Weser v. Goodson et al
Filing
96
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: For the aforementioned reasons, Defendant Deputy Anderson's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, [Doc. 72], is GRANTED. Likewise, Defendant Goodson's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, [Doc. 76], is GRANTED. Defendant Goodson's Motion to Stay, [Doc. 85], is DENIED as MOOT. A separate judgment shall enter. See Memorandum Opinion and Order for details. Signed by District Judge J Ronnie Greer on 01/21/2020. (CAT)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
JOAN ELIZABETH WESER,
Plaintiff,
v.
KIMBERLY GOODSON, LANCE ANDERSON
Defendants.
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No. 3:17-CV-473
MEMORANDUM OPINON AND ORDER
Before the Court are Defendants’ renewed summary judgment motions seeking judgment in their
favor on Plaintiff’s federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state claims for false arrest, malicious
prosecution, and false imprisonment arising out of her arrest by Defendant Loudon County Deputy
Sheriff Lance Anderson for criminal trespass in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-14-405.
[Docs. 72; 76]. Also before the Court is Defendant Kimberly Goodson’s motion to stay scheduling order
deadlines. [Doc. 85]. The matters are now ripe for review.
I.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The facts taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff are set forth below. In March, 2016,
Plaintiff Joan Elizabeth Weser, and Defendant Kimberly Goodson, met through the cat specific non-profit
animal rescue volunteer organization, Loudon County Friends of Animals (“LCFOA”).
Defendant
Goodson founded LCFOA and serves as its president; Plaintiff volunteered within the organization.
[Docs. 72-1 at 13-14; 72-2 at 3-4]. In 2016, both women served on LCFOA’s board of directors. [Doc.
72-2 at 4, 7]. The women volunteered together at LCFOA four days a week. Their close working
relationship evolved into a friendship. [Id. at 5].
Plaintiff owned a farm property at 4511 Watkins Road in Loudon County, Tennessee (“the farm”), on
which she allowed LCFOA to operate a cat rescue facility. [Doc. 72-1 at 3]. The property was used by
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LCFOA from June 2016, and up until the organization withdrew and ceased operations in October, 2016.
[Id. at 3-4; Doc. 72-2 at 6].
In late September, 2016, Plaintiff and Defendant Goodson’s relationship began to deteriorate after an
argument over proper animal population management techniques, specifically the spaying and neutering
of the farm cats. [Doc. 72-2 at 7-8]. The disagreement escalated during the following weeks, culminating
in Plaintiff and Defendant Goodson parting ways, and Plaintiff’s removal as a LCFOA director. [Id. at 7].
After LCFOA terminated operations on the farm in October, 2016, twelve LCFOA shelter cats and kittens
remained on Plaintiff’s property. [Docs. 72-1 at 9; 72-8]. As of November 7, 2016, the farm housed the
LCFOA cats and kittens but also a number of cats from feral trappings, totaling to approximately thirtyeight cats and kittens living on the property. [Doc. 72-2 at 12].
In a November 3, 2016 letter to Plaintiff, Defendant Goodson wrote that the twelve remaining
LCFOA farm cats needed to be transitioned into foster care by November 12, 2016. [Doc. 72-8]. The
letter stated that Plaintiff should “[c]ontact Lee Ann Burgett on time and date [LCFOA] can pick these
[kittens] up either Monday November 7, Friday November 11 or Saturday, November 12, 2016. [Id.].
The letter stated that if Plaintiff would not release the cats and kittens to LCFOA by Saturday, November
12, 2106, “they will become property of [Plaintiff’s] after [that] date and [LCFOA] will mail [] the
records.” [Id.]. The letter also informed Plaintiff that Defendant Goodson would be “spending 3 days in
Nashville . . . next week,” referring to the week of November 7, 2016. [Id.].
After arriving home from Ohio around 5:00 to 6:00 p.m. in the evening on November 7, 2016,
Plaintiff checked her mail, and “saw the letter” from LCFOA and went to “check[] on the farm.” [Doc.
72-1 at 11]. At the farm, Plaintiff encountered LCFOA volunteer Ms. Lee Ann Burgett. Plaintiff
inquired if Ms. Burgett could take the LCFOA farm cats from the property that day; Ms. Burgett
responded that could not take the cats, because her poodle was in poor health. [Id. at 7; 72-3 at 3, 7].
