Clanton v. Bedford County Jail
Filing
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MEMORANDUM AND OPINION: This action will be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim. Because plaintiff is an inmate in the Bedford County Jail, he is herewith ASSESSED the civil filing fee of $350.00. The Clerk is DIRECTED to se nd a copy of this Memorandum and Order to theSheriff of Bedford County. The Clerk is further DIRECTED to forward a copy of this Memorandum and Order to the Courts financial deputy. Signed by District Judge Harry S Mattice, Jr on 7/1/2015. (aws, ) Mailed to Robert Clanton, Sheriff of Bedford County, and Court's financial deputy.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
at WINCHESTER
ROBERT CARLYLE CLANTON,
Plaintiff,
v.
BEDFORD COUNTY JAIL,
Defendant.
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No.: 4:15-CV-30-HSM-SKL
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before the Court is a pro se prisoner’s civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 and an application to proceed in forma pauperis. It appears from the application
that plaintiff lacks sufficient financial resources to pay the $350.00 filing fee.
Accordingly, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, plaintiff is allowed to proceed in this action
without the prepayment of costs or fees or security therefor and his motion for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. 2] is GRANTED. For the reasons stated below,
however, process shall not issue and this action will be DISMISSED.
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), district courts must screen
prisoner complaints and sua sponte dismiss those that are frivolous or malicious, fail to
state a claim for relief, or are against a defendant who is immune. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915(A); Benson v. O'Brian, 179 F.3d 1014 (6th Cir. 1999).
Responding to a perceived deluge of frivolous lawsuits, and, in particular,
frivolous prisoner suits, Congress directed the federal courts to review or
"screen" certain complaints sua sponte and to dismiss those that failed to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted, that sought monetary
relief from a defendant immune from such relief, or that were frivolous or
malicious.
Id. at 1015–16 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A). The dismissal
standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)
and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554 (2007) “governs dismissals for
failure state a claim under [28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A] because the relevant
statutory language tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6).” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468,
470–71 (6th Cir. 2010). Thus, to survive an initial review under the PLRA, a complaint
“must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that he
was deprived of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law. Black v.
Barberton Citizens Hosp., 134 F.3d 1265, 1267 (6th Cir. 1998); O’Brien v. City of Grand
Rapids, 23 F.3d 990, 995 (6th Cir. 1994); Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 1036,
1042 (6th Cir. 1992); see also Braley v. City of Pontiac, 906 F.2d 220, 223 (6th Cir.
1990) (stating that “Section 1983 does not itself create any constitutional rights; it
creates a right of action for the vindication of constitutional guarantees found
elsewhere”).
Plaintiff states in his complaint that the medical facility at the Bedford County
Jail is inadequate, has neglected his need for medical care, and has exhibited a “flagrant
disregard for human life,” resulting in mutilation of his face. Plaintiff also generally
alleges “unhealthy living conditions” at the jail, including specifically “unidentifiable
dusts, molds, fungi, rusts, bacteria, and viruses” which plaintiff asserts are detrimental
to health. Plaintiff further states that various unnamed conditions at the jail are substandard. Plaintiff seeks $2,200,00.00 for his injuries, mental and emotional suffering,
and psychological and emotional rehabilitation and therapy.
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Bedford County Jail is a building, not a suable entity within the meaning of 42
U.S.C. § 1983. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 688–90 and
n. 55 (1978) (for purposes of a § 1983 action, a “person” includes individuals and “bodies
politic and corporate”); Marbry v. Correctional Medical Services, 2000 WL 1720959,
at*2 (6th Cir. Nov. 6, 2000) (holding that “the Shelby County Jail is not an entity subject
to suit under § 1983”) (citing Rhodes v. McDannel, 945 F.2d 117, 120 (6th Cir. 1991));
Cage v. Kent County Corr. Facility, 1997 WL 225647, at *1 (6th Cir. May 1, 1997)
(stating that “[t]he district court also properly found that the jail facility named as a
defendant was not an entity subject to suit under § 1983.”). Accordingly, all allegations
against Bedford County Jail fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and it
is therefore DISMISSED from this lawsuit.
Moreover, the complaint would be subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim
even if plaintiff had sued a “person” subject to suit under § 1983. Specifically, plaintiff’s
allegations that the jail medical facility is “inadequate” and has neglected him assert
negligence, rather than deliberate indifference. Negligence, even gross negligence, will
not support a § 1983 claim for denial of medical care. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
at 837; Gibson v. Foltz, 963 F.2d 851, 853 (6th Cir. 1992). "Deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs" is distinguishable from an inadvertent failure to provide
adequate medical care.
