Milstead v. Bedford County Sheriff's Department et al

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM Signed by District Judge Harry S Mattice, Jr on 2/4/14. (mailed to plaintiff)(GRE, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
at WINCHESTER
BRIAN KEITH MILSTEAD,
Plaintiff,
v.
BEDFORD COUNTY SHERIFF’S
DEPARTMENT, ASSISTANT
DISTRICT ATTORNEY MIKE
RANDALLS, ASSISTANT DISTRICT
ATTORNEY ANN LACY FILER,
JUDGE ROBERT CRIGLER, APRIL
HERNANDEZ, PUBLIC DEFENDER
DONNA ORR HARGROVE, AND
PUBLIC DEFENDER ANDREW
JACKSON DEARING, III,
Defendants.

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No. 4:12-CV-52
Mattice/Carter

MEMORANDUM
Brian Keith Milstead (“Plaintiff”), a pro se prisoner, filed a civil rights complaint
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court, Middle District of
Tennessee, Nashville Division (Doc. 1). After assessing the fee, the Middle District
transferred the case to this Court since the claims arose in Bedford County which lies
within the Eastern District of Tennessee (Doc. 3). See 28 U.S.C. § 123(a)(4).
Plaintiff brings suit against the Bedford County Sheriff’s Department; Assistant
District Attorneys Mike Randalls and Ann Lacy Filer (“ADA Randalls” and “ADA Filer”),
Judge Robert Crigler (“Judge Crigler”), April Hernandez (“Ms. Hernandez”), a person he
describes as a “housewife,” and Public Defenders Donna Orr Hargrove and Andrew
Jackson Dearing, III (“PD Hargrove” and “PD Dearing”). Although Plaintiff’s complaint is
difficult to decipher, the Court discerns Plaintiff’s claims are based on a July 2, 2004,

incident resulting in his interrogation, arrest, and prosecution; subsequent plea bargain
that occurred on November 15, 2004; and the denial of post-conviction relief on
September 11, 2005. Based on those events, the Court discerns Plaintiff is generally
alleging the Defendants orchestrated his alleged illegal confinement (Doc. 1, at 5-7).
Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages “for the time and pain and suffing [sic] and
mental stress that [he has gone] through since [he was] wrongfully in prisoned [sic] all
these years[.]” (Doc. 1, at 8).
For the reasons set forth herein, no service shall issue, and this complaint will be
sua sponte DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for the reasons explained herein (Doc. 1).
I.

SCREENING OF COMPLAINT
The Court screens the complaint to determine whether it should be dismissed as

frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and
§ 1915A. When performing this task, the Court bears in mind that the pleadings of pro
se litigants must be liberally construed and “held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citing
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Nevertheless, the complaint must be
sufficient “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), which simply means the factual content pled by a
plaintiff must permit a court “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

Therefore, the Court construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff
and accepts all well-pleaded allegations of fact in the complaint as being true. Erickson
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007). When a factual allegation is capable of more than one
2 

reasonable inference, it must be construed in Plaintiff’s favor. Saglioccolo v. Eagle Ins.
Co., 112 F.3d 226, 228 (6th Cir. 1997). The Court may not dismiss a complaint merely
because the Court does not believe the allegations of fact set forth in the complaint. In
re Sofamor Danek Group, Inc., 123 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir. 1997).
The Court is not required to accept as true mere legal conclusions and
unwarranted inferences of fact. Jackson v. City of Columbus, 194 F.3d 737, 745 (6th
Cir. 1999). The complaint must do more than recite bare assertions of legal conclusions
without supporting allegations of material facts. Evans v. Pearson Enterprises Inc., 434
F.3d 839, 847 (6th Cir. 2006). Conclusory allegations or bare legal conclusions will not
suffice as factual allegations. Followell v. Mills, 317 Fed. Appx. 501 (6th Cir. March 18,
2009), available at 2009 WL 723132, *4; see also Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544 (2007) (complaint must contain more than statement of facts that merely
creates speculation or suspicion of a legally cognizable cause of action).
Thus, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct.
1937, 1949 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability
requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.

When a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a

defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
entitlement to relief” Id. (Internal punctuation and citations omitted).

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During the screening process, the Court is mindful that where a deficiency in the
complaint is able to be cured, Plaintiff shall be permitted to amend his complaint to cure
such deficiency. See LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944 (6th Cir. 2013) (overruling in
part, McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997), and holding a district court
can allow a plaintiff to amend his complaint even when the complaint is subject to
dismissal under the PLRA). However, a complaint must contain more than “labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action[;]” it must
contain factual allegations sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted).
II.

