Bruce v. Great Britain et al

Filing 129

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION. Because Bruce has failed to state a claim capable of relief, this action is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by District Judge Harry S Mattice, Jr on 9/25/2018. (BDG, ) Order mailed to Bruce.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
at KNOXVILLE
SHANE BRUCE,
Plaintiff,
v.
GREAT BRITAIN, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 3:17-cv-285
Judge Mattice

ORDER
Shane Bruce (“Bruce”) filed this action alleging the 2010 Deepwater Horizon
explosion and subsequent oil leak “affected” him. According to him, that incident did
not result from negligence or recklessness. Bruce claims, rather, that the Deepwater
Horizon incident was a deliberate attack, orchestrated as part of an international
conspiracy. This alleged conspiracy involved numerous conspirators, including, but not
limited to: some local Tennessee healthcare providers, national medical associations—
such as the American Medical Association (AMA) and the American Association of
Poison Control Centers (AAPCC)—and even the highest levels of the American and
British governments, including Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II and United States
Secretary of Defense, James “Mad Dog” Mattis.1 Although details are sparse, Bruce
further concludes that “genetically modified bacteria” released during the Deepwater
Horizon incident caused him to suffer from arsenic poising and undergo “an unwilling

Bruce’s proffered conspiracy also involved BP p.l.c. (“BP”), which leased and operated the Deepwater
Horizon oil platform in 2010. Bruce’s Complaint named BP as a defendant, of course. [Doc. 1]. In
February of this year, however, the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation severed and
transferred Bruce’s claims against BP to the Eastern District of Louisiana for litigation in Multidistrict
Ligation No. 2179, which regards claims against BP that are related to the Deepwater Horizon incident.
[Doc. 98].

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genetic transformation,” which is something he discovered sometime last year—seven
years after the Deepwater Horizon incident. Bruce, acting pro se, brought a slew of
federal claims, ranging from the Anti-Terrorism Act (18 U.S.C. § 2333) to maritime law,
state tort law claims, and even a claim pursuant to the English Magna Carta. As
damages, he asks the Court to award him “$1,136,000,” which he believes is enough to:
pay “several specialists” to monitor his health indefinitely, relocate to a “very hot
climate” with a “higher cost of living,” build medically necessary “saunas,” and maintain
his “emotional support animals.”
After Bruce was granted in forma pauperis (IFP) status last year, the United
States Marshal Service trekked the nation, attempting to effectuate service on the suit’s
twenty-six named Defendants. Most Defendants have since appeared, although it seems
Queen Elizabeth could either not be reached or bothered; in any event, she has yet to
make an appearance before the Court. Many Defendants have filed motions to dismiss.
[Docs. 22, 24, 26, 28, 44, 73, & 123]. All argue dismissal is warranted, but they give
assorted and divergent reasons as to why. For instance, the Tennessee healthcare
providers seek dismissal under Tennessee’s “good faith certificate” law, which they
claim Bruce has not complied with. The Office of Secretary Mattis, the Centers for
Disease Control (CDC), and the National Institute of Health (NIH) assert that qualified
and sovereign immunity bar Bruce’s claims, and they contend he has otherwise failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies as required as to some of his federal claims (e.g.
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) claims).
[Doc. 123]. By comparison, some others, such as the AMA, argue the Court lacks
jurisdiction to hear Bruce’s claims because they are “attenuated, implausible, frivolous,”

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and are “clearly devoid of merit.” [Doc. 44 at 2 (quoting Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528,
536—37 (1974)].
After careful consideration, the Court agrees this suit should be dismissed, but
instead of judging the veracity of Bruce’s complaint or venturing piecemeal into the
myriad of complicated legal topics presented by Defendants, the Court finds dismissal is
due because Bruce has failed to plead a claim capable of relief. See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) (explaining “the court shall dismiss” an IFP case “at any time” if it is
determined that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted”
(emphasis added)). The Court notes Bruce has proposed an amendment to his
Complaint, but that amendment does not cure the pleading defects discussed herein,
making it futile. Accordingly, Bruce’s Motion to Amend Complaint [Doc. 90] is
DENIED, and all claims asserted in this lawsuit are hereby DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide, in relevant part, that all pleadings

must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While Rule 8(a) does not require plaintiffs
to set forth detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). At a minimum, Rule 8(a) requires the plaintiff to “give the defendant fair notice
of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests” – that is, Rule 8(a)(2)
“requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 555 n.3 (2007). A motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is thus not a challenge to the