Thus, a complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or
treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical
mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does
not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a
prisoner.
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. See also Gibson v. Matthews, 926 F.2d 532, 536-37 (6th Cir.
1991) (negligence of medical personnel does not state a claim under § 1983 for
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deliberate indifference to medical needs); Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n.5 (6th
Cir. 1976) ("Where a prisoner has received some medical attention and the dispute is
over the adequacy of the treatment, federal courts are generally reluctant to second
guess medical judgments and to constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort
law.").
While plaintiff also alleges that the jail medical facility has exhibited a “flagrant
disregard for human life,” this allegation is conclusory and unsupported by any specific
facts. See Harden-Bey v. Rutter, 524 F.3d 789, 796 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that “in the
context of a civil rights claim, . . . conclusory allegations of unconstitutional conduct
without specific factual allegations fail to state a claim”) (citing Lillard v. Shelby County
Bd. of Educ.,76 F.3d 716, 726 (6th Cir. 1987)); Nafziger v.McDermott Int’l, Inc., 467
F.3d 514, 520 (6th Cir. 2006) (observing that “the court is not required to create a claim
for the plaintiff[]”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Cline v. Rogers, 87
F.3d 176, 184 (6th Cir.1996) (instructing courts not to suppose a plaintiff would be able
to show facts not alleged or that a defendant has violated the law in ways not alleged).
Likewise, plaintiff’s allegations that “sub-standard” conditions, including but not
limited to rust, dust, bacteria, viruses, and mold, exist at the jail fail to demonstrate an
extreme deprivation which is actionable under the Eighth Amendment.
“[T]he
Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons.” Rhodes v. Chapman 452 U.S. 337,
349 (1981). In claims regarding conditions of confinement, only extreme deprivations
can be characterized as punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Hudson v.
McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1992). An extreme deprivation is one “so grave that it
violates contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk.
In other words, the prisoner must show that the risk of which he complains is not one
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that today's society chooses to tolerate.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36 (1993)
(emphasis in original); see also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981),
Perryman v. Graves, No. 3:10-MC-109, 2010 WL 4237921, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 20,
2010) (collecting cases that stand for the assertion that an allegation of mere exposure
to black mold, without additional allegations or evidence of injuries to the plaintiff’s
health resulting from such exposure, is insufficient to state a claim for violation of the
Eighth Amendment).
Accordingly, even if plaintiff had sued a “person” under § 1983, his complaint
would still be subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim.
As the complaint fails to state a cognizable § 1983 claim, this action will be
DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A. Because plaintiff is an inmate in the Bedford County
Jail, he is herewith ASSESSED the civil filing fee of $350.00. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(b)(1)(A) and (B), the custodian of plaintiff’s inmate trust account at the institution
where he now resides is directed to submit to the Clerk, U.S. District Court, 200 South
Jefferson Street, Room 201, Winchester, Tennessee 37398, as an initial partial payment,
whichever is greater of:
(a)
twenty percent (20%) of the average monthly deposits to the plaintiff’s
inmate trust account; or
(b)
twenty percent (20%) of the average monthly balance in the plaintiff’s
inmate trust account for the six-month period preceding the filing of the complaint.
Thereafter, the custodian shall submit twenty percent (20%) of plaintiff’s
preceding monthly income (or income credited to the plaintiff’s trust account for the
preceding month), but only when such monthly income exceeds ten dollars ($10.00),
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until the full filing fee of three hundred fifty dollars ($350.00) as authorized under 28
U.S.C. § 1914(a) has been paid to the Clerk. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
The Clerk is DIRECTED to send a copy of this Memorandum and Order to the
Sheriff of Bedford County to ensure that the custodian of plaintiff’s inmate trust account
complies with that portion of the Prison Litigation Reform Act relating to payment of
the filing fee. The Clerk is further DIRECTED to forward a copy of this Memorandum
and Order to the Court’s financial deputy.
The Court CERTIFIES that any appeal from this action would not be taken in
good faith and would be totally frivolous. See Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
A separate judgment will enter.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Harry S. Mattice, Jr._______
HARRY S. MATTICE, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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