Oellien et al v. Knox County, Tennessee

Filing 37

MEMORANDUM OPINION ORDER denying 35 Motionfor Oral Argument and Notice of Supplemental Authority; denying 30 Motion Revise Order Denying Knox County's Motion to Dismiss; denying 31 Motion for Certificate of Appealability; denying 31 Motion to Stay. Signed by District Judge Charles E Atchley, Jr on 1/6/2024. (MKM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
SEAN OELLIEN, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
KNOX COUNTY, TENNESSEE,
Defendant.

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Case No. 3:23-cv-319
Judge Atchley
Magistrate Judge McCook

MEMORANDUM OPINION ORDER
Before the Court are Defendant Knox County, Tennessee’s Motion to Revise Order [Doc.
30], its Motion to Certify this Court’s Order for Interlocutory Appeal and Stay Proceedings [Doc.
31], and its Motion for Oral Argument [Doc. 35]. For the following reasons, the Motions [Docs.
30–31, 35] are DENIED.
I.

BACKGROUND

The Oelliens allege that their child (“Minor”) joked about stealing a plane and crashing it
into his middle school during a school art class. [Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 12–13]. This was apparently part of
several students’ efforts to “one-up” each other by telling outlandish stories. [Id. at ¶ 14]. School
personnel, however, viewed the situation differently. Around midday, Minor was escorted to the
principal’s office by a Knox County Sheriff’s deputy. [Id. at ¶ 17]. Once he arrived, Minor was
handed a blank form and asked to detail what happened that morning in art. [Id. at ¶ 18]. Although
Minor was initially cooperative, he soon declined to answer any additional questions until an
attorney or his parents were present. [Id. at ¶ 19]. By this time, a deputy was already searching
Minor’s backpack, and Minor was in handcuffs. [Id. at ¶¶ 20–21].

The principal called Minor’s father, Plantiff Sean Oellien, to both describe the situation
and request that Mr. Oellien instruct Minor to answer the principal’s questions. [Id. at ¶ 22]. Mr.
Oellien responded that he would not instruct his child to answer any questions until he was present
but that he was only fifteen minutes away and already en route to the middle school. [Id. at ¶ 23].
As this point, one of the deputies (the “Arresting Deputy”) got on the phone and informed Mr.
Oellien that if Minor did not answer the questions immediately, Minor would be arrested. [Id. at ¶
24]. Mr. Oellien told the Arresting Deputy that Minor would gladly answer any questions as soon
as he and an attorney were present. [Id. at ¶ 25]. The Arresting Deputy responded by telling Mr.
Oellien that he did not need to come to the middle school, that Minor was being arrested, and that
Mr. Oellien should wait for a call from the Juvenile Center. [Id. at ¶¶ 27–28].
After Mr. Oellien confirmed that he did not need to go to the middle school, he travelled
the Juvenile Center. [Id. at ¶¶ 30–32]. There, he waited for several hours with no sign of Minor.
[Id. at ¶¶ 32–33]. Eventually, Mr. Oellien called the middle school to see if Minor was still there
but was told that he was not. [Id. at ¶¶ 33–34]. Around the same time, Minor’s criminal defense
attorney contacted the Knox County Sheriff’s Office to determine Minor’s location but was told
that the Office did not know where Minor was. [Id. at ¶ 35]. Juvenile Center personnel similarly
had no idea where to find Minor. [Id. at ¶ 36]. It was only when Minor arrived at the Juvenile
Center in the back of a transport van hours after his arrest that Mr. Oellien was finally able to
locate his child. [Id. at ¶¶ 37–38]. But having located Minor, Mr. Oellien was unable to take him
home. The transport van Minor arrived in had reached the Juvenile Center so late in the day that
all the judges had already left. [Id. at ¶ 38]. Consequently, there was no one able to arraign Minor.
[Id.]. Furthermore, because Minor was arrested on a Friday, this meant that he could neither be
arraigned nor receive a probable cause determination until the following Monday. [See id.]. In