CIVIL COMPLAINT
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a

constitutional right by a person acting under color of state law. See AirTrans, Inc. v.
Mead, 389 F.3d 594, 598 (6th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff brings this § 1983 case against Ms.
Hernandez based on an alleged false July 2, 2004, police report she made. Based on
Ms. Hernandez’s alleged false police report, the “Sheriff[‘s] Department” picked Plaintiff
up and questioned him after he requested counsel.
As the Court understands Plaintiff’s allegations, the initial plea agreement
provided he would “go free.” Instead of enforcing the original plea agreement to dismiss
the charge, on November 15, 2004, after Plaintiff failed a “mental health evaluation,” the
prosecutors and defense counsel made a deal resulting in his incarceration. Judge
Crigler denied Plaintiff post-conviction relief.
Thus, the main thrust of Plaintiff’s complaint is that his illegal confinement was
unconstitutionally orchestrated by the defendants when Ms. Hernandez submitted a
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false police report, the Sheriff’s Department questioned him without counsel, the
prosecutors and defense counsel failed to enforce the initial plea agreement to dismiss
the case, and Judge Crigler denied his request for post-conviction relief.

Notably,

neither the record nor the Court’s research reveals the factual background of Plaintiff’s
underlying criminal case.
III.

ANALYSIS
A.

Improper Defendants

Plaintiff has named several defendants who are private individuals or entities not
subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, i.e., Bedford County Sheriff’s Department; PD
Hargrove, PD Dearing, and Ms. Hernandez, a private citizen. An essential element for
all claims brought under § 1983 is a showing that the defendant acted under color of
state law. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978) (A claim brought under
§ 1983 requires a showing of a deprivation of a right “secured by the Constitution and
the laws of the United States[,]” and that the defendants deprived plaintiff of the right
“acting under color of any statute of the State[.]” (internal punctuation and citation
omitted)). Thus, § 1983 does not create a cause of action against private actors, but
rather, only creates a cause of action against defendants who have acted under color of
state law.
1.

Bedford County Sheriff’s Department

Plaintiff names the Bedford County Sheriff Department as a defendant. Sheriff’s
departments, however, are not persons within the meaning of § 1983. See Petty v.
County of Franklin, Ohio, 478 F.3d 341,347 (6th Cir. 2007) (a county sheriff’s office is
not a legal entity capable of being sued for purposes of § 1983); Matthews v. Jones, 35
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F.3d 1046, 1049 (6thCir. 1994) (a police department is not a person for purposes of
§ 1983).1

Accordingly, the Bedford County Sheriff Department is sua sponte

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE from this case.
2.

Private Citizen Hernandez

Plaintiff also named Ms. Hernandez, whom he describes as a housewife. Ms.
Hernandez is a private individual. A defendant must be a state actor before they are
subject to liability under § 1983 which requires that a plaintiff must allege he was
deprived of a right secured by the United States Constitution or laws of the United
States by a person acting under color of law. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. at 155.
Thus, § 1983 applies to acts of the states, not to acts of private parties.
Although “[a] plaintiff may not proceed under § 1983 against a private party no
matter how discriminatory or wrongful the party’s conduct[,] . . . there are circumstances
under which private persons may, by their actions, become state actors for § 1983
purposes.” Tahfs v. Proctor, 316 F.3d 584, 590-91 (6thCir. 2003) (internal punctuation
and citations omitted). A private party’s action may constitute state action for § 1983
purposes if the private party willfully participates in the alleged unconstitutional conduct
in joint action with the State or its agents. Id. at 590-91. Such is not the case before the
Court as Plaintiff does not claim Ms. Hernandez was acting under color of state law or
that she jointly engaged with state officials in unconstitutional conduct. Accordingly,
because a plaintiff may not sue private parties under § 1983, Ms. Hernandez, a non                                                       

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The Court declines to permit amendment of the claims against the Bedford County Sheriff
Department to include specific officers because, as the Court understands Plaintiff claim, such
amendment would be futile at this time since any claim against an individual officer for allegedly obtaining
a statement/confession from Plaintiff in violation of his constitutional right to counsel would be barred by
the favorable termination rule of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), which is explained in more
detail in the next section of this opinion.

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governmental defendant, is not a suable person or entity in this § 1983 action, and will
be sua sponte DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE from this lawsuit.
3.

Public Defenders

Additionally, Plaintiff brings suit against the two public defenders that represented
him in his underlying criminal case, PD Hargrove and PD Dearing. Plaintiff sues these
attorneys in the § 1983 action for their failure to enforce the alleged original agreement
to set Plaintiff free.
A public defender, like any retained attorney, serves his client.

