Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Southeast Food Services Company, LLC

Filing 17

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Chief District Judge Thomas A Varlan on 6/23/17. (JBR)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
Petitioner,
v.
SOUTHEAST FOOD SERVICES
COMPANY, LLC D/B/A WENDY’S,
Respondent.

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No.:

3:16-MC-46-TAV-HBG

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court on the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission’s (“EEOC”) Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Memorandum and Opinion
Issued March 27, 2017 [Doc. 14]. The EEOC filed these objections to United States
Magistrate Judge H. Bruce Guyton’s Memorandum and Order (“M&O”) [Doc. 10] denying
its Application for an Order To Show Cause Why an Administrative Subpoena Should Not
Be Enforced [Doc. 1]. Respondent filed a response to the objections [Doc. 16]. For the
reasons contained herein, the Court will overrule the EEOC’s objections and accept the
decision of Magistrate Judge Guyton.
I.

Background1
The EEOC is currently investigating a charge of employment discrimination filed

by Christine Cordero against respondent under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

1

The EEOC does not object to the M&O’s background section [Doc. 10 pp. 1–3]. The
Court, therefore, adopts the M&O’s factual background and will also presume the reader’s
familiarity with this case.

In the course of its investigation, the EEOC issued a subpoena seeking information and
documents regarding employment data. Respondent has refused to provide the requested
information. For purposes of the current matter, the following facts are not in dispute.
On September 25, 2014, Ms. Cordero was hired by respondent as a crew member to
work at one of its fast-food locations. Approximately two weeks later, on October 11,
2014, respondent offered to promote Ms. Cordero to crew leader. In connection with the
promotion, Ms. Cordero was asked to sign a general release, waiving all claims that she
may have had against respondent up to the date of the release’s execution. For the past
twenty years, respondent has required employees to sign this release of all claims as a
condition of promotion. At the time Ms. Cordero was asked to sign the release, she did not
have any claims. She declined to sign the release, however, because she felt that respondent
was discriminating against her by asking her to sign the waiver. Consequently, respondent
did not promote Ms. Cordero, admittedly because of her refusal to sign the release.
Respondent gave her the twenty-five-cent pay raise, as well as the same training, however,
that accompanied the promotion.
Ms. Cordero continued to work for respondent, but she filed a charge of
discrimination with the EEOC on December 5, 2014. In this charge, Ms. Cordero alleges
that respondent retaliated against her by failing to promote her due to her refusal to sign
the release. Ms. Cordero voluntarily resigned from her position on April 20, 2015.
Having learned that respondent required its employees to sign a release of claims as
a condition of promotion, the EEOC sent respondent a pre-subpoena letter on June 9, 2015,
2

notifying respondent of its intent to expand its investigation. In addition, the letter
requested various information about all former and current employees who worked for
respondent from December 4, 2012, to present. On February 18, 2016, after not receiving
the information requested,2 the EEOC issued a subpoena that sought the same information
identified in its pre-subpoena letter. Specifically, the subpoena seeks the identity and
contact information of all: (1) current and former employees since December 4, 2012, (2)
current and former employees who signed a release of claims since December 4, 2012, and
(3) current and former employees who were promoted since December 4, 2012.3 It also
seeks information related to the employees’ dates of hire, promotion, advances, and
termination, reasons for termination, and current and former job titles. Moreover, the
subpoena requests copies of all releases respondent required its employees to sign in order
to receive a promotion and copies of various documents relating to information about the
system or software components of respondent’s Human Resource Information System.4

2

Respondent responded to the EEOC’s pre-subpoena letter and also made efforts to resolve
the matter by limiting the scope of the information requested and proposing to discontinue its use
of a general release as a condition of promotion. The parties could not reach an agreement,
however, prompting the EEOC to file its subpoena.
3

Originally, the subpoena also requested the identity and contact information of all current
and former employees who refused to sign the release since December 4, 2012. The EEOC
eliminated this request after respondent contended that Ms. Cordero was the only employee who
had ever refused to sign a release of claims [Doc. 2 p. 5 n.1].
4

