Lemons v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner of

Filing 26

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Magistrate Judge Debra C Poplin on 6/21/18. (JBR)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
CYNTHIA M. LEMONS,
Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL,
Deputy Commissioner for Operations,
performing the duties and functions not
reserved to the Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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No. 3:16-CV-476-DCP

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This case is before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), Rule 73 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, and the consent of the parties [Doc. 19]. Now before the Court is
Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record and Memorandum in Support
[Docs. 20 & 21] and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support
[Docs. 24 & 25]. Cynthia M. Lemons (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of the decision of the
Administrative Law Judge (“the ALJ”), the final decision of Defendant Nancy A. Berryhill (“the
Commissioner”). For the reasons that follow, the Court will DENY Plaintiff’s motion and
GRANT the Commissioner’s motion.
I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 13, 2012, Plaintiff filed an application for supplemental security income benefits

pursuant to Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1385, claiming a period of
disability that began on August 27, 2007. [Tr. 209, 233]. After her application was denied initially
and upon reconsideration, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an ALJ. [Tr. 123-25]. A hearing
was held on August 8, 2014. [Tr. 51-84]. At the request of Plaintiff’s counsel, a supplemental

hearing was conducted on January 30, 2015, after the ALJ had ordered that consultative
examinations be performed following the first hearing. [Tr. 32-50, 82-83]. On March 2, 2015, the
ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled. [Tr. 8-31]. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s
request for review [Tr. 1-6], making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner.
Having exhausted her administrative remedies, Plaintiff filed a Complaint with this Court
on July 27, 2016, seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision under Section
405(g) of the Social Security Act. [Doc. 1]. The parties have filed competing dispositive motions,
and this matter is now ripe for adjudication.
II.

ALJ FINDINGS
The ALJ made the following findings:
1. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since
March 13, 2012, the application date (20 CFR 416.971 et seq.).
2. The claimant has the following severe impairments: degenerative
disc disease, osteoarthritis, and mood (bipolar) disorder. (20 CFR
416.920(c)).
3. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of
the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1
(20 CFR 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).
4. After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that the
claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary
work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(a). The claimant can lift and
carry, push and pull ten pounds occasionally and less than ten
pounds frequently. With normal breaks in an eight-hour day, she
can sit for six hours and stand and/or walk for two hours; she can
never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; cannot crawl; and can only
occasionally climb ramps and stairs, balance, stoop, and crouch.
She can frequently kneel; cannot lift her arms above her shoulders;
and can tolerate one out of eight hours of exposure to hazards. The
claimant can understand and perform simple and detailed, but not
multi-step detailed, tasks; can maintain concentration, persistence
and pace for these tasks; can relate to co-workers and supervisors
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for regular routines without intensive interaction; can relate to the
general public on an occasional basis; and can adapt to gradual, and
infrequent changes.
5. The claimant has no past relevant work. (20 CFR 416.965).
6. The claimant was born on January 29, 1969 and was 43 years
old, which is defined as a younger individual age 18-44, on the date
the application was filed. The claimant subsequently changed age
category to a younger individual age 45-49 (20 CFR 416.963).
7. The claimant has a limited education and is able to communicate
in English (20 CFR 416.964).
8. Transferability of job skills is not an issue because the claimant
does not have past relevant work (20 CFR 416.968).
9. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and
residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant
numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform (20
CFR 416.969 and 416.969(a)).
10. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the
Social Security Act, since March 13, 2012, the date the application
was filed (20 CFR 416.920(g)).
[Tr. 13-26].
III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing the Commissioner’s determination of whether an individual is disabled

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Court is limited to determining whether the ALJ’s decision
was reached through application of the correct legal standards and in accordance with the
procedure mandated by the regulations and rulings promulgated by the Commissioner, and
whether the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence. Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
581 F.3d 399, 405 (6th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541,
544 (6th Cir. 2004).

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Substantial evidence is “more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it
is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Cutlip v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). It
is immaterial whether the record may also possess substantial evidence to support a different
conclusion from that reached by the ALJ, or whether the reviewing judge may have decided the
case differently. Crisp v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 790 F.2d 450, 453 n.4 (6th Cir. 1986).
The substantial evidence standard is intended to create a “‘zone of choice’ within which the
Commissioner can act, without the fear of court interference.” Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 762,
773 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986)). Therefore, the
Court will not “try the case de novo, nor resolve conflicts in the evidence, nor decide questions of
credibility.” Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted).
On review, the plaintiff “bears the burden of proving his entitlement to benefits.” Boyes v.
Sec’y. of Health & Human Servs., 46 F.3d 510, 512 (6th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted).
IV.