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total, Minor was detained for over 63 hours without receiving a probable cause determination. [Id.
at ¶ 67].
As for where Minor was when no one could find him, he was in the back of a patrol car
sitting outside the middle school. [Id. at ¶ 29]. After the Arresting Deputy informed Mr. Oellien
that Minor was being arrested, Minor was escorted to a patrol car. [Id. at ¶¶ 27–29]. Minor waited
there for several hours until the transport van arrived to take him to the Juvenile Center. [Id. at ¶¶
46, 48].
Disturbed by these events, Mr. Oellien and Minor’s mother, Ronda Oellien, filed the instant
lawsuit alleging that Knox County, acting through the Knox County Sheriff’s Office, violated
Minor’s constitutional rights. [Doc. 1]. After the Oelliens amended the Complaint [Doc. 16], Knox
County moved to dismiss, arguing, among other things, that the Oelliens had failed to plausibly
allege a Monell claim against the County. [Doc. 17]. The Court denied this portion of the County’s
Motion to Dismiss. [Doc. 28].
Shortly thereafter, Knox County filed the currently pending Motion to Revise Order
wherein it argues that the Court committed clear error in denying its Motion as to the Oellien’s
Monell claims by relying on a district court case that has since been implicitly overruled. [Doc.
30]. Knox County also moved in the alternative for the Court to certify its prior order for
interlocutory appeal and to stay proceedings. [Doc. 31]. Finally, the County requested that the
Court hear oral arguments on its Motion to Revise Order. [Doc. 35]. Each of these Motions is ripe
for adjudication.
II.

MOTION FOR ORAL ARGUMENT

Starting with Knox County’s Motion for Oral Argument, the Court has reviewed the record
in this case, the applicable legal authorities, and the parties’ arguments. Given the issues at play,

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the Court finds that oral argument is not necessary for it to resolve Knox County’s Motion to
Revise Order. Accordingly, the Motion for Oral Argument [Doc. 35] is DENIED.
III.

MOTION TO REVISE ORDER

Next, the Court turns its attention to Knox County’s Motion to Revise Order [Doc. 30]
wherein the County asks the Court to correct a clear error and prevent manifest injustice by revising
its order allowing the Oelliens’ Monell claims to proceed.
A. Standard of Review
“District courts have authority both under common law and Rule 54(b) to reconsider
interlocutory orders and to reopen any part of a case before entry of a final judgment.” Rodriguez
v. Tenn. Laborers Health & Welfare Fund, 89 F. App’x 949, 959 (6th Cir. 2004). Courts will
generally reconsider interlocutory orders under three circumstances: (1) an intervening change of
controlling law; (2) availability of new evidence; and (3) to correct a clear error or prevent manifest
injustice. Id. The Court will not entertain motions to reconsider that are “intended to re-litigate
issues previously considered by the Court or to present evidence that could have been raised
earlier.” Walter v. Auto-Owners Mut. Ins. Co., No. 3:15-CV-535-TAV-DCP, 2018 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 145864, at *9 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 28, 2018) (quoting Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v.
Brunner, 652 F. Supp. 2d 871, 877 (S.D. Ohio 2009)). Likewise, a motion to reconsider is not “an
opportunity to raise new legal arguments that were available before the interlocutory order issued.”
Id.
B. Analysis
Knox County asserts that the Oelliens have failed to adequately plead their Monell claims
and that the Court committed clear error when it denied the County’s Motion to Dismiss. [See
generally Doc. 30]. Specifically, Knox County contends the Rolen v. City of Cleveland, No. 1:12