Respondent explains in its brief that it does not have a Human Resource Information
System that is capable of collecting the requested information, and it would instead be required to
review each individual employee file to retrieve the information requested [Doc. 5 p. 14].
3

Respondent continued to object to the subpoenaed information, prompting the
EEOC to file the instant application with the Court on November 18, 2016. Respondent
filed a response in opposition on February 22, 2017.
In the M&O, Judge Guyton denied the EEOC’s application, finding that the EEOC
has not met its burden in demonstrating that the information sought is relevant to Ms.
Cordero’s charge [Doc. 10 pp. 5–10]. The EEOC objects to the M&O on substantive and
procedural grounds. The Court will address the EEOC’s procedural objections first, and it
will then proceed to the EEOC’s substantive arguments.
II.

Standard of Review
As a preliminary point, the EEOC argues that Judge Guyton had jurisdiction only

to conduct the show-cause hearing and to submit to the undersigned his proposed findings
of fact and recommendations, rather than issuing the M&O [Doc. 14 p. 6]. According to
the EEOC, because the application to enforce the administrative subpoena is typically
treated as a dispositive matter, Judge Guyton did not possess authority to deny the EEOC’s
application and improperly disposed of this action [Id.]. Thus, the EEOC argues that this
Court should treat the M&O as a recommendation, rather than a final order, and conduct a
de novo review [Id.]. Respondent contends in opposition that this argument by the EEOC
is of no consequence [Doc. 16 p. 5]. It submits that this procedural issue has no substantive
bearing on the weight of Judge Guyton’s decision [Id.].

4

The standard of review for a magistrate judge’s ruling on a non-dispositive pretrial
matter is the “clearly erroneous or contrary to law” standard. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). In certain situations, however, where the decision will finalize the
district court proceeding, district courts have treated the motion as dispositive, making the
ruling subject to de novo review. Luppino v. Mercedes-Benz Fin. Servs. USA, LLC, No.
13-50212, 2013 WL 1844075, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 11, 2013); see also Jackson v. Gogel,
No. 15-35-DLB-JGW, 2015 WL 3452546, at *2 (E.D. Ky. May 29, 2015); EEOC v. Nestle
Prepared Foods, No. 11-358, 2012 WL 1888130, at *4–5 (E.D. Ky. May 23, 2012); Ross
v. Pioneer Life Ins. Co., No. 07-MC-18, 2007 WL 4150957, at *4 (N.D. Okla. 2007). In
this case, considering that the Court’s ruling on this motion will terminate the proceeding
in this district, the Court finds that it is appropriate to treat Magistrate Judge Guyton’s
M&O [Doc. 10] as a report and recommendation. The Court notes, however, that while it
has elected to apply a more demanding standard of review, it would have reached the same
result under the more deferential “clearly erroneous or contrary to law” standard.
A court must conduct a de novo review of those portions of a magistrate judge’s
report and recommendation to which a party objects unless the objections are frivolous,
conclusive, or general. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); Smith v. Detroit
Fed’n of Teachers, Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987); Mira v. Marshall, 806
F.2d 636, 637 (6th Cir. 1986). “[A]bsent compelling reasons,” parties may not “raise at
the district court stage new arguments or issues that were not presented to the magistrate.”
Murr v. United States, 200 F.3d 895, 902 n.1 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Waters,
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158 F.3d 933, 936 (6th Cir. 1998)); see also Marshall v. Chater, 75 F.3d 1421, 1426–27
(10th Cir. 1996) (“[I]ssues raised for the first time in the objections to magistrate judge’s
report and recommendation are deemed waived.”). The Court “may accept, reject, or
modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations” made by the magistrate
judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
III.

The EEOC’s Substantive Objections
In the M&O, Judge Guyton ruled that the EEOC has not demonstrated the relevance

of the subpoenaed information to Ms. Cordero’s claims [Doc. 10 p. 10]. “Give[n] the
Commission’s lack of explanation as to how the information would resolve the instant
charge or is necessary to determine whether [r]espondent has discriminated against Ms.
Cordero,” wrote Judge Guyton, “granting the Application would surely render the
relevancy requirement ‘a nullity’” [Id.].