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plaintiff’s factual allegations, but rather, a “test of the plaintiff’s cause of action as stated
in the complaint.” Flanory v. Bonn, 604 F.3d 249, 252 (6th Cir. 2010).
“[O]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to
dismiss.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The
reviewing court must determine not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but
whether the facts permit the court to infer “more than the mere possibility of
misconduct,” which is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw
on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570
(holding that a complaint is subject to dismissal where plaintiffs failed to “nudg[e] their
claims across the line from conceivable to plausible”). Although the Court must take all
of the factual allegations in the complaint as true, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements
of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice,” and a
plaintiff’s legal conclusions couched as factual allegations need not be accepted as true.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see Fritz v. Charter Twp. of Comstock, 592 F.3d 718, 722 (6th
Cir. 2010). Therefore, to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), plaintiff’s
“factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level
on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true.” Ass’n of Cleveland
Fire Fighters v. City of Cleveland, Ohio, 502 F.3d 545, 548 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Bruce is proceeding in this action pro se. The Court is mindful that pro se
complaints are liberally construed and are held to less stringent standards than the
formal pleadings prepared by attorneys. Bridge v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 681 F.3d 355, 358

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(6th Cir. 2012). The Court is “not, [however,] require[d] to either guess the nature of or
create a litigant’s claim.” See, e.g., Leeds v. City of Muldraugh, 174 F. App’x 251, 255
(6th Cir. 2006). Likewise, “liberal treatment of pro se pleadings does not require lenient
treatment of substantive law,” and ultimately, those who proceed without counsel must
still comply with the procedural rules that govern civil cases, including the pleading
standards set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Durante v. Fairlane Town Ctr., 201 F.  App’x
338, 344 (6th Cir. 2006); Whitson v. Union Boiler Co., 47 F. App’x 757, 759 (6th Cir.
2002); Kafele v. Lerner, Sampson, Rothfuss, L.P.A., 161 F. App’x 487, 491 (6th Cir.
2005) (“[P]ro se litigants are not relieved of the duty to develop claims with an
appropriate degree of specificity.”). Thus,  although the standard of review for pro se
litigants is liberal, it does require more than the bare assertion of conclusions. Lillard v.
Shelby Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 726 (6th Cir. 1996).
II.

ANALYSIS
As an initial matter, some Defendants have questioned the Court’s jurisdiction to

hear Bruce’s claims. Federal courts, which are courts of limited jurisdiction, are obliged
to first resolve jurisdiction challenges before reaching a claim’s merits. Steel Co. v.
Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94–97 (1998). Otherwise a merit based ruling
would, in essence, be an impermissible advisory opinion if issued without jurisdiction.
See id. at 101.
A.

Jurisdiction

There are two primary jurisdictional issues raised by Defendants. First, some
Defendants invoke the substantiality doctrine and assert Bruce’s claims are “attenuated,
implausible, frivolous,” and are “clearly devoid of merit.” [Docs. 44 at 2 & 74 at 1 (both
quoting Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536—37 (1974)]. This is in reference to the

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arguably fantastic nature of Bruce’s assertions. [See id.]. Those arguments are
misplaced, however. The Supreme Court has “made it clear,” at this stage, “a court must
take [a complaint’s] allegations as true, no matter how skeptical the court may be.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 696 (emphasis added); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (holding all wellpled allegations are presumed true “even if doubtful in fact”); Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 327 (1989) (“Rule 12(b)(6) does not countenance … dismissals based on a
judge’s disbelief of a complaint’s factual allegations.”). “The sole exception to this rule”
applies to allegations that are so “sufficiently fantastic” they defy consensus reality:
“claims about little green men, or the plaintiff’s recent trip to Pluto, or experience in
time travel.” Id. (emphasis added). Although Bruce’s claims border on the supernatural,
they are not “sufficiently fantastic” or reach the level of empirical absurdity. Consistent
with this, the Court takes any well pled facts as true for the purposes of this review.
The substantiality doctrine is otherwise inapplicable here. That jurisdictional
doctrine applies to claims that, when taken as true, do not accord with explicitly
established, black-letter law. See, e.g., Sims v. Waln, 536 F.2d 686, 689 (6th Cir. 1976)
(holding claims were not insubstantial when there were no “previous decisions [that]
inescapably render[ed] the claims frivolous.” (quoting Hagans, 415 U.S. at 537)); see
also Carter v. Homeward Residential, Inc., 794 F.3d 806, 807 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding
plaintiff’s § 1983 claims asserted against non-state actors were frivolous). In other
words, the doctrine applies to a complaint that “pleads itself out of court.” Carter, 794
F.3d at 809. Under those circumstances, courts are invited to dismiss claims sua sponte
on jurisdictional grounds, because it is unnecessary for a defendant to waste time and
resources responding. See Carter, 794 F.3d at 807. The doctrine does not, as Defendants
seem to believe, invite the Court to weigh the veracity of a claim’s facts. Instead, the

