Owen v. Knox County Detention Facility

Filing 15

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION. For the reasons set forth above, Petitioners motion to stay [Doc. 9] will be DENIED, Respondents motion to dismiss [Doc. 10] will be GRANTED, and this matter will be DISMISSED without prejudice due to Petitioners failure to exhaust his state court remedies. Signed by District Judge Harry S Mattice, Jr on 12/11/2018. (BDG, ) Opinion mailed to Owen.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
SHAWN DALLAS OWEN,
Petitioner,
v.
KNOX COUNTY DETENTION
FACILITY,
Respondent.

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No. 3:18-CV-106-HSM-DCP

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Now before the Court is a pro se prisoner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2254 [Doc. 2]. On June 12, 2018, the Court ordered Respondent to answer or
otherwise respond to the petition within thirty days [Doc. 8]. On July 5, 2018, the Court docketed
Petitioner’s motion to stay this action to allow him to exhaust his state court remedies [Doc. 9].1
On July 12, 2018, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition due to Petitioner’s failure to
exhaust his state court remedies [Doc. 10]. Petitioner did not file a response to this motion and the
time for doing so has passed. E.D. Tenn. L.R. 7.1. As such, Petitioner has waived any opposition
thereto. E.D. Tenn. L.R. 7.2; Elmore v. Evans, 449 F. Supp. 2, 3 (E.D. Tenn. 1976), aff’d 577 F.2d
740 (6th Cir. 1978). Also, on July 19, 2019, Respondent filed a response in opposition to
Petitioner’s motion to stay [Doc. 14].

As both Petitioner’s motion to stay [Doc. 9] and

Respondent’s motion to dismiss [Doc. 10] address substantively related issues, the Court will
address these motions together.

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This filing is undated and it is therefore unclear when Petitioner filed it by placing it in
the hands of prison officials for mailing under the prisoner mailbox rule. Houston v. Lack, 487
U.S. 266, 270-71 (1988).

First, in his motion to stay, Petitioner requests that the Court hold this matter in abeyance
so that he may exhaust his state-court remedies by pursuing a petition for post-conviction relief
that he has filed in state court and for which he has been appointed counsel who is preparing an
amended petition [Doc. 9 p. 1]. In its motion to dismiss, however, Respondent seeks to dismiss
this matter due to Petitioner’s failure to exhaust his claims in state court [Doc. 10]. Also, in its
response in opposition to the motion to stay, Respondent asserts that Petitioner has not shown good
cause as required to establish that he is entitled to stay and abeyance of this matter [Doc. 14].
A federal court has the discretion to stay and hold a habeas corpus petition in abeyance to
allow a petitioner to exhaust his claims in the state court, but only if the petitioner shows good
cause for failing to exhaust his claims prior to filing his habeas corpus petition. Rhines v. Weber,
544 U.S. 269, 273 (2005) (providing that “because granting a stay effectively excuses a petitioner’s
failure to present his claims first to the state courts, stay and abeyance is only appropriate when
the district court determines there was good cause for the petitioner’s failure to exhaust his claims
first in state court”); Hickey v. Hoffner, 701 F. App’x 422, 426–27 (6th Cir June 30, 2017)
(providing that a 2254 petitioner who can show good cause for failing to exhaust all of his claims
prior to filing a habeas petition may be entitled to stay of his petition).
In its response in opposition to the motion to stay, Respondent notes that Petitioner pled
guilty to the charges underlying his habeas petition on March 13, 2017, that the state court docketed
Petitioner’s pro se petition for post-conviction relief for those convictions on March 6, 2018, and
that Petitioner filed his habeas petition in this Court by submitting it to the prison mailroom on
March 8, 2018 [Doc. 14 p. 4]. Accordingly, Respondent asserts that Petitioner’s statement in his
motion to stay that he had not heard back from the state court about his post-conviction petition at
the time he filed the instant § 2254 petition is not good cause to excuse Petitioner’s failure to

