Bryson v. Knox County TN et al

Filing 3

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: The Court GRANTED Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. 1 ]; The Court permits Plaintiff's excessive force claim against Defendant Robert Cooter in his individual capacity to PR OCEED; and The Court DISMISSED Plaintiff's remaining claims; ORDERS Plaintiff to complete the service packet and return it to the Clerks Office within twenty-one (21) days of entry of this Order. At that time, the summons will be signed and sealed by the Clerk and forwarded to the U.S. Marshal for service pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4; ORDERS Defendant to answer or otherwise respond to the Complaint within twenty-one (21) days from the date of service. Signed by District Judge Katherine A Crytzer on 9/24/2024. (BJL)*Mailed this order and service packet for Defendant Robert Cooter to Danielle E Bryson 791 Old Highway 70 Harriman, TN 37748

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
DANIELLE E. BRYSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
KNOX COUNTY, TN., et al.,
Defendants.

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No.:

3:23-CV-422-KAC-JEM

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Danielle E. Bryson (“Plaintiff”), a former prisoner, filed (1) a pro se civil rights action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 concerning events that transpired while she was housed in the Roger D.
Wilson Detention Facility [Doc. 2] and (2) a motion to proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. 1]. For
the reasons set forth below, the Court (1) GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma
pauperis, (2) permits her excessive force claim against Defendant Robert Cooter in his individual
capacity to PROCEED, and (3) DISMISSES all remaining claims and Defendants.
I.

MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court may generally “authorize the commencement,

prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein,
without prepayment of fees or security therefor, by a person who submits an affidavit that includes
a statement of all assets such prisoner possesses that the person is unable to pay such fees or give
security therefor.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Although the relevant statute specifically references
the “assets such prisoner possesses,” the Sixth Circuit has construed the statute to extend to nonprisoners who apply to proceed in forma pauperis. See Floyd v. U.S. Postal Serv., 105 F.3d 274,
275-76 (6th Cir. 1997), superseded by rule on other grounds as stated in Callihan v. Schneider,
178 F.3d 800 (6th Cir. 1999). When assessing whether to permit an individual to proceed without

paying the filing fee, the Court assesses “whether the court costs can be paid without undue
hardship.” Foster v. Cuyahoga Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 21 F. App’x 239, 240 (6th Cir.
2001). Here, it appears from Plaintiff’s Motion that she lacks sufficient financial resources to pay
the filing fee without undue hardship [See Doc. 1]. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s
motion to proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. 1].
II.

SCREENING OF COMPLAINT
A.

Screening Standard

Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, this Court must screen the Complaint
and sua sponte dismiss any claims that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim for relief, or
are against a defendant who is immune. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Hill v.
Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Because Hill’s lawsuit seeks redress from
governmental officers, and because Hill proceeded in forma pauperis, the district court screened
Hill’s complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)).”).
The dismissal standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662
(2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) “governs dismissals for failure state
a claim under [28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A] because the relevant statutory language
tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6)” of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Hill, 630 F.3d at
470-71. Thus, to survive an initial review, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
Allegations that give rise to a mere possibility that a plaintiff might later establish
undisclosed facts supporting recovery are not well-pled and do not state a plausible claim.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570. Further, formulaic and conclusory recitations of the elements of
a claim that are not supported by specific facts are insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief.
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Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681. However, the Supreme Court has instructed that courts should liberally
construe pro se pleadings filed in civil rights cases and hold them to a less stringent standard than
“formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
B.

Plaintiff’s Allegations

At approximately 7:00 p.m. on December 9, 2022, at the Roger D. Wilson Detention
Facility, Officer Robert Cooter slammed Plaintiff’s head into the wall and threw her to the ground
[Doc. 2 at 2, 4]. Officers accused Plaintiff of resisting, but “proof of video shows” officers used
force against her “for no reason” [Id. at 2].

Plaintiff’s left knee was broken during the

incident [Id.]. “Each [Defendant] officer and nurse was involved or witnessed the incident or
allowed it to happen” [Id.]. No one intervened to help Plaintiff, and she was placed in a holding
cell for twenty-three (23) days “with no assistance” [Id.]. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages for
mental and physical injuries, court costs, and reimbursement for her medical bills against
Defendants Knox County, Tennessee; Robert Cooter; Lt. B. Keck; Nurse Seaton; Officer Burgess;
Lateesha Fritts; Sheriff Tom Spangler; and Chief Bernie Lyons [Id. at 2, 3].
C.

