Farr v. Centurion of Tennessee, LLC et al

Filing 100

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER. The Clerk is DIRECTED to update the Court's docket sheet to name Defendant Byrge, rather than Houston-Fagan. Defendants' pending motions for summary judgment 56 , 68 , 70 , and 73 are G RANTED. All other pending motions and objections 51 , 76 , 82 , 91 , and 92 are DENIED and/or OVERRULED as moot, as only Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Niner and Walker remain herein. Signed by District Judge Thomas A. Varlan on 3/31/20. (ADA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
THOMAS W. FARR,
Plaintiff,
v.
CENTURION OF TENNESSEE,
CORIZON, INC.,
JOSEPH CRUMP,
DR. NINER,
DAN WALKER, and
LYNNDY BYRGE,
Defendants.

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No.:

3:16-CV-387-TAV-HBG

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This is a pro se prisoner’s complaint for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that is
proceeding as to Plaintiff’s claims that Defendants Crump, Walker, Byrge, and Niner were
deliberately indifferent his serious medical needs in violation of his Eighth Amendment
rights in accordance with a custom or policy of Defendants Centurion and Corizon
[Doc. 13 p. 5–9]. While Defendants Walker and Niner have not yet answered, all other
Defendants have filed motions for summary judgment [Docs. 56, 68, 70, and 73], Plaintiff
filed responses in opposition to those motions [Docs. 65, 81, 83, 84] and Defendants
Crump, Centurion, and Byrge filed replies [Docs. 67 and 85].
For the reasons set forth below, the pending motions for summary judgment
[Docs. 56, 68, 70, and 73] will be GRANTED and all other pending motions and objections

[Docs. 51, 76, 82, 91, and 92] will be DENIED and/or OVERRULED as moot, as only
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Niner and Walker will remain.
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[t]he court shall

grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” In ruling on a
motion for summary judgment, the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of
the nonmoving party. McLean v. 988011 Ontario Ltd, 224 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 2000).
As such, the moving party has the burden of conclusively showing the lack of any genuine
issue of material fact. Smith v. Hudson, 600 F.2d 60, 63 (6th Cir. 1979). To successfully
oppose a motion for summary judgment, “the non-moving party . . . must present sufficient
evidence from which a jury could reasonably find for him.” Jones v. Muskegon Cty., 625
F.3d 935, 940 (6th Cir. 2010).
II.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Court has previously summarized the procedural history of this case as follows:
On June 24, 2016, Plaintiff, a former inmate at the Morgan
County Correctional Complex (“MCCX”), filed a civil-rights
complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the following
entities and persons: private medical-care providers Centurion
of Tennessee, LLC and Corizon, Inc.; physicians Dr. Crump,
Dr. C. Singleton, and Dr. Niner; MCCX Health Administrators
Dan Walker and Lynndy Houston-Fagan; MCCX Job
Coordinator Rhonda Armes; MCCX Warden Shawn Phillips;
MCCX Deputy Warden of Treatment Stanton Heidle; and
Tennessee Department of Corrections (“TDOC)” Medical
Director Kenneth Williams [Doc. 2, at 1].
2

Upon initial screening of Plaintiff’s complaint, the Court
concluded that Plaintiff had failed to allege the deprivation of
any constitutionally protected right, privilege or immunity
against any defendant, and dismissed the action sua sponte for
failure to state a viable § 1983 claim [Doc. 5]. Plaintiff
appealed. On June 5, 2018, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed this Court’s judgment to the extent it dismissed the
claims against Singleton and Williams, but vacated that
judgment to the extent it dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against
Centurion, Corizon, Walker, Houston-Fagan, Dr. Crump, and
Dr. Niner [Doc. 13 p. 9]. In particular, the Sixth Circuit
concluded that Plaintiff’s complaint: (1) sufficiently states an
Eighth Amendment claim against Corizon and Centurion based
on a policy of providing less than adequate medical care to save
money; (2) sufficiently states an Eighth Amendment claim of
deliberate indifference claim against Dr. Crump; (3)
sufficiently states Eighth Amendment claims against Walker
and Houston-Fagan for the denial of “reasonable requests for
medical treatment in the face of an obvious need for such
attention;” and (4) sufficiently states an Eighth Amendment
claim against Dr. Niner for delayed medical treatment [Doc.
13, at 4–9].
[Doc. 35 p. 2–3].
III.

