Devereux et al v. Knox County, Tennessee, et al (JRG1)
Filing
119
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: The Devereuxs fail to satisfy their burden of showing that Judge Guyton clearly erred or acted contrary to law. The Devereuxs' objections [Doc. 74 ] are therefore OVERRULED, and the report and recommendation [Doc. 70] is ACCEPTED IN WHOLE. Signed by District Judge J Ronnie Greer on 03/06/2019. (AMP)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
BRIAN B. DEVEREUX and RENEE
DEVEREUX,
Plaintiffs,
v.
KNOX COUNTY, TENNESSEE, PAUL
MOBLEY, SHAKER NASSER, HANNA FRYE,
and GREG MOORE,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
No. 3:17-CV-00197-JRG-HBG
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Order
Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiffs’ Motion to Extend the Discovery Deadline [Doc.
74] and Defendants’ Response in Opposition [Doc. 77]. For the reasons herein, the Court will
overrule Plaintiffs’ objections.
I.
BACKGROUND
In this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the parties appeared before Chief United States
Magistrate Judge H. Bruce Guyton for a hearing on Plaintiffs Brian B. Devereux and Renee
Devereux’s Motion to Extend Discovery Deadline [Doc. 61]. At the hearing, the Devereuxs
requested a sixty-day extension of all discovery. [Id. at 1–3]. They based their request on a need
to perform an on-site inspection of Mr. Devereux’s former prison cell in the Knox County
Detention Center and depose Defendant Knox County, Tennessee, under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 30(b)(6). [Id.; J. Guyton’s Order, Doc. 70, at 1]. According to the Devereuxs, an
inspection of the cell and a deposition of a Rule 30(b)(6) witness are vital because Knox County
manipulated footage from a camera in Mr. Devereux’s cell—a camera that, in their view, should
have clearly unequivocally he was suffering symptoms of a stroke but does not. [J. Guyton’s
Order at 2]. In short, the Devereuxs wanted extended discovery so that they could pursue a
motion for spoliation of evidence against Knox County. [Id.].
Judge Guyton allowed the Devereuxs to engage in limited discovery on the issue of
spoliation. [Id. at 3–4]. This limited discovery included permission for the Devereuxs to request
metadata from the camera, to serve interrogatories concerning the camera, and to depose Officer
Paul Cooper—the officer who oversaw the production of the camera’s footage in response to
the Devereuxs’ discovery request—about the footage. [Id. at 3]. Having allowed the Devereuxs
to depose Officer Cooper about the footage, Judge Guyton found a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition to
be unnecessary. [Id.]. As to a site inspection, he determined that the Devereuxs “have not
provided a sufficient explanation as to why a site inspection is necessary” or “why they did not
request a site inspection prior to the expiration of the discovery deadline.” [Id.]. He also noted
that the Devereuxs acknowledged that a site inspection would require evacuation of the cell, and
he further rejected a site inspection as an “unnecessary burden.” [Id. at 3–4].
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72, the Devereuxs have filed timely objections
to Judge Guyton’s order. [Pls.’ Objs. at 1]. They object to his denial of their request for a site
inspection and for a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. [Id. at 1–2]. The Court will now address their
objections.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A federal magistrate judge has “broad discretion to regulate nondispositive matters.”
Diorio v. TMI Hosp., No. 4:15-cv-1710, 2017 WL 1399869, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 19, 2017)
(quotation omitted). When reviewing a magistrate judge’s recommendation on a non-dispositive
2
issue, the Court must accept it unless it is clearly erroneous or contrary to law. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). This standard of review is “highly deferential” to the
magistrate judge’s decision-making authority, Diorio, 2017 WL 1399869 at *2 (quotation
omitted), and a magistrate judge’s recommendation is clearly erroneous or contrary to law only
if it “leaves the reviewing court with ‘a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed,’” Tri-Star Airlines, Inc. v. Willis Careen Corp. of L.A., 75 F. Supp. 2d 835, 839
(W.D. Tenn. 1999) (quoting Heights Cmty. Congress v. Hilltop Realty, Inc., 774 F.2d 135, 140
(6th Cir. 1985)). The Court may “modify or set aside any part of the order that is clearly
erroneous or is contrary to law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a).
III. ANALYSIS
Spoliation is “the intentional destruction of evidence that is presumed to be unfavorable
to the party responsible for its destruction.” United States v. Copeland, 321 F.3d 582, 597 (6th
Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). When an issue of spoliation arises in a case, federal courts derive
their authority to order site inspections under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34(a)(2), which
permits them to allow “entry onto designated land or other property possessed or controlled by
the responding party, so that the requesting party may inspect . . . the property.” In addition,
under Rule 30(b)(6), courts may authorize a party to subpoena a government agency for the
purpose of “designat[ing] one or more officers, directors, [] managing agents, or . . . other
persons who consent to testify on its behalf” on an issue of spoliation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6).
