Reynolds v. Knox County Government

Filing 57

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER; Defendant's Motion for Protective Order to Quash and/or Limit Depositions 34 is DENIED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Debra C. Poplin on 10/16/18. (ADA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
DEE ANN REYNOLDS,
Plaintiff,
v.

KNOX COUNTY GOVERNMENT,
Defendant.

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No. 3:17-CV-79-HSM-DCP

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This case is before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, the Rules of this Court,
and Standing Order 13-02.
Now before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Protective Order to Quash and/or Limit
Depositions [Doc. 34]. Plaintiff filed a Response [Doc. 39] in opposition to the Motion, and
Defendant filed a Reply [Doc. 44]. The Motion is ripe for adjudication. Accordingly, for the
reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion [Doc. 34].
I.

POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
Defendant moves [Doc. 34] the Court for a protective order and/or to limit Plaintiff’s

noticed depositions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) and (c). Specifically,
Defendant requests that the Court enter a protective order quashing the notice upon Mayor
Burchett and/or holding that Plaintiff is not entitled to depose Mayor Burchett. In addition,
Defendant argues that Plaintiff noticed a Rule 30(b)(6) witness on three matters relating to a
confidential mediation agreement. Defendant objects to any discovery regarding the mediated
agreement, arguing that Plaintiff is not complying with the properly executed confidentiality

agreement as more fully explained in Defendant’s first motion in limine [Doc. 33].1 Defendant
argues that any further disclosures constitute a material breach in violation of the confidentiality
provision of the mediation agreement dated June 6, 2016. Defendant states that for the reasons
explained in its motion in limine, Plaintiff is not permitted to engage in discovery under the new
standards under Rule 26(b) and that the discovery is not relevant.
Plaintiff filed a Response [Doc. 39], arguing that Mayor Burchett has first-hand knowledge
of the facts in this matter and that Defendant identified Mayor Burchett in its initial disclosures as
an individual who likely has discoverable information in support of defenses. In the alternative,
Plaintiff asserts that if the Court is inclined to forbid the deposition or limit the scope of the
deposition, she will not take Mayor Burchett’s deposition until after August 31, 2018, which is
when he leaves office. With respect to the Rule 30(b)(6) witness, Plaintiff asserts that the subject
matter does not violate the agreement to mediate and is entirely consistent with Rule 408 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence as referenced in the agreement to mediate. Plaintiff references her
response to Defendant’s motion in limine.2
Defendant filed a Reply [Doc. 44], stating that with respect to Mayor Burchett’s deposition,
it has met its burden under Rule 26(c) to quash the deposition. Defendant states that Plaintiff now
has the burden to show extraordinary circumstances to depose Mayor Burchett. Defendant argues

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In its Motion in Limine [Doc. 33], Defendant objects to any further disclosures and asserts
that the allegations of the Complaint constitute a material breach and violation of the
confidentiality provision of the mediation agreement.
2

In Plaintiff’s response to the motion in limine [Doc. 38], she asserts that there is not a
blanket ban on settlement negotiations under Rule 408 and that she does not intend to use such
evidence to prove or disprove the merits of the amount of a disputed claim. Instead, Plaintiff
submits that such evidence would show that she did not give up her right to employment with
Defendant by accepting an offer of judgment and that the evidence will show Defendant’s bias and
prejudice against Plaintiff for having engaged in protected conduct.
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that with respect to the Rule 30(b)(6) notice, settlement negotiations are irrelevant subject matter
for Plaintiff to explore in a deposition.
II.

ANALYSIS
The Court has considered the parties’ filings, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court

finds Defendant’s Motion not well taken.
As mentioned above, Defendant’s Motion is filed pursuant to Rule 26(b)(1) and (c). Rule
26(b)(1) provides as follows:
Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as
follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged
matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and
proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of
the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the
parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources,
the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether
the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely
benefit.
Courts have explained that the “scope of discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure is traditionally quite broad.” Meredith v. United Collection Bureau, Inc., 319 F.R.D.
240, 242 (N.D. Ohio 2017) (quoting Lewis v. ACB Bus. Serv., Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 402 (6th Cir.
1998)). Courts have cautioned, however, that “[d]iscovery requests are not limitless, and parties
must be prohibited from taking ‘fishing expeditions’ in hopes of developing meritorious claims.”
Bentley v. Paul B. Hall Reg'l Med. Ctr., No. 7:15-CV-97-ART-EBA, 2016 WL 7976040, at *1
(E.D. Ky. Apr. 14, 2016). “[T]he [C]ourt retains the final discretion to determine whether a
discovery requests is broad or oppressive.” Id. (citing Surles v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 474 F.3d
288, 305 (6th Cir. 2007)).
Further, Rule 26(c)(1) provides that a court may, “for good cause,” issue a protective order
to “[a] party or any person whom discovery is sought,” to prevent “annoyance, embarrassment,
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oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). The movant for the protective
order has the burden to show good cause. Nix v. Sword, 11 F. App’x 498, 500 (6th Cir. 2001).
“Rule 26(c) confers broad discretion on the trial court to decide when a protective order is
appropriate and what degree of protection is required.” Maxchief Investments Ltd. v. Plastic Dev.
Grp., LLC, No. 3:16-CV-63, 2017 WL 710956, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 22, 2017) (quoting Seattle
Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984)).
With the above guidance in mind, the Court will turn to the present issues. Specifically,
Defendant has objected to Mayor Burchett’s deposition and to certain topics with respect to the
Rule 30(b)(6) witness’s deposition.
1.

