Hillard v. Knox County Jail et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION: Plaintiff's complaint fails to state any claim upon which relief may be granted under § 1983 and this action will therefore be DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Signed by District Judge Thomas A Varlan on June 14, 2019. (copy mailed to Christopher B Hillard 507642, TROUSDALE TURNER CORRECTIONAL CENTER, 140 MACON WAY, HARTSVILLE, TN 37074) (AYB)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
CHRISTOPHER B. HILLARD,
Plaintiff,
v.
KNOX COUNTY JAIL,
KNOX COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE,
and KNOX COUNTY COURTS,
Defendants.
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No.
3:18-CV-168-TAV-DCP
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pro se Plaintiff, Christopher B. Hillard, brought this action on April 13, 2018,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The matter is now before the Court for screening of the
complaint pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). For the reasons set
forth below, this action will be DISMISSED based on Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim
up on which relief may be granted.
I.
SCREENING THE COMPLAINT
Under the PLRA, district courts must screen prisoner complaints and shall, at any
time, dismiss sua sponte any claims that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim for
relief, or are against a defendant who is immune. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)
and 1915(A); Benson v. O’Brian, 179 F.3d 1014 (6th Cir. 1999). The dismissal standard
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009),
and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), “governs dismissals for failure
state a claim under [28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A] because the relevant statutory
language tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6).” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th
Cir. 2010). Thus, to survive an initial review under the PLRA, a complaint “must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Courts liberally
construe pro se pleadings filed in civil rights cases and hold them to a less stringent
standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972).
In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that he
was deprived of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law. Braley v. City
of Pontiac, 906 F.2d 220, 223 (6th Cir. 1990) (stating that “Section 1983 . . . creates a right
of action for the vindication of constitutional guarantees found elsewhere”).
II.
BACKGROUND
In his complaint, Plaintiff complains that his arrest and charges were made public
and have tarnished his reputation in the community [Doc. 1 p. 4]. He asserts that “[t]he
government should be responsible for clearing our names as it is to ruining our names”
[Id.]. He believes that “[p]eople’s charges should not be made public until they are found
guilty” and by publicizing his charges, Defendants have violated his due process [Id.].
Plaintiff further complains about the conditions of Knox County Jail [Id. at 5]. He
complains that for two-and-a-half days he was without a bed or change of clothes and
unable to take a shower [Id.]. After booking, Plaintiff complains that he was placed in a
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one-man cell for four days with another inmate and forced to eat his meals in the small cell
near the toilet [Id.].
Next, Plaintiff complains that Knox County Jail has no law library, no face-to-face
visitation with family, and houses all classification of inmates together [Id.]. Knox County
Jail also charges inmates tax on commissary items, to make phone calls, and to transfer
money into their trust fund accounts [Id.]. Plaintiff asserts that Knox County jail limits
inmates recreation time to either four hours or one hour per day [Id.].
III.
PUBLICATION OF ARREST
First, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants published information concerning his arrest
via the internet that has violated his Constitutional right for due process [Doc. 1 p. 4].
Plaintiff contends that the publication of his arrest information suggests he is guilty when
he has not yet been found guilty of any crime.
To the extent Plaintiff intends to assert a procedural due process claim, it is subject
to dismissal. To state a claim for denial of procedural due process, Plaintiff must plead and
prove either that he was deprived of liberty or property as a result of an established state
procedure that itself violates due process rights; or that the defendants deprived him of
liberty or property pursuant to a random and unauthorized act and available state remedies
would not be adequate to redress the deprivation. Macene v. MJW, Inc., 951 F.2d 700, 706
(6th Cir. 1991); see Vicory v. Walton, 721 F.2d 1062, 1064 (6th Cir. 1983). Under this
standard, Plaintiff must first establish that he was deprived of a protected liberty or property
interest. Macene, 951 F.2d at 706. The Supreme Court has recognized a limited liberty
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interest “where a person’s good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of
what the government is doing to him.” Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972).