RELEVANT UNDISPUTED FACTS
First, neither Plaintiff’s complaint [Doc. 2] nor his responses in opposition to the

motions for summary judgment [Docs. 65, 81, 83, and 84] are sworn. Accordingly, the
Court will not consider Plaintiff’s assertions in these filings in determining whether a
genuine issue of material fact remains in ruling on Defendants’ motions for summary
judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4); Dole v. Elliot Travel & Tours, Inc., 942 F.2d 962, 968–
69 (6th Cir. 1991) (providing that a court may not consider unsworn statements when ruling
on a motion for summary judgment); El Bey v. Roop, 530 F.3d 407, 414 (6th Cir. 2008)

3

(holding that a sworn complaint carries the same weight as an affidavit for purposes of
summary judgment).
The Court will, however, consider the undisputed facts regarding Plaintiff’s medical
treatment that are supported by Plaintiff’s statements in his sworn deposition, Plaintiff’s
sworn medical records,1 the affidavit of Jeffrey Scott King [Doc. 69-4], and Plaintiff’s
statements in the record that support Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986) (providing that where the
nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a party moving
for summary judgment may rely solely on pleadings and admissions on file, among other
things).
Thus, the Court finds that the relevant undisputed evidence in the record for
purposes of the pending summary judgment motions includes the following:
1.

In 2012, while Plaintiff was incarcerated in the Morgan County Correctional
Complex (“MCCX”), Dr. Chasidy Singleton saw Plaintiff for his glaucoma
issues and ultimately performed a surgical “trabeculectomy” for those issues
which left a “diffuse bleb” on Plaintiff’s left eye [Doc. 56-3 p. 18–28];

2.

In January 2013, Defendant Dr. Crump saw Plaintiff for a follow up
appointment regarding Dr. Singleton’s eye operation [Doc. 73-1 p. 5];

3.

In February 2013, Defendant Dr. Crump again saw Plaintiff because he “was
starting to have trouble” with his left eye [Id. at 5, 49];

1

In support of his motion for summary judgment, Defendant Dr. Crump did not file an
affidavit, but instead filed a sworn copy of portions of Plaintiff’s medical records [Doc. 56-3] and
portions of Plaintiff’s deposition [Doc. 66-1]. While counsel appears to interpret these notes in
his memorandum in support of the motion for summary judgment, some of his interpretations go
beyond what is apparent to the Court from the face of the medical records [Doc. 57 p. 3–5].
However, in the absence of any sworn proof in the record to support these interpretations, the Court
will rely only on the information that is apparent from the face of the sworn medical records for
purposes of summary judgment.
4

4.

Defendant Dr. Crump told Plaintiff that he put in a request for Plaintiff to get
a consult for of his bleb in February 2013 that was denied, but no record of
any such request exists [Id. at 5, 49];

5.

In April 2013, Defendant Dr. Crump again saw Plaintiff and he complained
of “left eye irritation” without discharge and his eyelids were swollen with
increased redness and starting to get worse [Id. at 57];

6.

Prior to June 2013, Plaintiff’s discomfort in his left eye was “minor” [Doc.
69-1 p. 3];

7.

On September 8, 2013, Defendant Corizon stopped providing medical
services at MCCX [Doc. 69-4 p. 2];

8.

On October 9, 2013, Defendant Dr. Crump again saw Plaintiff for his eye
issues, noted that Plaintiff’s left eye blister/bleb was “doing well,” and
continued some eye treatment for Plaintiff [Doc. 56-3 p. 5];2

9.

On November 13, 2013, Defendant Dr. Crump again saw Plaintiff for his eye
issues, noted that Plaintiff’s left eye was “some better,” and again prescribed
treatment for Plaintiff’s left eye [Id. at 4];

10.

In 2013, Defendant Dr. Crump attempted to conservatively treat Plaintiff’s
bleb with eye drops despite telling Plaintiff that he did not treat blebs because
he is an optometrist [Doc. 73-1 p. 56];

11.

On January 8, 2014, Defendant Dr. Crump again saw Plaintiff and noted that
Plaintiff’s “bleb look[ed] good” [Doc. 56-3 p. 3];

12.

On February 19, 2014, Defendant Dr. Crump again saw Plaintiff and noted
that Plaintiff’s left eye was “much better” and requested a “referral to Oak
Ridge MD for fu bleb evaluation” [Id. at. 2];

13.