DISABILITY ELIGIBILITY
“Disability” is the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any

medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.”
42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). A claimant will only be considered disabled if:
his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such
severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but
cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage
in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the
national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the
immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy
exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work.
§ 1382c(a)(3)(B).
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Disability is evaluated pursuant to a five-step analysis summarized as follows:
1. If claimant is doing substantial gainful activity, he is not disabled.
2. If claimant is not doing substantial gainful activity, his
impairment must be severe before he can be found to be disabled.
3. If claimant is not doing substantial gainful activity and is
suffering from a severe impairment that has lasted or is expected to
last for a continuous period of at least twelve months, and his
impairment meets or equals a listed impairment, claimant is
presumed disabled without further inquiry.
4. If claimant’s impairment does not prevent him from doing his
past relevant work, he is not disabled.
5. Even if claimant’s impairment does prevent him from doing his
past relevant work, if other work exists in the national economy that
accommodates his residual functional capacity (“RFC”) and
vocational factors (age, education, skills, etc.), he is not disabled.
Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 529 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520).
A claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) is assessed between steps three and four and is
“based on all the relevant medical and other evidence in your case record.” 20 C.F.R. §
416.920(a)(4), -(e). An RFC is the most a claimant can do despite his limitations. § 416.945(a)(1).
The claimant bears the burden of proof at the first four steps. Walters, 127 F.3d at 529.
The burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. Id. At the fifth step, the Commissioner must
prove that there is work available in the national economy that the claimant could perform. Her
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 203 F.3d 388, 391 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137,
146 (1987)).
V.

ANALYSIS
On appeal, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ committed two errors of law. First, Plaintiff

submits that the ALJ erred in weighing the medical opinions of consultative examiner Jeffrey
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Uzzle, M.D., and nonexamining state agency physician Morris Susman, M.D., both of whom
opined manipulative limitations which were not included in Plaintiff’s RFC. [Doc. 21 at 15-18].
Second, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not properly consider Plaintiff’s testimony, rendering the
ALJ’s credibility finding unsupported by substantial evidence. [Id. at 18-22]. The Court will
address each alleged error in turn.
A.

Medical Opinions of Dr. Uzzle and Dr. Susman

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to provide a legally sufficient basis for discounting
the manipulative limitations opined by Dr. Uzzle and Dr. Susman.
Dr. Susman reviewed the record at the initial level of the agency’s disability determination,
completing a “Physical Residual Functional Capacity Assessment” on June 5, 2012. [Tr. 89-91].
Therein, Dr. Susman opined that Plaintiff could perform a reduced range of sedentary work1 that,
in pertinent part, included manipulative restrictions of occasional reaching (including overhead)
and handling (gross manipulation). [Tr. 90-91]. Dr. Susman attributed the limitation of overhead
reaching to Plaintiff’s medical history of cervical fusions, while the handling limitation was due
to Plaintiff exhibiting 4/5 strength in her upper extremities in addition to chronic neck pain. [Tr.
91]. In October 2012, at the reconsideration level, a second reviewing state agency physician,
Marvin Bittinger, D.O., likewise opined that Plaintiff could perform a reduced range of sedentary
work, but he did not assess any manipulative limitations. [Tr. 103-04].