See also Med. Corp., Inc. v. City of Lima, 296 F.3d 404, 413–14 (6th Cir. 2002). Injury to
reputation alone, however, is not sufficient to create a constitutionally protected liberty
interest. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976). Here, although Plaintiff alleges he was
stigmatized by the dissemination of his arrest information, he failed to show that any
Defendant also deprived him of a state created right or interest.
Plaintiff’s substantive due process claim is also subject to dismissal. Due process
claims of this nature involve official acts which cause a deprivation of a substantive
fundamental right, or are so egregious that they “shock the conscience.” Mertik v. Blalock,
983 F.2d 1353, 1367 (6th Cir. 1993). The conduct asserted must be “so severe, so
disproportionate to the need presented, and such an abuse of authority as to transcend the
bounds of ordinary tort law and establish a deprivation of constitutional rights.” Id.
The Sixth Circuit has found an individual has no constitutional right to privacy in
the criminal record pertaining to him. See Lambert v. Hartman, 517 F.3d 433, 440 (6th Cir.
2008) (finding Court Clerk’s publication of arrest records including social security
numbers and birth dates did not implicate a constitutional right of privacy, even when
plaintiff became the victim of identity theft as a result of the publication). Here, Plaintiff
has not alleged facts to suggest the government’s publication of his arrest violated a
fundamental right protected by the Constitution. There is no general fundamental right of
informational privacy, and Plaintiff does not allege facts suggesting the information itself
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placed him in immediate danger of bodily harm. Plaintiff fails to state a claim for denial
of substantive due process.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim that the publication of his arrest violates his due
process will be DISMISSED.
IV.
CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT
Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the conditions at the jail, accepted as true, do not
allow the Court to plausibly infer that those conditions have violated Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights. “[T]he Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons.” Rhodes
v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981). Only “extreme deprivations” that deny a prisoner
“the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities” will establish a conditions of
confinement claim. Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1992) (citations and quotations
omitted). Prison authorities may not, however, “ignore a condition of confinement that is
sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering the next week or month
or year.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993). In examining such claims, the
court must determine whether the risk of which the plaintiff complains is “so grave that it
violates contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk.
In other words, the prisoner must show that the risk of which he complains is not one that
today’s society chooses to tolerate.” Id. at 36 (1993); see also Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.
Nothing in the complaint suggests that spending two-and-a-half days without a bed,
shower, or change of clothes creates an unreasonable risk of damage to Plaintiff’s health
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or any other extreme deprivation. Accordingly, these allegations fail to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted under § 1983 and will be DISMISSED.
V.
OVERCROWDED
The Sixth Circuit has held that “overcrowding is not, in itself, a constitutional
violation.” Agramonte v. Shartle, 491 F. App’x 557, 560 (6th Cir. 2012). To allege extreme
deprivation to support a viable prison-overcrowding claim, an inmate must allege that the
overcrowding results in “deprivations denying ‘the minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities.’” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). “[I]f the overcrowding results in
the denial of a basic human need, such as food, shelter, or warmth, that would be a
constitutional wrong.” Starnes v. Green Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 2:08-cv-244, 2010 WL
2165368, at *5 (E.D. Tenn. May 26, 2010). Plaintiff’s allegations do not meet this standard.
Plaintiff asserts that he spent four days in a one-man cell with another inmate and
was forced to sleep on a mat on the floor for those four days and eat his meals in the cell
near a toilet [Doc. 1 p. 5]. However, these allegations do not state a claim cognitive under
§ 1983 because Plaintiff has failed to show a denial of basic human need or extreme
deprivation. The Court finds sleeping on the floor for four days and housed with one other
inmate was a temporary inconvenience. See, Sanders v. Kingston, 53 F. App’x 781, 783
(7th Cir. 2002) (“We know of no case holding that the Eighth Amendment requires elevated
beds for prisoners, and [plaintiff] does not cite one.”). Further, although eating meals in a
small cell also containing a toilet may be unpleasant for Plaintiff, the Constitution does not
protect a prisoner from unpleasant prison experiences. Nor does the Constitution mandate
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comfortable conditions of confinement. Rhodes, 101 S.Ct. 2400. The deprivations alleged
are insufficiently serious to establish that Plaintiff has been subject to cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Thus, Plaintiff’s complaints
concerning overcrowding at Knox County Jail will be DISMISSED.
