Orange v. Chapman
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION: The Clerk is DIRECTED to change the name of the Respondent to Cherry Lindamood on the Courts CM/ECF docket sheet. The Court finds that none of Petitioners claims warrant the issuance of a writ. Therefore, Pet itioners motion for a writ of habeas corpus 1 will be DENIED. Petitioner has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, a COA will not issue.Signed by District Judge Harry S Mattice, Jr on 9/17/2015. (aws, ) Mailed to Charles Orange.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
at CHATTANOOGA
CHARLES ORANGE,
Petitioner,
v.
CHERRY LINDAMOOD,1 Warden,
Respondent.
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No:
4:12-cv-71
Judge Mattice
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Charles Orange (“Petitioner”), a Tennessee inmate, acting pro se, brings this
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging the
legality of his confinement under a 2010 Bedford County Circuit Court Judgment (Doc.
1). Petitioner pled guilty to four counts of selling one-half gram or more of cocaine with
intent to sell, four counts of delivering one-half gram or more of cocaine, possessing
one-half gram or more of cocaine with intent to sell, possessing one-half gram or more
of cocaine with intent to deliver, possessing between one-half ounce and ten pounds of
marijuana with intent to sell, and possessing between one-half ounce and ten pounds of
marijuana with intent to deliver (Doc. 19 p. 3). Petitioner received a sentence of twenty
two years. Respondent has filed an answer to the petition, which was supported by
copies of the state record (Addenda 1, 2). 2 The case is now ripe for disposition.
1
Warden Cherry Lindamood replaced Arvil Chapman as the Warden of the South Central
Correctional Center. Accordingly, the Clerk is DIRECTED to change the name of the Respondent to
Cherry Lindamood on the Court’s CM/ECF docket sheet.
2
Petitioner filed a reply to Respondent’s response seemingly disputing the amount of marijuana
mentioned in Respondent’s answer (Doc. 22). However, Petitioner subsequently filed a letter retracting
his reply to Respondent’s brief (Doc.25).
I.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The transcripts from Petitioner’s guilty plea and sentencing hearings from the
Bedford County Circuit Court were not made part of the state post-conviction record,
and Respondent has been unable to determine the availability of these transcripts (Doc.
19). The record indicates that Petitioner pled guilty to six drug offenses on February 22,
2010, and was sentenced to twenty-two years in prison. Orange v. State, No. M20111168-CCA-R3-PC, 2012 WL 1417252, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 20, 2012). Following
his guilty plea and sentence, Petitioner did not file a direct appeal to the Tennessee
Court of Criminal Appeals (“TCCA”) or the Tennessee Supreme Court (Doc. 1).
On December 10, 2010, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the
Bedford County Circuit Court. Id. Petitioner’s motion alleged that trial counsel was
ineffective because counsel did not tell him that the trial court could not engage in
judicial fact-finding during sentencing, and as such his guilty plea was not knowingly
and voluntarily entered. Id. Petitioner also argued that his trial counsel failed to tell him
that he was supposed to be sentenced to the statutory minimum. Id. The trial court
dismissed the petition, concluding that it contained mere conclusions of law all of which
were erroneous, and it failed to state a factual basis for the grounds alleged. Id.
Petitioner appealed this decision to the TCCA, and the dismissal was affirmed. Orange,
2012 WL 1417252, at *1. The Tennessee Supreme Court denied permission to appeal.
Petitioner thereafter filed this timely habeas corpus petition.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), codified in
28 U.S.C. § 2241, a court considering a habeas claim must defer to any decision by a
state court concerning the claim, unless the state court’s judgment: (1) resulted in a
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decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court; or (2) resulted in a
decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the state court proceeding. 28 U.S. § 2254(d)(1)–(2).
A state court’s decision is “contrary to” federal law when it arrives at a conclusion
opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law, or resolves a case
differently on a set of facts which cannot be distinguished materially from those upon
which the precedent was decided. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000). Under
the “unreasonable application” prong of § 2254(d)(1), the relevant inquiry is whether the
state court decision identifies the legal rule in the Supreme Court cases which govern the
issue, but unreasonably applies the principle to the particular facts of the case. Id. at
407. The habeas court is to determine only whether the state court’s decision is
objectively reasonable, not whether, in the habeas court’s view, it is incorrect or wrong.
Id. at 411.
This is a high standard to satisfy. Montgomery v. Bobby, 654 F.3d 668, 676 (6th
Cir. 2011) (noting that Ҥ 2254(d), as amended by AEDPA is a purposefully demanding
standard . . . ‘because it was meant to be.’” (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct.
770, 786 (2011)).
III.
ANALYSIS
Petitioner’s § 2254 petition raises one main ground for relief which appears to
present two separate claims: (1) that the state trial court erred by summarily dismissing
his petition for post-conviction relief; and (2) that Petitioner received ineffective
assistance of counsel during his guilty plea proceedings (Doc. 1).
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In her answer, Respondent argues that Petitioner is not entitled to relief on his
first claim because the claim does not assert a constitutional violation (Doc. 19).
Respondent also argues that Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
should be denied because the state court’s determination was not contrary to nor an
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law (Id.).
The Court agrees with the Respondent concerning Petitioner’s entitlement to
federal habeas relief, and will DENY this petition, for the reasons provided below.
A.