Apparently

Plaintiff is of the impression that a court-appointed public defender representing a client
in the defense of a criminal charge is acting under color of state law within the meaning
of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff cites no authority and the Court finds no law to support
that view.
To the contrary, the United States Supreme Court has held “a public defender
does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as
counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.” Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312,
325 (1981). Thus, neither Attorney Hargrove or Attorney Dearing, even though they are
public defenders and were appointed by the state court, is suable in a § 1983 action
because attorneys do not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983. Mulligan
v. Schlacter, 389 F.2d. 231, 233 (6thCir. 1968) (court-appointed attorney representing
criminal defendant does not act under color of state law).

As the Supreme Court

observed, “[a] criminal lawyer’s professional and ethical obligations require him to act in
a role independent of and in opposition to the State[ ] . . .and when representing an
indigent defendant in a state criminal proceeding the public defender does not act under
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color of state law for purposes of § 1983 because, regardless of the fact that he is
appointed by the State, he is not acting on behalf of the State; he is the State’s
adversary.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 50 (1988) (internal punctuation and citations
omitted).
In sum, neither PD Hargrove nor PD Dearing was transformed into a state official
acting under color of state law for § 1983 purposes, because, even though they were
public defenders appointed by the court to represent Plaintiff, they did not act on the
State’s behalf; both attorneys were the State’s adversary.

Accordingly, Attorneys

Hargrove and Dearing will be sua sponte DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE from this
lawsuit.
B.

Claims Barred by Heck v. Humphrey

Plaintiff brings this action requesting money damages and, impliedly, specific
performance of the original plea agreement which he maintains was breached. Plaintiff
claims he was “suppose to go free acording [sic] to the first deal that was made.”
Additionally,

he

challenges

his

statement/confession

to

the

investigating

officers/Bedford County Sheriff’s Department and the post-conviction judge’s decision
declining to overturn his conviction and sentence (Doc. 1, at 7). Plaintiff’s claims that
his statement/confession was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights, the
prosecution violated the original plea agreement, and the judge unconstitutionally
refused to overturn his conviction and sentence on post-conviction are barred by Heck
v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) because, as explained below, each claim necessarily
implies the invalidity of his conviction and sentence.

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1.

Discussion

Under Heck, a plaintiff cannot pursue a § 1983 claim that, if successful, would
necessarily imply the invalidity of an underlying conviction or sentence, unless the
plaintiff can demonstrate favorable termination of the prior conviction or sentence. Id. at
487. The Heck Supreme Court held:
[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness
would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must
prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal
authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a
federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A
claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence
that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.
Id. at 486-487 (footnote omitted).
Plaintiff’s sentence has not been favorably terminated as required by Heck.
Plaintiff does not allege and nothing in the record before the Court or the Court’s
research demonstrates he has successfully challenged his conviction and sentence.
Here, success on any of Plaintiff’s claims would necessarily imply the conviction
and sentence are invalid because underlying his claims are the allegations that his
statement/confession was obtained in violation of his constitutional right to counsel; the
prosecutors breached the original agreement to dismiss the case; and Judge Crigler
unconstitutionally refused to overturn his conviction and sentence in post-conviction
proceedings, thus resulting in his illegal conviction and sentence. Plaintiff’s arguments,
assuming they were true, would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction and
sentence. Plaintiff’s claims are precisely the type prohibited under Heck.
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In sum, to recognize that his conviction and sentence were based on an
unconstitutionally obtained statement/confession, a breached plea agreement, or an
unconstitutional denial of post-conviction relief would necessarily imply his conviction
and sentence are invalid. Accordingly, the claims are barred by the Heck’s favorable
termination rule, as relief on any of his claims would imply the invalidity of his conviction
and sentence which have not been reversed or set aside.
2.

Requested Relief Barred by Heck

Plaintiff does not specifically request the Court to invalidate his conviction and
release him from prison, even though, as previously stated, a finding in his favor on his
claims would necessarily imply that his convictions and sentences were invalid. Rather,
he seeks compensation for the time, pain and suffering, and mental stress he has
endured while “wrongfully in prisoned [sic] all these years.” (Doc. 1, at 8). Heck, as
extended by Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997) (prisoner’s claim for
injunctive and monetary relief not cognizable under § 1983 as it necessarily implied
invalidity of good-time credits where he alleged deceit and bias on part of hearing
officer), does not permit money damages based on allegations that necessarily imply
the invalidity of a conviction or sentence. Because awarding relief to Plaintiff on any
portion of his claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction and
sentence, his claim for money damages is not cognizable under § 1983.
Accordingly, because a favorable ruling would necessarily imply the invalidity of
Plaintiff’s conviction and sentence, in direct violation of Heck, and Plaintiff has not had
his convictions reversed, expunged, or otherwise declared invalid, his claims are not yet
cognizable in a § 1983 action.
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Even assuming for the sake of discussion that Plaintiff’s complaint was not
barred by the Heck favorable termination rule, the claims nevertheless would be barred
because the government officials have absolute immunity.
C.