Plaintiff informed Ms. Burgett that she would be taking the cats to Defendant Goodson, to which Ms.
Burgett replied that Defendant Goodson was scheduled to be in Nashville for a medical appointment the
next day. [Doc. 72-3 at 8].
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Plaintiff called and subsequently messaged Defendant Goodson on Facebook Messenger to tell her
the cats were going to be dropped off at her house that evening. [Doc. 72-9 at 4-5]. Defendant Goodson
messaged a reply, “[w]ell can’t take them now. Friday or Saturday is the only time. I will be gone the
rest of the week. We will pick them up Friday or Saturday.” [Id. at 5]. The reply indicated that she could
not take the cats, because there was no place for them that day and arrangements for the cats would have
to occur at a later date, because she was going to be out of town the next day. [Docs. 72-1 at 8-9, 15; 72-2
at 13; 72-9 at 5]. Plaintiff responded, “[t]hey are, coming now. [I] am not available any other time.”
[Doc. 72-9 at 4]. Defendant Goodson answered that, in that case, the cats belong to Plaintiff. [Id.].
Around 7:00 p.m., Plaintiff “put the animals in a large crate and started [on her] way” to the Goodson
house, located at 231 Oligi Circle in Loudon County, Tennessee. [Docs. 72-1 at 6, 13; 72-2 at 2].
Plaintiff stated that she assumed that if the “foster was going to take the cats, that [Defendant Goodson]
would take the cats.” [Doc. 72-1 at 10]. Plaintiff further stated that Defendant Goodson “was only going
to be gone for one day” and that because most animal rescuers put their animals in a garage or other areas
of a house safely, she did not “think there would have been an issue at all.” [Id. at 8, 15]. Plaintiff
decided to return the LCFOA farm cats to Defendant Goodson, because she was “the one person who
could move them to where they needed to be,” and Plaintiff could not find them fosters or help adopt
them out. [Id. at 15].
Upon arrival at the Goodson property, Plaintiff backed her Subaru Outback into the end of the
driveway, lifted the hatch, and unloaded a crate full of cats. [Id. at 9, 13, 14]. Plaintiff placed the crate
outside on the ground on the driveway in front of the garage. [Doc. 72-1 at 10]. Plaintiff texted Ms.
Burgett and called another LCFOA volunteer to inform them of the dropped off cats at the Goodson
property. [Id. at 11; 72-9 at 3]. At 7:08 p.m., Plaintiff Facebook messaged Defendant Goodson: “Cats in
the driveway. Not my problem. Several are sick.” [Docs. 72-2 at 14; 72-9 at 6].
Concerned for the cats’ safety resulting from the cold air and the falling evening temperature,
Plaintiff drove off but circled back “to be sure the cats and kittens were taken inside.” [Doc. 72-1 at 11].
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Defendant Goodson, who was home at the time, observed the crate on her driveway, and Plaintiff
inside her car parked at the end of the driveway. [Doc. 72-2 at 15]. In response, Defendant Goodson
called Loudon County 911. [Id. at 14, 15]. After receiving a 7:21 p.m. call for an unwanted guest,
Defendant Deputy Anderson and Deputy Brewer responded and were dispatched to Defendant Goodson’s
residence. [Docs. 72-1 at 13; 72-2 at 22; 72-4 at 6; 72-5 at 11; 72-10]. Defendant Deputy Anderson was
previously dispatched approximately an hour earlier to another call, where he had taken Plaintiff’s
statement, involving a dispute amongst Plaintiff and her residential neighbors. [Docs. 72-1 at 13; 72-12;
72-14].
Upon arrival at the Goodson residence, as the incident report details, Deputy Brewer pulled up and
parked his vehicle behind Plaintiff’s car and approached Plaintiff sitting in her car in the roadway in front
of the residence. [Docs. 72-1 at 13; 72-11]. Plaintiff admitted she was the one who dropped the cats off.
[Doc. 72-5 at 16]. Deputy Brewer asked Plaintiff to leave the area, and Plaintiff refused until the cats
were taken inside from the driveway by Defendant Goodson. [Doc. 73-4 at 10]. Deputy Brewer again
advised her to leave, and she did not depart. [Id.].