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exhaust his state court remedies, as Petitioner did not give the state court a legitimate opportunity
to provide a remedy to the post-conviction petition [Id.].
The Court is cognizant, however, that, as Petitioner waited nearly a year after his
underlying convictions became final to file his state court petition for post-conviction relief, a
significant portion of the year-long statute of limitations for Petitioner to file a § 2254 petition
regarding those convictions also passed. Specifically, pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), a one-year statute of limitations applies to all applications
seeking a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The statute
generally begins to run “[t]he date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct
review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Thus,
where a Tennessee petitioner did not pursue a direct appeal, his state court conviction is deemed
“final” upon the expiration of the thirty-day time-period during which he could have commenced
a direct appeal. See, e.g., Feenin v. Myers, 110 F. App’x 669 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Tenn. R. App.
P. 4(a)). The time “during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other
collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted
toward any period of limitation. . . . ,” however. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).
If the Court assumes that Petitioner did not file an appeal of his convictions, accepts as true
Respondent’s undisputed assertions regarding the timing of Petitioner’s convictions and the filing
of his post-conviction petition, and applies the above-cited rules, approximately three-hundred and
twenty-eight days of Petitioner’s AEDPA one-year statute of limitation for his § 2254 petition ran
before Petitioner filed his state court petition for post-conviction relief on March 6, 2018. Thus,
if the Court dismisses Petitioner’s § 2254 petition due to Petitioner’s failure to exhaust his state
court remedies, Petitioner will have approximately thirty-seven days after a final state court

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judgment on a properly filed application for state post-conviction or other collateral relief to file a
timely federal petition for habeas relief.
The Supreme Court has considered this specific concern regarding federal habeas petitions
containing claims that the petitioner did not exhaust in state court, however, and still found that a
district court may not stay a § 2254 petition asserting such claims unless the petitioner shows good
cause for failing to exhaust his claims prior to filing his § 2254 petition. Specifically, in Rhines,
the Court noted that where a habeas petitioner comes to a federal court with unexhausted claims
close to the end of the one-year AEDPA limitations period, the petitioner’s chances to exhaust
those claims in state court and refile in federal court before the statute of limitations passes are
slim. Rhines, 544 U.S. 275–76. The Court still held, however, that such a petitioner must establish
good cause to be entitled to a stay. Id. at 277 (noting that “[s]taying a federal habeas petition
frustrates the AEDPA’s objective of encouraging finality by allowing a petitioner to delay the
resolution of the federal proceedings. It also . . . decreases a petitioner’s incentive to exhaust all
his claims in state court prior to filing his federal petition”). The Rhines Court also opined that a
federal court granting a stay should place reasonably brief limits on the petitioner’s time to return
to federal court, specifically citing a thirty-day limit. Id. at 278.
Liberally construing the filings in favor of Petitioner, nothing supports finding that
Petitioner has established good cause to excuse his failure to exhaust his state court remedies prior
to filing this action. The state court docketed Petitioner’s state court petition for post-conviction
relief only two days before Petitioner filed his § 2254 petition with this Court. While the Court is
aware that a petitioner’s reasonable confusion about the timeliness of a state filing may be good
cause to allow him to file a “‘protective’” habeas petition in federal court, see Pace v. DiGuglielmo,

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544 U.S. 408, 416 (2005), Petitioner has set forth nothing to suggest that he was reasonably
confused about whether his state court petition was timely.
Further, it is apparent that, by the time Petitioner filed his motion to stay, the state court
had appointed Petitioner counsel for his post-conviction petition and that this counsel was pursuing
the motion on Petitioner’s behalf [Doc. 9 p. 1]. Moreover, as set forth above, Petitioner will have
approximately thirty-seven days after a final state court judgment on a properly filed application
for state post-conviction or other collateral relief to file a timely federal petition for habeas relief,
which is more than the thirty-day-limit contemplated in Rhines for a petitioner in a stayed habeas
matter to return to federal court.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, Petitioner’s motion to stay [Doc. 9] will be
DENIED, Respondent’s motion to dismiss [Doc. 10] will be GRANTED, and this matter will be
DISMISSED without prejudice due to Petitioner’s failure to exhaust his state court remedies.
The Court must now consider whether to issue a certificate of appealability (“COA”),
should Petitioner file a notice of appeal. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(a) and (c), a petitioner may
appeal a final order in a habeas proceeding only if he is issued a COA, and a COA may only be
issued where a Petitioner has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28
U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When a district court denies a habeas petition on a procedural basis without
reaching the underlying claim, a COA should only issue if “jurists of reason would find it debatable
whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of
reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack
v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Reasonable jurists would not debate the Court’s findings
that that Petitioner did not exhaust his state court remedies prior to filing his petition for habeas

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corpus relief and that Petitioner has not established good cause for his failure to do so.
Accordingly, a COA SHALL NOT ISSUE.
AN APPROPRIATE JUDGMENT ORDER WILL ENTER.
ENTER:

/s/ Harry S. Mattice, Jr._______
HARRY S. MATTICE, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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