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CV 1914, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195086, at *15 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 6, 2013) decision that this Court
relied on in denying the County’s Motion has been so eroded by subsequent developments in Sixth
Circuit caselaw that it has effectively been overruled. [Doc. 30 at 3–7]. Accordingly, the County
asserts that the Court committed clear error by relying on this discredited case. [See id.]. The
Oelliens, on the other hand, contend both that Rolen remains good law and that they have
adequately pled their Monell claims irrespective of whether Rolen has been overruled. Upon
review, the Court finds that the Oelliens have sufficiently pled their Monell claims regardless of
whether Rolen remains good law. As a result, Knox County’s Motion to Revise Order [Doc. 30]
is DENIED.
“To prevail in a § 1983 suit against a municipality, a plaintiff must show that the alleged
federal right violation occurred because of a municipal policy or custom.” Thomas v. City of
Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426, 429 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S.
658, 694 (1978)). Absent such a policy or custom, a plaintiff cannot sue a municipality under §
1983 notwithstanding the fact that he was injured by the municipality’s agent or employee. Id. To
prove the existence of an illegal policy or custom, “[t]he plaintiff can look to (1) the municipality's
legislative enactments or official agency policies; (2) actions taken by officials with final decisionmaking authority; (3) a policy of inadequate training or supervision; or (4) a custom of tolerance
or acquiescence of federal rights violations.” Id. Where, as here, the plaintiff relies on only a single
incident to support a Monell claim, that claim may proceed under only the failure to train or
supervise theory of liability. See Annabel v. Jackson Cty. Sheriff Dep't, No. 22-12189, 2024 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 152745, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 26, 2024).
Establishing a failure to train claim requires a plaintiff to prove: “(1) that a training program
is inadequate to the tasks that the officers must perform; (2) that the inadequacy is the result of the

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municipality's deliberate indifference; and (3) that the inadequacy is closely related to or actually
caused his injury.” Rayfield v. City of Grand Rapids, 768 F. App'x 495, 511 (6th Cir. 2019)
(cleaned up). When such a claim is premised on a single incident, a plaintiff can establish deliberate
indifference by showing that a municipality has failed “‘to provide adequate training in light of
foreseeable consequences that could result from the lack of instruction,’ as would be the case, for
example, if a municipality failed to instruct its officers in the use of deadly force.” Cherrington v.
Skeeter, 344 F.3d 631, 646 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Brown v. Shaner, 172 F.3d 927, 931 (6th Cir.
1999)); see also City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989) (noting that there may be
circumstances where—in light of an employee’s duties—the need for training is so obvious and
the inadequacy of training so likely to result in constitutional violations that it amounts to
deliberate indifference). Here, the Oelliens allege that “Knox County, through the Knox County
Sheriff’s Office, failed to properly train the Arresting Deputy regarding the arrest and
transportation of a detainee and/or a juvenile detainee[,]” and that as a result of this failure to train,
Minor was unconstitutionally seized and denied a prompt probable cause hearing. [Doc. 16 at ¶¶
55–68]. These allegations are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.
“Individuals arrested and detained without a warrant are entitled to a ‘prompt’ judicial
determination of probable cause.” Brown v. Knapp, 75 F.4th 638, 649 (6th Cir. 2023) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Absent exceptional circumstances, this means that a detainee must
receive a probable cause determination within 48 hours. Id. (citing County of Riverside v.
McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56–57 (1991)). If he does not, then his Fourth Amendment rights have
been violated. Id. Given the frequency with which police officers make warrantless arrests, it is
entirely foreseeable that failing to train them on the need to ensure detainees receive prompt
probable cause determinations will result in a violation of the detainee’s constitutional rights. See

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Cherrington, 344 F.3d at 647; Rayfield, 768 F. App'x at 511. Thus, training that fails to instruct
police officers on the 48-hour probable cause determination requirement is inadequate, and a
municipality is deliberately indifferent if it fails to train its officers on the need for prompt probable
cause determinations. See Cherrington, 344 F.3d at 647; Rayfield, 768 F. App'x at 511.
Looking to the Amended Complaint, the Oelliens allege that Knox County failed to train
the Arresting Deputy regarding the arrest and transportation of detainees. [Doc. 16 at ¶ 55]. They
further allege that because of Knox County’s failure to properly train the Arresting Deputy, Minor
arrived at the Juvenile Center too late to receive his constitutionally required prompt probable
cause determination. [See id. at ¶¶ 39–55, 67]. Accepting these allegations as true and drawing all
reasonable inferences in the Oelliens’ favor,1 they have plausibly alleged: (1) that Knox County’s
training was inadequate regarding the need to ensure that detainees receive prompt probable cause
determinations; (2) that the County was deliberately indifferent to this inadequacy and the
constitutional violations it was likely to bring about; and (3) that Minor’s constitutional rights were
violated as a result of this inadequacy and the County’s deliberate indifference. In other words,
they have sufficiently pled a Monell claim, irrespective of whether Rolen remains good law. See
Rayfield, 768 F. App'x at 511. Consequently, it was not clear error to deny Knox County’s Motion
to Dismiss as to the Oelliens’ Monell claims and there is no manifest injustice in allowing them to
proceed. Accordingly, the Motion to Revise Order [Doc. 30] is DENIED.