Trial Court’s Summary Dismissal of Post-Conviction Petition
Petitioner first appears to allege that the trial court erred when it summarily
dismissed his petition for post-conviction relief because he actually presented a
colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel (Doc. 1 p. 4). Under § 2254(a), a
federal court may entertain a petition for the writ of habeas corpus only on the grounds
that the prisoner is being held in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States. It is well established that because there is no constitutional right to postconviction remedies, the federal “habeas corpus cannot be used to mount challenges to a
state’s scheme of post-conviction relief.” Greer v. Mitchell, 264 F.3d 663, 681 (6th Cir.
2001) (citing Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557 (1987); see also Kirby b. Dutton,
794 F.2d 245, 247 (6th Cir. 1986) (concluding that habeas corpus is not the proper
means by which prisoners can challenge errors or deficiencies in state post-conviction
proceedings). As such, the Court finds that Petitioner’s claim that the trial court erred in
summarily dismissing his post-conviction petition is not cognizable on federal habeas.
B.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Petitioner next asserts that he received ineffective assistance from his attorney in
entering his guilty plea (Doc. 1). According to Petitioner, his counsel failed to properly
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advise him, and as such, he ended up pleading guilty to an offense outside of his possible
range of punishment (Doc. 1).
1.
Applicable Law
The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.” U.S. Const.
amend. VI. This right to counsel necessarily implies a right to “reasonably effective
assistance” of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Under
the Strickland standard for proving ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
meet a two-pronged test: (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) that the
deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Id.
Proving deficient performance requires a “showing that counsel made errors so
serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by
the Sixth Amendment.” Id. The appropriate measure of attorney performance is
“reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” Id. at 688. A defendant asserting
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must “identify the acts or omissions of
counsel that are alleged to not have been the result of reasonable professional
judgment.” Id. at 690. The evaluation of the objective reasonableness of counsel’s
performance must be made “from counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error
and in light of all the circumstances, and the standard of review is highly deferential.”
Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986). It is strongly presumed that
counsel’s conduct was within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
The second prong, prejudice, “requires showing that counsel’s errors were so
serious to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is unreliable.” Id.
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Here, Petitioner must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different.” Moss v.
United States, 323 F.3d 445, 454 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient
to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Moss, 323 F.3d 464–55 (quoting Strickland,
466 U.S. at 694) (internal quotation marks omitted). Counsel is constitutionally
ineffective only if a performance below professional standards caused the defendant to
lose what he “otherwise would probably have won.” United States v. Morrow, 977 F.2d
222, 229 (6th Cir. 1992).
2.
Discussion
Petitioner argued to the TCCA that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and
voluntarily entered because his trial counsel did not tell him that he was supposed to be
sentenced to the statutory minimum and that the trial court could not engage in judicial
fact-finding during sentencing. Orange, 2012 WL 1417252, at *2. The court of appeals
found that Petitioner had failed to show that he was entitled to relief because had trial
counsel advised as Petitioner claims he should have, counsel would have been providing
incorrect information. Id. at *3.
Strickland affirms that a defendant is entitled to effective assistance of counsel
before deciding whether or not to plead guilty. 466 U.S. at 686 (citing McMann v.
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)). Here, the TCCA stated that the amended
Tennessee Criminal Reform Act no longer imposed a statutory minimum sentence, but
rather provided advisory sentencing guidelines for the trial court to follow in selecting a
sentence. Orange, 2012 WL 1417252, at *2. Based on this, the TCCA found that even
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taking the facts alleged in the petition for post-conviction relief as true, Petitioner was
not entitled to relief. Id. at *3.
The Court agrees with the TCCA’s determination. Petitioner cannot show that his
trial counsel’s performance was deficient under Strickland. As the TCCA noted, had
counsel given Petitioner the advice Petitioner claims he was entitled to, counsel would
have been opening himself up to an ineffective assistance of counsel challenge. The
Court cannot find that counsel was ineffective for in fact doing what he was supposed to
do. To the extent that Petitioner is challenging the state court’s interpretation of the
Tennessee sentencing statute, the Court notes that such an allegation does not present a
constitutional issue. See, e.g., Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991) (stating
that where state courts have spoken on a state law issue, it is not the role of a federal
habeas court ‘to reexamine state-court determinations of state-law questions.”).
As such, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim because the TCCA’s
rejection of Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was not an
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.
IV.
Conclusion
For the above mentioned reasons, the Court finds that none of Petitioner’s claims
warrant the issuance of a writ. Therefore, Petitioner’s motion for a writ of habeas corpus
(Doc. 1) will be DENIED.
V.
Certificate of Appealability
The Court must also consider whether to issue a Certificate of Appealability
(“COA”), should Petitioner file a notice of appeal. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(a) and (c), a
petitioner may appeal a final order in a habeas proceeding only if he is issued a COA,
and a COA may only be issued where a petitioner has made a substantial showing of the
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denial of a constitutional right. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Where a claim has been
dismissed on the merits, a substantial showing is made if reasonable jurists could
conclude that the issues raised are adequate to deserve further review. See Miller-El v.
Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327, 336 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
When a claim has been dismissed on procedural grounds, a substantial showing is
demonstrated when it is shown that reasonable jurists would debate whether a valid
claim has been stated and whether the court’s procedural ruling is correct. Slack, 529
U.S. at 484.
After reviewing each of Petitioner’s claims, the Court finds that reasonable jurists
could not conclude that Petitioner’s claims are adequate to deserve further review. As
such, because Petitioner has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right, a COA will not issue.
ORDER ACCORDINGLY.
/s/ Harry S. Mattice, Jr._______
HARRY S. MATTICE, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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