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doctrine places judges on surer footing and permits them to merely assess a claim’s legal
sufficiency. For reasons that will be explained, the Court cannot even do that here
because Bruce has not sufficiently pled enough facts to make that determination.
Without more, the Court cannot assess whether Bruce’s claims are legally frivolous even
assuming his facts true. Accordingly, the Court finds the substantiality doctrine does not
deprive the Court of its jurisdiction.
The next jurisdictional argument Defendants proffer regards the Court’s statutory
jurisdiction to entertain some of Bruce’s federal claims. Secretary Mattis, the CDC, and
the NIH, for instance, assert that the FTCA, maritime law, and various other federal
claims are unsupported by jurisdiction because Bruce has failed to exhaust various
administrative remedies, and they claim Bruce has otherwise failed to overcome their
sovereign immunity, which they assert is a jurisdictional bar. [See Doc. 124]. While all of
this might be true, to make those arguments and reach those conclusions, the
government Defendants infer facts from Bruce’s scant complaint. But Bruce has not
sufficiently pled enough relevant facts to tell one way or the other. In these
circumstances, instead of untangling the Gordian knot, asking Bruce to clarify by
amending his pleadings, opining on sovereign immunity without proper competing
briefings, or merely assuming he has not complied with the various administrative
requirements, judicial economy is furthered by bypassing the issues all together and
straightforwardly assessing the merits of Bruce’s suit by determining whether he has
pled a claim capable of relief. See Khodr v. Holder, 531 F. App’x 660, 665 n.4 (6th Cir.
2013) (joining the overwhelming majority of circuits in holding that courts can presume
“statutory jurisdiction—as distinct from constitutional jurisdiction—exists in order to

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resolve a case, by means of a straightforward merits analysis,” if resolution is in favor of
the party contesting jurisdiction).
B.

Failure to State a Claim

Bruce has not pled a claim capable of relief. Many facts Bruce alleges in his
Complaint are not entitled to an assumption of truth. “To be clear,” the Court does “not
reject [Bruce’s] bald allegations on the ground that they are unrealistic or nonsensical.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681. Rather, “[i]t is the conclusory nature of [Bruce’s] allegations,
rather than their extravagantly fanciful nature, that disentitles them to the presumption
of truth.” Id. When determining whether Bruce has pled sufficient factual allegations to
make out a claim capable of relief, the Court starts “by identifying the allegations in the
complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 680 (emphasis
added). Because of their conclusory nature, the following assertions in Bruce’s
Complaint are not entitled to the presumption of truth, that:


Great Britain conspired, through “implied and express contracts,” with BP
to purposefully cause the Deepwater Horizon incident as an attack on the
United States [Doc. 1 at ¶ 2];



Sir John Sawyers, as a spy for the United Kingdom and member of BP’s
board of directors, coordinated an attack on the United States. [Id. at ¶ 3];



The United States and the Secretary of Defense conspired with the United
Kingdom to conduct an attack on the American people;2 or



The AMA, CDC, and AAPCC “betray[ed] the nation and peoples” by being
controlled by “foreign intrigues,” or otherwise conspired to disseminate
false information. [Id. at ¶ 6].

These allegations lack relevant factual enhancements, and as such, they are
insufficiently pled. The Court does not accept them as true. Take for instance Bruce’s
allegations of a conspiracy between Great Britain and BP. When a plaintiff alleges a
2 In his response to the governmental Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Bruce even admits his conspiracy
allegations against them are nothing more than his bare conclusion. [Doc. 126 at 5 (“Collusion and
Conspiracy is a foregone conclusion giving [sic] the failure of the political structure…” (emphasis
added))].