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“Sedentary work” is defined as “lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and occasionally
lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools. Although a sedentary job is
defined as one which involves sitting, a certain amount of walking and standing is often necessary
in carrying out job duties.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(a). A claimant must be able to walk and stand
occasionally to perform sedentary work. Id.
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On September 9, 2014, Dr. Uzzle performed a detailed consultative examination, which
also included a review of Plaintiff’s medical records. [Tr. 1982-94]. Dr. Uzzle found that Plaintiff
was a “poor and vague historian,” who did “not present in a completely straightforward manner.”
[Tr. 1991-92]. Plaintiff’s medical history was recounted, which included, among other things,
whole body pains and multiple spinal surgeries. [Id.]. Plaintiff’s husband accompanied her and
assisted Plaintiff’s mobility endeavors. [Tr. 1994]. Dr. Uzzle found the husband’s assistance
hindered, rather than helped, Plaintiff move about and further interfered with Dr. Uzzle’s ability
to accurately assess Plaintiff’s limitations. [Id.]. Plaintiff moved slowly and in a guarded manner,
using a straight tip cane, and would not attempt toe walking, heel walking, deep knee bending, or
tandem walking. [Tr. 1993]. Dr. Uzzle noted that Plaintiff walked the same with and without her
cane. [Tr. 1993].
On examination, Plaintiff demonstrated various pain behaviors and muscle guarding,
myalgias, and arthralgias throughout her musculoskeletal exam of the spine and her extremities.
[Id.]. Dr. Uzzle noted “obvious inconsistencies in comparing formal versus informal range of
motion testing,” thereby making the testing unreliable. [Id.]. Straight leg raises in the sitting and
supine position caused lower back pain and nonradicular leg pain at 30 degrees with exaggerated
pain behavior responses. [Tr. 1994]. Phalen’s and Tinel’s testing of the wrists caused nonanatomic
responses and complaints. [Id.]. Additional testing demonstrated no atrophy, negative Hoffman,
Romberg, clonus, and Babinski testing, and Plaintiff exhibited 12-PSI right sided grip strength and
10-PSI left sided grip strength. [Id.]. With encouragement, Plaintiff’s strength testing was “pretty
good approaching 5/5 in all four extremities,” her muscle tone was normal, and “2/5 Waddell signs
[were] present despite obvious nonorganic presentation” during the examination. [Id.].

