Shelley v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner of (JRG1)
Filing
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MEMORANDUM AND OPINION as set forth in following order. Signed by Magistrate Judge H Bruce Guyton on 9/29/17. (ABF)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
DAMIEN SHELLEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, 1
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
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No. 3:16-CV-440-HBG
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This case is before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), Rule 72(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the consent of the parties [Doc. 17]. Now before the Court
is the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support [Docs. 18 & 19]
and the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support [Docs. 20 &
21]. Damien Shelley (“the Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of the decision of the Administrative
Law Judge (“the ALJ”), the final decision of the Defendant Nancy A. Berryhill, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security (“the Commissioner”). For the reasons that follow, the Court
will GRANT the Plaintiff’s motion, and DENY the Commissioner’s motion.
I.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On January 11, 2013, the Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits
pursuant to Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq., claiming a period of
disability that began on July 7, 2012. [Tr. 18, 136-42]. After his application was denied initially
1
During the pendency of this case, Nancy A. Berryhill replaced Acting Commissioner
Carolyn W. Colvin. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), Nancy A. Berryhill is
substituted as the Defendant in this case.
and upon reconsideration, the Plaintiff requested a hearing before an ALJ. [Tr. 97]. Following a
hearing [Tr. 30-54], the ALJ found the Plaintiff was “not disabled” [Tr. 15-29]. The Appeals
Council denied the Plaintiff’s request for review [Tr. 1-6], making the ALJ’s decision the final
decision of the Commissioner.
Having exhausted his administrative remedies, the Plaintiff filed a Complaint with this
Court on July 11, 2016, seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision under Section
405(g) of the Social Security Act. [Doc. 1]. The parties have filed competing dispositive motions,
and this matter is now ripe for adjudication.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing the Commissioner’s determination of whether an individual is disabled
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Court is limited to determining whether the ALJ’s decision
was reached through application of the correct legal standards and in accordance with the
procedure mandated by the regulations and rulings promulgated by the Commissioner, and
whether the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence. Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
581 F.3d 399, 405 (6th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541,
544 (6th Cir. 2004).
Substantial evidence is “more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it
is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Cutlip v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). It
is immaterial whether the record may also possess substantial evidence to support a different
conclusion from that reached by the ALJ, or whether the reviewing judge may have decided the
case differently. Crisp v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 790 F.2d 450, 453 n.4 (6th Cir. 1986).
The substantial evidence standard is intended to create a “‘zone of choice’ within which the
2
Commissioner can act, without the fear of court interference.” Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 762,
773 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986)). Therefore, the
Court will not “try the case de novo, nor resolve conflicts in the evidence, nor decide questions of
credibility.” Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted).
On review, the plaintiff “bears the burden of proving his entitlement to benefits.” Boyes v.
Sec’y. of Health & Human Servs., 46 F.3d 510, 512 (6th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted).
III.
MEDICAL EVIDENCE
The Plaintiff alleges disability based on hypertrophic cardiomyopathy. 2 [Tr. 55, 71]. His
cardiac impairment is treated by cardiologist, Gregory Brewer, M.D. The Plaintiff first presented
to Dr. Brewer on July 17, 2012, due to a history of chest pain. [Tr. 256]. Diagnostic testing,
including a 2D/M mode echocardiogram and color flow doppler echocardiogram, indicated
hypertrophic cardiomyopathy. [Tr. 258]. The Plaintiff often complained of chest pain, shortness
of breath, severe headaches, edema in all four extremities, nausea, sweating, light-headedness,
dizziness, and fainting spells. [Tr. 218, 256-75, 380-89]. During a three day hospitalization on
August 31, 2012, for severe chest pain, a heart catheterization was performed, revealing extensive
2
“Hypertrophic cardiomyopathy occurs if heart muscle cells enlarge and cause the walls
of the ventricles (usually the left ventricle) to thicken.” Hypertrophic Cardiomyopathy, Am. Heart
Ass’n, http://www.heart.org/HEARTORG/Conditions/More/Cardiomyopathy/ HypertrophicCardiomyopathy_UCM_444317_Article.jsp#.Wcu_3-srK72 (last updated Mar. 29, 2017). As a
result, “the thickened muscle makes the inside of the left ventricle smaller, so it holds less blood.