VI.
RECREATION TIME
Plaintiff asserts that some inmates are allowed four hours of recreation time while
other inmates only receive one hour of recreation time per day [Doc. 1 p. 6]. Plaintiff does
not clarify how much time he receives daily, but, either way, this claim fails to state an
constitutional violation. “It is generally recognized that a total or near-total deprivation of
exercise or recreational opportunity, without penological justification, violates Eighth
Amendment guarantees.” Patterson v. Mintzes, 717 F.2d 284, 289 (6th Cir. 1983). The
Sixth Circuit has not “set a minimum amount of time a prisoner must have access to outdoor
recreation.” Argue v. Hofmeyer, 80 F. App’x 427, 430 (6th Cir. 2003); Rodgers v. Jabe, 43
F.3d 1082, 1086–87 (6th Cir. 1995); Walker v. Mintzes, 771 F.2d 920, 927–28 (6th Cir.
1985). Courts have found that even only one hour of recreation time per day does not
violate the Eighth Amendment. See, Argue, 80 F. App’x at 429. Moreover, the complaint
does not allege that the exercise restrictions have adversely affected Plaintiff’s health. In
sum, this claim of limited hours of recreation will be DISMISSED.
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VII.
PAYMENT OF FEES
Plaintiff argues that he is charged a fee for commissary items and to transfer money
to make a phone call [Doc. 1 p. 5]. Plaintiff cites to no provision of the United States
Constitution as the basis for these claims and, indeed, these claims simply do not state a
claim of constitutional magnitude.
Most courts find that commissary pricing does not implicate constitutional concerns.
Tokar v. Armontrout, 97 F.3d 1078, 1083 (8th Cir. 1996) (“[W]e know of no constitutional
right of access to a prison . . . snack shop.”); Bennett v. Sheahan, 1999 WL 967534, *4
(N.D. Ill., Oct. 5, 1999) (“Commissary prices implicate no constitutional right”);
Thompson v. Gibson, 289 F.3d 1218, 1222 (10th Cir. 2002) (“[T]here is no constitutional
right to purchase food from the canteen”). Commissary access is a privilege, not a right,
and these allegations fail to state a cognizable constitutional claim for relief under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. If Plaintiff does not wish to pay the complained of amounts, he should not
patronize the commissary.
Next, Plaintiff complains that he is charged $0.75 to “transfer money to phone”
[Doc. 1 p. 5]. However, he does not state how much inmates are charged to make calls.
See Carter v. O’Sullivan, 924 F.Supp. 903, 911 (C.D. Ill. 1996) (The rate of $1.50 for a ten
(10) minute phone call is “not so out-of-line with normal phone rates as to be
unconscionable.”). While prisoners retain the right to communicate with friends, family,
and counsel while in prison, they do not have a right to unlimited telephone calls. See
Washington v. Reno, 35 F.3d 1093, 1099 (6th Cir. 1994). “Instead, a prisoner’s right to
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telephone access is subject to rational limitations in the face of legitimate security interests
of the penal institution. The exact nature of telephone service to be provided to inmates is
generally to be determined by prison administrators, subject to court scrutiny for
unreasonable restrictions.” Id. In addition, there is no authority for the proposition that
prisoners are entitled to a specific rate for their telephone calls. See Boyer v. Taylor, 2007
WL 2049905, *9 (D. Del., July 16, 2007). Here, Plaintiff has not provided any information
from which the Court could infer the jail’s cost associated to make phone calls infringe
upon his constitutional right to communicate with family, friends, and counsel; Plaintiff
makes no such allegation. As such, Plaintiff’s complaints regarding the payment of fees
to transfer money and for commissary will be DISMISSED.