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In conclusion, Dr. Uzzle assessed chronic pain syndrome with nonorganic findings, noting
that Plaintiff’s multiple comorbid medical conditions and spinal surgeries provided some objective
evidence that Plaintiff experienced pain. [Id.]. Dr. Uzzle assessed the following functional
limitations: Plaintiff could lift and carry up to 10 pounds frequently and up to 20 pounds
occasionally; she could sit for two hours and stand and walk for 30 minutes at one time but could
sit for six hours and stand and walk for three hours total in an eight-hour workday; she could
occasionally reach overhead and in all other directions, handle, finger, feel, and push or pull; she
could occasionally use her feet to operate foot controls; she could occasionally climb stairs and
ramps, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl but never climb ladders or scaffolds; she could be exposed
to pulmonary irritants frequently, vibrations occasionally, but never unprotected heights, moving
mechanical parts, or operate a motor vehicle; and she could perform daily living activities such as
shop, use public transportation, prepare simple meals, and care for her personal hygiene. [Tr.
1983-87].
After reviewing the opinions of the state agency medical sources, the ALJ assigned “some
weight” to Dr. Uzzle’s opinion, finding Plaintiff’s limitation to occasional handling and fingering
unsupported by the evidence. [Tr. 24]. The ALJ observed that Dr. Uzzle’s examination findings,
which included intact grip strength, normal muscle tone, and, by the physician’s own account,
unreliable range of motion and Tinel’s and Phalen’s testing, undermined the manipulative
restrictions assessed. [Id.]. The ALJ then assigned “great weight” to Dr. Uzzle’s finding that
Plaintiff did not require the use of a cane due to observations made during the examination,
Plaintiff’s intact strength, and her inconsistent presentation. [Id.].
Similarly, the ALJ assigned “some weight” to Dr. Susman’s opinion, but discounted the
portion of the opinion regarding Plaintiff’s handling limitations. [Id.]. The ALJ noted that while
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Dr. Susman opined about limitations in Plaintiff’s abilities to reach and handle, the record lacked
any documentation of problems with Plaintiff’s hands or wrists. [Id.]. In addition, the ALJ pointed
out that Dr. Uzzle’s examination records indicated that Plaintiff demonstrated intact strength,
sensation, and good grip strength in her upper extremities. [Id.]. Ultimately, the ALJ assigned
“great weight” to the opinion of Dr. Bittinger, a nonexamining state agency medical consultant
who evaluated Plaintiff’s claim at the reconsideration level of agency review [Tr. 103-04], noting
“it is most consistent with the credible evidence, which demonstrates intact strength and does not
support the [Plaintiff’s] allegations of hand/wrist problems,” [Tr. 24].
Plaintiff argues that Dr. Uzzle’s manipulative restrictions are supported by his examination
findings, including limited range of motion of the spine and shoulders, various pain behaviors and
complaints, having to move slowly with the assistance of her husband, positive straight leg raise
testing, and decreased sensation in the lower extremities. [Doc. 21 at 16]. With regard to Dr.
Susman, Plaintiff contends that because the physician attributed the manipulative limitations to
Plaintiff’s history of cervical fusion, reduced strength in her upper extremities, and chronic neck
pain, it was illogical for the ALJ to discount the limitations simply because the record did not
document “a specific hand or wrist impairment.” [Id. at 17]. As a result, Plaintiff submits that the
ALJ impermissibly substituted his own interpretation of the evidence for the medical findings
reached by Dr. Uzzle and Dr. Susman. [Id.].
The Court observes that opinions from nontreating and nonexamining state agency
physicians are weighed “based on the examining relationship (or lack thereof), specialization,
consistency, and supportability. . . .” Gayheart v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 710 F.3d 365, 376 (6th
Cir. 2013) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)). “Other factors ‘which tend to support or contradict
the opinion’ may be considered in assessing any type of medical opinion.” Id. (quoting 20 C.F.R.
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§ 404.1527(c)(6)). “Although the ALJ may not substitute his opinion for that of a physician, he is
not required to recite the medical opinion of a physician verbatim in his residual functional
capacity finding.” Poe v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 342 F. App’x 149, 157 (6th Cir. 2009).
The ALJ alone is tasked with the responsibility of assessing a claimant’s RFC. 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.1546(c). Accordingly, the “ALJ does not improperly assume the role of a medical expert
by assessing the medical and non-medical evidence before rendering a residual functional capacity
finding.” Poe, 342 F. App’x at 157. Rather, “[t]he ‘playing doctor’ prohibition comes into play
when the ALJ ‘either reject[s] a doctor’s medical conclusion without other evidence [or] draw[s]
medical conclusions himself about a claimant without relying on medical evidence.” Hill v.
Astrue, No. 5:12CV-00072-R, 2013 WL 3293657, at *3 (W.D. Ky. June 28, 2013), aff’d sub nom.,
Hill v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 560 F. App’x 547 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Armstrong v. Barnhart,
287 F.Supp.2d 881, 887 (N.D. Ill. 2003)).
In the instant matter, the Court finds that the ALJ cited to specific medical evidence and
examination findings in rejecting the manipulative limitations assessed by Dr. Uzzle and Dr.
Susman. Despite Dr. Uzzle assessing occasional limitations in reaching and handling, the ALJ
found the limitations contradicted by examination findings which included intact grip strength,
normal muscle tone, and unreliable test results. An ALJ may reject limitations that are inconsistent
with clinical signs and symptoms exhibited during a physical examination. See 20 C.F.R. §
416.927(c)(3)-(4) (“The more a medical source presents relevant evidence to support an opinion,
particularly medical signs and laboratory findings, the more weight we will give that opinion,” and
“the more consistent an opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight we will give to that
opinion”). While Plaintiff cites to limited range of motion in her spine and shoulders as evidence
to support the manipulative restrictions, Dr. Uzzle himself noted that Plaintiff’s testing in this
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regard was unreliable, as were her Tinel’s and Phalen’s testing. [Tr. 1993-94]. The ALJ was not
obligated to accept unreliable test results as substantial evidence of what Plaintiff can and cannot
do. Furthermore, while Plaintiff points to her various complaints of pain and having to receive
assistance from her husband, Dr. Uzzle found that Plaintiff was not a reliable historian, her pain
behaviors were exaggerated, and the assistance offered by Plaintiff’s husband appeared to hinder,
rather than help, Plaintiff’s mobility. Finally, the Court is uncertain how other examination
findings cited by Plaintiff, such as decreased sensation in the lower extremities, supports
manipulative restrictions of the hands.
The Court is likewise unpersuaded by Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ substituted his own
opinion for that of Dr. Susman’s opinion. The ALJ cited to specific medical evidence—Dr.
Uzzle’s examination findings and Dr. Bittinger’s competing opinion—in concluding that
Plaintiff’s RFC did not warrant manipulative limitations.

Cf. Stallworth v. Astrue, No.

3:08cv00036, 2009 WL 335317, at *9 (S.D. Ohio, Feb. 10, 2009) (“[A]n ALJ must not substitute
his own judgment for a physician’s opinion without relying on other evidence or authority in the
record.”) (quoting Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 870 (7th Cir. 2000)). Moreover, the ALJ did
not reject Dr. Susman’s opinion on the basis that the record lacked “a specific hand or wrist
impairment,” as argued by Plaintiff. Instead, the ALJ observed that the record did not document
any problems with Plaintiff’s hands or wrists. [Tr. 24].
Plaintiff additionally complains that Dr. Bittinger’s opinion could not have provided
substantial evidence in this case because it was rendered over two years before the ALJ issued his
decision, and therefore, Dr. Bittinger did not have the benefit of reviewing later generated medical

