Hedelsky v. USA
Filing
15
MEMORANDUM OPINION: The Court concludes that an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary, and Petitioners Section 2255 motion (Doc. 1 in Case No. 4:18-cv- 51; Doc. 169 in Case No. 4:15-cr-13) is DENIED. AN APPROPRIATE JUDGMENT WILL ENTER. Signed by District Judge Travis R McDonough on 1/23/2020. (AWS) Mailed to to James Hedelsky.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT WINCHESTER
JAMES HEDELSKY,
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
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Case Nos. 4:18-cv-51, 4:15-cr-13
Judge Travis R. McDonough
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before the Court is Petitioner James Hedelsky’s pro se motion to vacate, set aside, or
correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. 1 in Case No. 4:18-cv-51; Doc. 169 in
Case No. 4:15-cr-13). Petitioner has also moved for an evidentiary hearing (Doc. 3 in Case No.
4:18-cv-51), to appoint counsel (Doc. 5 in Case No. 4:18-cv-51), and to obtain transcripts (Doc.
12 in Case No. 4:18-cv-51). For the following reasons, the Court concludes that an evidentiary
hearing is unnecessary and will DENY Petitioner’s Section 2255 motion (Doc. 1 in Case No.
4:18-cv-51), as well as his motions for an evidentiary hearing, to appoint counsel, and to obtain
transcripts (Docs. 3, 5, 12 in Case No. 4:18-cv-51).
I.
BACKGROUND
On October 27, 2015, a federal grand jury returned a two-count indictment, charging
Petitioner with: (1) conspiracy to distribute fifty grams or more of methamphetamine (actual), a
Schedule II controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and 846
(“Count One”); and (2) possession with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of
methamphetamine (actual), in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A) and 18 U.S.C.
§ 2 (“Count Two”). (Doc. 1 in Case No. 4:15-cr-13.)
At trial, the jury heard testimony from 17th Judicial Drug and Violent Crime Task Force
Director Timothy Lane. (Doc. 156, at 53 in Case No. 4:15-cr-13.) According to Lane’s
testimony, in July 2015, law enforcement officers were attempting to locate Takesta Smith to
arrest her on state and federal charges. (Id. at 56.) On July 22, 2015, with the help of a
confidential informant, officers located Smith at a mall in Tullahoma, Tennessee. (Id. at 57‒58.)
Officers arrested Smith after the confidential source picked her up at the mall and drove away.
(Id.) After arresting Smith, officers returned to the mall parking lot because the confidential
source indicated that Smith had been driving a black Nissan Pathfinder and they wanted to see if
the Pathfinder in the mall parking lot met the confidential source’s description. (Id. at 58.)
When officers confirmed that the Pathfinder met the confidential source’s description, they
pulled up to the vehicle and saw Petitioner, along with David Hartley, one of his co-defendants,
standing next to the vehicle. (Id.) Petitioner and the co-defendant indicated to the officers that
the vehicle belonged to Smith, but Petitioner acknowledged that he was driving the vehicle, and,
when officers searched Petitioner, they found the key to the Pathfinder on his person. (Id. at 59‒
60.) When officers conducted an inventory search of the Pathfinder, they found over 194 grams
of methamphetamine and several documents addressed to Petitioner at a Cartersville, Georgia
address. (Id. at 62, 69‒70.) After officers searched the Pathfinder, they arrested Petitioner. (Id.
at 76.)
At trial, the Government also presented testimony from Lane and 17th Judicial District
Task Force Officer Kyle Brewer regarding law enforcement’s post-arrest, post-Miranda
interview of Petitioner at a jail the day after he was arrested. (Id. at 80; Doc. 157, at 25‒26 in
Case No. 4:15-cr-13.) According to Lane and Brewer, Petitioner admitted that he drove Smith
2
and Hartley to Tennessee from Georgia on multiple occasions so that they could sell
methamphetamine. (Doc. 156, at 80 in Case No. 4:15-cr-13; Doc. 157, at 26 in Case No. 4:15cr-13.) Lane and Brewer also testified that, during this interview, Petitioner informed them that
he had a safe containing drugs and money in a garage at the Cartersville, Georgia address and
told the officers the combination to the safe. (Doc. 156, at 81 in Case No. 4:15-cr-13; Doc. 157,
at 28 in Case No. 4:15-cr-13.) Based on this information, officers in Georgia obtained and
executed a search warrant at the residence in Cartersville, Georgia, where they found
methamphetamine, a loaded firearm, and over a thousand dollars in the safe in the garage.1
(Doc. 156, at 132 in Case No. 4:15-cr-13.)