The walls of the ventricle may stiffen, and as a result, the ventricle is less able to relax and fill with
blood.” Id. Symptoms include shortness of breath or trouble breathing, fatigue, swelling in the
ankles, feet, legs, abdomen, and veins in the neck, dizziness, light-headedness fainting during
physical activity, irregular heartbeat, chest pain, and heart murmurs. Symptoms and Diagnosis of
Cardiomyopathy, Am. Heart Ass’n, http://www.heart.org/HEARTORG/Conditions/More/
Cardiomyopathy/Symptoms-and-Diagnosis%20-of%20Cardiomyopathy_UCM_444175_Article.
jsp#.WcvAUOsrK7 (last updated Sept. 2, 2016).
3
muscle bridging in the mid and distal left anterior descending coronary artery with narrowing up
to 70-80% in multiple areas. [Tr. 266, 278].
Dr. Brewer referred the Plaintiff to the cardiology division at the Cleveland Clinic. [Tr.
261].
An echocardiogram and MRI was performed on September 12, 2012, confirming
hypertrophic cardiomyopathy with mid-cavitary obliteration. [Tr. 217, 233-35]. The examining
physician suggested further diagnostic testing, including a right heart catheterization and imaging,
and for the Plaintiff to continue medication prescribed by Dr. Brewer. [Tr. 218]. Based on
recommendations from the Cleveland Clinic, Dr. Brewer ordered a cardiac PET scan on September
24, 2012, to evaluate for ischemia. [Tr. 268]. Imaging results were negative for transmural
ischemia, but did indicate abnormal left ventricular ejection fraction of 47% 3 with mild global
hypokinesis 4 and increased septal thickness with increased radiopharmaceutical uptake. [Tr. 269].
On January 9, 2013, after the Plaintiff received a second opinion from the University of Tennessee
Medical Center [Tr. 274], Dr. Brewer noted that both tertiary referral centers had reached the same
conclusion: that the Plaintiff required medial management and unroofing or stenting on the left
anterior descending artery was not recommended. [Tr. 277].
The Plaintiff continued to present to Dr. Brewer through July 2014 with complaints of chest
pain, shortness of breath, edema, and elevated diastolic blood pressure. [Tr. 377, 380, 383, 386,
3
“Left ventricular ejection fraction (LVEF) is the measurement of how much blood is
being pumped out of the left ventricle of the heart (the main pumping chamber) with each
contraction.” Ejection Fraction, Cleveland Clinic, https://my.clevelandclinic.org/health/articles/
ejection-fraction (last visited Sept. 27, 2017). A normal LVEF ranges from 55% to 70%, and a
LVEF ranging between 40 % to 54% is considered slightly below normal. Id.
4
“Global hypokinesis means the heart strength is globally weak - all the walls are weak,
as opposed to regionally weak - in which case one or more walls are weak and others ok.” George
Younis, M.D., Texas Heart Institute, http://www.texasheart.org/HIC/HeartDoctor/answer_1739.
cfm (last updated Feb. 2012).
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389]. On May 9, 2013, the Plaintiff reported passing out six times from coughing. [Tr. 380]. On
July 1, 2013, another echocardiogram was performed, revealing left atrial enlargement with
asymmetrical ventricle septal hypertrophy with ejection-fraction of 65%. [Tr. 383]. Dr. Brewer
opined that the Plaintiff had non-obstructive hypertrophic cardiomyopathy 5 manifesting itself as
asymmetrical septal hypertrophy6 with a long segment of muscle bridging with persistent chest
pain. [Tr. 385]. Dr. Brewer concluded that medical management was still the appropriate course
of treatment. [Id.].
The record includes four medical opinions from Dr. Brewer. The first one, dated October
29, 2012, is an attending physician statement completed for a private insurer in connection with a
request for long term disability benefits. [Tr. 402-04]. Therein, Dr. Brewer opined that the
Plaintiff suffers from hypertrophic cardiomyopathy with muscle bridging – recurrent refractory
chest pain. [Tr. 402]. Hypertension was listed as a secondary condition contributing to disability.