In April 2014, Plaintiff saw Dr. Singleton for a follow up appointment at
which time she wrote a letter to TDOC stating that while Plaintiff’s filtering
bleb was “causing [Plaintiff] ocular irritation,” there was “no evidence of
bleb leak or infection,” recommending that Plaintiff receive drops and gel

2

Defendant Dr. Crump notes in his memorandum in support of his motion for summary
judgment that Plaintiff states in his complaint that he also saw Defendant Dr. Crump in May of
2013 and twice in June of 2013, but it is unclear whether Defendant Dr. Crump agrees that these
visits occurred and no party has cited any proof that any such visits occurred or what, if any,
treatment Defendant Dr. Crump provided Plaintiff therein [Doc. 2 p. 7; Doc. 57 p. 3 n.2].
5

ointment, and stating that Plaintiff should follow up at the Nashville General
Eye Clinic in one month for “automated visual field testing” and a recheck
of his “intraocular pressures and anterior segment of both eyes” [Id. at 11–
12];
14.

On July 16, 2014, Defendant Dr. Crump filled out a request for Plaintiff to
be referred to an ophthalmologist for “surgical correction” of Plaintiff’s
“abnormally large” filtering bleb because it was “causing irritation” and
“some dry eye” which was “not helped by artificial tears, gels or ointments,”
and this request was approved August 8, 2014 [Id. at 8, 10];

15.

On December 10, 2014, Defendant Dr. Crump made a note in Plaintiff’s
medical records in which he requested a “check up on ophthalmology followup at SPNDS approved 8/8/14 (in records)” [Id. at 6];

16.

In February 2015, Plaintiff had an appointment to see Dr. Singleton that was
cancelled due to bad weather and he therefore saw Dr. Singleton in April
2015 instead, at which time she decided not to surgically remove the bleb on
Plaintiff’s left eye because his vision and eye pressure in that eye were good
and she was concerned about possible complications [Id. at 6; Doc. 73-1 p.
24–27; Doc. 2 p. 11];

17.

At Plaintiff’s April 2015 appointment, Dr. Singleton also agreed to refer
Plaintiff to an eye specialist for an appointment in June 2015, but Plaintiff
did not see a specialist pursuant to this referral prior to June 23, 2015 [Doc.
56-3 p. 6; Doc. 73-1 p. 24–27];

18.

When he woke up on June 23, 2015, Plaintiff had lost about half of his vision
in his left eye, his eye was dark, he “was seeing these black squiggly things,”
and his eye was hurting [Id. at 31];

19.

Accordingly, on June 23, 2015, Plaintiff told Defendant Dr. Niner that he had
an emergency, and Defendant Dr. Niner agreed that it looked serious and told
Plaintiff that he would refer him to see Defendant Dr. Crump the next day
[Id. at 32];

20.

On June 24, 2015, Plaintiff was not called to see Defendant Dr. Crump, but
when he went to the infirmary around 1 p.m., an officer told Plaintiff that
Defendant Dr. Crump had already left for the day. Plaintiff then found Dr.
Lane and explained his situation, Dr. Lane discussed Plaintiff’s eye condition
with Defendant Dr. Crump, who recommended transfer of Plaintiff to an
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ophthalmologist, and Plaintiff was ultimately taken to an emergency center
[Id. at 36–41; Doc. 56-3 p. 7];
21.

22.

Plaintiff believes that Defendant Dr. Crump “went above and beyond what
he could do” in attempting to treat Plaintiff’s bleb and “seemed to be the only
one that realized [Plaintiff] really did need some help . . . . and he did what
he could do, but he couldn’t do too much,” though Plaintiff questions why
Defendant Dr. Crump did not tell Defendant Byrge that Plaintiff really
needed help or ask his friend who was an ophthalmologist about how to treat
Plaintiff’s bleb [Doc. 66-1 p. 4–6];

23.

Defendant Centurion “does not have a policy in place that results in
‘deliberate indifference’ to Plaintiff’s or any other inmates[’] medical need”
[Doc. 84 p. 1–2]; and

24.
IV.

Plaintiff received eye drops to treat the irritation he experienced due to the
bleb in his eye during the time period underlying his complaint, but asserts
that he “needed that bleb corrected or removed, and [] couldn’t get it done,”
“want[ed] to get [the bleb] removed because it was so irritating . . . and
because of his appearance,” and “did not receive the appropriate care that
[he] needed . . . or the proper treatment [he] needed” [Doc. 73-1 p. 27–28,
47–48];

Plaintiff has not sued any Corizon employees [Doc. 69-4 p. 2].