Thus, Judge Guyton denied the EEOC’s

application on relevance grounds and declined to address whether the information sought
is unduly burdensome [Id.].
The EEOC now objects to Judge Guyton’s reasoning for three primary reasons: (1)
“Sixth Circuit Law Allows the Commission to Investigate a Broader Pattern-or-Practice
Violation Arising from an Individual Charge”; (2) “Whether Respondent’s Promotion
Policy is Lawful or Unlawful is Not an Issue in the Subpoena Enforcement Action”; and
(3) “The Commission Has the Authority to Investigate Recordkeeping Violations” [Doc.
14 pp. 7, 12]. The Court will address each of these objections in turn.

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A.

Pattern or Practice Violation

First, the EEOC argues that Ms. Cordero’s charge alleges not only that respondent
engaged in an unlawful business practice that negatively affected her employment, but also
alleges that respondent engaged in a pattern or practice of discriminatory retaliation [Id. at
8]. The EEOC bases this contention on the language of Ms. Cordero’s complaint:
I was offered a Shift Manager Position promotion but was required to sign a
general release of my right to file a future discrimination complaint against
the Respondent. . . . [M]y promotion offer was withdrawn by the Respondent
because I would not sign the Release. Another employee, Estefany
Guichapa, was promoted because she agreed to sign the release. I believe I
have been retaliated against for opposing unlawful employment practices, in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended [Id. at 7–
8 (citing Doc. 3 p. 6)].
According to the EEOC, Ms. Cordero’s charge alleges that respondent’s business practices
also, therefore, potentially harmed another employee [Id. at 8]. Viewed in combination
with respondent’s admission that it required all employees to sign the release prior to their
promotion, the EEOC argues that Ms. Cordero’s charge claims that respondent engaged in
a pattern or practice of unlawful retaliation [Id.]. Thus, the information sought in the
subpoena at issue—demonstrating whether other employees gave up Title VII claims in
order to receive promotions—is relevant to Ms. Cordero’s charge [Id.].
Specifically, the EEOC objects to Judge Guyton’s reliance on Tenth and Eleventh
Circuit case law that stands for the proposition that a “single discriminatory act” does not
warrant a “broader pattern-or-practice investigation” [Id.]. According to the EEOC, Sixth
Circuit law allows it to pursue a “broader inquiry” once it finds that discrimination may