[Tr. 403]. Symptoms of chest pain, shortness of breath, and edema were also indicated. [Id.]. Dr.
Brewer opined that over the course of an eight-hour workday, the Plaintiff could not stand, sit,
walk, or drive; he could use his upper extremities for repetitive functions such as simple grasping,
pushing and pulling, and fine manipulation; he could occasionally bend, squat, climb, reach above
shoulder level, kneel, crawl, use feet for foot controls, and drive; and he could lift or carry up to
5
Non-obstructive hypertrophic cardiomyopathy occurs when “the thickened heart muscle
doesn’t block blood flow out of the left ventricle.” Hypertrophic Cardiomyopathy, supra n.2.
6
“[A]symmetric septal hypertrophy is a condition that occurs when heart muscles cells
enlarge, causing the walls of the lower heart chambers (typically the left ventricle) to become thick
and stiff. This makes it difficult for the heart to relax and for a sufficient amount of blood to fill
the heart chambers.” Heart and Stroke Encyclopedia, Am. Heart Ass’n, http://www.heart.org/
HEARTORG/Encyclopedia/Heart-Encyclopedia_UCM_445084_ContentIndex.jsp?title=asymme
tric%20septal%20hypertrophy (last visited Sept. 27, 2017).
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10 pounds. [Tr. 404]. In terms of mental limitations, the Plaintiff had no limitation relating to
other people beyond giving and receiving instructions, but was moderately limited in completing
and following instructions and performing simple and repetitive tasks, and extremely limited in
performing complex and varied tasks. [Id.]. Dr. Brewer rated the Plaintiff’s cardiac functional
capacity as a “Class 4 (complete limitation).” 7 [Id.].
A “Chest Pain Questionnaire” was also completed by Dr. Brewer on February 1, 2013. [Tr.
255]. Dr. Brewer described the Plaintiff’s chest pain as occurring on the left side of his chest,
lasting one hour to two days in duration, and radiating to his neck and down his left arm. [Id.].
Dr. Brewer did not identify any precipitating factors but indicated that the Plaintiff experienced
pain with or without exertion and experienced evaluated blood pressure as an associated symptom.
[Id.].
A second “Chest Pain Questionnaire” was completed on May 9, 2013. [Tr. 348]. Dr.
Brewer described the Plaintiff’s chest pain as occurring in the upper part of his chest, radiating to
the arms, and worsened with exertion. [Id.]. Exertion was also identified as sometimes being a
precipitating factor of chest pain. [Id.]. When the Plaintiff experienced pain, it lasted “minutes”
and induced symptoms such as sweating and syncope. [Id.].
Finally, Dr. Brewer completed a medical source statement also dated May 9, 2013. [Tr.
349-50]. Dr. Brewer again listed hypertrophic cardiomyopathy and hypertension as the Plaintiff’s
7
According to the American Heart Association, doctors typically use a classification
system that places an individual in one of four categories based on how much the individual is
limited during physical activity due to cardiac disease. Classes of Heart Failure, Am. Heart Ass’n,
https://www.heart.org/HEARTORG/Conditions/HeartFailure/AboutHeartFailure/Classes-ofHeart-Failure_UCM_306328_Article.jsp?appName=MobileApp (last visited Sept. 27, 2017). An
individual with a “Class 4” rating, the most severe of the four classes, is described as follows:
“Unable to carry on any physical activity without discomfort. Symptoms of heart failure at rest. If
any physical activity is undertaken, discomfort increases.” Id.