ANALYSIS
A prison authority’s deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical need

violates the Eighth Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). Prison medical
personnel or officials may be deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs
“in their response to a prisoner’s needs” or by “interfer[ing] with treatment once
prescribed.” Id. at 104–5. Establishing a deprivation of a federal right in the Eighth
Amendment medical context requires evidence that that acts or omissions of an individual
operating under the color of state law were “sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs.” Id. at 106. Deliberate indifference is equivalent to
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“subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
839 (1994). Under this standard, a state actor may not be liable under § 1983 unless the he
(1) knew that the inmate faced a substantial risk of serious harm; and (2) disregarded that
risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. Id. at 847.
However, “[a] patient’s disagreement with his physicians over the proper course of
treatment alleges, at most, a medical-malpractice claim, which is not cognizable under §
1983.” Darrah v. Krisher, 865 F.3d 361, 372 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 107 (1976)). Moreover, “a complaint that a physician has been negligent in
diagnosing or treating a medical condition” is insufficient to support claim for deliberate
indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs under the Eighth Amendment, as
“medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim
is a prisoner.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 107 (1976). Thus, while a doctor’s
treatment may violate the constitution where it is “so woefully inadequate as to amount to
no treatment at all,” federal courts are “generally reluctant to second guess medical
judgments.” Alspaugh v. McConnell, 643 F.3d 162, 169 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Westlake
v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n. 5 (6th Cir. 1975)).
Also, for a corporation acting under state law to be liable for a violation of
constitutional rights, the plaintiff must establish that the corporation’s custom or policy
was the moving force behind that violation. Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810,
818 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that a private corporation acting under color of state law may
not be liable under § 1983 for constitutional violations based upon a theory of respondeat
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superior, but rather may be liable only where its custom or policy caused a constitutional
violation) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)).
A.

Defendant Byrge

Plaintiff’s claim proceeding against Defendant Byrge arises out of his allegation that
she and/or Defendant Walker “denied his physicians’ requests for referrals to eye
specialists” [Doc. 13 p. 8]. However, in support of her motion for summary judgment,
Defendant Byrge filed an affidavit in which she testifies that she was not responsible for
Plaintiff’ medical care, did not make any decisions regarding that medical care, and was
not deliberately indifferent to any of Plaintiff’s serious medical needs during the time
period underlying Plaintiff’s complaint [Doc. 70-1 p. 1–2]. In his response to Defendant
Byrge’s motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff attempts to dispute this by asserting that
Defendant Byrge had knowledge of his serious eye condition, eye specialist appointments,
and his medical providers’ related treatments, findings, and referrals and therefore should
have ensured that he received proper care for this condition [Doc. 84 p. 7–8]. However, as
set forth above, both Plaintiff’s complaint and his response to Defendant Byrge’s motion
for summary judgment are unsworn and therefore insufficient to establish that a genuine
issue of material fact remains for purposes of summary judgment. Dole, 942 F.2d at 968–
69.
As Defendant Byrge has met her burden to set forth proof that she did not violate
Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights during the relevant time period underlying Plaintiff’s
complaint and Plaintiff has not set forth any evidence from which a reasonable jury could

9

find that she did, Defendant Byrge’s motion for summary judgment [Doc. 70] will be
GRANTED.
B.

Defendant Dr. Crump

Defendant Dr. Crump seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims against him on
the grounds that (1) they are time-barred; (2) Plaintiff did not properly exhaust his
administrative remedies; and (3) the sworn medical records establish that he was not
deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious eye condition [Doc. 57]. As the Court finds
that Defendant Dr. Crump has met his burden to set forth proof that he was not deliberately
indifferent to Plaintiff’s eye condition and Plaintiff has not cited any evidence that would
allow a reasonable juror to find in Plaintiff’s favor on this claim,3 the Court will not address
his remaining arguments.