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extend beyond the original charge without filing an additional pattern-or-practice charge
[Id. at 9 (citing EEOC v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 26 F.3d 44, 47, 48 (6th Cir. 1994))].
Indeed, the EEOC undoubtedly possesses broad investigatory powers, EEOC v. KMart Corp., 694 F.2d 1055, 1066 (6th Cir. 1982), and Title VII authorizes the EEOC to
issue subpoenas as part of its investigations. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–8(a), 2000e–9. The
subpoenas must, however, “be issued in connection with an investigation of a charge and
be relevant to that charge.” K-Mart, 694 F.2d at 1066 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–8(a)).
Although “courts have generously construed the term ‘relevant’ and have afforded the
Commission access to virtually any material that might cast light on the allegations against
the employer,” the Supreme Court has cautioned against construing the EEOC’s
investigative authority so broadly that the relevancy requirement is rendered “a nullity.”
EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 68–69 (1984); see also EEOC v. Cambridge Tile Mfg.
Co., 590 F.2d 205, 206 (6th Cir. 1979) (asserting that “notions of relevancy at the
investigatory stage are very broad, . . . so long as the EEOC is not wandering into wholly
unrelated areas”).
Thus, despite the EEOC’s argument to the contrary, information sought by the
EEOC through a subpoena must still be relevant to the underlying charge, even if the EEOC
decides to broaden its inquiry. See EEOC v. TriCore Reference Labs., 849 F.3d 929, 938–
39 (10th Cir. 2017) (holding that the EEOC could not rely on its letter informing TriCore
of the EEOC’s intent to expand its investigation because the letter was not a “charge” of
discrimination, “which is required for the EEOC to seek information about alleged
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discrimination under § 2000e–8”). If the subpoenaed information is not relevant to an
individual charge of discrimination, then the EEOC may file an additional pattern-orpractice charge. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(b) (providing that a discrimination charge may
be filed “by or on behalf of a person claiming to be aggrieved, or by a member of the
Commission”); id. § 2000e–6(e) (asserting that the EEOC also has authority to “investigate
and act on a charge of a pattern or practice of discrimination”); Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. at
62 (“[W]hen a Commissioner has reason to think that an employer has engaged in a ‘pattern
or practice’ of discriminatory conduct, he may file a charge on his own initiative.”); EEOC
v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 771 F.3d 757, 762 (11th Cir. 2014) (“The Commission
has the ability to file a Commissioner’s charge alleging a pattern and practice of
discrimination that could support a request for [broader employee] information.”).
In fact, the Sixth Circuit has noted that the purpose of a Title VII charge, including
a charge of pattern-or-practice discrimination, is to initiate an EEOC investigation. KMart, 694 F.2d at 1067. The EEOC may not, therefore, subpoena information unrelated to
the charge at hand by simply announcing that it has broadened the scope of its investigation.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–8(a) (asserting that the EEOC is entitled to inspect and copy “any
evidence of any person being investigated or proceeded against that relates to unlawful
employment practices . . . and is relevant to the charge under investigation” (emphasis
added)); see also TriCore, 849 F.3d at 935–38 (determining that the EEOC’s letter to the
respondent communicating that it was expanding the scope of its investigation due to its
suspicion that respondent had a companywide policy of discrimination did not moot the
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requirement that information sought be relevant to the actual charges under investigation);
Royal Caribbean, 771 F.3d at 762 (stating that “the EEOC may not enforce a subpoena in
the investigation of an individual charge merely as an expedient bypass of the mechanisms
required to file a Commissioner’s charge”).
Broader employment context, including the employment history of other
employees, may be relevant to a single charge of employment discrimination under certain
circumstances, however. Ford Motor, 26 F.3d at 47. For instance, in Blue Bell Boots, Inc.
v. EEOC, 418 F.2d 355 (6th Cir. 1969), the Sixth Circuit ruled that the employer’s “pattern
of action” was relevant to the EEOC’s determination of whether the employer practiced
racial discrimination in a particular instance. Id. at 358. “Discrimination on the basis of
race is by definition class discrimination,” wrote the court, “and the existence of patterns
of racial discrimination in job classifications or hiring situations other than those of the
complainants may well justify an inference that the practices complained of here were
motivated by racial factors.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
The Sixth Circuit extended this rationale to a charge of sex discrimination in
Cambridge Tile, 590 F.2d at 206. It held therein that “the Commission has the power to
investigate and thus to subpoena documents concerning any employer practice which may
shed light on the discrimination charged.” Id. The court further determined that the
employer’s potential discrimination against women in job classifications was relevant to
the specific charges of sex discrimination, as well as a charge of race discrimination, in
firing. Id. Thus, because the pattern-and-practice information was relevant to the specific
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charges at hand, the court permitted the EEOC to subpoena information related to the
“broader picture of discrimination” that unfolded during its investigation of the individual
charges. Id.
The Sixth Circuit again allowed the EEOC to subpoena broader pattern information
in EEOC v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 750 F.2d 40 (6th Cir. 1984). The subpoenas in Roadway
arose from two separate charges of race discrimination against the respondent. Id. at 41.
Roadway claimed that some of the information sought was too general in scope and had
no bearing on the individual discrimination charges. Id. at 43. The court acknowledged
that the EEOC may only subpoena relevant information but held that evidence of
Roadway’s employment practices, other than those specifically charged, was relevant in
this case because it helped illuminate the individual complaints of discriminatory
discharge. Id. (citing Blue Bell, 418 F.2d at 358).
In Ford Motor, 26 F.3d 44, the Sixth Circuit addressed an individual charge alleging
“continuing” discrimination, “not one isolated denial of promotion.”

Id. at 47.

Consequently, the court determined that broader comparative information was relevant to
the EEOC’s determination of whether discrimination occurred. Id. The claimant argued
that she was treated differently than similarly situated men, so the EEOC required
information as to whether she was actually similarly situated to men who were promoted.

