Lawrence v. Coffee County Sheriff's Department et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM AND OPINION as set forth in following order. Signed by District Judge Pamela L Reeves on 3/18/19. (c/m to John K. Lawrence #267123, HARDEMAN COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, P.O. Box 549, Whiteville, TN 38075)(ABF)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT WINCHESTER
JOHN K. LAWRENCE,
Plaintiff,
v.
COFFEE COUNTY SHERIFF’S
DEPARTMENT, STEVE GRAVES,
COFFEE COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, PAM FREEMAN,
RICK GENTRY, QUALITY
CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE,
and DR. JOHNNY BATES,
Defendants.
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No.
4:16-cv-00012
REEVES/LEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before the Court is a pro se prisoner’s complaint for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [Doc.
2]. Prior to transferring the case to this division, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Tennessee, Knoxville Division, granted Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis [Doc. 3]. For the reasons set forth below, no process shall issue, and the case will be
DISMISSED.
I.
PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that his constitutional rights were violated at the Coffee
County Jail, in Manchester, Tennessee, where he was formerly confined. Plaintiff complains that
mentally ill inmates at Coffee County Jail do not seek mental health treatment due to a jail policy
[Doc. 2 p. 4]. As an attachment to his complaint, Plaintiff provided a copy of the jail’s rules and
regulations handout outlining “qualifications to be placed to work” [Doc. 2-1]. The qualification
relevant to Plaintiff’s complaint states “[Inmates] [c]annot have a mental illness or be sent for
mental evaluation” [Id. p. 22]. Plaintiff alleges that due to this policy, inmates who wish to work
do not seek treatment for their mental illness [Doc. 2]. Plaintiff claims that by accepting this
policy, Defendants are “discriminating against [Plaintiff] as a mentally ill inmate” and “acting
deliberately indifferent to his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights” [Id.]. Plaintiff claims he
was attacked on three different occasions by three different inmates, all of who suffer from mental
health issues, but refuse treatment due to the above-mentioned policy [Id.].
The first altercation occurred on May 13, 2015, when inmate Joshua Cole attacked Plaintiff
causing serious injury [Id. at 4]. The second altercation occurred on June 8, 2015, when inmate
Danielle Dexter attacked Plaintiff causing serious injuries [Id.]. Plaintiff states that Defendant
Pam Freeman “is well acquainted with inmate Dexter and has personal knowledge of his mental
illness” [Id.].
The third altercation occurred on July 2, 2015 [Id.]. On this day Plaintiff alleges that
inmates David Fletcher and Paul Fletcher, Jr. “attacked and beat [him]” [Id. at 6]. In his complaint,
Plaintiff describes the incidents leading up to this third physical altercation as follows [Id.].
a.)
After waiting 20 minutes in a line to use a unit telephone inmate David
Fletcher attempted to tell the Plaintiff the phone he had acquired for use was ‘his
phone.’ Inmate Fletcher then told the Plaintiff he would ‘beat his ass’ if he did not
give up the phone, which the Plaintiff refused to do.
b.)
When the phone call ended inmates David Fletcher, Paul Fletcher, Jr. and
other members of their ‘Gangster Disciples’ street gang, and security threat group,
accosted the Plaintiff and escorted him to his cell where inmate David Fletcher
entered with the Plaintiff while the other inmates stood guard at the cell door.
c.)
Inmate David Fletcher immediately began punching the Plaintiff about the
face, head and body. At same point inmate Paul Fletcher, Jr. entered the Plaintiff’s
cell and joined the assault of the Plaintiff.
[Doc. 2 p. 6].
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Plaintiff alleges that days prior to the fight between himself and inmate David Fletcher
(hereinafter “Fletcher”), Fletcher went from cell to cell asking inmates if they wanted to fight
[Id.]. He claims that five unnamed officers observed this aggressive behavior [Id.]. Additionally,
prior to this fight, Plaintiff claims that he filed an emergency grievance to Defendant Rick Gentry
concerning inmate Fletcher’s intimidation and threats toward Plaintiff [Id.]. However, he
received no response to the grievance until after the fight with inmate Fletcher on July 2, 2015
[Id.].
After the fight between Plaintiff and inmate Fletcher, Plaintiff spoke with Defendant
Gentry at the jail and “made [him] aware of the problems [between himself and] inmate David
Fletcher, Joshua Cole, Danielle Dexter, and other members of their gang” [Id.]. He also informed
Defendant Gentry of the emergency grievance he filed on the matter prior to this incident [Id.].
Defendant Gentry advised Plaintiff that he had not received any such grievance and “would check
into [it]” [Id.].
Two days later, on July 4, 2015, “a mass fight and riot broke out” between members of
the Gangster Disciples and other inmates, including Plaintiff [Id.]. During this fight, Plaintiff
suffered “serious bodily injury” [Id.]. Plaintiff states that Defendants failure to classify and
separate the gang members, directly lead to these attacks on Plaintiff [Id.].
