Soloe v. Fischer

Filing 7

ORDER ADOPTING IN PART and MODIFING IN PART re 5 Report and Recommendations. Soloe is ORDERED to provide a status report within 14 days of the entry of this Order. Signed by District Judge Charles E Atchley, Jr. on 6/4/2024. (DCB) Mailed to Edward Soloe, 944 N. Wright Road, Apt 37, Alcoa, TN 37701.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
EDWARD SOLOE,
Plaintiff,
v.
JAMES P. FISCHER,
Defendant.

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Case No. 3:23-cv-382
Judge Atchley
Magistrate Judge McCook

ORDER
Before the Court is the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation [Doc. 5]. The
Magistrate Judge granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis [Doc. 1] and
recommends that Plaintiff’s Complaint [Doc. 2] and Amended Complaint [Doc. 4] be dismissed.
[Doc. 5 at 1]. Plaintiff filed an Objection [Doc. 6] to the Report and Recommendation. For the
reasons explained below, the Report and Recommendation will be ADOPTED IN PART and
MODIFIED IN PART.
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Edward Soloe, proceeding pro se, filed his Complaint against Defendant James

Fischer. [Doc. 2]. Fischer works as an officer at the Vonore Police Department, and Soloe asserts
claims against Officer Fischer for violations of various constitutional provisions, including the
Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. [Id. at 3, 5; Doc. 6 at 5]. Soloe alleges that on April 17,
2022, Officer Fischer issued a citation to him for violation of TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-50-504,
which prohibits driving with a suspended license. [Doc. 2 at 5]. Officer Fischer had Soloe’s vehicle
towed due to his lack of insurance. [Id.]. A Monroe County grand jury indicted Soloe for the
alleged violation of TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-50-504 on October 5, 2022. [Doc. 4-1 at 1].

Soloe disputes the validity of the charge against him. The relevant Tennessee statute, in
Soloe’s view, only requires those who operate commercial vehicles to obtain driver’s licenses.
[Doc. 2 at 5; Doc. 6 at 2]. Soloe contends that he did not need a driver’s license while operating a
non-commercial vehicle. [Id.]. Moreover, Soloe disputes any notion that he was required to
maintain car insurance. [Doc. 2 at 5; Doc. 6 at 4–5]. He claims that for non-commercial vehicles,
insurance is only required following an accident. [Id.].
Soloe asserts numerous claims in his Complaint and Amended Complaint. [Docs. 2, 4].
His requests for relief include (1) dismissal of the charge against him; (2) recognition of his rights
to liberty, travel, and use of property under stare decisis; (3) payment of $180 for recovery of his
towed vehicle; (4) payment of $200 for fuel expenses necessary to meet with attorneys and attend
court; (5) compensation for “sleepless nights, worry, legal research,” and his self-representation;
(6) compensation at a rate of $15 per hour for time spent traveling to court, attending to court, and
meeting with attorneys; (7) a judgment that TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-50-504 only applies to
commercial licenses; and (8) a preliminary injunction against the Monroe County prosecution.
[Doc. 2 at 6; Doc. 4 at 1].
The Magistrate Judge screened the Complaint and Amended Complaint pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915 and deemed Soloe’s claims barred by Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), which
created the Younger abstention doctrine. [Doc. 5 at 5]. Considering Younger’s application, the
Magistrate Judge characterized Soloe’s amendment as futile and recommends dismissal of the
Complaint and Amended Complaint. [Id. at 7]. Soloe filed an Objection to the Magistrate Judge’s
Report and Recommendation, wherein he largely rehashes his views on when driver’s licenses and
insurance are required. [See generally Doc. 6]. The Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation is now ripe for the Court’s review.

