Fugate v. John Doe One et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM AND OPINION finding that this action is hereby DISMISSEDWITH PREJUDICE pursuant to Rule 41(b). Signed by District Judge Pamela L Reeves on 4/17/2019. A copy of this M&O has been sent via U.S. Mail to Clinton Fugate. (MDG)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
CLINTON M FUGATE,
Plaintiff,
v.
JOHN DOE (1-4),
Defendants.
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No.
3:17-CV-00388
REEVES/GUYTON
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court on a sua sponte review of the record. When Clinton M.
Fugate (“Plaintiff”) filed this action, he listed the Bledsoe County Correctional Complex
(“BCCX”) as his address, and the Court has no other address on file for him [Doc. 1]. On January
10, 2019, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in form pauperis and ordered him to
“immediately inform the Court . . . of any address changes” pursuant to Local Rule 83.13 [Doc.
4]. Plaintiff was forewarned that failure to promptly notify the Clerk and other parties to the
proceeding within fourteen days of any changes in his address, to monitor the progress of the case,
and to prosecute or defend the action diligently “may result in the dismissal of this action” [Id.].
On January 28, 2019, however, the Custodian of Inmate Accounts at BCCX notified the Court of
Plaintiff’s release from custody on November 26, 2018 [Doc. 5].
On March 29, 2019, this Court ordered Plaintiff to show cause in writing, within fourteen
days, explaining why his case should not be dismissed with prejudice for failure to prosecute and/or
failure to follow the orders of this Court [Doc. 6]. Plaintiff was again put on notice that failure to
comply with the terms of the Court’s order will result in dismissal of his case [Id.]. The order was
returned to the Court as “Undeliverable” on April 9, 2019 with the notation “Paroled” [Doc. 7].
Plaintiff has not filed any other response to the Court’s order and the deadline to do so has passed.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) gives this Court the authority to dismiss a case for
“failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of the court.” See,
e.g., Nye Capital Appreciation Partners, L.L.C. v. Nemchik, 483 F. App’x 1, 9 (6th Cir. 2012);
Knoll v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 176 F.3d 359, 362–63 (6th Cir. 1999). Involuntary dismissal under
Rule 41(b) “operates as an adjudication on the merits.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); see Link v. Wabash
R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629 (1962) (“The authority of a federal trial court to dismiss a plaintiff’s
action with prejudice because of his failure to prosecute cannot seriously be doubted.”).
The Court considers four factors when considering dismissal under Rule 41(b):
(1) whether the party’s failure is due to willfulness, bad faith or fault; (2) whether
the adversary was prejudiced by the dismissed party’s conduct; (3) whether the
dismissed party was warned that failure to cooperate could lead to dismissal; and
(4) whether less drastic sanctions were imposed or considered before dismissal was
ordered.
Wu v. T.W. Wang, Inc., 420 F.3d 641, 643 (6th Cir. 2005); see Regional Refuse Sys., Inc. v. Inland
Reclamation Co., 842 F.2d 150, 155 (6th Cir. 1988).
As to the first factor, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute this action can be
attributed to his own willfulness or fault. Notably, the last two attempts made by this Court to
contact Plaintiff regarding his case have been unsuccessful. Plaintiff has been released from
TDOC custody for over four months now and, whether willful or negligent, Plaintiff has failed to
update his address and/or monitor this action as required by Local Rule 83.13. Pursuant to Local
Rule 83.13, it is the duty of the pro se party to monitor the progress of the case and to prosecute or
defend the action diligently. See E.D. Tenn. L.R. 83.13. Accordingly, the first factor weighs in
favor of dismissal.
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The second factor, however, weighs against dismissal; since Defendants have not yet been
served, they have not been prejudiced by Plaintiff’s inactions.
By contrast, the third factor clearly weighs in favor of dismissal, as Plaintiff has failed to
comply with the Court’s orders, despite being expressly warned of the possible consequences of
such a failure [Doc. 4 p. 2; Doc. 6 p. 2].
Finally, the Court finds that alternative sanctions would not be effective. Plaintiff has filed
a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis; therefore, the Court has no indication that Plaintiff
has the ability to pay a monetary fine. Moreover, there seems little purpose allowing alternative
sanctions where Petitioner has apparently abandoned his case showing a lack of respect for this
Court’s deadlines and orders, even after threatened with its dismissal.
The Court thus concludes that, in total, the factors weigh in favor of dismissal of Plaintiff’s
action pursuant to Rule 41(b). For the reasons discussed herein, this action is hereby DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to Rule 41(b).
AN APPROPRIATE ORDER WILL ENTER.
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CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
CHIEF
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DISTRICT JUDGE
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