Mayor Burchett’s Deposition

Defendant asserts that courts impose substantial limitations in actions that implicate highranking public officials and that Plaintiff cannot make a clear showing that the deposition of Mayor
Burchett is essential to her case. Plaintiff disagrees with Defendant’s assertion and adds that she
will agree not to take Mayor Burchett’s deposition until after he leaves office on or about August
31, 2018.
The Court finds Defendant’s request to quash or limit Mayor Burchett’s deposition on the
basis that he is a high-ranking public official moot. As Plaintiff indicated, Mayor Burchett left
office on August 31, 2018, and therefore, he is no longer a high-ranking public official.
Accordingly, the Court finds Defendant’s request to quash or limit Mayor Burchett’s deposition
to be moot.
2.

Rule 30(b)(6) Witness’s Deposition

Defendant states that Plaintiff noticed a Rule 30(b)(6) witness and that the topics included
in the notice are protected by a properly executed mediation confidentiality agreement. In its
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motion in limine referenced in the instant Motion, Defendant states that both parties agreed as
follows, “Absent the permission of all parties, no participant at the mediation shall disclose to any
other person any conduct or statements made in the course of the mediation proceedings . . .” [Doc.
33 at 2]. Further, Defendant asserts that such discovery is not relevant. Plaintiff disagrees and
argues that the subject matter contained in the Rule 30(b)(6) notice seeks evidence that may be
used for “another purpose” consistent with Rule 408. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that such
evidence goes to motive, prejudice, bias, intent, knowledge of protected activities, and is relevant
to pretext.
Defendant objects to the following subjects that were noticed for the Rule 30(b)(6)
deposition:
1. With respect to the mediation Waiver and Release Agreements
attached as Ex. A, the names and roles of the Knox County
agents and/or and [sic] employees who had knowledge, and/or
requested, and/or approved of the “no rehire clause” contained
in Paragraph 13;
2. The names and roles of the Knox County employees who gave
approval of and/or authorized the mediated settlement in
Reynolds V. [sic] Knox County and MPC, Case No. 3:15-cv265, in the amount of $800,000 (See Exh. A.); and
3. The names and roles of the Knox County agents, and/or
employees who gave approval and/or authorized Knox County
and MPC to make the Offer of Judgment in the amount of
$800,000 in Reynolds v. Knox County and MPC, Case No. 3:15cv-265 (See Exh. B.).

In the instant matter, the Court finds Defendant’s position not well taken. First, the three
matters set forth above simply request the names and the roles of the individuals approving certain
agreements and provisions, and the Court is not entirely convinced such matters are protected
under the confidentiality agreement. In any event, the Court finds that the subject matter is
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permissible discovery pursuant to Rule 26(b). Here, Plaintiff has alleged that she was not rehired
for several positions, despite promises from the Knox County Finance Director and the Finance
Controller and despite being qualified for the applicable jobs. Plaintiff asserts that the “no rehire
clause” is relevant to show that she did not give up her right to employment with Defendant by
accepting the Offer of Judgment and that this provision shows Defendant’s bias and prejudice
against Plaintiff for having engaged in protected conduct. The Court finds Plaintiff has established
that the information is discoverable and that Defendant has not shown otherwise.
Finally, the Court does not opine on Defendant’s motion in limine and whether such
evidence is admissible at trial, and the parties may submit a joint motion for a protective order to
protect the confidentiality of the above matters during the discovery phase.
III.

CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s Motion for Protective Order to

Quash and/or Limit Depositions [Doc. 34] is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
ENTER:
_________________________
Debra C. Poplin
United States Magistrate Judge

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