At trial, the jury also heard testimony from Smith. (Id. at 165.) Smith testified that she
purchased methamphetamine for resale from co-defendant, David Hartley, whom she observed
receiving methamphetamine from Petitioner. (Id. at 169‒70.) Smith also testified that, on July
22, 2015, she, Hartley, and Petitioner met in Georgia, where they picked up methamphetamine
from a storage shed and weighed the methamphetamine in Petitioner’s garage in Georgia. (Id. at
172‒74.) From there, Petitioner drove Smith in the Pathfinder to Tennessee, with Hartley
following on his motorcycle, so that Smith could sell methamphetamine. (Id. at 172‒80.) After
the Government rested, Petitioner elected not to offer proof. (Doc. 157, at 78, in Case No. 4:15cr-13.)
On September 16, 2015, the jury convicted Petitioner on Count One but could not reach a
verdict on Count Two. (Doc. 112 in Case No. 4:15-cr-13.) The Court subsequently granted the
Government’s motion to dismiss Count Two without prejudice. (Doc. 128 in Case No. 4:15-cr-
1
Brian Bunce, a former detective for the Barto County Sheriff’s Office, testified that he was able
to open the safe using the combination supplied by Brewer. (Doc. 156, at 132‒33, in Case No.
4:15-cr-13.)
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13.) Because the Government filed an information pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851 (Doc. 35 in Case
No. 4:15-cr-13), the Court imposed a mandatory life sentence (Doc. 152 in Case No. 4:15-cr-13).
Petitioner appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit, arguing that the Court erred in admitting testimony about the evidence recovered from
the safe at the Carterville, Georgia, residence and that there was insufficient evidence in the
record to support his conspiracy conviction. (See Doc. 162 in Case No. 4:15-cr-13.) The Sixth
Circuit affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and sentence on August 17, 2017, holding, among other
things, that the evidence recovered from the safe was probative of whether Petitioner was
engaged in a conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine because he “possessed a distribution
quantity of methamphetamine” in the safe, which was “in the same location where he prepared
the methamphetamine for sale with [his co-defendants] on the day he was arrested.” (Id. at 3.)
On August 13, 2018, Petitioner filed a timely motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his
sentence pursuant to Section 2255.2 (Doc. 1 in Case No. 4:18-cv-51.) This motion is now ripe
for the Court’s review.
2
Section 2255(f) is a one-year statute of limitations on all petitions for collateral relief under
Section 2255 running from either: (1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes
final; (2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental action
in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was
prevented from making a motion by such governmental action; (3) the date on which the right
asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized
by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or (4) the
date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered
through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). The Sixth Circuit affirmed
Petitioner’s conviction on August 17, 2017, and Petitioner did not seek a writ of certiorari from
the United States Supreme Court. Accordingly, Petitioner’s judgment of conviction became final
when the ninety-day period for seeking a writ of certiorari expired on November 15, 2017. See
Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 525 (2003). Petitioner filed the instant motion on July 24,
2017, which falls within the one-year window for requesting collateral relief. Accordingly,
Petitioner’s motion is timely filed.
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II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
To obtain relief under § 2255, a petitioner must demonstrate “(1) an error of
constitutional magnitude; (2) a sentence imposed outside the statutory limits; or (3) an error of
fact or law . . . so fundamental as to render the entire proceeding invalid.” Short v. United States,
471 F.3d 686, 691 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Mallett v. United States, 334 F.3d 491, 496–97 (6th
Cir. 2003)). He “must clear a significantly higher hurdle than would exist on direct appeal” and
establish a “fundamental defect in the proceedings which necessarily results in a complete
miscarriage of justice or an egregious error violative of due process.” Fair v. United States, 157
F.3d 427, 430 (6th Cir. 1998).