Official Capacity Claims

Plaintiff has sued ADA Randalls and Filer, and Judge Crigler without indicating
the capacity in which he is suing the defendants. A suit brought against a public,
government official will not be construed as seeking damages against the defendant in
his individual capacity unless such a claim for individual liability is clearly and definitely
set forth in the pleading. Pelfrey v. Chambers, 43 F.3d 1034, 1038 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 515 U.S. 1116 (1995); Thiokol Corp. v. Department of Treasury, State of Mich.,
Revenue Div., 987 F.2d 376, 383 (6th Cir.1993); Lovelace v. O'Hara, 985 F.2d 847, 850
(6th Cir.1993); Hardin v. Straub, 954 F.2d 1193, 1199–1200 (6th Cir.1992); Wells v.
Brown, 891 F.2d 591 (6th Cir.1989); Johnson v. Turner, 855 F. Supp. 228, 231
(W.D.Tenn.1994), aff'd, 125 F.3d 324 (6th Cir.1997). Generally, absent any express
indication the defendant is being sued in his individual capacity, the Court must assume
he is being sued only in his official capacity as an employee of the governmental entity.
Whittington v. Milby, 928 F.2d 188, 193 (6th Cir.) (Court treated complaint as suing
judge in official capacity due to complaint's lack of indication of capacity), cert. denied,
502 U.S. 883 (1991). Nevertheless, for the reasons explained below, Plaintiff is not
entitled to relief whether suing the prosecutors and judge in their official or individual
capacities.
A state officer or employee is defined as “any person who is state official,
including members of the general assembly and legislative officials elected by the
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general assembly, or any person who is employed in the service of those and whose
compensation is payable by the state, or any person who is employed by the state
whose compensation is paid in whole or in part from federal funds[.]” Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 8-42-101(3). Defendants Assistant District Attorneys Randalls and Filer and Judge
Crigler are state employees. See Earl v. Ballew, No. 10-5052 (unpublished) (6th Cir.
Feb. 2, 2011) (suit against individual judges in their official capacities for monetary relief
treated as suit against the state); Cady v. Arenac County¸574 F.3d 334 343 (6th Cir.
2009) (suit against prosecutor treated as a suit against the state). Suing a state officer
in his official capacity for damages is equivalent to suing the state itself.

Will v.

Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). However, “neither a
State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Id.
Accordingly, because § 1983 applies only to persons, and States are not persons,
Plaintiff’s claim premised on § 1983 against Defendants Assistant District Attorneys
Randalls and Filer and Judge Crigler in their official capacities will be sua aponte
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
D.

Individual Capacity Claims

Plaintiff has not specifically sued the prosecutors and judge in their individual
capacities. Nevertheless, assuming for the sake of discussion that he has, they are all
entitled to immunity.
1.

ADA Randalls and Filer

Plaintiff claims the prosecutors breached the original plea agreement to dismiss
the case. Although this claim is confusingly pled and factually lacking, even assuming a
sufficient allegation, it must be dismissed with prejudice because the complaint fails to
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state a claim upon which relief may be granted because the prosecutor has absolute
immunity from suit on these claims and allegations.
Absolute prosecutorial immunity protects government officials from individual
liability for actions undertaken “in the exercise of their duties[,]” Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S.
478, 386-87 (1991), and extends to those activities falling within a prosecutor’s role as
advocate for the state. Blakely v. United States, 276 F.3d 853, 871 (6th Cir. 2002).
Therefore, prosecutors are afforded immunity for their conduct in “initiating a
prosecution and in presenting the State’s case,” inasmuch as that conduct is “intimately
associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976). However, acts not inherently prosecutorial in nature are not
protected by absolute immunity but rather, are protected by qualified, good-faith
immunity. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 277-78 (1993).
Plaintiff’s allegation that the prosecutors breached the plea agreement is
inherently prosecutorial in nature. Thus, not only has Plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege
a claim, even assuming a claim is alleged, Defendant ADAs are entitled to immunity.
First, the allegation against the prosecutors fail to state a § 1983 claim because
Plaintiff has not identified the specific contents of the alleged agreement to dismiss the
case or submitted any documentary evidence of the alleged agreement. Plaintiff simply
has failed to provide any factual support to his claim that the prosecutors breached the
initial agreement to dismiss the case. Consequently, Plaintiff’s bald allegations that the
defendant prosecutors breached the plea agreement, without identifying the specific
terms of the plea agreement, are insufficient to raise a constitutional violation. See Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554 (“Factual allegations must be enough to
13 

