Noles v. United States of America et al (TV1)

Filing 21

MEMORANDUM OPINION: For the reasons set forth above, defendants' motion to dismiss [Doc. 20] is GRANTED. This case is DISMISSED with prejudice. Plaintiff's pending motions to strike and to show cause [Docs. 11, 16, 17] are DENIED as moot. A separate order will enter. Signed by District Judge Thomas A Varlan on 11/26/2024. (Copy of Memorandum Opinion mailed to James D. Noles, II) (CAT)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
JAMES D. NOLES, II,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, and
DEPUTY ASSISTANT ATTORNEY
GENERAL d/b/a DAVID A. HUBBERT,
Defendants.

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No.:

3:23-cv-150-TAV-JEM

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court on defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction, or alternatively, failure to state a claim [Doc. 20]. Plaintiff has
not responded and the time for doing so has long expired. See E.D. Tenn. L.R. 7.1(a). For
the reasons set forth below, defendants’ motion to dismiss [Doc. 20] is GRANTED and
this case is DISMISSED.
I.

Background
In his pro se complaint, plaintiff raises a number of unclear allegations regarding

tax proceeding and the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) [Doc. 1]. As best the Court can
discern, plaintiff asserts that the IRS failed to prove he was a “taxpayer” before
commencing tax collections [Id. at 9]. Plaintiff contends that the IRS presumed that he is
a “federal citizen” or “resident alien,” neither of which are true [Id.]. He also complains

that Title 261 was never enacted into “positive law” [Id.]. Nonetheless, he contends that he
has never been a “taxpayer” as defined by the Internal Revenue Code but rather has always
been a “non-taxpayer” [Id. at 11]. Plaintiff further argues that Form 1040 contains no
reference to any law explaining who is subject to income tax and did not warn him that by
sending a completed form to the IRS, he would waive his Fourth Amendment right to
privacy and his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination [Id. at 12]. As relief,
plaintiff appears to ask that the IRS produce various documents [Id. at 12–15]. Plaintiff
further appears to ask the Court to declare the “Letter of Notice of Intent to levy” as “null[]
and void” [Id. at 19]. Plaintiff attaches a variety of exhibits, although it is unclear how any
of the exhibits relate to the complaint [Doc. 1-1].
II.

Standard of Review
Under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure a court may, at any

time, sua sponte or upon the motion of a party, dismiss a complaint for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). A dismissal for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) is appropriate when the allegations “are totally
implausible, attenuated, unsubstantial, frivolous, devoid of merit, or no longer open to
discussion.” Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1999). A plaintiff bears the
burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction in order to survive dismissal pursuant to Rule
12(b)(1). Swint v. Fultano’s Pizza, No. 5:23-cv-1556, 2023 WL 5893370, at *1 (N.D. Ohio
Sept. 11, 2023).

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Title 26 of the United States Code is the Internal Revenue Code.
2

III.

Analysis
Although the government does not directly address this matter, the Court notes that