In his unsworn responses to Defendant Dr. Crump’s motion for summary judgment,
Plaintiff repeatedly alleges that Defendant Dr. Crump’s treatment of his eye condition was
negligent and requests to amend his complaint to add such claims [Docs. 65 and 81]. Also, in both
his pretrial narrative statement and his second response in opposition to Defendant Dr. Crump’s
motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff requests that the Court add Chasidy Singleton back in as
a defendant herein based on her acts of placing a blister on Plaintiff’s eye and Plaintiff’s allegation
that she failed to treat and correct this bleb [Doc. 80 p. 6; Doc. 81 p. 5–6]. However, the Court
previously dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against Chasidy Singleton and his negligence claims
against all Defendants for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under § 1983
[Docs. 5 and 6] and the Sixth Circuit affirmed [Doc. 13 p. 4–6]. Moreover, Plaintiff has not set
forth grounds for the Court to alter or amend its dismissal of these claims under Rule 60(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b); Leisure Caviar, LLC v. U.S. Fish &
Wildfire Serv., 616 F.3d 612, 616 (6th Cir. 2010) (providing that “[w]hen a party seeks to amend
a complaint after an adverse judgment . . . . the claimant must meet the requirements for reopening
a case established by Rules 59 or 60”). Accordingly, these requests are DENIED.
10
3

The undisputed evidence in the record4 establishes that the medical care Defendant
Dr. Crump provided Plaintiff was not so inadequate that it was equivalent to no care at all.
Rather, Defendant Dr. Crump repeatedly attempted to treat Plaintiff’s symptoms related to
his bleb and repeatedly referred Plaintiff to an ophthalmologist for treatment of this
condition. Moreover, while Plaintiff disagrees with the manner in which Defendant Dr.
Crump treated his left eye, he does not dispute that Defendant Dr. Crump took the steps
that he could take to abate Plaintiff’s left eye issues. Accordingly, no genuine issue of
material fact remains as to Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Dr. Crump and Defendant
Dr. Crump therefore is entitled to summary judgment.
Specifically, as set forth above, the undisputed evidence in the record establishes
that Plaintiff admits that his eye issues were “minor” from prior to June of 2013.5
Moreover, Plaintiff acknowledges that in 2013, Defendant Dr. Crump attempted to treat
Plaintiff’s left eye issues by prescribing drops and/or gels. Also, the medical records
establish that when Defendant Dr. Crump saw Plaintiff during 2013, he observed that
Plaintiff’s left eye was improving or looked “good.” Thus, no evidence in the record would
allow a reasonable juror to find that Defendant Dr. Crump disregarded any substantial risk
of serious harm to Plaintiff due to his left eye issues during 2013.

4

Some of the materials the Court relies on to establish undisputed relevant facts regarding
Defendant Dr. Crump’s treatment of Plaintiff are taken from evidence in the record that neither
Defendant Dr. Crump nor Plaintiff cited in their summary judgment filings pursuant to Rule
56(c)(4).
5

The facts the Court will refer to in the analysis portion of this opinion are taken from the
“Relevant Undisputed Facts” section above.
11

The undisputed evidence further establishes that when Defendant Dr. Crump again
saw Plaintiff in January 2014, he noted that Plaintiff’s bleb “looked good,” and that when
he saw Plaintiff in February of 2014, he noted that Plaintiff’s bleb was “much better” and
requested a follow up appointment for Plaintiff with Dr. Singleton. Plaintiff then saw Dr.
Singleton in April of 2014, at which time she noted that Plaintiff’s filtering bleb was
“causing [Plaintiff] ocular irritation,” but had “no evidence of bleb leak or infection” and
recommended that Plaintiff receive drops and gel ointment. Accordingly, no evidence in
the record would allow a reasonable juror to find that Defendant Dr. Crump disregarded a
substantial risk of serious injury to Plaintiff during this time period.
Plaintiff next saw Defendant Dr. Crump in July 2014, at which time Defendant Dr.
Crump made a request for Plaintiff to be referred to a specialist for surgical correction of
his bleb because it was “causing some dry eye” which was “not helped by artificial tears,
gels or ointments” and this request was approved on August 8, 2014. Moreover, when
Plaintiff still had not seen a specialist pursuant to this referral in December 2014, Defendant
Dr. Crump checked on that request. Plaintiff then had a February 2015 appointment
scheduled with Dr. Singleton that was cancelled due to bad weather and rescheduled in
April 2015, at which time Dr. Singleton decided that she did not want to surgically remove
the bleb on Plaintiff’s left eye because his vision and eye pressure was good and she was
concerned about possible complications, but agreed to refer Plaintiff to an eye specialist.
Thus, the medical records establish that during this time period, Defendant Dr.
Crump recognized that his and/or Dr. Singleton’s treatment of Plaintiff’s bleb through the
12