Meanwhile, Defendant Deputy Anderson interviewed Defendant Goodson at her residence, who told
him that Plaintiff came into her driveway and dropped off a crate full of cats and remained on the
property in her car. [Docs. Docs. 72-2 at 17; 72-5 at 12; 72-11]. Defendants spoke twice after the initial
exchange. The second conversation provided Defendant Goodson with an update on the situation outside
and lasted approximately a minute. The final conversation informed Defendant Goodson of Plaintiff’s
arrest and Defendant Deputy Anderson inquired about the cats’ care 1. [Doc. 72-2 at 19-20]. Defendant
Goodson neither asked Defendant Deputy Anderson nor Deputy Brewer to arrest Plaintiff. [Docs. 72-2 at
34; 72-5 at 19].
Defendant Deputy Anderson observed the crate of cats in the middle of the driveway. [Doc. 72-5 at
3]. Both deputies approached and warned Plaintiff that if she did not leave the area she could be arrested.
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The cats were in good health and were safely brought to Ms. Burgett for care later that evening. [Docs. 72-3, at 9;
72-9].
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Plaintiff again failed to vacate the property stating that she would not leave until the cats were taken care
of by Defendant Goodson and safe. [Doc. 72-4 at 11-13, 18]. Defendant Deputy Anderson again warned
Plaintiff to leave, and after her refusal, Defendant Deputy Anderson placed Plaintiff in custody. [Id. at
12; 72-5 at 18].
Plaintiff was then arrested for criminal trespass, a Class C misdemeanor, with the victim listed as
Defendant Goodson. [Docs. 72-1 at 13; 72-10; 72-11; 72-15]. Plaintiff’s charge was later dismissed, and
the costs were taxed to the state. [Doc. 72-17].
Subsequently, plaintiff filed this action. In the November 2, 2017 complaint, Plaintiff seeks damages
against Defendant Deputy Anderson, in his individual capacity, and Defendant Goodson for violating her
state and constitutional rights. [Doc. 1 at 5]. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts state law claims for false arrest
and malicious prosecution and a series of constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A grant of summary judgment is proper, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, “if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Material facts are
those defined by substantive law and necessary for the application of the law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists if the evidence would permit a
reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court interprets
Federal Rule Civil Procedure 56 as mandating the entry of summary judgment “after adequate time for
discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of
proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. A failure of proof concerning an element of the nonmoving
party’s prima facie case renders all other facts immaterial. See id. A party seeking summary judgment
bears the initial responsibility of informing the Court of the basis for its motion. Id. at 323.
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III.
DISCUSSION
Section 1983 imposes liability on any “person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom or usage, of any State” subjects another to “the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution or laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 is not the source of any
substantive right,” Humes v. Gilless, 154 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1357 (W.D. Tenn. 2001), but creates a
“species of tort liability” for the violation of rights guaranteed in the Constitution itself, Manuel v. City of
Joliet, Ill., 580 U.S. ___, ___, 137 S. Ct. 911, 916 (2017) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417
(1976)).
A. Claims Against Defendant Deputy Anderson
Deputy Anderson argues that he is immune from suit in his individual capacity and claims that he is
entitled to qualified immunity for the alleged Fourth Amendment violations, i.e. false arrest, false
imprisonment and malicious prosecution.
In determining an officer’s entitlement to qualified immunity [this Court]
follow[s] a two-step inquiry. 2 Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201-02,
121 S. Ct. 2151, 150 L. Ed. 2d 272 (2001). First, taken in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, [the Court] decide[s] whether the facts alleged
show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right. Id. at 201. If
no constitutional right would have been violated were the plaintiff’s
allegations established, there is no need for further inquiry into
immunity. If a violation can be made out on a favorable view of the
plaintiff’s submissions, [the Court] next ask[s] whether the right was
clearly established. Id.
