Hinson Bull v. Watson et al (RHC)

Filing 7

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: All of Plaintiff's claims against Knox County Detention Facility are DISMISSED, her housing and verbal abuse claims are DISMISSED, and her motion to appoint counsel [Doc. 3 ] is DENIED. Plaintiff's colorable Eighth Amendment medical claims will be allowed to proceed against Defendants Watson and Hornsby. Accordingly, the Clerk is DIRECTED to send Plaintiff two service packets, each of which consists of a blank summons and USM 285 form. Plai ntiff is ORDERED to complete the service packets and return them to the Clerk's Office within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this Order. Signed by Chief District Judge Thomas A Varlan on 7/12/16. (c/m along with service packets) (JBR)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
JOLETTA HINSON/BULL,
Plaintiff,
v.
F/N/U WATSON, Corporal;
F/N/U HORNSBY, Sergeant; and
KNOX COUNTY DETENTION FACILITY,
Defendants.

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No.:

3:16-CV-266-TAV-CCS

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Acting pro se, state prisoner Joletta Hinson Bull filed this civil rights complaint for
monetary relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against two correctional officers in the Knox County
Detention Facility and against the facility itself [Doc. 1]. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants
Corporal Watson and Sergeant Hornsby subjected her to unconstitutional conditions of
confinement [Id.]. In addition to her complaint, plaintiff filed a motion for the appointment of
counsel [Doc. 3]. Because this case was transferred to this Court by the Middle District after the
filing fee was assessed [Doc. 4], the Court turns first to the contentions in Plaintiff’s complaint.

I.

PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff states her claims in their entirety as follows:
I was incarcerated in Knox County Detention Facility on October 31, 2015 upon
release from UT Hospital. I had seventeen (17) broken bones upon arrival at Knox
County Detention Facility. My scapula was broken. My spine was broken in three
(3) places, seven ribs on the right side of my body were broken and five (5) on the
left side of my body were broken. My right femur was broken and a rod was
placed from my hip to my right knee to provide stability and strength for the
healing process. They made me walk on a severely broken leg causing me to
break one of the screws. I was in extensive pain and suffering. They denied me
any pain medication and proper housing. They mocked me and made fun of me.

[Doc. 1 p.5].

II.

SCREENING AND LEGAL STANDARDS
The Court must now review the complaint to determine whether it states a claim entitling

Plaintiff to relief or is frivolous or malicious or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A. If so, this suit must be dismissed. In
performing this task, the Court bears in mind the rule that pro se pleadings filed in civil rights
cases must be liberally construed and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
Still, the complaint must be sufficient “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face,” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), which simply means that the
factual content pled by a plaintiff must permit a court “to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Formulaic and conclusory recitations of the elements of a
claim which are not supported by specific facts are insufficient to state a plausible claim for
relief. Id. at 681. Furthermore, conclusory allegations need not be accepted as true. Newberry
v. Silverman, 789 F.3d 636, 640 (6th Cir. 2015). The standard articulated in Twombly and Iqbal
“governs dismissals for failure state a claim under [§§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)]
because the relevant statutory language tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6).” Hill v. Lappin,
630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010).
In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must establish that she was
deprived of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law. See Black v. Barberton
Citizens Hosp., 134 F.3d 1265, 1267 (6th Cir. 1998); O’Brien v. City of Grand Rapids, 23 F.3d
990, 995 (6th Cir. 1994); see also Braley v. City of Pontiac, 906 F.2d 220, 223 (6th Cir. 1990)

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(“Section 1983 does not itself create any constitutional rights; it creates a right of action for the
vindication of constitutional guarantees found elsewhere.”).
The Court examines the claims under these guidelines.

III.

LAW AND ANALYSIS
A.

Non-Suable Defendant

Defendant Knox County Detention Facility is a building which serves as a place for
confinement for those in custody, and it is not a suable entity. See Monell v. New York City
Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 689–90 n.53 (1978) (finding that only “bodies politic” are
“persons” who can be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983”). The Sixth Circuit, this Court, and other
courts in this circuit have so held. See Marbry v. Corr. Med. Serv., No. 99-6706, 2000 WL
1720959, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 6, 2000) (citing Rhodes v. McDannel, 945 F.2d 117, 120 (6th Cir.
1991)) (holding that “the Shelby County Jail is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983”); Cage
v. Kent Cnty. Corr. Facility, No. 96-1167, 1997 WL 225647, at *1 (6th Cir. May 1, 1997)
(stating that “[t]he district court also properly found that the jail facility named as a defendant
was not an entity subject to suit under § 1983”); Russell v. Juvenile Court of Kingsport, Tenn.,
No. 2:15-CV-13, 2015 WL 3506523, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. June 3, 2015); Brinkley v. Loftis, No.
3:11–CV–1158, 2012 WL 2370106, at *3 (M.D.Tenn. June 22, 2012); Seals v. Grainger Cnty.
Jail, No. 3:04-CV-606, 2005 WL 1076326, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. May 6, 2005).
Thus, the Knox County Detention Facility will be dismissed as a defendant in this suit.
B.

