Joyner v. USA
Filing
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MEMORANDUM AND OPINION signed by District Judge Pamela L Reeves on 11/12/2019. [Copy mailed to James Brian Joyner] (JDH)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
JAMES BRIAN JOYNER,
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
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Case Nos.
3:14-CR-124
3:17-CV-487
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before the court is pro se petitioner James Brian Joyner’s motion to vacate, set aside,
or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. [Doc. 482].1 The United States has
responded to the motion, objecting to Joyner’s requested relief [Doc. 484]. For the reasons
set forth herein, the court finds Joyner’s § 2255 motion lacks merit and will be denied, and
the case dismissed. Because Joyner is not entitled to relief under § 2255, no evidentiary
hearing is necessary.
On May 31, 2016, Joyner entered a guilty plea to conspiracy to distribute
Oxycodone, Morphine, Oxymorphone, and Alprazolam by writing illegal prescriptions.
For approximately three months in 2010, Joyner was employed at the Breakthrough Pain
Therapy Center in Maryville, Tennessee, as a licensed medical doctor. During this time,
1
In accordance with Rule 4(b) of the Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings in the United States District
Courts (§ 2255 Rules), the Court has considered all of the pleadings and filings in Petitioner’s motion. The Court has
also considered all the files, records, transcripts, and correspondence relating to Petitioner’s conviction. All citations
to the record are found on the criminal docket in Case No. 3:14-CR-124.
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he issued prescriptions to patients for narcotics without a legitimate medical purpose and
outside the course of professional medical practice. Breakthrough was a pain clinic that
issued prescriptions for scheduled narcotics to every patient despite the absence of any
medical justification for the prescriptions. It operated from July 2009 until it was closed
by law enforcement in December 2010. The owners of the clinic had no medical training
and could not write prescriptions, so they employed various medical providers, including
Joyner, to write prescriptions for patients.
Joyner was the medical provider for 530 patient visits. He prescribed medications
and every patient he saw was prescribed a scheduled narcotic. In addition, Joyner provided
his signature in a supervisory physician role for various files in which prescriptions were
issued by nurse practitioners and physician assistants who were employed by the clinic.
The grand jury returned criminal charges against nine medical practitioners who had
worked at the clinic, including Joyner. All were charged with conspiring to distribute
controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 and conspiring to commit money
laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h).
Joyner, through counsel, negotiated a written plea agreement to plead guilty to the
drug conspiracy, in exchange for dismissal of the money laundering count. Joyner
stipulated that he had issued prescriptions for scheduled narcotics outside the usual course
of professional practice and without a legitimate medical purpose. He also stipulated that
the controlled substance quantities obtained through the illegal prescriptions he wrote had
the marijuana equivalency of at least 6,661.07 kilograms of marijuana.
2
On November 17, 2016, the court sentenced Joyner to 70 months imprisonment,
followed by 3 years of supervised release. Joyner did not appeal his conviction or sentence,
and the judgment became final on December 1, 2016. Joyner filed a § 2255 motion on
November 9, 2017. Joyner contends that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective in
three respects: (1) for not alleging a violation of the Speedy Trial Act; (2) for allowing or
inducing him to enter an involuntary guilty plea; and (3) for not objecting to the drug
quantity attributed to him at sentencing.
Joyner also claims that the government
“suppressed inconsistent proffer statements, video recordings, fabricated and coached
grand jury testimonies” in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
To obtain relief pursuant to § 2255, a petitioner must demonstrate “(1) an error of
constitutional magnitude; (2) a sentence imposed outside the statutory limits; or (3) an error
of fact or law that was so fundamental as to render the entire proceeding invalid.” Short v.
United States, 471 F.3d 686, 691 (6th Cir. 2006). He “must clear a significantly higher
hurdle than would exist on direct appeal” and establish a “fundamental defect in the
proceedings which necessarily results in a complete miscarriage of justice or an egregious
error violative of due process.” Fair v. United States, 157 F.3d 427, 430 (6th Cir. 1998).
A petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must satisfy the two-part test
set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1987). First, the petitioner must
establish, by identifying specific acts or omissions, that counsel’s performance was
deficient and that counsel did not provide “reasonably effective assistance, as measured by
prevailing professional norms.” Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 380 (2005). Counsel is
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presumed to have provided effective assistance, and a petitioner bears the burden of
showing otherwise. Mason v. Mitchell, 320 F.3d 604, 616–17 (6th Cir. 2003) A reviewing
court “must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range
of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the
presumption that . . . the challenged action might be considered sound . . . strategy.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
Second, a petitioner must demonstrate “a reasonable probability” that, but for
counsel’s acts or omissions, “the result of the proceedings would have been different.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable,
does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no
effect on the judgment.” Id. at 691. If a petitioner fails to prove that he sustained prejudice,
the court need not decide whether counsel’s performance was deficient. See United States
v. Hynes, 467 F.3d 951, 970 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that alleged “flaws” in trial counsel’s
representation did not warrant new trial where the claims, even if true, did not demonstrate
that the jury would have reached a different conclusion).
Further, the petitioner has the burden to establish that he is entitled to relief. See
Bevil v. United States, No. 2:06-CR-52, 2010 WL 3239276, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 16,
2010) (recognizing that “burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel is on the
petitioner”); see also Douglas v. United States, No. 2:05-cr-07, 2009 WL 2043882 at *3
(E.D. Tenn. July 2, 2009) (stating that “[w]hen a defendant files a § 2255 motion, he must
set forth facts which entitle him to relief”).
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I. Speedy Trial Act
Joyner argues that his counsel was ineffective for not moving to dismiss the
indictment for violating the “70-day Speedy Trial statute of limitations.” In support of his
argument, Joyner states that he was employed with the pain clinic from April 30, 2010 until
July 30, 2010. The indictment was returned by the grand jury on October 7, 2014, and
defendant was not taken to trial until May 25, 2016, some 591 days later.2
The Speedy Trial Act generally requires a federal criminal trial to begin within
seventy days after a defendant is charged or makes an initial appearance, but contains a
detailed scheme under which certain specified periods of delay are not counted. United
States v. Brown, 498 F.3d 523, 529 (6th Cir. 2007). As relevant here, the Speedy Trial Act
deems excludable:
Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any judge on
his own motion or at the request of the defendant or his counsel or at the
request of the attorney for the government, if the judge granted such
continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by
taking such action outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant
in a speedy trial. No such period of delay resulting from a continuance
granted by the court in accordance with this paragraph shall be excludable
under this subsection unless the court sets forth, in the record of the case,
either orally or in writing, its reasons for finding that the ends of justice
served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the bests interest of the
public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Here, Joyner’s initial appearance was on October 16, 2014.
At that time, his trial was scheduled for December 15, 2014, within the 70-day period. On
November 13, 2014, Joyner and his co-defendants filed a joint motion to declare the case
2
Joyner’s plea agreement was filed with the court on May 25, 2016 and he entered his plea of guilty to Count 1 of the
indictment on May 31, 2016. There was no trial.
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complex and to continue the trial, based in part on the volume of discovery in the case.
The case was continued to October 6, 2015. The court determined that the ends of justice
would be served by a continuance. Citing 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), the court specifically
found that “all time between the filing of the motion and the new trial date is fully
excludable time under the Speedy Trial Act.” On July 7, 2015, the defendants again jointly
moved to continue the trial based on: (1) voluminous discovery and recently produced
discovery; (2) investigation could not be completed by defense counsel in time for
sufficient use at trial; (3) the “huge” number of potential witnesses (including expert
witnesses); (4) the government planned to bring a superseding indictment; and (5) the
parties’ need to litigate additional pretrial motions. The parties agreed on a date and trial
was continued to June 14, 2016. Again, the court set forth the reasons for granting the
continuance under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Thereafter, Joyner decided to enter an
unconditional guilty plea, waiving his right to litigate any Speedy Trial Act claim. 18
U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2). A defendant who pleads guilty may not raise challenges based on
denial of due process rights to a speedy trial. United States v. Dossie, 188 Fed. Appx. 339,
345 (6th Cir. 2006).
Because there was no violation of the Speedy Trial Act, Joyner’s counsel did not
run afoul of either prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel standard articulated in
Strickland. In addition, because there was no underlying violation of the Speedy Trial Act,
Joyner was not prejudiced by the delay to allow the parties additional time to prepare for
trial.
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II. Guilty Plea
Joyner next argues that his guilty plea was involuntary because counsel failed to
conduct an adequate investigation and interview alibi witnesses such as Sandy Kincaid, Dr.
Thomas and Walter Blankenship “all of whom would have testified that [Joyner] had no
knowledge of their criminal conduct at the clinic.”3 Joyner’s brief argument is insufficient
to state a valid claim. He states in conclusory fashion that these witnesses would have
established his innocence, but states no facts regarding the nature of the witnesses’
testimony. Rather than provide supporting facts, Joyner asks the court to speculate that the
testimony of these witnesses would have demonstrated his innocence.