use of drops and gels was not alleviating Plaintiff’s left eye irritation and that Plaintiff
therefore needed new or additional treatment. Defendant Dr. Crump accordingly took the
reasonable steps of referring Plaintiff to a specialist and specifically requesting surgical
removal of the bleb to abate Plaintiff’s left eye irritation. While Plaintiff did not see Dr.
Singleton pursuant to this referral until approximately six months after it was approved, no
evidence in the record would support a reasonable jury finding that this delay was due to
Defendant Dr. Crump’s disregard of a substantial risk of harm to Plaintiff. Moreover,
nothing in the record suggests that Defendant Dr. Crump had any involvement in treating
Plaintiff after December 2014 until Dr. Lane called him on June 24, 2015, and he
recommended that Plaintiff be taken to an ophthalmologist.
Also, even making the reasonable inference in favor of Plaintiff that his sworn
statement at his deposition that Defendant Dr. Crump was the only person who recognized
that Plaintiff needed additional medical treatment for the bleb on his left eye is evidence
that Defendant Dr. Crump recognized a substantial risk of harm to Plaintiff due to his left
eye issues, Plaintiff further testified that Defendant Dr. Crump “went above and beyond”
and “did what he could do” to treat Plaintiff’s left eye issues. Thus, despite Plaintiff’s
apparent disagreement with the treatment that Defendant Dr. Crump provided him, the
undisputed evidence in the record establishes that Defendant Dr. Crump was not
deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm to Plaintiff, but rather took reasonable
measures to abate any risk of harm to Plaintiff that he perceived.

13

Accordingly, Defendant Dr. Crump’s his motion for summary judgment [Doc. 56]
will be GRANTED.
C.

Defendant Corizon

Defendant Corizon seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims on the grounds
that (1) they are time-barred; (2) Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies; and
(3) Defendant Corizon did not violate Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights [Doc. 69]. In
support thereof, Defendant Corizon filed a portion of Plaintiff’s medical records, a portion
of Plaintiff’s deposition, a TDOC grievance policy, and a sworn declaration from Jeffrey
Scott King in which he states that Defendant Corizon stopped providing medical care,
except mental health services, at MCCX on September 8, 2013, and that Plaintiff has not
sued any Corizon employees [Docs. 69-1–4].
In his response in opposition to this motion, Plaintiff questions his medical treatment
during the time period in which Defendant Corizon provided medical services at MCCX
but cites no evidence in the record from which a reasonable jury could find that Defendant
Corizon is liable for any violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights with regard to that
treatment [Doc. 83 p. 8–9, 10–11], and no such evidence is apparent from the record.
Accordingly, Defendant Corizon’s motion for summary judgment [Doc. 68] will be
GRANTED.
D.

Defendant Centurion

Defendant Centurion seeks summary judgment on the ground that Plaintiff does not
have evidence that its custom or policy was the moving force behind any violation of
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Plaintiff’s constitutional rights as required for a corporation acting under color of state law
to be liable for a constitutional violation under § 1983 [Doc. 74]. In his response in
opposition to this motion, Plaintiff does not cite any evidence from which a reasonable jury
could find that a custom or policy of Defendant Centurion caused any violation of his
constitutional rights [Doc 84], nor is any such evidence apparent from the record. To the
contrary, Plaintiff states in his response in opposition to Defendant Centurion’s motion for
summary judgment that “[o]f course Centurion does not have a policy in place that results
in ‘deliberate indifference’ to Plaintiff’s or any other inmates[’] medical need” [Doc. 84 p.
1–2].
Accordingly, Defendant Centurion’s motion for summary judgment [Doc. 73] will
be GRANTED.
V.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above:
1.

The Clerk is DIRECTED to update the Court’s docket sheet to name
Defendant Byrge, rather than Houston-Fagan;

2.

Defendants’ pending motions for summary judgment [Docs. 56, 68, 70, and
73] are GRANTED; and

3.

All other pending motions and objections [Docs. 51, 76, 82, 91, and 92] are
DENIED and/or OVERRULED as moot, as only Plaintiff’s claims against
Defendants Niner and Walker remain herein.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
ENTER:
s/ Thomas A. Varlan
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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