Foxx v. Knoxville Police Department et al (TWP1)

Filing 9

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Thomas W Phillips on 9/19/16. (JBR)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
BRANDON ALLEN FOXX,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
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KNOXVILLE POLICE
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DEPARTMENT, DAVID RAUSCH,
)
THOMAS TURNER, RICHARD D.
)
WHITE, JOHN PICKENS, JOHN A.
)
MARTIN, JORDAN G. HENDERSON, )
)
Defendants.
)

No. 3:16-CV-154
Judge Phillips

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Brandon Allen Foxx alleges several federal civil rights claims and state law
tort claims against the Knoxville Police Department (“KPD”), KPD Chief of Police David
Rausch, and Thomas Turner, Richard D. White, John Pickens, John A. Martin, and Jordan
G. Henderson, all KPD officers. These claims arise from a series of interactions between
KPD officers and plaintiff in 2014 and 2015. This civil action is before the Court on the
motion to dismiss [Doc. 7] filed by defendants Richard D. White (“Officer White”) and
John Pickens (“Officer Pickens”). No response or opposition to the pending motion has
been filed and the time for doing so has passed. E.D. Tenn. L.R. 7.1(a), 7.2.
After careful consideration of the pending motion and supporting memorandum
[Doc. 8], the motion to dismiss by defendants White and Pickens [Doc. 7] will be
GRANTED.

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I.

Relevant Facts 1
Plaintiff alleges that he has been “targeted and harassed by KPD and the Officers

that make up that force” “through false allegations and embellishments” and “pretextual
violations of the law” [Doc. 1 at ¶ 1]. The complaint alleges that Officer White stopped
plaintiff for speeding on March 18, 2014, at 4:37 p.m. [Id. at ¶ 3]. This stop revealed an
outstanding warrant for unpaid speeding tickets [Id.]. Plaintiff was placed into custody and
later released. Officer Thomas Turner (“Officer Turner”), who is not a party to the instant
motion, was also present during this stop [Id.].
On March 19, 2014, at approximately 3:00 p.m., Officer Turner and Officer Pickens
conducted a “knock and talk” at the apartment where plaintiff lives with his parents and
his girlfriend, Brittany Quince [Id. at ¶ 4]. The officers searched the apartment and
discovered 477.3 grams of marijuana [Id.]. Plaintiff advised the officers that all of the
marijuana was his in an effort to protect his girlfriend. Although he did not have any drugs
or weapons on his person, plaintiff was taken into custody and charged with Drug Free
School Zone, Possession of a Firearm during the Commission of a Felony, and Possession
of Drug Paraphernalia [Id.]. On October 8, 2014, plaintiff entered into a plea agreement
for Simple Possession arising out of the March 19, 2014 incident [Id. at ¶ 7].
The complaint also describes encounters between plaintiff and KPD officers on May
30, 2014 [Id. at ¶ 5], September 19, 2014 [Id. at ¶ 6], and April 3, 2015 [Id. at ¶ 8]. Neither

For the purposes of a motion to dismiss, the Court takes the factual allegations in the complaint
[Doc. 1] as true. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (noting that, “when ruling on a
defendant’s motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained
in the complaint”).

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Officer White nor Officer Pickens are mentioned as being involved in these events. The
complaint, filed on April 4, 2016, contains no other factual allegations as to Officer White
or Officer Pickens.
Count One alleges a violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 against all of the
defendants for the use of unlawful and excessive force and cruel and unusual punishment
arising out of the April 3, 2015 incident [Id. at ¶¶ 23—34]. Although he was not mentioned
in the lengthy factual description of the events of April 3, 2015 [Id. at ¶ 8], Count One
generally alleges that Officer Pickens and others violated plaintiff’s civil rights under the
Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution [Id. at ¶¶
27]. Count Two generally alleges a violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 against all of
the defendants for failure to protect plaintiff from excessive force by KPD officers [Id. at
¶¶ 35—40]. Count Three generally alleges a state law claim of assault and battery against
all defendants [Id. at ¶¶ 41—44].

Count Four alleges a claim of outrageous

conduct/intentional infliction of emotional distress against all defendants [Id. at ¶¶ 45—
49]. Count Five alleges a claim of negligence against all defendants under the Tennessee
Governmental Tort Liability Act (“TGTLA”), Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-101 [Id. at ¶¶ 50—
54]. Officer White is not specifically mentioned in any of the counts; Officer Pickens is
specifically mentioned only in Count One.

II.

Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) sets out a liberal pleading standard, Smith

v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 576 n.1 (6th Cir. 2004), requiring only “‘a short and plain
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statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the
[opposing party] fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,’”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.
41, 47 (1957)). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but a party’s “obligation to
provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and
conclusions.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “[A] formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do,” nor will “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court must construe the complaint
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept all factual allegations as true, draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, and determine whether the complaint
contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550
U.S. at 570; Directv, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible
claim for relief will [ultimately] . . . be a context-specific task that requires th[is Court] to
draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679.

III.

Analysis
Officers White and Pickens first argue that they should be dismissed from this case

because the claims against them are time-barred [Doc. 8 at pp. 5—6]. As noted above, the
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only factual allegations against Officer White relate to the March 18, 2014 incident [Doc.
1 at ¶ 3]. The only factual allegations against Officer Pickens relate to the March 19, 2014
incident [Id. at ¶ 4].
It is well settled that claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are subject to a one-year statute
of limitations. Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1)(B) (one-year statute of limitations for
civil action for compensatory or punitive damages under the federal civil rights statutes);
Roberson v. Tennessee, 399 F.3d 792, 794 (6th Cir. 2005) (same). Similarly, claims for
personal injury and the TGTLA are also subject to a one-year statute of limitations. Tenn.
Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1)(A) (actions for personal injury); Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20305(b) (TGTLA claims); Leach v. Taylor, 124 S.W.3d 87, 91 (Tenn. 2004) (intentional
infliction of emotional distress is a personal injury tort governed by the one-year statute of
limitations). Thus, all of the claims in the complaint are governed by a one-year statute of
limitations. Because this case was filed on April 4, 2016, Officers White and Pickens argue
that the only incident which is not barred by any of the limitations periods is the April 3,
2015 incident and the complaint contains no factual allegations that they were involved in
this incident.
The Court agrees. To the extent that any of plaintiff’s claims against Officer White
or Officer Pickens are based on events other than the April 3, 2015 incident, those claims
are clearly time-barred by the statutes of limitations for § 1983 claims, TGTLA claims, and
claims for personal injury. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 28-3-104, 29-20-305(b). 2

As the defendants note, the complaint also contains alleges in its introductory section that
“[o]fficers and their supervisors conspired to deprive Mr. Foxx of his constitutional rights in

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The factual allegations as to the April 3, 2015 incident contain no mention of either
Officer White or Officer Pickens [Doc. 1 at ¶ 9]. The complaint describes an event where
plaintiff was pulled over by Officers Turner and Henderson and detained until Officer
Martin arrived with a K-9 [Id.]. The complaint alleges that Officer Turner forcibly
removed plaintiff from his vehicle, a struggle ensued, and plaintiff then attempted to flee
[Id.]. Plaintiff claims he was then chased and assaulted by all three of the officers and the
K-9 [Id.]. After being treated at the UT Medical Center, plaintiff was taken to the Knox
County Detention Facility [Id.]. The charges against him arising from this incident were
ultimately dismissed [Id.].
Officers White and Pickens argue that any claims against them arising from the
April 3, 2015 incident should be dismissed because the complaint contains no allegations
that they were personally involved and thus the complaint fails to state a plausible claim
for relief [Doc. 8 at pp. 6—8]. As noted above, the plaintiff must plead sufficient “factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The complaint contains no factual
content that Officer White was present or in any way involved in the events of April 3,
2015. The only alleged connection between Officer Pickens and the events of April 3,
2015 is the general allegation in Count One that “[o]n or about April 3, 2015, Defendants

violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 by attempting to cover up and suppress evidence of their use of
excessive force” [Doc. 1 at ¶ 2(c)]. The complaint contains no other reference to a § 1985 claim.
To the extent that plaintiff has attempted to assert a claim pursuant to § 1985, such a claim would
also be subject to the one-year statute of limitations contained in Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)
and would be time-barred.

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Turner, Pickens, Martin, and Henderson, under color of state and federal law, violated
Plaintiff’s civil rights under the Fourth, Eighth and Fourteen [sic] Amendments of the
United States Constitution” [Doc. 1 at ¶ 27]. This is a legal conclusion that, at least with
respect to Officer Pickens, is wholly unsupported by any factual allegations. See Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 679 (“While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they
must be supported by factual allegations.”). Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to allege a
plausible claim for relief against Officers White and Pickens as to the events of April 3,
2015. Inasmuch as this is the only alleged event that is not time-barred, the Court concludes
that the complaint fails to state any plausible timely claims against either Officer White or
Officer Pickens.
In light of the foregoing conclusions, the Court finds it unnecessary to address the
defendants’ remaining arguments for dismissal.

IV.

Conclusion
For the reasons set forth herein, the motion to dismiss by Officers White and Pickens

[Doc. 7] will be GRANTED and they will be dismissed from this action. An appropriate
order will be entered.
IT SO ORDERED.

s/ Thomas W. Phillips
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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