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II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
“The Court must conduct a de novo review of those portions of the report and

recommendation to which objections are made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in
part, the magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations.” Wynne v. Berryhill, No. 1:16-cv-260,
2017 WL 3835887, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 1, 2017) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)). A party’s
specific objections are reviewed de novo. Partin v. Astrue, No. 3:11-cv-365, 2012 WL 1344266,
at *1 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 18, 2012). General and frivolous objections, on the other hand, are not
entitled to de novo review and may be deemed waived. Mira v. Marshall, 806 F.2d 636, 637 (6th
Cir. 1986) (quoting Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 410 n.8 (5th Cir. 1982)).
III.

ANALYSIS
To the extent Soloe’s Objection is liberally construed, the Court concludes that Soloe takes

issue with the Magistrate Judge’s application of Younger. Soloe appears to argue that the bad faith
exception to Younger applies to his case, meaning that the Court should not abstain from resolving
his claims. [Doc. 6 at 2–5]. For the following reasons, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge
and concludes that Younger applies to Soloe’s claims.
A. Applicability of Younger
Younger abstention exists to prevent federal courts from unnecessarily interfering with
ongoing state criminal prosecutions. Doe v. Univ. of Ky., 860 F.3d 365, 368 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing
Younger, 401 U.S. at 44). The typical Younger situation is straightforward: a person subject to
pending state criminal proceedings files “a parallel federal action involving claims that could have
been raised in the state case.” Carroll v. City of Mount Clemens, 139 F.3d 1072, 1074 (6th Cir.
1998) (citations omitted). The federal court will abstain under Younger when the relevant state

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proceeding “(1) is currently pending, (2) involves an important state interest, and (3) affords the
plaintiff an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional claims.” Id. (citations omitted).
The Magistrate Judge concluded that all three elements were satisfied, and Soloe does not
offer any specific objections to these conclusions. [Doc. 5 at 5–6]. Indeed, the record supports the
Magistrate Judge’s conclusions as to each element. Regarding the first element, a state criminal
proceeding is deemed pending if it is ongoing “at the time the action is filed in federal court.” Fed.
Express Corp., 925 F.2d 962, 969 (6th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). Soloe alleges a grand jury
indicted him on October 17, 2022, and nothing in the record suggests the criminal proceeding
concluded before Soloe filed this action on October 20, 2023.1 Consequently, the first element of
Younger is satisfied.
The second and third elements are easily met. “[I]t is axiomatic that state criminal
proceedings involve important state interests.” Doe v. Lee, No. 3:21-cv-809, 2022 WL 1164228,
at *6 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 19, 2022) (citing Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 345 (1977)). Soloe’s state
criminal proceeding serves an important state interest and therefore satisfies the second element.
As to the third element, courts “must presume that the state courts are able to protect the interests
of the federal plaintiff.” Meyers v. Franklin Cnty. Ct. of Common Pleas, 23 F. App'x 201, 205 (6th
Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). And the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating the state court’s
inability to protect his interests. Id. The Court presumes that Tennessee state courts can adequately
protect Soloe’s constitutional rights, and Soloe has offered no evidence to suggest otherwise. For
these reasons, the third factor is satisfied, and Younger requires the Court to abstain, unless an
exception applies.

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In fact, Soloe’s Amended Complaint adds a claim to enjoin the prosecution against him, which he claims “is set for
October 31st, 2023.” [Doc. 4 at 1]. Thus, the record suggests Soloe’s state criminal proceeding was pending when he
filed this suit.