Additionally, in ruling on a motion made pursuant to § 2255, the Court must determine
whether an evidentiary hearing is necessary. “An evidentiary hearing is required unless the
record conclusively shows that the petitioner is entitled to no relief.” Martin v. United States,
889 F.3d 827, 832 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Campbell v. United States, 686 F.3d 353, 357 (6th
Cir. 2012)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). “The burden for establishing entitlement to an
evidentiary hearing is relatively light, and where there is a factual dispute, the habeas court must
hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the truth of the petitioner’s claims.” Martin, 889 F.3d
at 832 (internal quotations omitted). While a petitioner’s “mere assertion of innocence” does not
entitle him to an evidentiary hearing, the district court cannot forego an evidentiary hearing
unless “the petitioner’s allegations cannot be accepted as true because they are contradicted by
the record, inherently incredible, or conclusions rather than statements of fact.” Id. When
petitioner’s factual narrative of the events is not contradicted by the record and not inherently
incredible and the government offers nothing more than contrary representations, the petitioner is
entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Id.
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III.
ANALYSIS
In his Section 2255 motion, Petitioner claims that he suffered errors of constitutional
magnitude primarily based on the way the Government, his attorney, and the Court handled
evidence related to the safe in the Cartersville, Georgia, residence. (See generally Doc. 1 in Case
No. 4:18-cv-51.) Contrary to Lane and Brewer’s testimony at trial, Petitioner claims he never
told Lane and Brewer the combination to the safe in his post-arrest interview. (Id.) Contending
that Lane and Brewer perjured themselves, the Government knew Lane and Brewer were
perjuring themselves, his attorney had no effective strategy for combating the perjured
testimony, and the Court erred in admitting evidence related to the safe, Petitioner asserts that his
due-process rights were violated and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. (Id.) As
explained below, because each of Petitioner’s arguments fails, the Court will deny his Section
2255 motion.
A. Violation of Due-Process Rights
Petitioner first argues that he is entitled to relief under Section 2255 because the
Government violated his due-process rights and denied him a fair trial. (Id. at 15.) Specifically,
Petitioner argues that his due-process rights were violated because: (1) law enforcement
witnesses lied while under oath at trial, and the Government knew they were lying; (2) the
Government improperly vouched for the credibility of certain witnesses; (3) the Government
withheld evidence favorable to Petitioner; (4) the Government failed to publish to the jury the
Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) report summarizing a post-arrest interview of
Petitioner; and (5) law enforcement used a fraudulent warrant to keep Petitioner in jail. (Id. at
15‒17, 22.)
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To the extent Petitioner contends that he is entitled to relief solely because Lane and
Brewer perjured themselves at trial, that claim fails because perjured testimony without
government knowledge does not provide a basis for habeas corpus relief:
An allegation of perjury, apart from an allegation of knowing use by the
Government of that perjury, constitutes no basis for habeas corpus or coran nobis
relief as it alleges no error of constitutional dimensions. The credibility of
witnesses is ordinarily for trial by the jury in a criminal trial. False evidence and
perjury are matters that may be raised on the trial and on motions for a new trial,
but not in habeas corpus, Section 2255, or other post-conviction petitions.
United States v. Castano, 906 F.3d 458, 464‒65 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Burks v. Egeler, 512
F.2d 221, 229 (6th Cir. 1975)). Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to relief based on his
assertion that Lane and Brewer provided false testimony at trial.
To the extent Petitioner claims he is entitled to relief because the Government knowingly
sponsored perjured testimony, that claim also fails. “The ‘deliberate deception of court and jury
by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured’ violates a defendant’s due-process
rights.” Monea v. United States, 914 F.3d 414, 421 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting Mooney v.
Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935)). However, “[t]o prevail on such a claim, [a petitioner] must
show that the Government knowingly presented false testimony that materially affected the
proceeding.” Id. “[M]ere inconsistencies will not suffice”; rather, the petitioner “must prove
that the Government’s testimony was indisputably false.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
In this case, Petitioner’s motion fails because he has not identified any facts indicating
that the Government knowingly presented false testimony at trial. First, Petitioner has not
presented sufficient facts to demonstrate that Lane and Brewer perjured themselves when they
testified he told them the combination to the safe at the Cartersville, Georgia, residence. Second,
even if Lane and Brewer falsely testified that Petitioner told them the safe combination in the
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post-arrest interview, there is nothing in the record suggesting that the Government knew the
testimony was false and elected to present it anyway.
Petitioner’s motion also fails to the extent he contends that the Government violated his
due-process rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to disclose favorable
evidence. “Brady violations involve a three-part test: ‘The evidence at issue must be favorable
to the accused, either because it is exculpatory or because it is impeaching; that evidence must
have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have
ensued.” Castano, 906 F.3d at 466 (quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281‒82 (1999)).
“Prejudice means that the nondisclosure was so serious that there is a reasonable probability that
the suppressed evidence would have produced a different verdict.” Id.
Here, Petitioner has not demonstrated that the Government failed to disclose Brady
material. Indeed, Petitioner’s motion generically states that the Government “fail[ed] to disclose
evidence favorable to the defense” (Doc. 1 at 15 in Case No. 4:18-cv-51), but Petitioner fails to
identify what that evidence is. Petitioner has failed satisfy his burden to demonstrate that the
Government failed to disclose exculpatory or impeachment evidence, that the Government
willfully or inadvertently suppressed such evidence, or that prejudice ensued. Accordingly,
Petitioner is not entitled to relief based on his assertion that the Government violated its
obligations under Brady.
Petitioner’s motion also fails to the extent he claims the Government violated his dueprocess rights by failing to publish to the jury a Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”)
report summarizing his post-arrest interview. Although Lane and Brewer’s testimony referenced
a DEA report that Brewer authored summarizing Petitioner’s post-arrest interview, Petitioner
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cites no authority supporting his assertion that such testimony obligates the Government to seek
to admit the report into evidence or publish the report to the jury.
Finally, Petitioner’s motion fails to the extent he claims the Assistant United States
Attorney improperly vouched for the credibility of Lane and Brewer on redirect examination
when he asked them why they did not record Petitioner’s interview.
Improper vouching occurs when a prosecutor supports the credibility of a witness
by indicating a personal belief in the witness’s credibility thereby placing the
prestige of the office of the United States Attorney behind that witness. . . . This
generally involves either blunt comments asserting personal belief, or comments
that imply special knowledge of facts not before the jury or the credibility or
truthfulness of the witness.
United States v. Reid, 625 F.3d 977, 982 (6th Cir. 2010).
During trial, Petitioner’s counsel sought to undermine Lane and Brewer’s credibility by
questioning them about why Petitioner’s post-arrest interview was not recorded. On redirect
examination, the Assistant United States Attorney asked Lane and Brewer to explain why they
did not record the interview and to explain the basis for their testimony that Petitioner told them
the combination to the safe in the interview. Contrary to Petitioner’s assertions, the Assistant
United States Attorney’s questions did not indicate his personal belief in Lane or Brewer’s
testimony or imply that he had special knowledge of facts not before the jury. Accordingly,
Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the Government improperly vouched for the credibility
of Lane and Brewer and, thus, has failed to demonstrate that his due process rights were violated.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Petitioner next argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his
attorney failed to: (1) pursue the issue of prosecutorial misconduct at trial and on direct appeal;
(2) properly impeach government witnesses; (3) “object to major issues in trial and direct
appeal”; (4) “interview and secure witnesses for trial” and “investigate any relevant issues”; and
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(5) have any defense. (See Doc. 1, at 17‒20 in Case No. 4:18-cv-51.) Petitioner also argues that
“[c]ounsel made damaging statements,” had a conflict of interest, and failed to consult with him
“about direct appeal.” (Id. at 17‒19.)
To collaterally attack his conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner
must establish “that [his] lawyers performed well below the norm of competence in the
profession and that this failing prejudiced [his] case.” Caudill v. Conover, 881 F.3d 454, 460
(6th Cir. 2018) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). The performance
inquiry requires the defendant to “show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. The prejudice inquiry requires the
defendant to “show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694.