raise a right to relief above the speculative level (citation omitted). Indeed, under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege he was deprived of a right secured by the United
States Constitution or laws of the United States, and the deprivation was caused by a
person while acting under color of state law. See Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. at
155-57. Plaintiff’s complaint against the prosecutors fails to satisfy the first requirement
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Nevertheless, even assuming Plaintiff has sufficiently stated a
claim, the prosecutors are entitled to immunity.
Plaintiff complains about ADA Randalls’ and ADA Filer’s conduct as prosecutors
and advocates during his criminal proceedings and in relation to the plea agreement.
ADA Randalls and ADA Filer are entitled to absolute immunity from suit when they act
within the scope of their prosecutorial duties. Absolute prosecutorial immunity extends
to those activities that occur in the prosecutor’s role as an advocate for the government
in all judicial proceedings. Yaselli v. Goff, 275 U.S. 503 (1927) (affirming Second Circuit
extending absolute immunity to federal prosecutors); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,
430 (1976) (prosecutor protected by absolute immunity against civil damages for
activities “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process”); Harris
v. Bornhorst, 513 F.3d 503, 509-10 (6th Cir. 2008); Skinner v. Govorchin, 463 F.3d 518,
525 (6th Cir. 2006). Thus, because the allegations against ADA Randalls and ADA Filer
arise from actions taken during their traditional role in the judicial process, they are
entitled to absolute immunity. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 409; Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320 (2nd
Cir. 1980) (prosecutorial immunity protected prosecutor against civil liability for
falsification of evidence and coercion of plea bargain). Nevertheless, as previously
stated, even if Plaintiff could somehow prove the prosecutors were not entitled to
14 

absolute immunity, he still could not proceed with his claims against them at this time
because Heck prevents him from bringing this § 1983 action until his underlying criminal
conviction was been reversed, vacated, or otherwise invalidated.
Accordingly, because the challenged conduct clearly occurred during the
prosecutors’ traditional role in the judicial process, they are entitled to absolute immunity
from damages for the challenged actions and all claims against the Assistant District
Attorneys must be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)
and 1915A.
2.

Judicial Immunity

Plaintiff claims that Judge Crigler violated his constitutional rights when he
denied him post-conviction relief and refused to overturn his conviction (Doc. 1).
Under the doctrine of judicial immunity, Judge Crigler has absolute immunity from
suit both from money damages and injunctive relief for his judicial acts. Bradley v.
Fisher, 80 U.S. 335 (1871) (judicial officials are exempt from civil action for judicial
acts); see also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) Kipen v. Lawson, 57 Fed.
Appx. 691 (6th Cir. 2003). Judges are entitled to judicial immunity arising out of the
performance of their judicial functions. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991); Forrester v.
White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988); Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980).
Judicial immunity is immunity from suit, not just immunity from the assessment of
money damages. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11. Even a plaintiff’s allegations of bad faith,
malice, or corruption against a judge cannot overcome absolute judicial immunity from
suit. Judicial immunity from suit applies even when a judge is accused of acting in bad
faith, maliciously, or corruptly. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11.
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Judicial immunity from suit can be overcome in two situations, neither of which is
applicable to Plaintiff’s complaint. A judge is not immune from liability for non-judicial
actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity, or for actions, though
judicial in nature, which are taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. Mireles,
502 U.S. at 11-12; Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978).

Neither of these

exceptions to judicial immunity is applicable because the alleged acts of Judge Crigler
in Plaintiff’s post-conviction case were taken in the course of his judicial capacity and
were not committed in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.
Consequently, based on the allegations contained in the complaint, Judge Crigler
is absolutely immune from suit under § 1983. Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Judge
Crigler fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and seek to recover
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. Accordingly, all
claims against Judge Crigler must be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.
IV.

CONCLUSION
In light of the above analysis and law, the defendants either are not state actors

and suable persons under § 1983, or are immune from Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s complaint is sua sponte DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1) (Doc. 1).

Had Plaintiff raised arguable § 1983

claims, the Court would have allowed him to amend, but since the claims are not

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remediable by amendment, it would be futile to permit an amended complaint.
LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944 (6th Cir. 2013).
Accordingly, this case will be DISMISSED by separate judgment order.

/s/ Harry S. Mattice, Jr._______
HARRY S. MATTICE, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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