Vakilian v. Shaw, 335 F. 3d 509, 516-17 (6th Cir. 2003). In general, government officials performing
discretionary functions are shielded “from civil damages liability as long as their actions could reasonably
have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated.” Anderson v. Creighton,
483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987). “[A]ll but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law”
are protected by the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341
(1986). The relevant question for the Court regarding whether the right was clearly established is not the
2
The Supreme Court has held that the Saucier approach is no longer mandatory, and the district courts can elect to
decide the second issue without determining whether a constitutional violation actually occurred. Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). This Court will use the two-step approach of Saucier.
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subjective intent of the defendant, but whether a reasonable officer would have believed the defendant’s
conduct to be lawful, in light of the clearly established law and information possessed by the defendant.
Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640. When the defense is raised in a motion for summary judgment, as here, courts
must weave the summary judgment standard into each step of the qualified immunity analysis. Scott v.
Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007). In other words, the Court must view the facts in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. “In qualified immunity cases, this usually means adopting . . . the plaintiff’s
version of the facts.” Id.
Plaintiff's false imprisonment claim arises out of her alleged false arrest, so the elements of these
causes of action are the same in this case. Corvin v. Bice, No. 1:05-cv-219, 2007 WL 776501, at *4 (E.D.
Tenn. March 9, 2007) (considering federal false imprisonment and false arrest claims); Lee v. Ritter, No.
1:02-CV-282, 2005 WL 3369616, at *20 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 12, 2005) (considering Tennessee common
law claims). To prove false arrest, Plaintiff must show the arresting officer lacked probable cause to
arrest her. Shearon v. Womack, No. 3:15-cv-01061, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183503, at *3 (M.D. Tenn.
Nov. 3, 2017). A claim for false arrest under Tennessee law has two elements: the detention or restraint
of one against his will and the unlawfulness of such detention or restraint. Newsom v. Thalhimer Bros.,
Inc., 901 S.W.2d 365, 367 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994). To prevail on a claim for malicious prosecution in
Tennessee, a plaintiff must prove: (1) a prior suit or judicial proceeding was instituted without probable
cause; (2) defendant brought the prior action with malice; and (3) the prior action was finally terminated
in the plaintiff's favor. Shearon, 2017 WL 5126180, at *3 (citing Roberts v. Fed. Express Corp., 842
S.W.2d 246, 247-48 (Tenn. 1992)).
Further, the existence of probable cause is critical to the determination of whether the officer’s
conduct violated the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment constitutional rights. Crockett v. Cumberland
College, 316 F.3d 571, 580 (6th Cir. 2003) (“It is well established that any arrest without probable cause
violates the Fourth Amendment.”). For probable cause for an arrest to exist, the “facts and circumstances
within the officer’s knowledge must be sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable
caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing or is
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about to commit an offense.” Thacker v. City of Columbus, 328 F.3d 244, 255 (6th Cir. 2003) (internal
citation and quotation omitted). Whether “a probability of criminal activity” exists is assessed under a
“reasonableness standard” that is based on a consideration of “all facts and circumstances within an
officer’s knowledge at the time of an arrest.” Id. In short, “there is no precise formula for determining
the existence or nonexistence of probable cause; rather, a reviewing court is to take into account the
factual and practical considerations of everyday life that would lead a reasonable person to determine that
there is a reasonable probability that illegality has occurred.” U.S. v. Strickland, 144 F.3d 412, 415 (6th
Cir. 1998) (internal quotation omitted).
The analysis is commonsense, not hyper-technical, and
objectively accounts for the nuances, particulars, inferences, and details of the situation on the ground at
the time of the decision to seize. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983). The absence of probable
cause is thus essential to each of Plaintiff's state and federal claims. See Shearon, 2017 WL 5126180, at
*3 (reviewing federal and state claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution).
Here, Plaintiff was arrested and charged for trespassing under Tennessee Code Annotated § 3914-405, which prohibits a person from:
(a) enter[ing] or remain[ing] on property, or any portion of property,
without the consent of the owner. Consent may be inferred in the
case of property that is used for commercial activity available to the
general public or in the case of other property when the owner has
communicated the owner’s intent that the property be open to the
general public.
T.C.A. § 39-14-405(a). The statute also enumerates defenses, which include:
(1) A person entered or remained on property that the person reasonably
believed to be property for which the owner's consent to enter had
been granted;
(2) The person's conduct did not substantially interfere with the owner's
use of the property; and
(3) The person immediately left the property upon request.