Plaintiff further alleges that on May 17, 2015, after moving to the new Coffee County Jail,
Defendant Dr. Bates removed Plaintiff from his mental health medication [Id. at 4]. Prior to
entering the jail, an outside psychiatrist prescribed Plaintiff to Seroquel as an anti-psychotic/mood
stabilizer [Id.]. However, Dr. Bates informed Plaintiff that “he was acting doctor for multiple
jails in the area” and “no inmates under his care were on either Seroquel or Wellbutrin due to
their expense” [Id.]. Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Bates acted deliberately indifferent to his medical
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needs by not prescribing him the same medication as his outside psychiatrist in order to cut costs
[Id. at 8].
II.
SCREENING STANDARD
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), district courts must screen prisoner
complaints and sua sponte dismiss those that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim for
relief, or are against a defendant who is immune. See, e.g., Benson v. O’Brian, 179 F.3d 1014 (6th
Cir. 1999). The pleading must be sufficient “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), which simply means that the factual content
pled by a plaintiff must permit a court “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556).
The “facial plausibility” standard does not require “detailed factual allegations, but it
demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. at 678
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The standard articulated in Twombly and Iqbal
“governs dismissals for failure to state a claim under [28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A] because
the relevant statutory language tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6).” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d
468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010).
III.
ANALYSIS OF CLAIMS
To state a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege and show: 1) that he was deprived
of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and 2) that the deprivation was
caused by a person acting under color of state law. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981)
(overruled in part by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330 (1986)); Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436
U.S. 149, 155–56 (1978); Black v. Barberton Citizens Hosp., 1.34 F.3d 1265, 1267 (6th Cir. 1998).
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Both parts of this two-part test must be satisfied to support a claim under § 1983. See Christy v.
Randlett, 932 F.2d 502, 504 (6th Cir. 1991).
A.
Medical Claim Regarding Prescription Medication
The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners against the imposition of “cruel and unusual
punishment.” The Eighth Amendment’s ban against cruel and unusual punishment obliges prison
authorities to provide medical care for prisoners’ serious medical needs. In order to state a claim
under § 1983 in the medical context, “a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful
to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106
(1976). “Where prison officials are so deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of
prisoners as to unnecessarily and wantonly inflict pain, they impose cruel and unusual punishment
in violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Horn by Parks v. Madison County Fiscal Court, 22 F.3d
653, 660 (6th Cir .1994).
A “serious medical need” is defined “as one that has been diagnosed by a physician as
requiring treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a layperson would easily recognize the
necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Camberos v. Branstad, 73 F.3d 174, 176 (8th Cir. 1995). The
test for whether a defendant has demonstrated deliberate indifference to medical needs is a
subjective inquiry into the defendant’s state of mind rather than an objective test. Negligence,
even gross negligence, will not support a § 1983 claim for denial of medical care. See Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994); Gibson v. Foltz, 963 F.2d 851, 853 (6th Cir. 1992).
“Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs” is distinguishable from an inadvertent failure
to provide adequate medical care. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Where a prisoner receives some
medical care and the dispute is over its adequacy, no claim has been stated. Westlake v. Lucas, 537
F.2d 857, 860 n.5 (6th Cir. 1976).
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Plaintiff claims that an outside psychiatrist prescribed him Seroquel as a mood stabilizer
prior to entering jail [Doc. 2 p. 4]. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant, Dr. Bates, took Plaintiff off
this specific brand of medication upon entering jail due to the drug’s expense [Id.]. Plaintiff states
that, although, there are other medications for his condition, based on past experience, he reacts
best to Seroquel [Id.].
Plaintiff’s assertion that Dr. Bates refused to distribute his prescription medication because
of its cost fails to state a constitutional violation. See, Tribe v. Englelsgjerd, No. 00-10451-BC,
2002 WL 31051984 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 11, 2002) (Prison physician’s refusal to prescribe
medication of prisoner’s choice did not violate Eighth Amendment, where physician prescribed
alternative medication and prisoner provided no evidence that such medication was ineffective.).
This claim appears to concern Plaintiff’s personal satisfaction with the medical care he received,
not the doctor’s deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Plaintiff provides no
information that an alternative medication would be ineffective; rather, he claims that he strongly
prefers Seroquel. That medical decision, however, rests within the discretion of the physician, not
the patient. Absent allegations that alternative medication would not treat Plaintiff’s ailment, no
Eighth Amendment claim is stated.
The Court finds that Defendant Dr. Bates’s conduct does not amount to an intent to inflict
unnecessary pain or suffering or otherwise to punish Plaintiff, which, as noted earlier, is the
culpable mental state necessary to a finding of deliberate indifference. Horn by Parks, 22 F.3d at
660.
As such, Plaintiff’s claim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical claim is
DISMISSED.
B.
Failure to Protect
Although Plaintiff has not identified any specific constitutional bases for his allegations
regarding the physical confrontation with three inmates, liberally construing Plaintiff’s allegations
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and prayer for relief, the Court discerns that Plaintiff is attempting to assert claims under the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution for failure to protect.
1.