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Peffer v. Thompson, 754 F. App'x 316, 318 (6th Cir. 2018) (“In reviewing a 12(b)(6) motion, the court must view
the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepting as true all allegations in the complaint and drawing
all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.”)

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IV.

MOTION
TO
CERTIFY
THIS
COURT’S
ORDER
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL AND STAY PROCEEDINGS

FOR

In the alternative to its Motion to Revise Order, Knox County also moved to certify this
Court’s prior order for interlocutory appeal and to stay proceedings. [Doc. 31]. As the Court finds
that an interlocutory appeal is not warranted, the County’s Motion [Doc. 31] is DENIED.
“A district court may certify its decision for interlocutory appeal if, together with satisfying
prudential concerns, it involves a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial
ground for a difference of opinion, and immediate appeal may materially advance the termination
of the litigation.” Kollaritsch v. Mich. State Univ. Bd. of Trs., No. 17-2445/18-0101, 2018 U.S.
App. LEXIS 17379, at *2 (6th Cir. June 25, 2018). “The party seeking an interlocutory appeal has
the burden of showing exceptional circumstances exist warranting an interlocutory appeal and
district court judges have broad discretion to deny certification even where the statutory criteria
are met.” Gasiorowski-Watts v. CSX Transp., Inc., No. 1:23 CV 1043, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
195695, at *15 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 1, 2023). “When exercising this discretion, this Court must heed
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals’ warning that interlocutory review should be ‘granted sparingly
and only in exceptional cases.’” Wang v. GM, LLC, No. 18-10347, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74166,
at *3 (E.D. Mich. May 2, 2019) (quoting In re City of Memphis, 293 F.3d 345, 350 (6th Cir. 2002)).
Knox County argues that all the relevant factors weigh in favor of an interlocutory appeal.
The County notes that the contested legal issues are controlling because if the Sixth Circuit found
that the Oelliens had failed to sufficiently allege a Monell claim, it would result in the dismissal of
this case. [Doc. 31 at 2]. The County also argues that because reversal would result in dismissal,
allowing an interlocutory appeal could materially advance the termination of the instant litigation.
[Id. at 3]. While the Court agrees with the County that these two factors weigh in favor an
interlocutory appeal, it disagrees with the County’s contention that if it denies the Motion to Revise

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Order, it must conclude that there is substantial ground for difference of opinion as to whether the
Oelliens’ Monell claims should proceed past the motion to dismiss stage. [Id. at 1, 3]. The County’s
position is premised on its argument that Rolen has been overruled, and the Court erred in relying
on it. [Id. at 1]. But as the Court has already noted, the Oelliens’ Monell claims survive the
County’s Motion to Dismiss irrespective of Rolen. Thus, it is immaterial whether there is
substantial ground for disagreement as to Rolen’s validity. What matters is whether there is
substantial ground for disagreement as to whether the Oelliens have plausibly alleged a Monell
claim. And for the reasons described in the preceding section, the Court finds there is not.
Accordingly, the Motion to Certify This Court’s Order for Interlocutory Appeal and Stay
Proceedings [Doc. 31] is DENIED.
V.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Knox County’s Motion for Oral Argument [Doc. 35], its Motion
to Revise Order [Doc. 30], and its Motion to Certify this Court’s Order for Interlocutory Appeal
and Stay Proceedings [Docs. 31] are DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Charles E. Atchley, Jr.
CHARLES E. ATCHLEY, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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