Simerly v. Blount County Jail Medical Staff et al

Filing 10

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. 1 ] is GRANTED; Plaintiff will be ASSESSED the civil filing fee of $350.00. Even liberally construing the complaint in Pla intiffs favor, it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under § 1983, and this action will be DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A; and The Court CERTIFIES that any appeal from this action would n ot be taken in good faith and would be totally frivolous.Signed by District Judge Thomas A Varlan on 8/29/2024. (BJL)*Mailed to Anthony Lynn Simerly and to the Custodian Of Inmate Accounts at BLOUNT COUNTY DETENTION CENTER 920 E LAMAR ALEXANDER PARKWAY MARYVILLE, TN 37804. *Sent to the Court's Financial Deputy Clerks.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
ANTHONY LYNN SIMERLY,
Plaintiff,
v.
BLOUNT COUNTY JAIL MEDICAL
STAFF and NURSE BRITTANY,
Defendants.

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No.:

3:24-CV-101-TAV-JEM

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, a pretrial detainee1 housed in the Blount County Jail, filed a pro se civil
rights action against Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [Doc. 2] and a motion for leave
to proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. 1] with supporting documents [Doc. 7]. For the reasons
set forth below, the Court will GRANT Plaintiff’s motion [Doc. 1] but DISMISS this
action for failure to state a claim.
I.

Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
It appears from Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. 1] and

accompanying documents [Doc. 7] that he lacks the financial resources to pay the filing
fee in a lump sum. Accordingly, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, this motion [Doc. 1] will
be GRANTED.

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Plaintiff does not disclose his custodial status in his complaint, but he is listed as a pretrial
felon by the Blount County Sheriff’s Office. See Blount County Sheriff’s Office, Inmate Lookup
System, http://ils.bcso.com/ (last visited April 22, 2024). Accordingly, the Court will assume that
he was a pretrial detainee at the time of the incidents alleged in his complaint.

Plaintiff will be ASSESSED the civil filing fee of $350.00. The custodian of
Plaintiff’s inmate trust account will be DIRECTED to submit to the Clerk, U.S. District
Court, 800 Market Street, Suite 130, Knoxville, Tennessee 37902, as an initial partial
payment, whichever is the greater of: (a) twenty percent (20%) of the average monthly
deposits to Plaintiff’s inmate trust account; or (b) twenty percent (20%) of the average
monthly balance in his inmate trust account for the six-month period preceding the filing
of the complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b) (1) (A) and (B). Thereafter, the custodian of
Plaintiff’s inmate trust account is directed to submit twenty percent (20%) of Plaintiff’s
preceding monthly income (or income credited to Plaintiff’s trust account for the preceding
month), but only when such monthly income exceeds ten dollars ($10.00), until the full
filing fee of three hundred fifty dollars ($350.00) as authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)
has been paid to the Clerk. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
To ensure compliance with this fee-collection procedure, the Clerk will be
DIRECTED to mail a copy of this memorandum opinion to the custodian of inmate
accounts at the institution where Plaintiff is now confined. The Clerk will also be
DIRECTED to furnish a copy of this memorandum opinion to the Court’s financial
deputy. This memorandum opinion shall be placed in Plaintiff’s prison file and follow him
if he is transferred to another correctional institution.
II.

Screening Complaint
A.

Screening Standard

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), district courts must screen
prisoner complaints and sua sponte dismiss any claims that are frivolous or malicious, fail
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to state a claim for relief, or are against a defendant who is immune. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Benson v. O’Brian, 179 F.3d 1014 (6th Cir. 1999). The
dismissal standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662
(2009) and Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) “governs dismissals
for failure to state a claim under [28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A] because the
relevant statutory language tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6)” of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). Thus, to survive an
initial review under the PLRA, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
Courts liberally construe pro se pleadings filed in civil rights cases and hold them
to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, allegations that give rise to a mere possibility that a
plaintiff might later establish undisclosed facts supporting recovery are not well-pled and
do not state a plausible claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570. Further, formulaic and
conclusory recitations of the elements of a claim which are not supported by specific facts
are insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681.
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that he was
deprived of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
Braley v. City of Pontiac, 906 F.2d 220, 223 (6th Cir. 1990) (stating that “[s]ection 1983
does not itself create any constitutional rights; it creates a right of action for the vindication
of constitutional guarantees found elsewhere”).
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B.

Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff has chronic high blood pressure, which is checked daily at the Blount
County Jail, and for which he receives three different medications [Doc. 2, p. 4]. He also
receives medications for other conditions [Id.]. At around 9:30 a.m. on February 27, 2024,
Plaintiff was awakened by Officer Beal and Nurse Brittany to receive his medications [Id.
at 3]. Nurse Brittany told Plaintiff that he “had to put [his] stripes on” —presumably
meaning to get dressed—to receive his medication [Id. at 4]. But on a prior occasion when
Nurse Brittany worked Plaintiff’s pod, she gave Plaintiff his medication “without [his]
stripes on” [Id.]. And on that occasion Plaintiff witnessed Nurse Brittany tell Officer
Burger that she had made inmates angry by forcing them to get dressed to receive their
medications. Id. Thus, when Nurse Brittany refused Plaintiff his medication on February
27, Plaintiff told Officer Beal that “it is not required [for an inmate] to have [his] stripes
on other than when [he is] in the dayroom and that [he] would be filing a grievance” [Id.].
Nurse Brittany then stated, “file away all day long” and refused to give Plaintiff his
medications [Id.].
On February 29, 2024, Officer Beal informed Plaintiff that he had reviewed the
Inmate Handbook, and it states, as Plaintiff had informed Nurse Brittany, that inmates are
only required to “have [their] stripes on in the dayroom” [Id.].
Aggrieved by these incidents, Plaintiff filed the instant suit against Nurse Brittany
“with Medico” and the Blount County Jail’s medical staff seeking monetary damages and
to hold Nurse Brittany accountable [Id.].

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C.

Analysis

Plaintiff does not state whether he is suing Defendants in their individual capacities,
their official capacities, or both [See generally Doc. 2]. Out of an abundance of caution,
the Court will assume that Plaintiff has sued Defendants in both capacities and address
Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims before turning to a consideration of each Defendant’s
individual liability.
1.

Official-Capacity Claims

By suing Defendants in their official capacities, Plaintiff is suing the entities that
employ them.

See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (holding “an

official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the
entity”); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978) (“[O]fficial-capacity
suits generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which
an officer is an agent.”). Here, that is Blount County as to the Blount County Jail’s medical
staff and either Blount County or Medico as to Nurse Brittany. But to maintain a claim
against either entity, Plaintiff must allege facts from which this Court could infer that his
constitutional rights were violated because of an unconstitutional policy or custom. See
Monell, 436 U.S. at 708 (Powell, J., concurring) (explaining a municipality can only be
held liable for harms that result from a constitutional violation when that underlying
violation resulted from “implementation of its official policies or established customs”);
Braswell v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 419 F. App’x 622, 627 (6th Cir. 2011) (holding plaintiff
must allege “a policy or well-settled custom of the company was the ‘moving force’ behind
the alleged deprivation” of his rights) (citation omitted).
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Here, Plaintiff has not alleged that an official policy or custom of Blount County
and/or Medico was the moving force behind any alleged deprivation of his rights.
Accordingly, any claim against Defendants in their official capacities will be
DISMISSED.
2.

