Evans v. Claiborne County Board of Education

Filing 30

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying 23 Motion to Amend/Correct. Signed by Magistrate Judge H Bruce Guyton on 7/9/19. (JBR)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE

JERTON EVANS,
Plaintiff,
v.
CLAIBORNE COUNTY BOARD OF
EDUCATION,
Defendant.

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No. 3:18-CV-247-CLC-HBG

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This case is before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, the Rules of this Court,
and Standing Order 13-02.
Now before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend [Doc. 23]. Defendant has
responded in opposition [Doc. 27], and Plaintiff filed a Reply [Doc. 28]. The Motion is now ripe
for adjudication. Accordingly, for the reasons more fully explained below, the Court finds
Plaintiff’s Motion [Doc. 23] not well taken, and it is DENIED.
I.

POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
Plaintiff requests [Doc. 23] leave to amend his Complaint as a precaution in light of

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and to more specifically plead violations of his
constitutional rights. Plaintiff further requests leave to cure what Defendant has called a defective
pleading or otherwise failure to state a claim. Plaintiff filed a copy of his proposed Fourth
Amended Complaint [Doc. 23-1] as an exhibit to his Motion in accordance with Local Rule 15.1.

Defendant objects [Doc. 27] to Plaintiff’s Motion. For grounds, Defendant asserts that
Plaintiff filed his original Complaint three years ago in state court. Defendant argues that Plaintiff
filed his Motion to Amend solely in an attempt to circumvent Defendant’s dispositive motion.
Defendant asserts that several deadlines have already expired in this case, including the discovery
deadline and the dispositive motion deadline. Defendant acknowledges that the basis of Plaintiff’s
claims are still substantively the same but asserts that the Scheduling Order would likely need to
be modified to permit discovery on Plaintiff’s newly alleged facts. Defendant argues that
Plaintiff’s amendment is likely futile with respect to his federal claims because his newly alleged
facts are not sufficient to state a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Plaintiff filed a Reply [Doc. 28], stating that his proposed Fourth Amended Compliant does
not change the theories that he is pursuing. Plaintiff claims that the only substantial change is the
elimination of his claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1986, and therefore, Defendant cannot be
prejudiced by the filing of the Fourth Amended Complaint. Plaintiff insists that further discovery
is not necessary because the additional facts to be gleaned from the amendment are already in
Defendant’s control and possession. Plaintiff further asserts that Defendant has not shown any
prejudice in allowing the amendment.
II.

ANALYSIS
The Court has considered the parties’ filings as summarized above. Accordingly, the Court

finds Plaintiff’s Motion [Doc. 23] not well taken, and it is DENIED.
The Court begins with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, which provides that courts
should “freely give leave where justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The decision as to
whether justice requires the amendment is committed to the district court’s discretion. Moore v.

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City of Paducah, 790 F.2d 557, 559 (6th Cir. 1986). Despite the liberality of Rule 15(a)(2), courts
have explained that motions to amend may be denied if the court finds undue delay, bad faith, or
dilatory motive, repeated failures to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue
prejudice, and futility of the amendment. Scheib v. Boderk, No. 3:07-CV-446, 2011 WL 208341,
at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 21, 2011) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). “[D]elay
alone does not justify denial of leave to amend.” Id. (quoting Morse v. McWhorter, 290 F.3d 795,
800 (6th Cir. 2002)). A delay in filing a motion to amend, however, can become undue or
prejudicial at some point. Id. (citing Morse, 290 F.3d at 800). For instance, “[t]he longer the
period of unexplained delay, the less will be required of the nonmoving party in terms of showing
of prejudice.” Id. (quoting Phelps v. McClellan, 30 F.3d 658, 663 (6th Cir. 1994)). As explained
in Phelps:
In determining what constitutes prejudice, the court considers
whether the assertion of the new claim or defense would require the
opponent to expend significant additional resources to conduct
discovery and prepare for trial; significantly delay the resolution of
the dispute; or prevent the plaintiff from bringing a timely action in
another jurisdiction.
30 F.3d at 662–63.
With the above analysis in mind, the Court turns to the facts of the present matter and finds
that the above factors weigh in favor of denying Plaintiff’s Motion.1 First, Plaintiff has already
amended his Complaint three times. Further, the Court finds that Defendant would be unduly
prejudiced if Plaintiff is permitted to file his proposed Fourth Amended Complaint. Plaintiff filed

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Defendant asserts that the amendment is futile because the two additional paragraphs do
not amount to a sufficiently pled § 1983 claim. Defendant does not develop this argument. In any
event, however, because the Court finds undue delay and undue prejudice weigh in favor of
denying Plaintiff’s Motion, the Court need not address Defendant’s futility argument.
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the instant Motion on May 20, 2019. Many of the deadlines contained in the Court’s Scheduling
Order have already expired, including the discovery deadline (April 1, 2019), the pretrial
disclosure deadline (May 15, 2019), the dispositive motion deadline (May 1, 2019), and the
deadline to file motions in limine (May 15, 2019). In fact, Plaintiff acknowledges that his Motion
to Amend was filed “[a]s a precaution and in view of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.”
[Doc. 23]. Defendant would not be able to challenge Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint under
Rule 56 given that the dispositive motion deadline has expired and any continuance of the
dispositive motion deadline would affect the trial date, which is currently set for September 9,
2019.
Further, in his Reply, Plaintiff states that the circumstances surrounding the Tennessee
Comptroller investigative report clearly show that the reasons given for Plaintiff’s separation were
pre-textual. Plaintiff, acknowledges, however, that the investigative report was published on
December 13, 2018. Plaintiff does not provide a sufficient reason for why he waited five months,
after many of the deadlines had expired, to request leave to amend the Third Amended Complaint.
See Duggins v. Steak 'N Shake, Inc., 195 F.3d 828, 834 (6th Cir. 1999) (“There appears to be no
justification for the delay, and the plaintiff proposes none.”). In fact, the primary reason Plaintiff
provides for amending his This Amended Complaint is in “precaution and in view of Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment.” [Doc. 23 at 1]. This is not a sufficient reason to amend the
Complaint at this late stage of the litigation.
Plaintiff argues that the only substantial change in the proposed Fourth Amended
Complaint is the elimination of his 42 U.S.C. § 1986 claim, and therefore, Defendant is not
prejudiced. The parties, however, can stipulate to a dismissal of that claim, making the amendment

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unnecessary.2 Plaintiff further argues that Defendant will not need to take any discovery on the
additional allegations because such facts are in Defendant’s control and possession. The Court
disagrees. For instance, in Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint, he alleges that he called a
meeting to discuss the future of the Claiborne County Highschool football team. [Doc. 1-9 at 119,
¶ 119]. The Fourth Amended Complaint alleges that Plaintiff, a private citizen, called the meeting
to address the football programs at the little league, middle school, and high school levels. [Doc.
23-1 at ¶ 18]. While Defendant has a copy of the message regarding the meeting, Defendant does
not have control or possession of information regarding Plaintiff’s motivation for requesting the
meeting. Further, there is no doubt that this amendment is in response to Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, which challenges Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims on the basis that
Plaintiff was speaking in his role as a public employee about a private concern, as opposed to a
private citizen addressing a public concern. Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Motion not
well taken.
IV.

CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons explained above, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for

Leave to Amend [Doc. 23].
IT IS SO ORDERED.

ENTER:

United States Magistrate Judge
The Court notes that in Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant
challenges Plaintiff’s § 1986 claim. Plaintiff does not respond to the merits of Defendant’s
challenge, but instead, states that the issue is moot because the Fourth Amended Complaint
withdraws the claim. [Doc. 24-1 at 20].
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