Miller v. Warren County Jail

Filing 5

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Plaintiffs motion to proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. 4]is GRANTED. Nonetheless, Plaintiff will be ASSESSED the filing fee of three hundred and fifty dollars ($350). Plaintiffs complaint and the present acti on will be DISMISSED sua sponte for failure to state a viable claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Finally, the Court CERTIFIES that any appeal from this action would not be taken in good faith and would be totally frivolous.Signed by District Judge Travis R McDonough on 6/12/2018. (AML, ) M/O mailed to William Miller and Warren County Jail, Inmate Accounts. M/O emailed to court financial deputy.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT WINCHESTER
WILLIAM CORDELL MILLER,
Plaintiff,
v.
WARREN COUNTY JAIL,
Defendant.

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Case No. 4:16-CV-42
Judge Travis R. McDonough
Magistrate Judge Susan K. Lee

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [Doc. 1] and
motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. 4]. For the reasons set forth below,
Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. 4] will be GRANTED, and
Plaintiff’s complaint will be DISMISSED sua sponte.
I.

FILING FEE
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), any prisoner who files a complaint in

a district court must tender the full filing fee or file (1) an application to proceed in forma
pauperis without prepayment of fees and (2) a certified copy of their inmate trust account for the
previous six-month period. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). Plaintiff submitted a fully compliant
application to proceed in forma pauperis on May 25, 2016 [Doc. 4], and it appears from the
application that Plaintiff lacks sufficient financial resources to pay the $350.00 filing fee.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. 4] is GRANTED
and, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Clerk is DIRECTED to file this action without the
prepayment of costs or fees or security therefor as of the date the Complaint was received.

Because Plaintiff is currently confined at the Warren County Jail, he is herewith
ASSESSED the civil filing fee of $350.00. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2), the custodian of
Plaintiff’s inmate trust account at the institution where he now resides is directed to submit to the
Clerk, U.S. District Court, 800 Market Street, Suite 130, Knoxville, Tennessee 37902, twenty
percent (20%) of the Plaintiff’s preceding monthly income (or income credited to the Plaintiff’s
trust account for the preceding month), but only when such monthly income exceeds ten dollars
($10.00), until the full filing fee of three hundred fifty dollars ($350.00) as authorized under 28
U.S.C. § 1914(a) has been paid to the Clerk. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
The Clerk is DIRECTED to send a copy of this Memorandum to the Warren County Jail
to ensure that the custodian of Plaintiff’s trust account complies with that portion of the PLRA
relating to payment of the filing fee. The Clerk is DIRECTED to forward a copy of this
Memorandum to the Court’s financial deputy.
II.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed this complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on May 25, 2016, against Defendant

Warren Count Jail [Doc. 1 p. 1]. Plaintiff claims that during his incarceration at the Warren
County Jail, his federal mail was tampered with, government postage was illegally taxed, and a
jail administrator refused to provide him with a notary [Id.]. The substance of the complaint
alleges, in its entirety:
1) I received a legal letter from C/O Chris Oden which was already opened.
2) I ordered a book of ten stamps which were posted at $4.90 and I was taxed
and charged $5.19. To my understanding federal postage can NOT be taxed.
3) I asked Evonne McGuinness who is a certified notary public to notarize my
lawsuit papers and she refused to do so once I told her who the lawsuit was
against.

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[Id. at 2]. As relief for these alleged constitutional violations, Plaintiff requests that the jail be
reprimanded, that two jail employees be suspended or terminated, and seeks compensation for
his pain and suffering [Id. at 3].
III.