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diagnoses. [Tr. 349]. Dr. Brewer indicated that the Plaintiff had adequate memory, concentration,
and social ability. [Id.]. He further opined the Plaintiff had not limitations completing the
following functions:
the Plaintiff could remember and carry out simple, one to two step
instructions and maintain a work routine without frequent breaks for stress related reasons; he
could maintain socially appropriate behavior, hygiene, and grooming; he could respond
appropriately to normal stress and routine changes; and he could care for himself and maintain
independence in daily living tasks on a sustained basis. [Tr. 350]. The Plaintiff would, however,
be unable to maintain an ordinary work routine without inordinate supervisions because of
recurrent chest pain symptoms and would further be unable to maintain a work schedule without
missing frequently due to psychological issues. [Id.]. Dr. Brewer elaborated that the Plaintiff
“has profound coronary artery muscle bridging that results in significant obstruction during
septole,” and that he “has had 4 different cardiology groups evaluate [him] including Cleveland
Clinic.” [Id.].
IV.
ALJ’S DECISION
In concluding that the Plaintiff was not disabled, the ALJ determined that the Plaintiff
retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform:
Light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except that he cannot
climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. He cannot crawl. He cannot be
exposed to pulmonary irritants. He cannot be in close proximity to
moving or mechanical parts. He cannot work in high, exposed
places. He is limited to performing work where co-worker and
public contact is causal and superficial, where supervision is direct
and non-confrontational, and where changes in the workplace are
infrequent and gradually introduced.
[Tr. 22]. The ALJ discussed Dr. Brewer’s treatment notes, cardiology diagnostic testing, including
findings made by the Cleveland Clinic and University of Tennessee Medical Center, and the
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Plaintiff’s reported symptoms. [Tr. 22-23]. The ALJ then addressed Dr. Brewer’s May 9, 2013
medical source statement wherein Dr. Brewer concluded that the Plaintiff could not maintain a
full-time work schedule and would require inordinate amount of supervision. [Tr. 23]. The ALJ
assigned “little weight” to the opinion, finding that “Dr. Brewer rendered an opinion primarily
regarding the claimant’s mental functional ability, and he is the claimant’s cardiac physician.”
[Id.]. The ALJ did not discuss Dr. Brewer’s other three opinions. The ALJ then proceeded to give
“great weight” to the opinions of nonexamining, nontreating state agency physicians who opined
limitations consistent with light work and various environmental limitations. [Tr. 23, 63-64, 8082]. The ALJ found their opinions were “consistent with the medical evidence as a whole.” [Tr.
23].
V.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, the Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s RFC assessment is not supported by
substantial evidence because he gave “little weight” to Dr. Brewer’s May 9, 2013 medical source
statement without “good reason.” [Doc. 19 at 14-22].
Under the Social Security Act and its implementing regulations, if a treating physician’s
opinion as to the nature and severity of an impairment is (1) well-supported by medically
acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and (2) is not inconsistent with the other
substantial evidence in the case record, it must be given “controlling weight.” 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(c)(2). When an opinion does not garner controlling weight, the appropriate weight to be
given to an opinion will be determined based upon the length of treatment, frequency of
examination, nature and extent of the treatment relationship, amount of relevant evidence that
supports the opinion, the opinion’s consistency with the record as a whole, the specialization of
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the source, and other factors which tend to support or contradict the opinion. § 404.1527(c)(1)(6).
When an ALJ does not give a treating physician’s opinion controlling weight, the ALJ must
always give “good reasons” for the weight given to a treating source’s opinion in the decision. §
404.1527(c)(2). A decision denying benefits “must contain specific reasons for the weight given
to the treating source’s medical opinion, supported by evidence in the case record, and must be
sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to
the treating source’s medical opinion and the reasons for the weight.” Soc. Sec. Rul. 96-2p, 1996
WL 374188 at *5 (July 2, 1996).
Although the Plaintiff does not allege any error with regard to Dr. Brewer’s October 29,
2012 Attending Physician Statement or his February 1, 2013 and May 9, 2013 Chest Pain
Questionnaires, the Court finds that these opinions nonetheless warrant review by the Court. The
Court will first address Dr. Brewer’s Attending Physician Statement and Chest Pain
Questionnaires, and then turn to the merits of the Plaintiff’s specific arguments as to Dr. Brewer’s
May 9, 2013 medical source statement.
1.