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Id. at 48. Thus, it was “both reasonable and relevant for EEOC to have access to hiring
and promotion information on other employees.” Id.5
These Sixth Circuit cases confirm that subpoenaed information must still comply
with statutory requirements, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–8, and demonstrate that the scope of the
EEOC’s subpoena power in any given case is a fact-specific inquiry. See Ford Motor, 26
F.3d at 47 (affirming that “the appropriate scope of investigation depends on the
circumstances of a particular case”). Even when the EEOC suspects a larger-scale pattern
of discrimination, the Court still has a duty to determine whether information sought is
relevant to the charge. See id. (providing that, although the Congress intended the EEOC
to have broad access to relevant information, it is still the court’s duty to determine
relevance of material sought).
Unlike in Blue Bell, Cambridge Tile, Roadway, Ford Motor, and UPS, the Court
finds that the information sought by the EEOC in this case is not relevant to Ms. Cordero’s
charge. First, the Court is not convinced that her charge alleges a pattern or practice of
discrimination, as argued by the EEOC. Rather, the wording of her charge merely contrasts
her situation with that of another employee who was promoted. In contrast with the
plaintiff’s amended charge in UPS, nothing in the language of Ms. Cordero’s charge

5

Recently, the Sixth Circuit affirmed allowance of subpoenaing wider employment
information in the context of an Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) charge. EEOC v.
United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS), No. 16-2132, 2017 WL 2486017 (6th Cir. June 9, 2017). The
court in UPS reiterated that § 2000e-8(a)’s relevancy requirement does not “force the EEOC only
to review evidence concerning the specific charge.” Id. at *2. It also confirmed, however, that the
“true test of relevance” is “whether the evidence provides context for determining whether
discrimination has taken place.” Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
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indicates her desire to bring a claim on behalf of the other employee or to allege a pattern
of discriminatory behavior. See UPS, 2017 WL 2486017, at *1, 3 (asserting that the
plaintiff’s amended charge stated, “I am aware that all other employees subject to Health
and Safety incident action/reports have had their confidentiality breached in the same
manner as me,” and thus finding that the plaintiff’s charge was “not limited to himself”).
Consequently, there is no actual pattern-or-practice charge in this case.
Second, the Court finds that other employees’ information does not provide context
for, or shed light on, Ms. Cordero’s retaliation charge. See id. at *2 (affirming that the
“true test of relevance” is “whether the evidence provides context for determining whether
discrimination has taken place”). Respondent has admitted that it required all employees
seeking a promotion to sign the release for the past twenty years and that anyone who
refused to sign the release was denied a promotion. Thus, the EEOC need not evaluate
broader employment information in order to determine whether respondent refused to
promote Ms. Cordero because of her refusal to sign the waiver. Unlike in the cases cited
by the EEOC, employment practices of respondent other than those specifically charged
are not relevant to the underlying charge in this case, which is the only relevance of
consequence. See Royal Caribbean, 771 F.3d at 761 (“The relevance that is necessary to
support a subpoena for the investigation of an individual charge is relevance to the
contested issues that must be decided to resolve that charge, not relevance to issues that
may be contested when and if future charges are brought by others.”).

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The Court concludes that the EEOC has not demonstrated the relevance of the
subpoenaed information to Ms. Cordero’s retaliation charge, and it is not, therefore,
entitled to enforcement of its subpoena. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–8(a) (asserting that the
EEOC is only entitled to “any evidence of any person being investigated or proceeded
against that relates to unlawful employment practices . . . and is relevant to the charge
under investigation”); Shell, 466 U.S. at 64 (stating that “the EEOC’s investigative
authority is tied to charges filed with the Commission; unlike other federal agencies that
possess plenary authority to demand to see records relevant to matters within their
jurisdiction, the EEOC is entitled to access only to evidence ‘relevant to the charge under
investigation’”). Consequently, the Court will overrule the EEOC’s objection on this
ground and, like Judge Guyton, will decline to reach the issue of whether the EEOC’s
subpoenaed information is unduly burdensome.
B.