ANALYSIS
Under the PLRA, district courts must screen prisoner complaints and sua sponte dismiss

those that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim for relief, or are against a defendant
who is immune. See Benson v. O’Brian, 179 F.3d 1014, 1015–16 (6th Cir. 1999) (“Congress
directed the federal courts to review or ‘screen’ certain complaints sua sponte and to dismiss
those that failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted [or] . . . sought monetary
relief from a defendant immune from such relief.”). The dismissal standard articulated by the
Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544 (2007), “governs dismissals for failure to state a claim under [28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A] because the relevant statutory language tracks the language in Rule
12(b)(6).” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010). Thus, to survive an initial
review under the PLRA, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570). However, “a district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.” Tackett v.
M&G Polymers, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461,
466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must establish that he was deprived of
a federal right by a person acting under color of state law. Black v. Barberton Citizens Hosp.,
134 F.3d 1265, 1267 (6th Cir. 1998); O’Brien v. City of Grand Rapids, 23 F.3d 990, 995 (6th

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Cir. 1994); Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 1036, 1042 (6th Cir. 1992); see also Braley v.
City of Pontiac, 906 F.2d 220, 223 (6th Cir. 1990) (“Section 1983 does not itself create any
constitutional rights; it creates a right of action for the vindication of constitutional guarantees
found elsewhere.”). In other words, Plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to show: (1) the
deprivation of a right, privilege, or immunity secured to him by the United States Constitution or
other federal law; and (2) that the individual responsible for such deprivation was acting under
color of state law. Gregory v. Shelby Cty., 220 F.3d 433, 441 (6th Cir. 2000).
At the outset, Plaintiff has named a non-suable entity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as the sole
Defendant in this case [Doc. 1 p. 1]. The Warren County Jail is a building that serves as a place
of confinement for those in custody, and it is not a “person” under § 1983. See Monell v. Dep’t
of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 689–90 n.53 (1978) (finding that only “bodies politic” are
“persons” who can be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Marbry v. Corr. Med. Serv., No. 99-6706,
2000 WL 1720959, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 6, 2000) (holding that “the Shelby County Jail is not an
entity subject to suit under §1983”) (citing Rhodes v. McDannel, 945 F.2d 117, 120 (6th Cir.
1991)); Cage v. Kent Cty. Corr. Facility, No. 96-1167, 1997 WL 225647, at *1 (6th Cir. May 1,
1997) (stating that “[t]he district court also properly found that the jail facility named as a
defendant was not an entity subject to suit under § 1983”). Thus, the Warren County Jail will be
DISMISSED as a Defendant in this action.
Additionally, even if Plaintiff were given leave to amend his complaint to bring suit
against proper Defendants, Plaintiff’s factual allegations fail to state a claim for relief under §
1983. First, with respect to Plaintiff’s claims regarding the taxation of stamps at the Warren
County Jail, “[c]ommissary pricing does not implicate constitutional concerns.” See Newell v.
Ruth, No. 1:11–CV–86, 2014 WL 4411045, at *9 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 8, 2014) (collecting cases).

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Therefore, “[a]s to Plaintiff’s first claim, his challenge to the overcharging of stamps, a prisoner
does not have ‘a constitutionally protected interest in buying stamps as cheaply as possible, as
there is simply no legal basis for a demand that inmates be offered items for purchase at or near
cost.’” Moss v. Curry, No. 4:09-CV-P33-M, 2009 WL 3334907, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 15, 2009)
(quoting McCall v. Keefe Supply Co., 71 F. App’x 779, 780 (10th Cir. 2003)) (additional internal
citation and quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff’s claims that the Warren County Jail
unconstitutionally taxed the purchase of stamps thus fail to state a claim for relief under § 1983,
and will be DISMISSED.
Plaintiff also alleges that a jail administrator refused to notarize documents related to his
lawsuit [Doc. 1 p. 2]. Prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts. Bounds v.
Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977). However, the right of access to the courts has never been
equated with unlimited access to legal materials and assistance. See Walker v. Mintzes, 771 F.2d
920, 932 (6th Cir. 1985). In order to state a claim for interference with access to the courts, a
plaintiff must show “actual injury” and prejudice. Thaddeus–X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th
Cir. 1999) (citing Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996)); see, e.g., Moore v. Chavez, 36 F.
App’x 169, 171 (6th Cir. 2002) (“Although prisoners have a constitutional right of meaningful
access to the courts, a prisoner must demonstrate actual prejudice to pending or contemplated
litigation to state a claim.”). Therefore, a plaintiff “must plead and prove prejudice stemming
from the asserted violation, [such as] the late filing of a court document or the dismissal of an
otherwise meritorious claim.” Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996).
In the present case, Plaintiff fails to allege actual injury or prejudice resulting from the
failure of the jail administrator to notarize certain documents. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351; see,
e.g., Harbin–Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571, 578 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Examples of actual prejudice to