Attending Physician Statement and Chest Pain Questionnaires
Upon review of the ALJ’s decision and the entire record, the Court finds, sua sponte, 8 that
8
Although courts may treat a party’s failure to raise argument on a particular issue waived,
courts may order a remand on issues raised sua sponte. See Berger v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No.
12-CV-11779, 2013 WL 4437254, at *9 n.3 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 16, 2013) (“Notably, in Social
Security cases, the failure to submit a particular legal argument is ‘not a prerequisite to the Court’s
reaching a decision on the merits’ or a finding, sua sponte, that grounds exist for reversal.”); Buhl
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 12-10087, 2013 WL 878772, at *7 n.5 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 13, 2013)
(plaintiff’s failure to raise an argument did not prevent the court from identifying error based on
its own review of the record and ruling accordingly), adopted by, 2013 WL 878918 (E.D. Mich.
Mar. 8, 2013).
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the ALJ erred when he did not weigh Dr. Brewer’s Attending Physician Statement and Chest Pain
Questionnaires. Implmenting regulations of the Social Security Act require that every “medical
opinion” be considered and evaluated. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(b)-(c). A “medical opinion” is a
statement from a physician, psychologist, or other acceptable medical source, that “reflect[s]
judgments about the nature and severity of [a claimant’s] impairment(s),” including symptoms,
diagnosis, prognosis, and physical or mental restrictions. § 404.1527(a)(2). As described above,
“good reason” must also be given for the weight assigned to a treating physician’s medical opinion
in the absence of the opinion receiving controlling weight. § 404.1527(c)(2).
Here, the Court finds Dr. Brewer’s Attending Physician Statement and Chest Pain
Questionnaires are medical opinions because they opine on the Plaintiff’s symptoms, diagnoses,
and functional restrictions. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has determined that the failure to
assign a specific weight to a treating physician’s opinion constitutes error. Cole, 661 F.3d at 938.
The purpose of the “good reason” rule is to allow claimants to “understand the disposition of their
cases, particularly where a claimant knows that his physician has deemed him disabled and
therefore might be bewildered when told by an administrative bureaucracy that [he] is not.” Rogers
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 243 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544)
(internal quotation marks omitted). The ALJ erred in failing to adhere to this fundamental principle
which the Court finds hinders it from conducting meaningful appellate review.
While the Sixth Circuit has instructed that courts should not hesitate to remand a case when
an ALJ fails to adhere to the treating physician rule, see Wilson, 378 F.3d at 545, remand is not
necessary if violation of the “good reason” rule is harmless, Cole, 661 F.3d at 940. Error is
harmless when:
(1) a treating source’s opinion is so patently deficient that the
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Commissioner could not possibly credit it; (2) if the Commissioner
adopts the opinion of the treating source or makes findings
consistent with the opinion; or (3) where the Commissioner has met
the goal of § 1527[(c)](2) . . . even though she has not complied with
the terms of the regulation.
Friend v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 375 F. App’x 543, 551 (6th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). The
Court finds that none of these exceptions apply in the present case.
Therefore, the Court will order that this case be remanded to the ALJ to weigh Dr. Brewer’s
October 29, 2012 Attending Physician Statement and February 1, 2013 and May 9, 2013 Chest
Pain Questionnaires. To the extent that the opinions are not given controlling weight, the ALJ
must provide “good reason” for the weight assigned.
2.
May 9, 2013 Medical Source Statement
Arguing that the ALJ did not give “good reason” for assigning “little weight” to Dr.
Brewer’s May 9, 2013 medical source statement, the Plaintiff contends that the limitations opined
by Dr. Brewer were appropriate and supported by the record. The Plaintiff concedes that the form
completed by Dr. Brewer, which was sent by the Social Security Administration, is designed to
determine mental health limitations. [Doc. 19 at 15]. The Plaintiff argues, however, that the
specific limitations assessed by Dr. Brewer—that he cannot maintain an ordinary work routine
without inordinate supervision or maintain a work schedule without missing work frequently—are
limitations based on the Plaintiff’s cardiac impairment, and as Plaintiff’s treating cardiologist, Dr.