There is a “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 689. Therefore, the court should resist “the
temptation to rely on hindsight . . . in the context of ineffective assistance claims.” Carson v.
United States, 3 F. App’x 321, 324 (6th Cir. 2001); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (“A fair
assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting
effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to
evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.”).
In this case, Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel fail because he has
not demonstrated that his counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of care or that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. First, as discussed above, Petitioner has not identified
credible evidence suggesting that Lane and Brewer perjured themselves while testifying about
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the safe and Petitioner’s post-arrest interview at trial, that the Government knowingly presented
false testimony, or that the Government improperly vouched for witnesses at trial. As a result,
Petitioner cannot demonstrate that his counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard
of care by failing to pursue prosecutorial or law-enforcement misconduct theories at trial or by
failing to impeach these witnesses. Moreover, the trial transcript is replete with examples of
counsel’s efforts to undermine Lane and Brewer’s credibility by questioning them about why
they failed to record Petitioner’s post-arrest interview and why they failed to have Petitioner sign
a Miranda waiver. (See, e.g., Doc. 156, at 101‒07 in Case No. 4:15-cr-13.) Given the “strong
presumption” that counsel’s strategic decisions at trial fell within a wide range of reasonable
professional assistance, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that his counsel’s actions fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness with regard to Petitioner’s allegations regarding
prosecutorial and law-enforcement misconduct, his allegations that the Government improperly
vouched for Lane and Brewer’s testimony, and his allegations that his counsel should have
impeached Lane and Brewer based on their false testimony or more strenuously objected to their
testimony regarding the safe.3
Petitioner’s motion also fails to the extent he contends he received ineffective assistance
of counsel because his attorney failed “to have any defense theory.” (Doc. 1, at 19 in Case No.
4:18-cv-51.) The Court construes Petitioner’s argument as taking issue with his counsel electing
not to call any witnesses after the Government rested. Petitioner, however, has not identified any
witnesses he contends should have been called or about what those witnesses would have
3
Petitioner also appears to argue that his counsel’s performance was so deficient that his conduct
“help[ed] the Government get [their] conviction,” thereby creating a conflict of interest. (Doc. 1,
at 19 in Case No. 4:18-cv-51.) Because Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that his attorney’s
conduct fell below an objective standard of care, his assertion that his attorney somehow helped
the Government and created a conflict of interest also fails.
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testified. Further, counsel’s decision not to put on evidence and hold the Government to its
burden of proof was a reasonable trial strategy. See United States v. Perales, No. 3:12 CR 186,
2014 WL 12586393, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 3, 2014) (citing Hale v. Davis, 512 F. App’x 516,
521‒22 (6th Cir. 2013)).
To the extent Petitioner claims his counsel failed to adequately investigate potential
defense witnesses, that argument also fails. As the Government correctly notes, Petitioner has
failed to identify what counsel should have done differently with respect to investigating
potential witnesses. Moreover, to the extent Petitioner claims his counsel should have further
investigated evidence related to the safe through “Ms. Katen,” that argument fails because
Petitioner’s motion acknowledges that his counsel tried to track down Ms. Katen with the help of
the United States Marshal’s Service and was unsuccessful. (Doc. 1, at 19 in Case No. 4:18-cv51.) Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel failed to adequately
investigate potential witnesses and that counsel’s actions fell below an objective standard of
care.4
Finally, even if counsel’s representation somehow fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness, Petitioner’s ineffective-assistance claim still fails because he cannot demonstrate
he was prejudiced by his counsel’s performance. At trial, Lane, Brewer, and Smith all testified
regarding Petitioner’s involvement in a methamphetamine-distribution conspiracy that included
him driving Smith and Hartley from Georgia to Tennessee so that Smith could sell
4
To the extent Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on
counsel’s alleged failure to consult with him during his direct appeal, that argument also fails
because Petitioner has not identified any issue he wanted counsel to raise or explained how
raising that issue would have resulted in a different outcome on direct appeal. See McFarland v.
Yukins, 356 F.3d 688, 699 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Counsel’s failure to raise an issue on appeal could
only be ineffective assistance if there is a reasonable probability that inclusion of the issue would
have changed the result of the appeal.”).