Remaining Defendants

From the contentions presented in the complaint, the Court infers that Plaintiff is
attempting to state the following three claims against Defendants Watson and Hornsby under the

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Eighth Amendment: (1) that she was denied adequate medical care, (2) that she was housed
under unconstitutional conditions of confinement, and (3) that she was subjected to verbal abuse.

1.

Medical Claims

The Supreme Court has held that punishments involving the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain extend beyond barbarous physical punishments and can include the conditions
under which an inmate is confined. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345–47 (1993). Hence, a
prison authority’s deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs violates the
Eighth Amendment. Id. at 347; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). An Eighth
Amendment claim has both an objective and a subjective component. Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 834 (1994). The objective component requires a plaintiff to show a “sufficiently
serious” deprivation. Id. The subjective component requires a showing of a sufficiently culpable
state of mind—one of deliberate indifference. Id. at 842.
Prison doctors and officials may evidence deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious
medical needs either “in their response to a prisoner’s needs” or by “interfer[ing] with treatment
once prescribed.”

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104–05.

Moreover, “a prisoner who suffers pain

needlessly when relief is readily available has a cause of action against those whose deliberate
indifference is the cause of his suffering.” See Berryman v. Rieger, 150 F.3d 561, 566 (6th Cir.
1998) (citing Boretti v. Wiscomb, 930 F.2d 1150, 1154–55 (6th Cir. 1991)); see also Estelle, 429
U.S. at 103 (stating that “the denial of medical care may result in pain and suffering which no
one suggests would serve any penological purpose”).
In support of Plaintiff’s allegations concerning her medical care, she contends that
Defendants made her walk on a broken leg, which caused her to break a screw and, in turn,
caused her to suffer significant pain and suffering, and that they denied her pain medication. The
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Court finds that Plaintiff arguably has stated an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).

2.

Housing and Verbal Abuse Claims

These claims are addressed together because Plaintiff has offered no contentions of fact
in support of her claims that Defendants did not furnish her “proper housing” and that they
mocked and ridiculed her. These claims, therefore, are conclusory. Conclusory allegations, as
noted, need not be accepted as true, Newberry, 789 F.3d at 640, and do not state actionable
claims under § 1983. Coker v. Summit Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 90 F. App’x 782, 787 (6th Cir.
2003) (finding that bare bones, conclusory assertions do not state a cognizable constitutional
claim); Morgan v. Church’s Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir. 1987). Indeed, it is
improper to assume that a plaintiff would be able to show facts not alleged or that a defendant
has violated the law in ways not alleged. Cline v. Rogers, 87 F.3d 176, 184 (6th Cir. 1996).
Because these allegations lack facial plausibility, see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (noting that
“an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” has no facial plausibility), they
fail to state claims entitling Plaintiff to relief under § 1983.1 Therefore, the housing and verbal
abuse claims will be dismissed.

IV.

MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL
Plaintiff has filed a motion for the appointment of counsel [Doc. 3]. There is no

“automatic” constitutional right to counsel in a civil rights case and, typically, counsel is only
appointed in an exceptional case. See Glover v. Johnson, 75 F.3d 264, 268 (6th Cir. 1996)

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Even if Plaintiff had offered facts to support her allegation that Defendants mocked and
made fun of her, she still would not state § 1983 claims because, as explained by the Sixth
Circuit, “harassment and verbal abuse . . . do not constitute the type of infliction of pain that the
Eighth Amendment prohibits.” Johnson v. Dellatifa, 357 F.3d 539, 546 (6th Cir. 2004).
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(observing that courts in the Sixth Circuit do not appoint counsel for indigent and pro se
prisoners in civil cases absent truly extraordinary circumstances). The claims in the complaint
are not complex, but are straightforward and are pleaded clearly. The sole ground for relief
involves Plaintiff’s contentions that she was denied proper medical treatment.
The Court has carefully considered Plaintiff’s motion, the record as a whole, the issues
and the complexity of this case, and her ability to represent herself, and has concluded that the
appointment of counsel is not warranted here because there are no exceptional circumstances to
justify appointing counsel. Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601 (6th Cir. 1993); Mira v. Marshall,
806 F.2d 636 (6th Cir. 1986). As such, her motion to appoint counsel will be denied.

V.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, all of Plaintiff’s claims against Knox County Detention

Facility are DISMISSED, her housing and verbal abuse claims are DISMISSED, and her
motion to appoint counsel [Doc. 3] is DENIED.
Plaintiff’s colorable Eighth Amendment medical claims will be allowed to proceed
against Defendants Watson and Hornsby.

Accordingly, the Clerk is DIRECTED to send

Plaintiff two service packets, each of which consists of a blank summons and USM 285 form.
Plaintiff is ORDERED to complete the service packets and return them to the Clerk’s Office
within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this Order. At that time, the summonses will be
signed and sealed by the Clerk and forwarded to the U.S. Marshal for service on Defendants.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4. Plaintiff is forewarned that failure to return the completed service packets
within the time required will jeopardize her prosecution of this action.
Also, Plaintiff SHALL promptly notify the Court of any address changes, and she is
ADVISED that her failure so to do, within fourteen (14) days of any such change, see E.D.
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Tenn. L.R. 83.13, will result in the dismissal of this lawsuit for failure to prosecute under Rule
41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ Thomas A. Varlan
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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