Conclusory
allegations alone, without supporting factual averments, are insufficient to state a valid
claim under § 2255. Jefferson v. United States, 730 F.3d 537, 547 (6th Cir. 2013). Joyner
has not demonstrated that his counsel was deficient for failing to interview these witnesses
or that he was prejudiced as a result.
To show prejudice in a guilty plea context, Joyner must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and
instead would have insisted on going to trial.” Hodges v. Colson, 727 F.3d 517, 534 (6th
Cir. 2013). When evaluating prejudice, the court generally must consider the “totality of
the evidence.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695. Joyner cannot make a showing of prejudice
under the facts in this case. The record shows that the clinic lacked basic medical
equipment, no medical examinations were performed, patients were required to pay cash
3
Sandy Kincaid went to trial in October 2013 and was found guilty. Dr. Thomas and Walter Blankenship entered
guilty pleas to Count 1 of the indictment. Blankenship testified at Joyner’s sentencing hearing.
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in advance of seeing a medical practitioner, and every patient was prescribed a scheduled
narcotic. During the plea colloquy, Joyner said he had sufficient time to discuss the case
with counsel; he was satisfied with his counsel’s representation; counsel had explained to
him the charged offenses, their elements, any defenses, his sentencing exposure, and the
terms and conditions of the plea agreement. Joyner also stipulated that the factual summary
in the written plea agreement was correct, and that he was pleading guilty because he was,
in fact, guilty. Joyner stipulated that he issued prescriptions to patients for scheduled
narcotics without a legitimate medical purpose and outside the course of professional
practice and by providing his signature in a supervisory physician role for files in which
prescriptions were issued by nurse practitioners and physician assistants employed by the
clinic.
“Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity.”
Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977). Based on these admitted facts, a jury could
infer Joyner’s knowledge that the clinic was not a legitimate medical practice, and that
Joyner wrote prescriptions to patients for narcotics without a legitimate medical purpose.
Thus, the court finds that Joyner has not established that his counsel’s investigation was
inadequate or that his plea was unknowing or involuntary as a result.
III. Drug Quantity
Joyner next argues his counsel should have objected to the drug quantity attributed
to him at sentencing and he should have received a lighter sentence. However, the quantity
of drugs attributed to defendant was set out in his written plea agreement wherein Joyner
admitted to prescribing narcotic medications for 530 patients. For sentencing purposes,
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Joyner stipulated that the drug quantities he prescribed had the marijuana equivalency of
6,661.07 kilograms of marijuana, resulting in a base offense level 32. Because Joyner
agreed to the drug quantity, counsel had no basis on which to object to the drug quantity
or the base offense level at sentencing. Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing
to raise a meritless objection. Chapman v. United States, 74 Fed. Appx. 590, 593 (6th Cir.
2003).
IV. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Last, Joyner argues the government “suppressed inconsistent proffer statements,
video recordings, fabricated and coached grand jury testimonies,” and that the suppressed
evidence was significant and therefore material. Other than this conclusory allegation,
Joyner provides no supporting details or context for his claim. The government responds
that Joyner has not specifically identified the evidence in question; therefore, his claim in
inadequately developed and should be dismissed.
The Supreme Court held in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), that the
government must provide defendants with material, exculpatory evidence in its possession.
Inculpatory evidence, however, is not covered by Brady. See Montgomery v. Bobby, 654
F.3d 668, 678 (6th Cir. 2011). In order to establish a violation of Brady, a petitioner must
show that the following three requirements are met: (1) the evidence at issue must be
favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; (2)
the evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and
(3) prejudice must have ensued. Id.
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Here, Joyner’s claim is purely conclusory and otherwise is without any factual
support. Generally, courts have held that “conclusory allegations alone, without supporting
factual averments, are insufficient to state a valid claim under § 2255.” Jefferson, 730 F.3d
at 547; Milburn v. United States, 2013 WL 1120856 at *1 (E.D.Tenn. Mar. 18, 2013)
(motion may be dismissed if it only makes vague conclusory statements without
substantiating allegations of specific facts and thereby fails to state a claim cognizable
under § 2255). Joyner bears the burden of articulating sufficient facts to state a claim for
relief under § 2255. Douglas, 2009 WL at *3. Joyner has failed to meet this burden and
his claim based upon a Brady violation will be denied.
Conclusion
Joyner is not entitled to relief under § 2255, a hearing is unnecessary in this case,
and a Judgment will enter DENYING the Motion [Doc. 482].
___________________________________________
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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