Lawfulness of Respondent’s Policy

Second, the EEOC objects to Judge Guyton’s conclusion that “the unlawfulness of
Respondent’s employment practice is not dependent on how many other employees signed
a release” [Doc. 14 p. 12 (citing Doc. 10 p. 7)]. The EEOC argues that “the fact that a
charge may not ultimately be provable or sustainable does not render it invalid” [Id.]. It
does not further explain, however, how this supposedly invalidates Judge Guyton’s
conclusion.
Although the EEOC need not prove “probable cause or reasonable cause to believe
that the charge of discrimination is true,” K-Mart, 694 F.2d at 1066, and the Court
14

acknowledges that it may not “use an enforcement proceeding as an opportunity to test the
strength of the underlying complaint,” McLane Co. v. EEOC, 137 S. Ct. 1159, 1165 (2017),
the EEOC still bears the burden of establishing the relevance of information sought. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e–8(a). While the Court agrees that the merits of Ms. Cordero’s claim is not
at issue, this does not alter its conclusion as to the EEOC’s application, and Judge Guyton
did not rule otherwise. Thus, the Court will also overrule this objection.
C.

Investigation of Recordkeeping Violations

Finally, the EEOC argues that respondent’s counsel admitted to respondent’s failure
to preserve its employee records, which is required under Title VII [Doc. 14 pp. 12–13].
The EEOC contends, therefore, that it has a duty to investigate this recordkeeping violation
and that the subpoenaed information will aid in this investigation [Id. at 13]. It submits
that the EEOC is not required to amend the charge or to file a separate charge in order to
investigate the alleged recordkeeping violation [Id.].
Judge Guyton did not address this issue in his M&O, and the EEOC did not raise
this argument in its original application or in its reply [Docs. 1, 7]. Counsel for the EEOC
appears to have raised this issue for the first time during the February 28, 2017, hearing
before Judge Guyton, while replying to respondent’s oral argument [Doc. 13 p. 34]. At the
conclusion of the hearing, counsel stated that respondent has a statutory duty to keep,
preserve, and make available employment records during a Title VII investigation [Id.].
Counsel for the EEOC then informed Judge Guyton that counsel for respondent told him
recently that the records “are not available because the respondent has been destroying
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them” [Id. at 35]. According to the EEOC, respondent’s practice of deleting employees
from the system after their employment is terminated amounts to a recordkeeping violation
under Title VII [Id.]. Thus, counsel for the EEOC contended, “if they have engaged in a
recordkeeping violation, then that itself becomes part of the charge, and that has to be
investigated too” [Id.]. Because the EEOC raised this argument for the first time in
response to respondent’s oral argument, respondent did not have the opportunity to rebut
these claims of recordkeeping violations.
The EEOC cites to no case law in support of its argument that it need not file a new
recordkeeping charge in order to investigate the matter. Rather, case law firmly establishes
that the pertinent inquiry in this brand of proceeding is whether the subpoenaed information
is (1) within the agency’s authority, (2) reasonable in scope, and (3) relevant to the
investigation. Univ. Penn. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 191 (1990). The EEOC has not brought
a charge of recordkeeping violation, and it has not demonstrated how the subpoenaed
information at issue is relevant to the EEOC’s investigation into Ms. Cordero’s charge.
Consequently, the Court will overrule this final objection of the EEOC.
IV.

Conclusion
As addressed above, the Court construes Judge Guyton’s M&O [Doc. 10] as a report

and recommendation. Accordingly, upon careful and de novo review of the record and the
law, the Court finds that the recommendations contained in Judge Guyton’s Report [Doc.
10] are correct. The EEOC’s objections [Doc. 14] will, consequently, be OVERRULED.

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The Court will ACCEPT in whole the Report and Recommendation [Doc. 10] and
incorporate it into this Memorandum Opinion. Accordingly, for the reasons stated herein,
the EEOC’s Application for an Order To Show Cause Why an Administrative Subpoena
Should Not Be Granted [Doc. 1] will be DENIED, and the Clerk of Court will be
DIRECTED to close this case.
ORDER ACCORDINGLY.

s/ Thomas A. Varlan
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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