Brewer could properly opine on such limitations. [Id. at 15-16]. The Court agrees.
The sole reason the ALJ assigned little weight to Dr. Brewer’s opinion was because “Dr.
Brewer rendered an opinion primarily regarding the claimant’s mental functional ability, and he is
the claimant’s cardiac physician.” [Tr. 23]. In other words, the ALJ believed that Dr. Brewer was
opining on matters outside of his specialty or treatment of the Plaintiff. While requiring an
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inordinate amount of supervision, for example, may not be a physical exertional limitation, it
certainly is not immune from being a consequence of a physical impairment. To that end, workrelated functional limitations like those opined by Dr. Brewer are not within the exclusive purview
of mental health specialists. Therefore, the ALJ did not provide “good reason” for discounting Dr.
Brewer’s opinion.
Moreover, the ALJ’s blanket rejection of Dr. Brewer’s opinion says nothing about whether
the opinion is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques or whether it is consistent with the other substantial evidence in the case record, thereby
entitling the opinion to controlling weight. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). Dr. Brewer treated
the Plaintiff for over a year, performed numerous diagnostic tests, obtained second opinions that
confirmed Dr. Brewer’s diagnosis and prognosis, and provided multiple opinions on the Plaintiff’s
impairment and resulting limitations. Even if Dr. Brewer’s assessed limitations could properly be
characterized as “mental limitations,” the ALJ’s reasoning fails to explain whether, and why or
why not, Dr. Brewer’s opinion is well-supported and consistent with other substantial evidence.
Declining to give Dr. Brewer’s opinon controlling weight does not mean it is entitled to no
weight. “Treating source medical opinions are still entitled to deference and must be weighed
using all of the factors provided in 20 CFR 404.1527 . . . .” Soc. Sec. Rul. 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188,
at *4. The Court finds the ALJ did not consider all of the regulatory balancing factors beyond Dr.
Brewer’s specialization. There is no indication that the ALJ considered the length of treatment,
frequency of examination, nature and extent of the treatment relationship, amount of relevant
evidence that supports the opinion, or the opinion’s consistency with the record as a whole. To be
sure, the ALJ does not address the basis of Dr. Brewer’s opinion—that is, that the Plaintiff requires
an inordinate amount of supervision and cannot maintain a work schedule without missing
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frequently because he “has profound coronary artery muscle bridging that results in significant
obstruction during septole.” [Tr. 350].
The Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ’s error was compounded when he assigned “great
weight” to the opinions of the nonexamining, nontreating state agency physicians without any
explanation beyond a cursory finding that said opinions were “consistent with the medical
evidence as a whole.” [Doc. 19 at 20 (quoting Tr. 32)]. Indeed, the ALJ does not identify the
“medical evidence” that is consistent with their opinions. “A more rigorous scrutiny of the
treating-source opinion than the nontreating and nonexamining opinions is precisely the inverse of
the analysis that the regulation requires.” Gayheart v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 710 F.3d 365, 379
(6th Cir. 2013). Although the ALJ discussed the medical evidence in general before he weighed
the medical opinions of record [Tr. 22-23], nothing within the ALJ’s discussion indicates why the
medical evidence is more consistent with the opinions of the state agency physicians than that of
Dr. Brewer.
Accordingly, the Court finds the ALJ did not provide “good reason” for the assignment of
little weight to Dr. Brewer’s opinion. Therefore, the Court will also remand the case on this basis
as well and order the ALJ to reweigh Dr. Brewer’s opinion.
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VI.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 18] will be
GRANTED, and the Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 20] will be DENIED.
The decision of the Commissioner will be REMANDED for further proceedings. Upon remand,
the ALJ shall consider and evaluate Dr. Brewer’s October 29, 2012 Attending Physician
Statement, his February 1, 2013 and May 9, 2013 Chest Pain Questionnaires, and his May 9, 2013
medical source statement, assign each opinion a specific weight, and to the extent that the opinions
are not assigned controlling weight, provide “good reason” for the weight assigned.
ORDER ACCORDINGLY.
United States Magistrate Judge
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