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methamphetamine. Smith further testified that she purchased methamphetamine for resale from
Hartley and that she observed Hartley receive methamphetamine from Petitioner. As a result,
even setting aside the evidence related to the safe, there was more than sufficient evidence in the
record to convict Petitioner of engaging in a conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine.
Petitioner, therefore, cannot show that he was prejudiced by counsel’s alleged failures.
C. Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)
Petitioner next argues that admission of evidence regarding the safe, including the drugs,
gun, and money found in the safe, violated Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). This argument,
however, fails because Petitioner raised this argument on direct appeal, and the Sixth Circuit
rejected it, holding that the Court did not err in admitting this evidence and that, even if it did,
such error was harmless. (Doc. 162, at 3 in Case No. 4:15-cr-13.) Absent extraordinary
circumstances, which Petitioner has failed to demonstrate, Petitioner cannot use a motion under
Section 2255 to relitigate issues decided on direct appeal. DuPont v. United States, 76 F.3d 108,
110 (6th Cir. 1996) (“A § 2255 motion may not be used to relitigate an issue that was raised on
appeal absent highly exceptional circumstances.”). Accordingly, Petitioner’s argument that the
Court erred by admitting the contents of the safe into evidence under Rule 404(b) fails.5
5
In his motion, Petitioner also appears to argue that his Miranda rights were violated by law
enforcement and that his life sentence was illegal. Because Petitioner did not raise these
arguments on direct appeal, they are procedurally defaulted. Elzy v. United States, 205 F.3d 882,
884 (6th Cir. 2000). Further, Petitioner’s motion fails to demonstrate that he is entitled to review
these procedurally defaulted claims because he has not shown good cause for failing to raise the
claim and actual prejudice that would result if these claims are not reviewed, or that he is
actually innocent. See id. Finally, even if these claims were not procedurally defaulted, they
would still fail on the merits because the Court previously found that Petitioner’s Miranda rights
were not violated when it ruled on his motion to suppress and because the Court correctly
imposed a mandatory life sentence based on Petitioner’s three prior felony drug convictions.
(See Docs. 35, 56, 58, 145 in Case No. 4:15-cv-13.)
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IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Court concludes that an evidentiary hearing is
unnecessary, and Petitioner’s Section 2255 motion (Doc. 1 in Case No. 4:18-cv-51; Doc. 169 in
Case No. 4:15-cr-13) is DENIED.6 Should Petitioner give timely notice of an appeal from this
order, such notice will be treated as an application for a certificate of appealability, which is
hereby DENIED since he has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right or “that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a
valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable
whether the district court [is] correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,
484 (2000); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b).
AN APPROPRIATE JUDGMENT WILL ENTER.
/s/Travis R. McDonough
TRAVIS R. MCDONOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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In addition to his Section 2255 motion, Petitioner has filed a motion to appoint counsel, a
motion for an evidentiary hearing, and a motion for transcripts. Rule 8 of the Rules Governing
Section 2255 Proceedings provides for the appointment of counsel if an evidentiary hearing has
been set and the moving party qualifies to have counsel appointed under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A. In
this case, an evidentiary hearing is not necessary, and, while the Court has discretion to appoint
counsel when the interests of justice so require, there is no reason to appoint an attorney, because
the record conclusively shows that Petitioner is not entitled to relief. Additionally, the Court will
deny Petitioner’s motion for transcripts because Petitioner has not demonstrated a particularized
need for transcripts. First, it is clear from citations in Petitioner’s Section 2255 motion that he
has access to transcripts from trial, and Petitioner did not file his motion for transcripts until after
he filed his Section 2255 motion and after he filed his thirty-six-page reply in support of his
Section 2255 motion. (See Docs. 1, 11 in Case No. 4:18-cv-51.) Second, Petitioner has not
explained why he needs transcripts from his sentencing hearing or the “preliminary hearing” in
Coffee County, Tennessee General Sessions Court. Accordingly, the Court will DENY
Petitioner’s motions for an evidentiary hearing, to appoint counsel, and for transcripts (Docs. 3,
5, 12 in Case No. 4:18-cv-51.)
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