A. The Devereuxs’ Request for a Site Inspection
As an initial matter, the Court would be remiss if it did not begin by acknowledging
Defendants’ argument that the Devereuxs have cited “[n]o cases or authorities whatsoever” to
buttress their cause. [Defs.’ Resp. at 1]. Under Rule 72(a), the “critical inquiry” is whether case
3
law does or does not support a magistrate judge’s decision, Diorio, 2017 WL 1399869 at *2
(quotation omitted), so the Devereuxs’ failure to cite any legal precedent is by itself a basis for
the Court to summarily overrule their objections, see Fairfield v. Wacha, No. 1:07-cv-948, 2008
WL 584940, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 28, 2008) (stating that a party’s failure to cite any case law
rendered his “purported objection the same as no objection at all” (citations omitted)); see also
McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995–96 (6th Cir. 1997) (“[I]ssues adverted to in a
perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed
waived. It is not sufficient for a party to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way,
leaving the court to . . . put flesh on its bones.” (quotation omitted)); E.D. Tenn. L.R. 7.1(b)
(stating that a party’s legal brief “shall include the . . . legal grounds which justify the ruling
sought from the Court”).
In a two-sentence argument, the Devereuxs merely contend that they are “materially
prejudiced by not being allowed to conduct an inspection of the cell.” [Pls.’ Objs. at 6]. But
material prejudice is not the operative legal standard. Rather, clear error is the standard, and the
Devereuxs make no demonstrable assertion that Judge Guyton committed this type of error by
refusing their entry into the cell. Also, the Court cannot help but notice that Judge Guyton was
not inclined to grant their request partly because they did not sufficiently explain why a site
inspection was necessary, [J. Guyton’s Order at 3], and this same shortcoming now undermines
their appeal.
Without some effort on the Devereuxs’ part to show—with developed legal argument—
that Judge Guyton clearly erred or acted contrary to law, the Court, having conducted its own
research, cannot hold that his decision is anything but presumptively reasonable, especially in
light of the ample discovery that he already awarded to them on the issue of spoliation. See
4
Hoxie v. Livingston County, No. 09-CV-10725, 2010 WL 3085461, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 5,
2010) (allowing a site inspection of a cell when it was “the only way” for the plaintiff to obtain
the information he sought (emphasis added)); Williams v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 226 F.R.D.
144, 146 (D. Mass. 2005) (“Before permitting such an intrusion . . . the inquiring party must
present at least some reliable information that the opposing party’s representations are
misleading or substantively inaccurate.” (citing In re Air Crash Disaster at Detroit Metro.
Airport, 130 F.R.D. 641, 646 (E.D. Mich. 1989))); Shira A. Scheindlin, Daniel J. Capra, & The
Sedona Conference, Electronic Discovery and Digital Evidence 396 (2d ed. 2012) (“Rule 34(a)
is not meant to create a routine right of direct access to the opponent’s electronic information
systems. Court-ordered . . . on-site access . . . can be intrusive and burdensome, causing
significant inconvenience and interruption to business operations of the responding party.”).
B. The Devereuxs’ Request for a Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition
Next, the Devereuxs take issue with Judge Guyton’s decision not to allow them to
perform a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. They appear to argue that Judge Guyton erred because he
permitted them to take “a deposition of [Officer Cooper] but not of the County in any way.”
[Pls.’ Objs. at 3]. But this argument is wrong, if not disingenuous. By every appearance from
the record, Officer Cooper is a Knox County official. [Officer Cooper Decl., Doc. 63-8, ¶ 2].
In this same vein, the Devereuxs fault Judge Guyton by citing a “need, at the very least,
to be able to ask the county questions as to where the video was exported and held before being
reviewed by [Officer Cooper] and most importantly, the type of software-system [Knox County]
has that allowed [Officer Cooper] to download/capture the video.” [Pls.’ Objs. at 3–4]. But in
raising these concerns, they make no attempt to explain why the service of interrogatories, the
limited deposition of Officer Cooper, and the collection of metadata—all of which Judge Guyton
5
permitted as discovery—are insufficient means for them to cull the information they request,
much less why Judge Guyton’s provision of these means constitutes clear error. Without any
backing from case law, the Devereuxs’ argument reads as little more than a disagreement with
how Judge Guyton crafted limited discovery on the issue of spoliation, and the Court lacks
license to entertain this type of argument. See Lafoe v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:14-cv-335,
2016 WL 902571, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 9, 2016) (“An ‘objection’ that does nothing more than
state a disagreement with a Magistrate Judge’s suggested resolution, or simply summarizes what
has been presented before, is not an ‘objection’ as that term is used in this context.” (quoting
VanDiver v. Martin, 304 F. Supp. 2d 934, 937 (E.D. Mich. 2004))).
In whole, the Devereuxs claim that Judge Guyton “should [have] give[n]” them “carteblanche authority” to conduct all the discovery that they saw necessary, but the Court is unable
to whimsically substitute its own judgment for Judge Guyton’s. See Nisus Corp. v. Perma-Chink
Sys., Inc., 327 F. Supp. 2d 844, 851 (E.D. Tenn. 2003) (“[T]his standard does not permit the
reviewing court to substitute its own conclusion for that of the magistrate judge.” (quotation
omitted)). Simply, the Court has no power to amend Judge Guyton’s order without a showing
that he clearly diverged from precedent, and the Devereuxs come up well short of this showing,
having cited no precedent and identified no clear error.
IV.
CONCLUSION
The Devereuxs fail to satisfy their burden of showing that Judge Guyton clearly erred or
acted contrary to law. The Devereuxs’ objections [Doc. 74] are therefore OVERRULED, and
the report and recommendation [Doc. 70] is ACCEPTED IN WHOLE.
So ordered.
6
ENTER:
s/J. RONNIE GREER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
7
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?