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Younger establishes exceptions to its applicability, including “bad faith, harassment, or
flagrant unconstitutionality.” Squire v. Coughlan, 469 F.3d 551, 557 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting
Fieger v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 740, 750 (6th Cir. 1996)). If an exception applies, the federal court can
decline to abstain. Id. Soloe appears to rely on the bad faith and harassment exceptions. In his
Objection, Soloe argues that prosecutors and courts act in bad faith whenever non-commercial
drivers like him are charged under TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-50-504. [Doc. 6 at 2]. Soloe asserts that
these prosecutions proceed “under false pretenses” and satisfy the bad faith and harassment
exceptions to the Younger doctrine. [Id. at 3].
The Sixth Circuit and Supreme Court apply the bad faith and harassment exceptions
narrowly. Specifically, “the Supreme Court has applied the bad faith/harassment exception ‘to only
one specific set of facts: where state officials initiate repeated prosecutions to harass an individual
or deter his conduct, and where the officials have no intention of following through on these
prosecutions.” Lloyd v. Doherty, No. 18-3552, 2018 WL 6584288, at *4 (6th Cir. Nov. 27, 2018)
(quoting Ken-N.K., Inc. v. Vernon Twp., 18 F. App'x 319, 324–25 n.2 (6th Cir. 2001)). Soloe does
allege in his Objection that Officer Fischer and the prosecution were aware that he had two
previous driving on a suspended license criminal cases that were dismissed. [Doc. 6 at 5]. Beyond
this assertion, however, Soloe does not specifically contend that those earlier prosecutions were
brought for purposes of harassment or “without ‘any expectation of securing valid convictions.’”
Doe, 2022 WL 1164228, at *8 (quoting Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 482 (1965)). Nor
does Soloe elaborate on the circumstances surrounding the earlier cases’ dismissals. Considering
the “extremely narrow” nature of the bad faith and harassment exceptions, the Court concludes
that Soloe has failed to demonstrate its applicability to this case. Lloyd, 2018 WL 6584288, at *4
(citations omitted).

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In any event, even if Soloe’s passing reference to the earlier prosecutions provided
evidence of bad faith or harassment, these allegations are nowhere to be found in his Complaint or
Amended Complaint. [See generally Docs. 2, 4]. Soloe only mentions the alleged earlier
prosecutions in his Objection, while his Complaint and Amended Complaint focus entirely on his
pending criminal prosecution. [Id.; Doc. 6 at 2]. The Court need not consider these new allegations
raised for the first time in Soloe’s Objection. Norton v. Barker, No. 2:21-cv-84, 2021 WL 4128865,
at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 9, 2021) (citing Peterson v. Hopson, No. 2:17-cv-02891, 2018 WL
4431409, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 14, 2018)). Accordingly, the bad faith and harassment
exceptions do not apply, and the Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that Younger requires the
Court to abstain.
B. Equitable Versus Legal Claims
When Younger applies, how the federal court must respond depends on the types of claims
asserted. If the plaintiff asserts equitable claims, such as those seeking injunctive and declaratory
relief, the federal court should dismiss them without prejudice. Lloyd, 2018 WL 6584288, at *4
(affirming dismissal of equitable claim when Younger applied); Meyers, 23 F. App'x at 206 (same).
For claims that seek damages, however, the federal court should issue a stay as to those claims and
not evaluate their merits until after the state criminal proceeding concludes. Doe, 860 F.3d at 372;
Carroll, 139 F.3d at 1075. Because state criminal proceedings can take years to complete, issuing
a stay, as opposed to ordering dismissal, protects against statute of limitations defenses that would
arise if the plaintiff was required to refile his federal suit. Carroll, 139 F.3d at 1076.
Soloe asserts claims for both equitable and legal relief. His equitable claims include those
that seek (1) dismissal of the charge against him; (2) recognition of his rights to liberty, travel, and
use of property under stare decisis; (3) a judgment that TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-50-504 only applies