Analysis

A claim for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires a plaintiff to establish that a “person”
acting “under color of” state law deprived her of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws” of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It is unclear whether Plaintiff
was a pretrial detainee or an inmate at the time of the incident in the Complaint. And this status
makes a difference in the applicable law. If Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee, the Fourteenth
Amendment would apply to her Section 1983 claims. See Lawler as next friend of Lawler v.
Hardeman Cnty., Tenn., 93 F.4th 919, 926 (6th Cir. 2024). If, instead, she was an inmate, the
Eighth Amendment would apply. See id. For purposes of screening Plaintiff’s Complaint, the
Court presumes that she is entitled to the arguably greater protections of the Fourteenth
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Amendment,1 unless otherwise noted. Additionally, Plaintiff has not specified whether she is
suing Defendants in their individual capacities, their official capacities, or both. Again, out of an
abundance of caution, the Court presumes Plaintiff intends to bring suit against each Defendant in
his or her official and individual capacities.
1. Official-Capacity Liability
For Plaintiff to state a claim against Defendant Knox County, or against any of the
individual Defendants in their official capacities, she must plausibly allege that a custom or policy
of Knox County caused a violation of her constitutional rights.2 See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658, 708 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (explaining a municipality can only be held
liable for a constitutional violation when the violation resulted from “implementation of [the
municipality’s] official policies or established customs”). But Plaintiff’s Complaint does not
plausibly allege that a custom or policy of Defendant Knox County caused any violation of her
constitutional rights. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Defendant Knox County and all
official-capacity claims against the individual Defendants.
2. Individual-Capacity Liability
To state a claim against an individual Defendant, Plaintiff must adequately plead that the
Defendant, by his or her own actions, has violated the Constitution. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676;
see also Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (providing that “a complaint

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See Spencer v. Bouchard, 449 F.3d 721, 727 (6th Cir. 2006) (describing the protections
of the Due Process Clause to be “similar if not greater” than those under the Eighth Amendment)
(citing Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849-50 (1998)); see also Griffith v. Franklin
Cnty., Ky., 975 F.3d 554, 566 (6th Cir. 2020).
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Plaintiff’s claims against the individual Defendants in their official capacities are actually
against the individual Defendants’ employer, Knox County, Tennessee. See Kentucky v. Graham,
473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (holding “an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to
be treated as a suit against the entity”); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n. 55
(1978) (“[O]fficial-capacity suits generally represent only another way of pleading an action
against an entity of which an officer is an agent.”).
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must allege that the defendants were personally involved in the alleged deprivation of federal
rights” to state a claim upon which relief may be granted). This requirement exists because
constitutional liability cannot attach to a Defendant solely based on his or her position of authority.
See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“[O]ur precedents establish . . . that Government officials may not be
held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat
superior.”); Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (finding that liability under Section 1983 may not be imposed
merely because a defendant “employs a tortfeasor”).
“[A] supervisory official’s failure to supervise, control or train” is “not actionable [under
Section 1983] unless the supervisor either encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in
some way directly participated in it.” See Peatross v. City of Memphis, 818 F.3d 233, 242 (6th
Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).

“[A]t a minimum,” a plaintiff must show that a supervisor

“implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the
offending officers.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Troutman v. Louisville Metro Dep’t of Corrs.,
979 F.3d 472, 487-88 (6th Cir. 2020).
To establish an excessive force claim against an officer who fails to intervene in another
officer’s unconstitutional use of force, a plaintiff “must prove that ‘the officer observed or had
reason to know that the excessive force would be or was being used and that the officer had both
the opportunity and the means to prevent the harm from occurring.’” Wright v. City of Euclid,
Ohio, 962 F.3d 852, 872 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Smith v. City of Troy, Ohio, 874 F.3d 938, 94546 (6th Cir. 2017)).
In the body of her Complaint, Plaintiff does not attach any wrongdoing to any particular
individual [See generally Doc. 2]. However, she attached an “Incident Report Form” and “Use of
Force Report” to the Complaint indicating that Officer Robert Cooter was the officer involved in
the use of force incident, and that Nurse Seaton “attempted to evaluate” Plaintiff following the use
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of force [Id. at 4-6]. These forms also identify Defendant Keck as Officer Cooter’s supervisor and
Lateesha Fritts as the facility commander [Id. at 5-6].
a.

Defendants Keck, Burgess, Fritts, Spangler, and Lyons

Plaintiff has not identified any personal involvement in the alleged offense by Defendants
Keck, Burgess, Fritts, Spangler, or Lyons that would give rise to individual Section 1983 liability.
And she has not set forth any facts to support a plausible inference that any of the supervisory
Defendants “authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in” the alleged unconstitutional act.
See Peatross, 818 F.3d at 242. Additionally, to the extent Plaintiff alleges that one or more of
these Defendants was “involved” with, “witnessed,” or “allowed [the allegedly excessive use of
force] to happen[,]” she has not set forth any specific facts plausibly alleging that any Defendant
“had both the opportunity and the means to prevent the harm from occurring.” See Wright, 962
F.3d at 872 (cleaned up). Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Defendants Keck,
Burgess, Fritts, Spangler, or Lyons, and the Court DISMISSES these Defendants.
b.