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evidence. [Doc. 21 at 17].2 The record reflects that Dr. Bittinger evaluated Plaintiff’s claim at the
reconsideration level of agency review. [Tr. 99-100, 103-04]. While he opined that Plaintiff could
perform less than the full range of sedentary work, Dr. Bittinger did not include manipulative
limitations [Tr. 104], leading the ALJ to conclude that Dr. Bittinger’s opinion was consistent with
objective test results indicating intact strength that contradicted Plaintiff’s allegation of hand/wrist
problems [Tr. 24]. With respect to opinions of nonexamining physicians, they can be given weight
“only insofar as they are supported by evidence in the case record.” Soc. Sec. Rul. 96-6p, 1996
WL 374180, at *2 (July 2, 1996). Here, the Court finds that the ALJ did not err by relying on the
opinion of Dr. Bittinger because his finding that Plaintiff did not have manipulative restrictions is
supported by Plaintiff’s intact grip strength, normal muscle tone, and unreliable range of motion,
Tinel’s, and Phalen’s testing. Moreover, the ALJ’s decision makes clear that Dr. Bittinger
considered later submitted evidence, including Dr. Uzzle’s opinion, in conjunction with all of the
relevant evidence of record in assessing Plaintiff’s RFC. See Brooks v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 531
F. App’x 636, 642 (6th Cir. 2013) (“When an ALJ relies on a non-examining source who did not
have the opportunity to review later submitted medical evidence,” our appellate court “require[s]
some indication that the ALJ at least considered these [new] facts before giving greater weight to
an opinion that is not based on a review of a complete case record.”); Kelly v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
314 F. App’x 827, 831 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[A]bsent a clear showing that the new evidence renders
the prior opinion untenable, the mere fact that a gap exists does not warrant the expense and delay

2

Plaintiff also suggests that Dr. Bittinger’s opinion is unreliable because the ALJ ordered
a consultative examination despite Dr. Bittinger’s opinion already existing in the record. [Doc. 21
at 17-18]. The Court observes that Plaintiff’s contentions would likewise diminish the
supportability of Dr. Susman’s opinion as he rendered his opinion earlier than Dr. Bittinger, and
therefore would have reviewed even less evidence.
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of a judicial remand.”).
Accordingly, the Court finds the ALJ properly considered and weighed the medical
opinions of record, and Plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary are without merit.
B.