Individual Defendants

To state a claim against Defendants in their respective individual capacities,
Plaintiff must adequately plead that each Defendant, through his or her own actions, has
violated the Constitution. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; see also Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x
762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (providing that “a complaint must allege that the defendants were
personally involved in the alleged deprivation of federal rights” to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted). This requirement exists because constitutional liability cannot
attach to a Defendant solely based on his or her position of authority. See Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 676 (“[O]ur precedents establish . . . that Government officials may not be held liable
for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat
superior.”); Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (finding that liability under § 1983 may not be
imposed merely because a defendant “employs a tortfeasor”).
First, with regard to the Blount County Jail’s medical staff, the Court notes that the
mere filing of a complaint does not commence a civil action against that unidentified party.
See Smith v. City of Chattanooga, No. 1:08-CV-63, 2009 WL 3762961, at *5 (E.D. Tenn.
Nov. 4, 2009) (“A civil action cannot be commenced against a fictitious party such as an
unknown John Doe.” (citing Bufalino v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 404 F.2d 1023, 1028 (6th Cir.
1968))). Instead, “until an amendment adding additional defendants has been permitted by
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the court,” allegations against an unknown defendant “are merely ‘surplusage[.]’” Dunn
v. Paducah Int’l Raceway, 599 F. Supp. 612, 613 n. 1 (W.D. Ky. 1984) (citing Hannah v.
Majors, 35 F.R.D. 179, 180 (W.D. Mo. 1964)). Therefore, Plaintiff cannot maintain suit
against unidentified members of the Blount County Jail’s medical staff. Additionally,
Plaintiff could not otherwise sustain an action against these individuals, as he has not
alleged any facts suggesting that any unidentified member of the Blount County Jail’s
medical staff was personally involved in any decision to deny him medical care.
Accordingly, Blount County Jail’s medical staff will be DISMISSED.
This brings the Court to the gravamen of Plaintiff’s complaint—that Nurse Brittany
denied him medical care. The Court notes that prison officials have a duty to “ensure that
inmates receive adequate food, clothing shelter, and medical care” and “take reasonable
measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832
(1994) (citation omitted). Deliberate indifference to those needs violates an inmate’s
constitutional rights. Richmond v. Huq, 885 F.3d 928, 937-38 (6th Cir. 2018) (citation
omitted).
Because Plaintiff is presumably a pretrial detainee, his claims are analyzed under
the Fourteenth, rather than the Eighth, Amendment. Brawner v. Scott Cnty., 14 F.4th 585,
596 (6th Cir. 2021). Under the Fourteenth Amendment, pretrial detainees cannot be
subjected to punishment prior to a determination of guilt. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576
U.S. 389, 400 (2015) (“[P]retrial detainees (unlike convicted prisoners) cannot be punished
at all, much less ‘maliciously and sadistically.’”) (citation omitted). Therefore, to state a
claim that Nurse Brittany exposed him to punishment by failing to obtain adequate medical
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care for him, Plaintiff must show that (1) he had a sufficiently serious medical need, and
(2) Nurse Brittany “acted deliberately (not accidentally), [and] also recklessly ‘in the face
of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that it should be
known.’” Helphenstine v. Lewis Cnty., 60 F.4th 305, 317 (6th Cir. 2023) (citations
omitted).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that he missed one day of medication. When a claim is based
on “occasional missed doses of medication[,]” Plaintiff must plead facts demonstrating that
the missed dose of medication is sufficiently serious. Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390
F.3d 890, 897–98 (6th Cir. 2004). Otherwise, an occasional missed dose of medication
does not give rise to a constitutional claim. See Bellotto v. Cnty. of Orange, 248 F. App’x
232, 237 (2nd Cir. 2007) (finding county jail did not show deliberate indifference to
medical condition of pretrial detainee when he missed doses of medication due to
inadequate monitoring and the only consequence was anxiety attack, which resulted in no
physical injuries); Mayweather v. Foti, 958 F.2d 91, 91 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding an
occasional missed dose of medication does not, without more, constitute deliberate
indifference); Zentmeyer v. Kendall Cnty., 220 F.3d 805, 812 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that
the occasional missed dose of medicine, without more, does not violate the Eighth
Amendment); Stone v. Cheboygan Cnty., No. 00-CV-10404-BC, 2002 WL 507504, at *5
(E.D. Mich. Apr. 4, 2002) (concluding that “[a]n occasional missed dose [of medicine],
and missed scheduled, non-emergency medical appointments, do not pose a ‘substantial
risk of serious harm’” sufficient to satisfy the objective component of a constitutional
claim). Plaintiff has not alleged that he suffered any harm because he missed his daily (or
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morning) dose of medication on February 27, 2024, and his allegations are insufficiently
serious to give rise to a constitutional claim. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against Nurse
Brittany will be DISMISSED.
III.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above:
1.

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. 1] is
GRANTED;

2.

The custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust account is DIRECTED to submit
the filing fee to the Clerk in the manner set forth above;

3.

The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail a copy of this memorandum opinion to the
custodian of inmate accounts at the institution where Plaintiff is now
confined and to the Court’s financial deputy;

4.

Even liberally construing the complaint in Plaintiff’s favor, it fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted under § 1983, and this action will be
DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A; and

5.

The Court CERTIFIES that any appeal from this action would not be taken
in good faith and would be totally frivolous. See Rule 24 of the Federal Rules
of Appellate Procedure.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Thomas A. Varlan
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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