Jones v. Miller
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Thomas A Varlan on 7/17/19. (copy mailed to Tommy Earl Jones at NECX) (JBR)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
TOMMY EARL JONES,
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Plaintiff,
v.
DANIEL MILLER and
DOCTOR SMITH,
Defendants.
No.:
3:18-CV-124-TAV-DCP
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Tommy Earl Jones, an inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department
of Correction (“TDOC”), has filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
[Doc. 1]. This matter is before the Court for screening pursuant to the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (“PLRA”).
I.
SCREENING STANDARDS
Under the PLRA, district courts must screen prisoner complaints and shall, at any
time, sua sponte dismiss any claims that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim for
relief, or are against a defendant who is immune. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)
and 1915A; Benson v. O’Brian, 179 F.3d 1014 (6th Cir. 1999). The dismissal standard
articulated by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and in Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) “governs dismissals for failure state a
claim under [28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A] because the relevant statutory
language tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6).” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th
Cir. 2010). Thus, to survive an initial review under the PLRA, a complaint “must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Courts liberally
construe pro se pleadings filed in civil rights cases and hold them to a less stringent standard
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that he
was deprived of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law. Braley v. City
of Pontiac, 906 F.2d 220, 223 (6th Cir. 1990) (stating that “Section 1983 . . . creates a right
of action for the vindication of constitutional guarantees found elsewhere”). “Absent either
element, a section 1983 claim will not lie.” Christy v. Randlett, 932 F.2d 502, 504 (6th
Cir. 1991).
II.
ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT
Plaintiff alleges that Daniel Miller, a treating physician at the Northeast Correctional
Complex (“NECX”), and Dr. Smith, an emergency room doctor at Johnson City Medical,
have refused him surgery and pain medication necessary to treat his Chron’s disease. [See
Docs. 1 & 5].
III.
ANALYSIS
A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment with regard to lack of medical care
or treatment only when he responds with deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious
medical needs. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97 (1976). This standard requires that the medical condition be objectively serious, but it
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also requires that the prison official actually knew of and disregarded the excessive risk to
the inmate’s health. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Therefore, to meet this subjective standard,
a plaintiff must establish that the prison official: (1) “perceived facts from which to infer
substantial risk to the prisoner;” (2) “did in fact draw the inference;” and (3) “then
disregarded that risk.” Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 703 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).
A patient’s disagreement with his doctor’s choice of treatment alleges, at most, a
medical-malpractice claim, which is not cognizable under § 1983. Darrah v. Krisher, 865
F.3d 361, 372 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107). “Additionally, ‘[w]here a
prisoner has received some medical attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of the
treatment, federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments and to
constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort law.’” Id. (quoting Westlake v. Lucas,
537 F.2d 857, 860 n.5 (6th Cir. 1976)).
As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that Dr. Smith is not a proper Defendant in
this action, as an emergency room doctor is not a State actor for purposes of § 1983. See
Styles v. McGinnis, 28 F. App’x 362, 354 (6th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, Dr. Smith must be
dismissed from this action.
The Court otherwise finds that Plaintiff cannot sustain this action against Dr. Daniel
Miller, as it is apparent from Plaintiff’s allegations that Dr. Miller has evaluated Plaintiff
and determined that he does not require surgery or pain medication [See Doc. 1 p.5; Doc.
5 p. 7]. Plaintiff notes that Dr. Miller has specifically advised him that pain medication
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will only aggravate his symptoms [Doc. 1 p. 5]. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s desire for
additional treatment, and/or his disagreement with course of his current treatment, is
insufficient to raise a § 1983 claim.1
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, and his complaint will be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE against all
named defendants under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915(g).
Additionally, the Court will CERTIFY that any appeal from this action would not
be taken in good faith and would be frivolous. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); Fed. R. App. P. 24.
An appropriate order will enter.
s/ Thomas A. Varlan
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
1
Plaintiff has unsuccessfully raised substantially similar claims against different
Defendants in prior lawsuits. See Jones v. Clement, 3:16-CV-257-PLR-CCS (E.D. Tenn.); Jones
v. Centurion, 3:16-CV-322-PLR-CCS (E.D. Tenn.).
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