Plaintiff’s Credibility

Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ’s credibility determination is not supported by
substantial evidence, because the ALJ did not properly consider Plaintiff’s testimony.
In evaluating complaints of pain, an ALJ may properly consider the credibility of the
claimant.” Walters, 127 F.3d at 531. “[D]iscounting credibility to a certain degree is appropriate
where an ALJ finds contradictions among the medical reports, claimant’s testimony, and other
evidence.” Id. The ALJ’s finding regarding credibility “are to be accorded great weight and
deference, particularly since an ALJ is charged with the duty of observing a witness’s demeanor
and credibility.” Id. Nonetheless, the ALJ’s “decision must contain specific reasons for the finding
on credibility, supported by the evidence in the case record, and must be sufficiently specific to
make clear to the individual and to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to
the individual’s statements and the reasons for that weight.” Soc. Sec. Rul. 96-7p, 1996 WL
374186, at *2 (July 2, 1996).
The ALJ cited to several reasons why Plaintiff’s subjective allegations were inconsistent
with other evidence of record. [Tr. 22-23]. First, the ALJ noted that in March 2012, Plaintiff
reported she was caring for her 93-year-old mother who lived with her and her husband. [Tr. 20,
22, 364-65]. The ALJ found Plaintiff’s ability to care for her mother at odds with her depiction of
limited daily activities and incompatible with her physical and emotional status which Plaintiff
had testified essentially left her bedridden and reliant on her husband for her needs. [Tr. 20].
Second, while Plaintiff testified that her husband was the sole performer of chores, meal
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preparation, and shopping, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s testimony undermined by medical records
that documented that Plaintiff’s husband had been involved in a car accident which rendered him
unable to stand or walk for a significant amount of time. [Tr. 20, 22, 399, 407, 411]. Third, the
ALJ found that Plaintiff’s ability to travel back and forth to help another ailing family member in
May 2013, inconsistent with Plaintiff’s complaints. [Tr. 20, 22, 405]. Finally, the ALJ referenced
a May 2012 form completed by Plaintiff as evidence that Plaintiff engaged in leisure activities
such as cooking, going to church, and fishing. [Tr. 22, 1963].
In addition to the above referenced evidence of Plaintiff’s activities, the ALJ cited to Dr.
Uzzle’s examination findings—range of motion testing that yielded results that were significantly
more restrictive than informal observations, nonanatomic responses and complaints with Tinel’s
and Phalen’s testing, Plaintiff’s husband’s inference with her mobility, and 2/5 Waddell signs —
as evidence that conflicted with Plaintiff’s testimony. [Tr. 22]. The ALJ also cited to Dr. Uzzle’s
conclusion that Plaintiff’s presentation was not entirely straightforward during the examination.
[Id.].
With regard to the ALJ’s credibility findings, Plaintiff contends it was improper for the
ALJ to conclude that her husband was incapable of caring for her to the extent alleged because she
never testified that the pain her husband suffered as a result of his car accident was so severe as to
prevent him for caring for her,. [Doc. 21 at 20]. But in making his finding, the ALJ cited to
treatment records, not Plaintiff’s testimony, which document that Plaintiff’s husband was injured
so severely that he could not stand. [Tr. 20, 22, 399, 407, 411]. The Court therefore finds that this
evidence provides a reasonable basis for the ALJ’s conclusion.
Plaintiff next argues that Dr. Uzzle’s examination does not conflict with her subjective
complaints because Dr. Uzzle ultimately concluded that some objective evidence existed to
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support Plaintiff’s complaints of pain. [Doc. 21 at 21]. However, as discussed above, the ALJ
appropriately cited to inconsistencies between Dr. Uzzle’s examination findings and his
conclusions, and therefore, the ALJ was not obligated to uncritically accept the limitations assessed
by Dr. Uzzle. As to the leisure activity form completed by Plaintiff, Plaintiff submits that the
form only asked which activities Plaintiff enjoyed and that she did not actually engaged in any of
the listed activities. [Doc. 21 at 21]. The Court agrees with Plaintiff that the form only indicated
activities Plaintiff enjoyed. Nonetheless, given the ALJ’s other appropriate reasons for finding
that Plaintiff’s subjective allegations were not entirely credible, including Plaintiff’s ability to care
for other relatives, the Court finds substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s credibility
determination.
Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s assertions were not
“believable” suggests that the ALJ assessed Plaintiff’s truthfulness, rather than the credibility of
her symptoms. [Doc. 21 at 19] (quoting Tr. 22). The Commissioner concedes that the language
used by the ALJ “was less than optimal, as agency ruling after the ALJ’s decision have clarified
that the credibility determination is not to be a judgment on Plaintiff’s character, but rather an
assessment of the consistency between Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and the other evidence of
record.” [Doc. 25 at 14] (citing Soc. Sec. Rul. 16-3p, 2016 WL 1237954, at *1 (Mar. 28, 2016)).
Nonetheless, the Commissioner argues that despite the language used by the ALJ, the ALJ
complied with the Commissioner’s regulations and rulings promulgated for assessing subjective
complaints. [Id.]. The Court agrees with the Commissioner and finds that in discounting
Plaintiff’s credibility, the ALJ’s cited reasons are supported by the record and provide a reasonable

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basis for finding Plaintiff’s symptoms and pain less severe than alleged.3 Therefore, the Court
finds the ALJ’s credibility determination supported by substantial evidence, and Plaintiff’s
arguments to the contrary are not well taken.
VI.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record

[Doc. 20] will be DENIED, and the Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 24]
will be GRANTED. The decision of the Commissioner will be AFFIRMED. The Clerk of Court
will be DIRECTED to close this case.
ORDER ACCORDINGLY.

____________________________
Debra C. Poplin
United States Magistrate Judge

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Plaintiff also suggests that the ALJ improperly considered a pain management treatment
note from March 2012 as reason for discounting Plaintiff’s credibility. [Doc. 21 at 19-20]. The
ALJ cited to the treatment note which documented that Plaintiff had taken all of her medication
after a back injury and she was warned she would be discharged from treatment if this happened
again. [Tr. 19, 33]. The ALJ noted that no subsequent treatment records were provided from the
medical source. [Tr. 19]. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s observation improperly implies that
Plaintiff was discharged from treatment for abusing medication. [Doc. 21 at 20]. In assessing
Plaintiff’s credibility, however, the ALJ did not mention or make an adverse finding regarding this
treatment note. [Tr. 22]. Moreover, the Court observes that this particular treatment note was not
addressed in isolation by the ALJ but was one of many medical records fully addressed by the ALJ
in discussing Plaintiff’s pain management treatment. [Tr. 19-21].
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