T.C.A. § 39-14-405(b).
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Therefore, in order to have had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff, Defendant Deputy Anderson had to
reasonably believe, based on the facts and circumstances known to him at the time of arrest, that Plaintiff
entered or remained on the subject property without the consent of Defendant Goodson.
Defendant Deputy Anderson observed the crate with cats and kittens on Defendant Goodson’s
driveway approximately twenty feet from the garage door. From his observation, he determined that
Plaintiff had entered the property because of the placement of the crate of cats in the driveway, which was
interfering with the use of the driveway and garage. Defendant Deputy Anderson interviewed Defendant
Goodson as part of his investigation, and she had communicated that she did not want the Plaintiff to drop
off the crate of cats on her property, but that Plaintiff had shown up anyway with the cats. Based on the
interview, Defendant Deputy Anderson reasonably determined that Plaintiff did not have consent to enter
Defendant Goodson’s property.
Defendant Deputy Anderson could not reasonably determine that any statutory defenses applied in
Plaintiff’s favor. Plaintiff was inside her vehicle parked in proximity of the Goodson house when
Defendant Deputy Anderson arrived. Plaintiff told the deputies that she was waiting for cats to be taken
care of by Defendant Goodson. A reasonable person could understand that police presence signals that an
intrusion on private property is unwanted; Plaintiff could not reasonably believe to be on the property
with Defendant Goodson’s consent. Moreover, Defendant Deputy Anderson could reasonably believe
that Plaintiff reasonably understood that she remained on the Goodson property without the Goodson’s
consent, especially after the police had arrived and had inquired about her entering and lingering on the
property. Further, the placement of the crate of cats was in the middle of the driveway in front of the
garage. Plaintiff’s conduct substantially interfered with the Goodson’s use of the garage and driveway;
the owners would not reasonably be able to exit the garage without potentially encountering the crate
filled with live animals. Finally, Plaintiff did not immediately leave the property upon request. Plaintiff
repeatedly refused to comply with the deputies’ instructions to leave the premises. Instead, Plaintiff
blatantly had told the deputies that she would not leave until the cats were taken inside.
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Based on the facts and circumstances known to him, Defendant Deputy Anderson had probable cause
to arrest Plaintiff for criminal trespass. See Thacker, 328 F.3d at 255. Defendant Deputy Anderson’s
arrest of Plaintiff was valid, and no constitutional violation occurred. For the aforementioned reasons, the
Court will GRANT summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment and state law claims as to
Defendant Deputy Anderson.
B. Claims Against Defendant Goodson
“Section 1983 does not, as a general rule, prohibit the conduct of private parties acting in their
individual capacities.” Lindsey v. Detroit Entm't, LLC, 484 F.3d 824, 827 (6th Cir. 2007). Defendant
Goodson is a private citizen, and to be subject to § 1983 liability, her conduct must be “fairly attributable
to the state.” Collyer v. Darling, 98 F.3d 211, 231-32 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil
Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982)).
Private citizens acting in concert with governmental actors may, on occasion, also be held liable,
but this exception remains narrow.
See Redding v. St. Eward, 241 F.3d 530, 533-34 (6th Cir.
2001) (noting that the acts of a private citizen may be actionable under § 1983 if the private citizen acts in
concert with governmental actors). The joint action test requires that there be a sufficiently close
relationship between the state and the challenged action such that it is fair to treat the action of the private
actor as that of the state itself. Id. (citing Wolotsky v. Huhn, 960 F.2d 1331, 1335 (6th Cir. 1992)). A
conspiracy between private actors and state actors can satisfy the joint action test. See Hooks v. Hooks,
771 F.2d 935, 943 (6th Cir. 1985). To validly allege a civil conspiracy, the plaintiff must allege facts to
show the parties made a single plan, in pursuit of the shared objective, and an overt act was committed in
furtherance of the conspiracy that caused the plaintiff's injury. Id at 944. However, with regard to joint
action, courts uniformly hold that merely “[p]roviding information to the police, responding to questions
about a crime, and offering witness testimony at a criminal trial does not expose a private individual to
liability for actions taken ‘under color of law.’” Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351, 399 (6th Cir.
2009).
