Taylor et al v. Erie Insurance Company (TV2)

Filing 18

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER, the Court finds Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction 15 not well taken, and it is DENIED. Signed by Magistrate Judge H. Bruce Guyton on 6/8/18. (ADA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
CHARLES TAYLOR, and SABRINA TAYLOR,
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,
v.
ERIE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff.

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No. 3:17-CV-481-HBG

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This case is before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Rule 73 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, and the consent of the parties, for all further proceedings, including entry
of judgment [Doc. 11].
Now before the Court is Plaintiff Sabrina Taylor’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction [Doc.
15]. Defendant filed a Response [Doc. 17] in opposition to the Motion. The Motion is now ripe
for adjudication. Accordingly, for the reasons explained below, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Motion
[Doc. 15] not well taken, and it is DENIED.
I.

POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
Plaintiff requests [Doc. 15] that the Court order Defendant to pay Plaintiff rent

reimbursements in the amount of $16,500.00 and to resume monthly reimbursements in the amount
of $1,500.00 until Plaintiff is able to move back into her home. In addition, she requests attorney’s
fees incurred by filing the instant Motion. For grounds, Plaintiff states that her home was destroyed
by a fire in late November and early December 2016. Her home was insured by an insurance
policy (“Policy”) issued by Defendant. The Policy provided that Plaintiff would be reimbursed
for additional living expenses incurred, such as rent, during the time her home was made

inhabitable. Plaintiff states that Defendant initially reimbursed Plaintiff for this expense from
December 2016 to June 2017, except that Defendant did not reimburse Plaintiff for April 2017.
Defendant discontinued its reimbursement payments starting in July 2017. Plaintiff states that the
discontinuance of said payments has caused her severe financial strain and that she was not
provided notice as to why the payments were discontinued.
Defendant filed a Response [Doc. 17], asserting that Plaintiff’s Motion fails to comply with
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c). In addition, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not carried
her burden to show that a preliminary injunction is appropriate or warranted.
II.

ANALYSIS
The Court has considered the parties’ positions and finds Plaintiff’s Motion not well taken.

“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy which should be granted only if the movant
carries his or her burden of proving that the circumstances clearly demand it.” Overstreet v.
Lexington-Fayette Urban Cty. Gov't, 305 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2002). In determining whether
to issue a preliminary injunction, the district court is required to consider four factors:
(1) whether the movant is likely to prevail on the merits; (2)
whether the movant would suffer an irreparable injury if the
court does not grant a preliminary injunction; (3) whether
a preliminary injunction would cause substantial harm to others;
and (4) whether a preliminary injunction would be in the public
interest.

Abney v. Amgen, Inc., 443 F.3d 540, 547 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Deja Vu of Nashville, Inc. v.
Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cty., 274 F.3d 377, 400 (6th Cir. 2001)). While the above
factors are not prerequisites, the Court must balance them. Hamad v. Woodcrest Condominium
Ass’n, 328 F.3d 224, 230 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Mich. Bell Tel. Co. v. Engler, 257 F.3d 587, 592
(6th Cir. 2001)).

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The Court finds that Plaintiff has not satisfied the substantive requirements for a
preliminary injunction. Specifically, she has not explained, let alone mentioned, whether she is
likely to prevail on the merits, whether the preliminary injunction would cause substantial harm to
others, or whether a preliminary injunction would be in the public interest.
With respect to whether she will suffer irreparable harm, Plaintiff simply states that the
discontinued payments have caused “a severe financial strain” and that she needs the payments to
resume to “avoid delinquency with regard to property payments, household bills, and other
expenses.” [Doc. 15 at 2]. The Court finds Plaintiff’s conclusionary statement insufficient to
show that she will be irreparably harmed without the preliminary injunction. See SEIU Health
Care Michigan v. Snyder, 875 F. Supp. 2d 710, 723 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (“Irreparable injury based
on financial loss alone will only be found where the potential economic loss is so great as to
threaten the existence of the movant's business or financial ruin will result. If money damages can
compensate the moving party, a preliminary injunction is not appropriate.”) (Other citations
omitted).
Finally, Plaintiff's Motion does not address the issue of security pursuant to Rule 65(c).
While the amount of security required is within the Court’s discretion, the undersigned cannot
properly address this issue because Plaintiff did not address it. See Preterm-Cleveland v. Himes,
294 F. Supp. 3d 746, 757 (S.D. Ohio 2018) (explaining that the Court “is required to consider the
question of requiring a bond before issuing a preliminary injunction”) (citing Roth v. Bank of the
Commonwealth, 583 F.2d 527, 539 (6th Cir. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 18-3329 (6th Cir. Apr.
12, 2018)). Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction not
warranted.

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III.

CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons explained above, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Motion for

Preliminary Injunction [Doc. 15] not well taken, and it is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
ENTER:

United States Magistrate Judge

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