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to commercial licenses; and (4) a preliminary injunction against the Monroe County prosecution.
[Doc. 2 at 6; Doc. 4 at 1]. Given Younger’s application, the Magistrate Judge correctly concluded
that these claims must be dismissed. The Court will abstain from adjudicating these equitable
claims and dismiss them without prejudice.
The result is different as to Soloe’s remaining claims. Among those claims, Soloe seeks
damages for towing expenses, traveling expenses, and legal expenses. [Doc. 2 at 6]. These claims
appear entirely frivolous, but Sixth Circuit precedent requires the Court to refrain from addressing
these requests for damages until after Soloe’s state criminal proceeding concludes. Accordingly,
the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation will be modified to the extent it recommends
dismissal of Soloe’s claims for damages. The Court will stay the case as to those claims pending
the conclusion of Soloe’s state criminal proceeding.
On this point, Soloe’s state criminal proceeding remains pending for purposes of Younger
until he “has exhausted his state appellate remedies.” Loch v. Watkins, 337 F.3d 574, 578 (6th Cir.
2003) (citations omitted). The Court notes that it lacks the ability to monitor the day-to-day
progression of Soloe’s state criminal proceeding in Monroe County and determine whether it has
concluded. For purposes of preparing this Order, the Court did peruse Monroe County’s criminal
docket and discovered an apparent entry in Soloe’s case. The entry is from October 30, 2023, and
includes a handwritten notation next to Soloe’s case caption which reads “Plea – Drive on
suspended.”2 The Court will not draw any conclusions from this entry, but it could suggest that
Soloe entered a plea in his case.
Soloe is the Plaintiff in this case, so it is his responsibility to diligently prosecute this
matter. Because the Court cannot know the status of his criminal proceedings, he must update the

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This docket entry can be found on page twenty-seven at http://monroecircuitcourt.com/pdf/Scan2023-1030_174118.pdf.

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Court regarding the status of his state criminal proceeding in Monroe County. Timely updates from
Soloe regarding his criminal case will allow this matter to be unstayed and resolved as
expeditiously as possible. To that end, Soloe is ORDERED to file a status report within 14 days
of the entry of this Order advising as to the status of his criminal case in Monroe County, Case No.
22350. In the status report, Soloe shall indicate whether he has entered a plea and/or been
sentenced, including the date of his sentencing if applicable. The status report shall also indicate
whether Soloe has appealed his conviction, if any, in state court. Soloe is placed ON NOTICE
that any failure to comply with the terms of this Order may result in dismissal of his case with
prejudice.
C. 18 U.S.C. § 242 Claim
The Magistrate Judge also recommends that Soloe’s claim brought pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 242 be dismissed. [Doc. 5 at 6]. That statute makes it a crime for a person acting under
color of law to willfully deprive another of their constitutional rights. 18 U.S.C. § 242. Reviewing
Soloe’s claim, the Magistrate Judge concluded that Soloe, as a private citizen, lacks standing to
assert a claim under a federal criminal statute. [Doc. 5 at 6]. The Court agrees, and Soloe does not
offer any objection on this point, beyond stating that he believes his right to sue under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 is dependent on violations of 18 U.S.C. § 242. [Doc. 6 at 7]. This objection is
without merit, and the Court adopts the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to dismiss Soloe’s
claim brought under 18 U.S.C. § 242.
IV.

CONCLUSION
The Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation [Doc. 5] is ADOPTED IN PART

and MODIFIED IN PART. The Report and Recommendation is adopted to the extent it
recommends dismissal of Soloe’s equitable claims. Accordingly, Soloe’s claims that seek (1)

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dismissal of the charge against him; (2) recognition of his rights to liberty, travel, and use of
property under stare decisis; (3) a judgment that TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-50-504 only applies to
commercial licenses; and (4) a preliminary injunction against the Monroe County prosecution are
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
On the other hand, the Report and Recommendation is modified insofar as it recommends
dismissal of Soloe’s remaining claims that seek damages. These claims, which include Soloe’s
request for (1) payment of $180 for recovery of his towed vehicle; (2) payment of $200 for fuel
expenses necessary to meet with attorneys and attend court; (3) compensation for “sleepless nights,
worry, legal research,” and his self-representation; and (4) compensation at a rate of $15 per hour
for time spent traveling to court, attending to court, and meeting with attorneys, are not subject to
dismissal at this time. Instead, this matter will be STAYED as to these claims pending the
conclusion of Soloe’s state criminal proceeding.
To ensure the Court remains updated as to the status of the state criminal proceeding, Soloe
is ORDERED to provide a status report within 14 days of the entry of this Order in accordance
with the terms set forth above. Once again, Soloe is placed ON NOTICE that any failure to
provide a status report may result in dismissal of his case with prejudice.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Charles E. Atchley, Jr.
c
CHARLES E. ATCHLEY, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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