Personal Safety
Inmates have a constitutionally protected right to personal safety grounded in the Eighth
Amendment. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833. This right includes the right to be free “from violence at
the hands of other prisoners.” Bishop v. Hackel, 636 F.3d 757, 766 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833). Thus, prison staff are obliged “to take reasonable measures to guarantee
the safety of the inmates” in their care. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 27 (1984). To
establish a violation of this right, a plaintiff must show that a defendant was deliberately indifferent
to the Plaintiff’s risk of injury. Walker v. Norris, 917 F.2d 1449, 1453 (6th Cir. 1990); McGhee v.
Foltz, 852 F.2d 876, 880-81 (6th Cir. 1988). To demonstrate deliberate indifference, the plaintiff
must present evidence from which a trier of fact could conclude “that the official was subjectively
aware of the risk” and “disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it”
Greene v. Bowles, 361 F.3d 290, 294, quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 829, 847. Generally, an isolated
or occasional attack is insufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim. See Stewart v. Love, 696
F.2d 43, 44 (6th Cir. 1982).
2.
Analysis
Prior to the alleged assaults with inmates Joshua Cole and Danielle Dexter, Plaintiff failed
to assert that any Defendant was made aware of any threat specific to Plaintiff. Although Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant Pam Freeman had knowledge of inmate Dexter’s mental illness and that he
was not on any medication for that illness, nothing in the complaint alleges that Defendant
Freeman had any knowledge that Dexter posed a threat to Plaintiff’s safety as a result of his mental
illness. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not met the subjective component necessary to establish an
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Eighth Amendment violation because he failed to allege that Defendants possessed a sufficiently
culpable state of mind prior to the attacks from inmates Cole and Dexter.
As to Defendant Rick Gentry, Plaintiff alleges that days prior to the fight between Plaintiff
and inmate David Fletcher, Plaintiff filed an emergency grievance concerning inmate Fletcher’s
intimidation and threats toward Plaintiff [Doc. 2 p. 6]. However, Plaintiff did not receive a
response to the grievance until after the physical altercation on July 2, 2015 [Id.]. Following the
fight, Plaintiff informed Defendant Gentry of the emergency grievance filed on the matter prior to
this incident [Id.]. Defendant Gentry advised Plaintiff that he had not received said grievance and
“would check into [it]” [Id.].
Plaintiff attached the relevant grievance to his complaint [Doc. 2-1 p. 39]. The grievance,
dated June 29, 2015, states that inmate Fletcher “intimidates” other inmates and Plaintiff asks for
Fletcher to be moved to another division [Id.]. Three days later, on July 2, 2015 (the same day as
the physical altercation between Plaintiff and Fletcher), a response to the grievance provided as
follows, “Did not get to this until after the situation that occurred on July 2, 2015. I believe we
have taken actions to help this situation.” [Id.]. This attached exhibit proves that, at the time of
the alleged assault by inmate Fletcher, Defendant Gentry was unaware of any threat to Plaintiff.
Although there is no set time a grievance should be responded to, three days is not an excessive
amount of time between the filling of the grievance and the response. If Defendant Gentry was
unaware of the grievance filed at the time of the fight, he, therefore, did not know of any
“intimidation” by inmate Fletcher toward Plaintiff or other inmates. Plaintiff failed to demonstrate
the necessary requirement of deliberately indifferent by Defendant Gentry. Accordingly, this
Eighth Amendment claim for failure to protect from inmate Fletcher is DISMISSED.
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Further, two days following the physical altercation between Plaintiff and inmate Fletcher,
“a mass fight and riot broke out” between members of the Gangster Disciples and other inmates,
including Plaintiff [Doc. 2 p. 7]. In his complaint, Plaintiff asserts that “the jail’s” failure to
classify and separate the gang members directly lead to this riot [Id.]. This, allegation is flawed
for two reasons.
First, Plaintiff fails to follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pleading standard,
because he does not connect any Defendant to this allegation. See F.R.C.P. 8(a)(2). It is a basic
pleading essential that a plaintiff attribute factual allegations to particular defendants. Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555 (holding that in order to state a claim, the plaintiff must make sufficient allegations
to give a defendant fair notice of the claim). As previously stated, pro se litigants “are held to less
stringent [pleading] standards than . . . lawyers in the sense that a pro se complaint will be liberally
construed in determining whether it fails to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.”
Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106
(1976)); see also Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Yet, this Court’s “lenient treatment
generally accorded to pro se litigants has limits.” Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir.
1996). “Neither [this] Court nor other courts . . . have been willing to abrogate basic pleading
essentials in pro se suits.” Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989).
Second, even if Plaintiff had asked a specific defendant to place certain inmates in different
areas of the jail, the Court notes that transfers and inner prison inmate housing are functions wholly
within the discretion of the prison authorities. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245 (1983).
Inmates have no right to be housed, or to request other inmates be housed, in a particular institution
or a particular part of an institution. See Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976); Beard v.
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Livesay, 798 F.2d 874, 876 (6th Cir. 1986). For these reasons, any claim alleging failure to
separate gang members will be DISMISSED.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this action will be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b).
AN APPROPRIATE ORDER WILL ENTER.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
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