing any efforts made to give notice. See,
e.g., Lawrence, 2015 WL 1299285, at *4 (granting a TRO without notice without noting
whether plaintiff’s counsel certified in writing any efforts made to give notice); Mauvais
v. Herisse, No. CIV. A. 13-13032-GAO, 2013 WL 6383930, at *1 (D. Mass. Dec. 4,
2013) (stating that “[i]ssuance of an injunction without prior notice to defendant is
necessary due to the possibility . . . that the children might be concealed or taken from
this jurisdiction before the injunction can be served”); Culculoglu, 2013 WL 1413231, at
*2 (holding that, “because of the risk that Respondent will flee this jurisdiction with the
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children, . . . it [is] necessary to grant this Motion for Temporary Restraining Order
without notice to Respondent); Wood v. Wood, No. 13-CV-3046-TOR, 2013 WL
1907492, at *4 (E.D. Wash. May 8, 2013) (reasoning that it was appropriate for the TRO
to be issued without notice to respondent for the same reasons that warranted issuing the
TRO to begin with, including the dangers of petitioner being unable to locate the child in
the future); Mikovic v. Mikovic, No. 3:07-CV-69732-TEM, 2007 WL 2225979, at *2
(M.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2007) (finding that entry of a TRO without prior notice was
appropriate because “[t]he likelihood that Respondent will flee this Court’s jurisdiction
with [the child] will increase dramatically when she is served with the Verified Petition
seeking return of [the child]”). Like these courts, the Court finds that the risk that
defendant may leave the jurisdiction once she has notice of plaintiff’s verified complaint
warrants issuing a TRO without notice.
Rule 65 also requires the Court to determine whether bond is required in this case.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c). As the Sixth Circuit has stated, “the rule in our circuit has long
been that the district court possesses discretion over whether to require the posting of
security.” Moltan Co. v. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 55 F.3d 1171, 1176 (6th Cir. 1995)
(citing Roth v. Bank of the Commonwealth, 583 F.2d 527, 539 (6th Cir. 1978)). The
Court finds that bond in this case would be nominal, as the order just requires defendant
to not leave the jurisdiction until the Court has a hearing on the merits of plaintiff’s
petition. Mikovic, 2007 WL 2225979, at *2 (waiving the bond requirement “as this is not
a case suited to monetary bonds”); Morgan v. Morgan, 289 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1070 (N.D.

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Iowa 2003) (stating that any bond in this type of case would be “nominal”).

In its

discretion, the Court finds that bond is not required in this case.
V.

Ordering Defendant to Appear with the Child
Plaintiff also seeks to have the Court order the United States Marshals Service to

direct defendant to appear before the Court with the child for an expedited hearing on the
merits of his petition [Doc. 1 ¶ 30]. The ICARA provides that, in proceedings for the
return of a child, courts may not “order a child removed from a person having physical
control of the child unless the applicable requirements of State law are satisfied.” 22
U.S.C. § 9004.
In Tennessee, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act
(“UCCJEA”) governs domestic and international child custody disputes. Tenn. Code
Ann. §§ 36-6-201 et seq. The UCCJEA provides that “the court may order a party . . .
who is in this state to appear before the court in person with or without the child” and the
court may order any person who is in the state and who has physical custody of the child
“to appear in person with the child.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-225. Plaintiff’s verified
complaint alleges that defendant is in Tennessee [Doc. 1 ¶ 27]. Accordingly, the Court
finds that it can order defendant to appear with the child at the hearing set by the Court.
VI.

Conclusion
Upon balancing each of the factors for determining whether to grant a TRO, and

pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 65(b) and (c), the Court finds that plaintiff
has demonstrated that a TRO is warranted in this case.

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Plaintiff’s petition for the

issuance of an immediate order prohibiting the child from being removed from this
Court’s jurisdiction is hereby GRANTED.
Defendant Alma Soto Soto is hereby TEMPORARILY ENJOINED as follows:
1.

Defendant shall not take any action to remove the child from the

jurisdiction of this Court.
2.

This temporary restraining order shall expire within fourteen days of

this order, unless, prior to that time, the order is extended upon good cause
shown, the parties consent to a longer period, or the hearing is continued
upon good cause shown and the order is extended until the time of such
hearing.
3.

This temporary restraining order shall be binding on the parties to

this action, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and
upon those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive
actual notice of this order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2).
In addition, the parties are ORDERED to appear for a preliminary injunction
hearing on Tuesday, January 12, 2016, at 2:00 p.m. in Courtroom 4 of the Howard H.
Baker, Jr. United States Courthouse at 800 Market Street, Knoxville, Tennessee 37902, at
which date and time defendant shall (1) show cause why she should not be prohibited
from removing the child from this Court’s jurisdiction until this proceeding is concluded
and (2) provide for the appearance and physical presence of the child involved in this
dispute. The parties are advised that the Court “may advance the trial on the merits and
consolidate it with the [preliminary injunction] hearing.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(2).
15

Finally, the Court DIRECTS the United States Marshals Service to personally
serve a copy of this order upon defendant at either the address provided in the certificate
of service attached to the verified petition (103 Suburban Road, No. D-201, Knoxville,
Tennessee 37923) [Doc. 1 p. 15], which appears to be the address of her attorney [See
Doc. 1-9], or any other known address for defendant. Any service effectuated by the
Marshals Service will not relieve plaintiff of his obligation to serve defendant in
accordance with Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Thomas A. Varlan
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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