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Defendants argue that they did not engage in concerted action or conspire to have Plaintiff arrested.
Defendant Deputy Anderson contends that Defendant Goodson did not instruct, request, advise, pressure
or persuade him to arrest the Plaintiff. [Doc. 74 at 20]. Defendant Deputy Anderson maintains that his
decision to arrest the Plaintiff was made independently and was based on his training and experience as a
certified law enforcement officer after he had determined that probable cause existed based upon the facts
and circumstances within his knowledge at the time of Plaintiff’s arrest. [Id.]. Defendant Goodson
contends “that she did nothing more than provide information to a police officer” to help aid him in
responding to her 911 call. [Doc. 77 at 10].
Defendant Goodson spoke to Defendant Deputy Anderson three times the evening of November 7,
2016.
Defendant Deputy Anderson initially interviewed Defendant Goodson, where she relayed
information to him about the events that led to her unwanted guest 911 call. Defendant Goodson did not
act under color of law by providing information to the police, and responding to Defendant Deputy
Anderson’s questions to assist in his investigation. See Moldowan, 578 F.3d at 399. The second
conversation between the defendants provided Defendant Goodson with an update of the events occurring
outside and, in their final conversation, Defendant Deputy Anderson informed Defendant Goodson of
Plaintiff’s arrest and inquired about the care of the cats. The three brief conversations do not amount to a
single plan between the Defendants with a shared objective to arrest Plaintiff. Defendants both affirm
that Defendant Goodson never requested the deputies to take action to arrest Plaintiff. Because Defendant
Goodson’s actions were not taken “under color of law,” she cannot be sued under § 1983. Accordingly,
the Court will GRANT summary judgment as to Defendant Goodson.
C. Fourteenth Amendment Claims
Plaintiff also claims Defendants deprived her of liberty without due process of law. Plaintiff’s
reliance on the Due Process clause is misplaced.
In Gerstein v. Pugh, the Supreme Court explained that “[t]he Fourth Amendment [probable cause
requirement] was tailored explicitly for the criminal justice system, and its balance between individual
public interests always has been thought to define the ‘process that is due’ for seizures of person or
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property in criminal cases . . . .” 420 U.S. 103, 125 n.27 (1975). Thus, where probable cause exists for a
criminal prosecution under Fourth Amendment standards, procedural due process has also been satisfied
under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Gehl Group v. Koby, 63 F.3d 1528, 1538 (10th Cir. 1995).
The Sixth Circuit used that same reasoning in Radvansky v. City of Olmsted Falls, where the plaintiff
brought a § 1983 claim consisting of claims under the Fourth Amendment, Equal Protection Clause,
and Due Process Clause. 395 F.3d at 313. There, the court held that although the officers involved did
not have probable cause to arrest the plaintiff under the Fourth Amendment, the plaintiff's reliance on
the Due Process Clause was “misplaced . . . because it is the Fourth Amendment which establishes
procedural protections in this part of the criminal justice area.” Id. “[B]ecause the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment does not require any additional procedures beyond those mandated by
the Fourth Amendment,” the Sixth Circuit affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the
plaintiff's due process claim. Id.
Plaintiff also invokes the substantive protections of the due process clause, but those protections do
not apply.
“Where a particular [a]mendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional
protection against a particular sort of government behavior, that [a]mendment, not the more generalized
notion of ‘substantive due process,’ must be the guide for analyzing such a claim.” Albright v. Oliver,
510 U.S. 266, 266 (1994) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment, not substantive due process, provides the standard for analyzing claims involving
unreasonable search or seizure of free citizens)). As such, the Court defers to its Fourth Amendment
analysis under Graham.
Under the Court’s previous Fourth Amendment analysis, the Court has held there was probable cause
for plaintiff’s charge, as explained above, summary judgment will be GRANTED for Defendants on this
claim.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, Defendant Deputy Anderson’s Renewed Motion for Summary
Judgment, [Doc. 72], is GRANTED. Likewise, Defendant Goodson’s Renewed Motion for Summary
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Judgment, [Doc. 76], is GRANTED. Defendant Goodson’s Motion to Stay, [Doc. 85], is DENIED as
MOOT. A separate judgment shall enter.
ENTER:
s/J. RONNIE GREER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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