plaintiff’s complaint appears to raise a number of so-called “sovereign citizen” beliefs or
arguments. As this district previously explained:
Sovereign citizens (or “sovereigns”) are a “loosely knit network” of
individuals who express—and act on—a shared anti-government sentiment.
See Joshua P. Weir, Sovereign Citizens: A Reasoned Response to the
Madness, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 830, 834 (2015). Members of the
contemporary movement believe that with the passage of the Fourteenth
Amendment, along with various developments in commercial law (including
the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”), abandonment of
the gold standard, and creation of the Federal Reserve Bank), the modernday legal system has tricked people into giving up their “sovereign”
citizenship in order to receive government benefits. See id. at 837; Francis
X. Sullivan, The “Usurping Octopus of Jurisdictional/Authority”: The Legal
Theories of the Sovereign Citizen Movement, 199 WIS. L. REV. 85, 795-813
(1999).
Sovereigns believe there are two forms of citizenship—inferior federal (or
Fourteenth Amendment) citizenship, and superior state (also known as
sovereign, or “de jure”) citizenship. They further believe the original
Constitution recognized three types of jurisdiction—common law (which
requires an injury to person or property), equity (which requires a contract),
and admiralty (originally limited to the high seas). Sovereigns argue that
federal district courts are admiralty courts, and through the UCC, federal
courts have superseded common law by enforcing federal government
contracts that bind people into federal citizenship. Sullivan, supra at 805-06.
By filing abstruse legal documents to free themselves from the yoke of
federal citizenship, sovereigns argue they are exempt from the jurisdiction of
any legitimate court, state or federal. Weir, supra at 838.
...
Sovereign citizen pleadings are “dense, complex, and virtually unreadable,”
and a branch of sovereign citizen case law has grown to address the
voluminous and often frivolous workload. Sullivan, supra at 796 (“Faced
with mountains of paperwork, courts must choose between spending hours
deciphering Sovereign Citizen arguments or dismissing them out of hand”);
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see U.S. v. Coleman, 871 F.3d 470, 476 (6th Cir. 2017) (“Defendant’s legal
arguments directly correspond to meritless rhetoric frequently espoused by
tax
protestors,
sovereign
citizens,
and
self-proclaimed
Moorish-Americans”); . . . ; U.S. v. Benabe, 654 F.3d 753, 767 (7th Cir. 2011)
(A sovereign citizen’s arguments that they are beyond the jurisdiction of the
courts should be “rejected summarily, however they are presented.”).
United States v. Cook, No. 3:18-cr-19, 2019 WL 2721305, at *1–2 (E.D. Tenn. June 28,
2019) (footnote omitted).
Thus, “Courts have repeatedly rejected, as frivolous, arguments based on the theory
of sovereign citizenship” recognizing that such arguments are “a waste of court resources.”
Powell v. Michigan, No. 22-10816, 2023 WL 2154954, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 24, 2023)
(internal quotation marks omitted). In light of this, courts frequently sua sponte dismiss
sovereign citizen complaints for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or dismiss sovereign
citizen complaints on this ground without extended argument. Id. (dismissing for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction “without the need for an extended argument”); Adkins v.
Kentucky, No. 3:18-mc-26, 2018 WL 6528462, at *1–2 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 12, 2018) (sua
sponte dismissing sovereign citizen complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction
without further discussion); Primero v. Barum, No. 3:24-cv-200, 2024 WL 1543782, at *2
(W.D. Ky. Apr. 9, 2024) (dismissing sovereign citizen complaint, at screening stage, for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction because “the legal theories espoused in this action are
frivolous”); Maddox El v. Scharf, No. 23-10990, 2023 WL 3587538, at *1–2 (E.D. Mich.
May 22, 2023) (dismissing sovereign citizen complaint at screening stage for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction without further discussion).

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The Court finds it appropriate to follow this course of action here. Although the
government has raised a number of well-reasoned grounds for dismissal under Rule
12(b)(1) in its motion [Doc. 20-1], the Court need not provide an in-depth analysis of those
specific grounds.2 It is clear that plaintiff’s complaint is frivolous on its face and, therefore,
dismissal is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(1). Apple, 183 F.3d at 479; see also Maxwell v.
I.R.S., 3:08-mc-113, 2009 WL 920533, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 1, 2009) (addressing similar
sovereign citizen arguments regarding tax liability and noting that such are
“routinely-rejected substantive arguments”).

Moreover, given that plaintiff has not

responded to the government’s motion, which has been pending for approximately three
months, plaintiff has not met his burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction.
IV.

Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, defendants’ motion to dismiss [Doc. 20] is

GRANTED. This case is DISMISSED with prejudice. Plaintiff’s pending motions to
strike and to show cause [Docs. 11, 16, 17] are DENIED as moot. A separate order will
enter.
ENTER:
s/ Thomas A. Varlan
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

2

Although the Court will not provide an in-depth analysis of the government’s specific
arguments, the Court has reviewed the government’s brief, and the entire record, and finds that the
government’s arguments that plaintiff’s claims are barred by sovereign immunity and the
Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) are well-taken.
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