Defendant Nurse Seaton

Plaintiff does not mention Defendant Nurse Seaton by name in the substantive allegations
of her Complaint, but she does allege that “no one helped [her] after the incident” and that she
“was put in the holding cell for 23 days with no assistance” [See Doc. 2 at 2]. The appended
Incident Report notes that Defendant Nurse Seaton “attempted to evaluate” Plaintiff following the
use of force [Id. at 4]. Liberally construing Plaintiff’s allegations, the Court presumes that Plaintiff
intends to assert a claim against Nurse Seaton for the denial of medical care. To state a claim for
inadequate medical care, Plaintiff, a presumed pretrial detainee for her benefit, must show that (1)
she “had a sufficiently serious medical need” and (2) the relevant defendant “acted deliberately
(not accidentally), [and] also recklessly ‘in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is

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either known or so obvious that it should be known.’” Helphenstine v. Lewis Cnty., Ky., 60 F.4th
305, 317 (6th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted).
Here, although Plaintiff claims her knee was broken during the use of force incident, she
does not allege that Nurse Seaton was aware of that fact, or that she requested medical care from
Nurse Seaton and was denied. Therefore, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that would allow the
Court to plausibly infer that Nurse Seaton “acted deliberately (not accidentally), [and] also
recklessly ‘in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that
it should be known.’” See Helphenstine, 60 F.4th at 317 (citation omitted). Accordingly, Plaintiff
has failed to state a plausible Section 1983 inadequate medical care claim against Defendant
Seaton, and the Court DISMISSES this Defendant.
c.

Defendant Robert Cooter

The reports attached to Plaintiff’s Complaint associate Defendant Cooter with the
challenged use of force [Doc. 2 at 4-6]. Because the law applying to this claim is different
depending on whether Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or inmate at the time of the incident in the
Complaint, the Court specifically screens Plaintiff’s excessive force claim against Defendant
Robert Cooter under both the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments. To establish a Fourteenth
Amendment excessive force claim, a pretrial detainee must show that “the force purposely or
knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S.
389, 397 (2015). An Eighth Amendment excessive force claim has both a subjective and objective
component. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992). To satisfy the objective component “an
excessive-force claimant must show something more than de minimis force.” Leary v. Livingston
Cnty., 528 F.3d 438, 443 (6th Cir. 2008). To satisfy the subjective component, a plaintiff must
show that the officers used force “maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing
harm” rather than in a “good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6.
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Here, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Cooter falsely accused her of resisting and used
unnecessary force against her, “slam[ing]” her head “into the wall” and throwing her on her knees
“to the ground for no reason” [Doc. 2 at 2]. Accepting these allegations as true, as the Court must
at this stage, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that Defendant Cooter’s use of force was
unconstitutional under both the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments. Thus, the Court permits
Plaintiff’s excessive force claim to PROCEED against Defendant Cooter individually.
III.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above:
1.

The Court GRANTED Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. 1];

2.

The Court permits Plaintiff’s excessive force claim against Defendant Robert
Cooter in his individual capacity to PROCEED; and

3.

The Court DISMISSED Plaintiff’s remaining claims.

In addition, the Court:
1. DIRECTS the Clerk to send Plaintiff a service packet (a blank summons and USM 285
form) for Defendant Robert Cooter;
2. ORDERS Plaintiff to complete the service packet and return it to the Clerk’s Office
within twenty-one (21) days of entry of this Order. At that time, the summons will
be signed and sealed by the Clerk and forwarded to the U.S. Marshal for service
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4;
3. NOTIFIES Plaintiff that if she fails to timely return the completed service packet, this
action will be dismissed;
4. ORDERS Defendant to answer or otherwise respond to the Complaint within twentyone (21) days from the date of service. If Defendant fails to timely respond to the
Complaint, it may result in entry of judgment by default;
5. ORDERS Plaintiff to immediately inform the Court and Defendant, or his counsel of
record, of any address change in writing. Under Local Rule 83.13, it is the duty of a
pro se party to promptly notify the Clerk and the other parties to the proceedings of any
change in his address, to monitor the progress of the case, and to prosecute or defend
the action diligently. E.D. Tenn. L.R. 83.13. Failure to provide a correct address to
this Court within fourteen (14) days of any change in address may result in the dismissal
of this action.
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SO ORDERED.
ENTER:

s/ Katherine A. Crytzer
KATHERINE A. CRYTZER
United States District Judge

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