Gillespie v. Matthews

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: 1. Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of fees [Doc. 4 ] is GRANTED and Plaintiff is ASSESSED the civil filing fee of $350.00; 2. The custodian of Plaintiff's i nmate trust account is DIRECTED to submit the filing fee to the Clerk in the manner set forth above; 3. The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail a copy of this memorandum opinion and order to the custodian of inmate accounts at the institution where Plaintiff i s now confined and to the Courts financial deputy; 4. This action will be DISMISSED as duplicative; and 5. The Court CERTIFIES that any appeal from this action would not be taken in good faith and would Signed by District Judge Thomas A Varlan on 4/8/2024. (BJL)*Mailed to Gordon W Gillespie 104482 and to the custodian of inmate accounts. BLOUNT COUNTY DETENTION CENTER 920 E LAMAR ALEXANDER PARKWAY MARYVILLE, TN 37804. *Sent via ad hoc to the Court's Financial Deputy Clerks.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
GORDON W. GILLESPIE,
Plaintiff,
v.
KENNETH MATTHEWS,
Defendant.

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No.:

3:23-CV-458-TAV-JEM

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
The Court is in receipt of a pro se complaint for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [Doc. 1]
and a motion to proceed without prepayment of fees [Doc. 4]. For the reasons set forth below,
Plaintiff’s motion to proceed without prepayment of fees [Doc. 4] will be GRANTED, and
the complaint [Doc. 1] will be DISMISSED as duplicative.
I.

FILING FEE
It appears from Plaintiff’s motion to proceed without prepayment of fees [Doc. 4] that

he cannot pay the filing fee in a lump sum. Accordingly, this motion [Doc. 4] is GRANTED.
Plaintiff is ASSESSED the civil filing fee of $350.00. The custodian of Plaintiff’s
inmate trust account is DIRECTED to submit to the Clerk, U.S. District Court, 800 Market
Street, Suite 130, Knoxville, Tennessee 37902, as an initial partial payment, whichever is the
greater of: (a) twenty percent (20%) of the average monthly deposits to Plaintiff’s inmate trust
account; or (b) twenty percent (20%) of the average monthly balance in his inmate trust
account for the six-month period preceding the filing of the complaint.

28 U.S.C. §

1915(b)(1)(A) and (B). Thereafter, the custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust account is directed
to submit twenty percent (20%) of Plaintiff’s preceding monthly income (or income credited

to Plaintiff’s trust account for the preceding month), but only when such monthly income
exceeds ten dollars ($10.00), until the full filing fee of three hundred fifty dollars ($350.00) as
authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) has been paid to the Clerk. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
To ensure compliance with this fee-collection procedure, the Clerk is DIRECTED to
provide a copy of this memorandum opinion and order to the Court’s financial deputy and the
custodian of inmate accounts at the institution where Plaintiff is now confined. This order
shall be placed in Plaintiff’s prison file and follow him if he is transferred to another
correctional institution.
II.

COMPLAINT
In this action, Plaintiff sues Kenneth Matthews for denying him medical care [Doc. 1,

p. 1]. Plaintiff specifically states that after Matthews reviewed Plaintiff’s x-rays and medical
file and admitted that Plaintiff “desperately needs” a bone fusion surgery due to missing
cartilage in his ankle area, which he called “a ‘serious problem,’” Plaintiff told Matthews that
he is spending two years in the Anderson County Detention Facility before release to a federal
hold. Matthews then stated that “‘the feds can deal with this when you get there,’” and that if
“‘they operate on every inmate who needed surgery, people would just come to jail for
surgery’” [Id.]. As relief, Plaintiff seeks “fair and just compensation and any other punishment
in which this Honorable Court would see fit” [Id. at 2].
However, the Court is aware that, prior to Plaintiff filing his complaint in this action,
he filed a § 1983 complaint arising out of the same denial of medical care in this District.
Gillespie v. Anderson Cnty., No. 3:23-CV-390-CEA-DCP (filed Oct. 10, 2023). Plaintiff’s
other § 1983 action is proceeding against Anderson County based on the claim that Matthews
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denied Plaintiff medical care for his ankle in a manner that is substantively identical to his
allegations in the instant case, and that this denial of medical care was due to a custom or
policy of Anderson County. Id. at Doc. 6, pp. 2–4.
As (1) the facts underlying Plaintiff’s first-filed action for violation of § 1983 are
substantively identical to the facts underlying the claim that Plaintiff seeks to bring herein
against Matthews; (2) Matthews’s actions formed the basis for Plaintiff’s pending § 1983
action against Anderson County; and (3) determination of one of Plaintiff’s pending § 1983
actions would leave very little, if anything at all, for the other to determine, this action is
duplicative. Houston v. Caruso, No. 2:08-CV-124, 2009 WL 579411, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Mar.
5, 2009) (“Where the factual allegations are the same and the actions of the newly named
defendants merely formed a partial basis for the previous suit, the suit against the new
defendants may be found to be duplicative.” (citing Bailey v. Johnson, 846 F.2d 1019, 1021
(5th Cir. 1988) for its affirmance of a dismissal of a prisoner’s second § 1983 complaint where
the second complaint named different defendants)); see also Smith v. S.E.C., 129 F.3d 356,
361 (6th Cir. 1997) (providing that, to be duplicative, a case “‘must be materially on all fours
with the other . . . . [T]he issues ‘must have such an identity that a determination in one action
leaves little or nothing to be determined in the other.’”).
Federal court try to avoid “duplicative litigation.” Smith, 129 F.3d at 360 (citing
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976)). Where
a court is faced with duplicative cases, it may stay one of the cases, allow both cases to proceed,
or “enjoin the parties from proceeding in” one of cases. Id. In determining which of these

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options to choose, courts generally proceed based on “the rule of thumb” that “the court in
which an action was first filed” should handle the entire action. Id.
Accordingly, this action will be DISMISSED as duplicative. Should Plaintiff still wish
to proceed with his claims against Matthews, he may file a motion seeking to add him as a
defendant in his Anderson County case. United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S.
715, 724 (1966) (providing that joinder of parties is “strongly encouraged” for purposes of
judicial economy and fairness where it is appropriate).
III.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above:
1.

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of fees [Doc. 4] is
GRANTED;

2.

The custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust account is DIRECTED to submit the
filing fee to the Clerk in the manner set forth above;

3.

The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail a copy of this memorandum opinion and order
to the custodian of inmate accounts at the institution where Plaintiff is now
confined and to the Court’s financial deputy;

4.

This action will be DISMISSED as duplicative; and

5.

The Court CERTIFIES that any appeal from this action would not be taken in
good faith and would be totally frivolous. See Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure.

AN APPROPRIATE JUDGMENT ORDER WILL ENTER.

s/ Thomas A. Varlan
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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