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conspiracy, he must provide enough factual information from which to infer an
agreement; bald conclusions are insufficient. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557. The plaintiff
must provide “specific allegations,” such as “identifying a written agreement or even a
basis for inferring a tacit agreement.” Id. (parenthetically quoting DM Research, Inc. v.
College of Am. Pathologists, 170 F.3d 53, 56 (2007)). Bruce has not done so here.
Bruce has also failed to state a claim against the healthcare provider Defendants.
Bruce alleges medical malpractice (which Defendants assert are barred due to Bruce’s
failure to comply with Tennessee’s “good faith certificate” law), but Bruce also cites the
federal patient anti-dumping statute, the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active
Labor Act (EMTALA), in his Complaint, assumingly in reference to these Defendants’
conduct. It is unlikely Tennessee’s “good faith” statute would defeat a claim pled under
that federal statute. Whatever the case may be, Bruce claims, in sum, that the healthcare
Defendants refused to treat him. [See Doc. 1 at ¶ 7]. Yet, Bruce fails to state in his
Complaint an essential predicate for a malpractice claim; that is, he does not state he
and the seventeen odd healthcare providers named in this suit had, at relevant times, a
patient-physician relationship. Without such a relationship, Defendants were not
obliged to treat Bruce, and without that duty, they cannot face malpractice liability
under Tennessee law for refusing to do so. See Kelley v. Middle Tennessee Emergency
Physicians, P.C., 133 S.W.3d 587, 592 (Tenn. 2004).
To the extent Bruce asserts EMTALA claims against individual doctors, those
claims are summarily dismissed. The EMTALA does not provide a cause of action
against individuals, only hospitals that participate in Medicare and have an “emergency
department.” Moses v. Providence Hosp. and Med. Ctr., Inc., 561 F.3d 573, 579, 587
(6th Cir. 2009). With respect to the remaining Defendants who may fall within the

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EMTALA’s coverage, the claims against them are likewise due to be dismissed. There are
two ways to proceed with an EMTALA claim. To demonstrate how Bruce has failed to
plead either, the Court will examine both in the context of his Complaint.
First, a plaintiff can assert a “stabilization claim,” which permits a person
damages if an emergency department discharges or transfers him without first
providing stabilizing care. Perry v. Owensboro Health, Inc., 2015 WL 4450900, at *3
(W.D. Ky. July 20, 2015). To make such a claim, a plaintiff must show he had a lifethreatening, emergency condition at the time, and that the defendant hospital had
actual knowledge of said condition. Id. But to be sure, the EMTALA is not a negligence
statute. For example, misdiagnosing a patient’s emergency condition for a less severe,
non-life-threatening condition precludes actual knowledge, and that in fact would defeat
a stabilization claim. Id. at *6 (“EMTALA ‘does not hold hospitals accountable for failing
to stabilize conditions of which they are not aware, or even conditions of which they
should have been aware.’” (quoting Barber v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872, 883
(4th Cir. 1992))). Bruce asserts the healthcare Defendants, despite his requests, refused
to sample “cultures of specific bacteria,” presumably from his bodily fluids. Whatever
the results Bruce believes these test would have revealed, they were allegedly not
conducted, and due to this, the healthcare Defendants cannot be said to have had actual
knowledge of whatever acute, life-threatening disease Bruce’s believes he was suffering
from at the time. Given this, it necessarily follows that Bruce has failed to make out a
stabilization claim.
The other claim one can make under the EMTALA is a “screening claim.” Id. at
*3. The EMTALA requires, in essence, that patients receive the same appropriate
screening tests as other patients, regardless of their ability to pay for medical services.

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See id. at *4. To succeed under a screening claim, then, a plaintiff must show he did not
receive an apparently necessary screening due to his inability to pay. Id. However, Bruce
has not alleged the healthcare Defendants treated him differently than other patients
due to his inability to pay. Without that factual predicate, there could be an infinite
number of nondiscriminatory reasons the healthcare Defendants refused to treat him. It
could be the case that the healthcare Defendants did not screen or treat Bruce in the way
he requested because they merely disagreed with his self-diagnosis. Or it could be they
refused to treat Bruce due to his disruptive behavior at the hospital, if any, regardless of
his ability to pay for medical services.
Given that so many of the healthcare Defendants allegedly refused to treat or
screen Bruce, these explanations seem more likely than one based on his alleged
inability to pay. Without facts one way or the other, Bruce has “not nudged his claims
across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. As such, the
Court finds Bruce has not made out a claim showing he is entitled to relief under a
screening theory. See Perry, 2015 WL 4450900 at *4. (holding plaintiff failed to state a
screening claim because he failed to alleged “disparate treatment [that was] attributable
to an improper motive.”).

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III.

CONCLUSION
Because Bruce has failed to state a claim capable of relief, this action is hereby

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
SO ORDERED this 25th day of September, 2018.

/s/ Harry S. Mattice, Jr._____
HARRY S. MATTICE, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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