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pending or contemplated litigation include having a case dismissed, being unable to file a
complaint, and missing a court-imposed deadline.”). Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim that a jail
administrator refused to notarize documents related to his lawsuit also fails to state a claim for
relief under § 1983, and will be DISMISSED. See, e.g., Odom v. Lynn, No. 4:13-CV-P60-R,
2013 WL 5504167, at *5 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 2, 2013) (holding the plaintiff’s access-to-court claims,
including claims that the defendants “refused to mail legal mail and notarize documents,” failed
to state a claim for relief under § 1983 as the plaintiff failed to allege prejudice).
Lastly, Plaintiff also claims that he received a piece of legal mail that was already opened
[Doc. 1 p. 2]. Prisoners maintain a First Amendment right to send and receive mail. See
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408–409 (1974), overruled in part on other grounds
by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407 (1989); Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union,
Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977). An inmate’s exercise of constitutional rights is necessarily limited,
however, “both from the fact of incarceration and from valid penological objectives—including
deterrence of crime, rehabilitation of prisoners, and institutional security.” Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822–23 (1974)
Plaintiff’s accusation that his mail was searched on one occasion is insufficient to state a
claim for a violation of his constitutional rights. A single, isolated interference with Plaintiff’s
mail does not establish a constitutional violation. See Johnson v. Wilkinson, 229 F.3d 1152
(Table), 2000 WL 1175519, at *2 (6th Cir. Aug. 11, 2000) (holding that one isolated incident of
interference with mail did not violate plaintiff’s constitutional rights) (citing Gardner v. Howard,
109 F.3d 427, 431 (8th Cir. 1997)); see, e.g., Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 293 (6th Cir.
2010) (citing Johnson for the holding that “isolated incidents” of interference with prisoners’
rights do not rise to the level of a First Amendment violation); Okoro v. Scibana, 63 F. App’x

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182, 184 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Such a random and isolated incident [of mail interference] is
insufficient to establish a constitutional violation.”); Lloyd v. Herrington, No. 4:11-CV-P128-M,
2011 WL 6026661, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 2, 2011) (collecting cases to hold that plaintiff’s
allegations “that one piece of incoming legal mail was opened outside of his presence” fail to
state a claim for relief under § 1983). Further, Plaintiff fails to allege prejudice required to assert
a violation of his right of access to the courts under the First Amendment. See Truss-El v.
Bouchard, 103 F. App’x 575, 577 (6th Cir. 2004) (upholding dismissal of prisoner’s claim
against prison officials based on alleged interference with his legal mail where he did not
demonstrate any prejudice to pending or contemplated litigation). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim
that his legal mail was opened fails to state a claim for relief under § 1983, and will be
DISMISSED.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. 4]

is GRANTED. Nonetheless, Plaintiff will be ASSESSED the filing fee of three hundred and
fifty dollars ($350) and shall follow the procedures as outlined in this Memorandum Opinion.
Although this Court is mindful that a pro se complaint is to be liberally construed, Haines
v Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 510–21 (1972), it is clear that Plaintiff has not alleged the deprivation of
any constitutionally protected right, privilege, or immunity, and thus, the Court finds his claims
to be frivolous under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A. Therefore, Plaintiff’s complaint and the
present action will be DISMISSED sua sponte for failure to state a viable claim for relief under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Finally, the Court CERTIFIES that any appeal from this action would not be
taken in good faith and would be totally frivolous. See Fed. R. App. P. 24.

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AN APPROPRIATE JUDGMENT WILL ENTER.
/s/ Travis R. McDonough
TRAVIS R. MCDONOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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