VIII. ACCESS TO COURTS
Plaintiff complains that there is no law library available at Knox County Jail [Doc.
1 p. 5]. The court construes this claim as one under the First Amendment, the right of
access to the courts. In Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977), the Supreme Court of the
United States wrote that “the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts
requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal
papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from
persons trained in the law.” Id. at 828. However, “[p]risoners may not dictate to the state
the method by which access to the courts will be assured.” Penland v. Warren County Jail,
759 F.2d 524, 531 n. 7 (6th Cir. 1985).
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In short, the State has the option of where and when and how inmates may be
assisted in accessing the courts. A law library is not required under the First Amendment.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has specifically held that a First
Amendment claim must be based upon an actual denial of access to the courts rather than
access to a law library. See Childs v. Pellegrin, 822 F.2d 1382, 1385 (6th Cir.1987).
Further, a plaintiff fails to state a claim of First Amendment denial of right of access
to courts unless he has shown actual prejudice to underlying litigation. See Walker v.
Mintzes, 771 F.2d 920, 932 (6th Cir. 1985). A pro se litigant alleging denial of access to
the courts must establish that either his defense or other pending civil matters have been
prejudiced by the alleged denial of access. See Flittie v. Solem, 827 F.2d 276, 280 (8th Cir.
1987). Plaintiff has made no such showing and this claim will be DISMISSED.
IX.
VISITATION
Plaintiff complains the he is denied face-to-face visitation with his family while
incarcerated at Knox County Jail, rather inmates use a kiosk system for personal visitations
[Doc. 1 p. 5]. The Court finds that Knox County Jail’s prohibition on contact visits is an
entirely reasonable, nonpunitive response to legitimate security concerns, consistent with
the Fourteenth Amendment. Contact visits invite a host of security problems. Block v.
Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984). They have been found to open a detention facility to the
introduction of drugs, weapons, and other contraband. Id. Totally disallowing contact
visits is not excessive in relation to the security and other interests at stake. Nothing in the
Constitution requires detainees, such as Plaintiff’s classification, be allowed contact visits;
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responsible, experienced administrators have determined, in their sound discretion, that
such visits will jeopardize the security of the facility and other persons and the Court does
not intervene with such penal decisions. This claim will be DIMISSED.
X.
POTENTIAL CLAIM
Plaintiff argues that when in his cell, there is “no way to let them know I need
medical emergency” [Doc. 1 p. 5].
However, Plaintiff does not claim that he has
experienced any medical emergency or that he was unable to notify any Defendant of any
medical emergency. Plaintiff’s complaint appears to be purely hypothetical. Nothing in
Plaintiff’s complaint allows the Court to plausibly infer that this assertion has personally
affected Plaintiff or violated his constitutional rights in any way and Plaintiff lacks standing
to assert the constitutional rights of other prisoners. Newsom v Norris, 888 F.2d 371, 381
(6th Cir. 1989). This claim will be DISMISSED.
XI.
CLASSIFICATION OF INMATES
Plaintiff claims that federal inmates and pretrial detainees are improperly housed
together [Doc. 1 p. 5]. However, placement of prisoners is a matter left to the discretion
of state officials, and a prisoner has no constitutional right or protected liberty interest to
be housed in any particular facility or unit. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245–
46 (1983); Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976). As such, this claim will be
DISMISSED.
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XII.
CONCLUSION
Based on the above, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state any claim upon which relief
may be granted under § 1983 and this action will therefore be DISMISSED pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
AN APPROPRIATE ORDER SHALL ENTER.
s/ Thomas A. Varlan
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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