Luna v. Social Security Administration

Filing 19

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION: The undersigned recommends that Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record be DENIED, and that the decision of the Commissioner be AFFIRMED. Signed by Magistrate Judge E. Clifton Knowles on 12/9/2014. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(eh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
KRYSTLE CHANTEL LUNA,

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Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,1
Defendant.

Civil Action No. 1:12-cv-00031
Judge Nixon / Knowles

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This is a civil action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), to obtain judicial review of the
final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff Supplemental Security
Insurance (“SSI”), as provided under Title XVI of the Social Security Act (“the Act”), as
amended. The case is currently pending on Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the
Administrative Record. Docket No. 12. Defendant has filed a Response, arguing that the
decision of the Commissioner was supported by substantial evidence and should be affirmed.
Docket No. 17.
For the reasons stated below, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff’s Motion for
Judgment be DENIED, and that the decision of the Commissioner be AFFIRMED.

1

Carolyn W. Colvin became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on February
14, 2013. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d), Carolyn W. Colvin should therefore be substituted
for Commissioner Michael J. Astrue as the Defendant in this action. No further action needs to
be taken to continue this suit by reason of the last sentence of section 205(g) of the Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
1

I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff filed her application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) on March 25,
2008, alleging that she had been disabled since January 2, 2006, due to Diabetes Mellitus Type I
and Bipolar Disorder Type II. See, e.g., Docket No. 10, Attachment (“TR”), pp. 56, 173.
Plaintiff’s application was denied both initially (TR 56) and upon reconsideration (TR 57).
Plaintiff subsequently requested (TR 72) and received (TR 80) a hearing. Plaintiff’s hearing was
conducted on July 23, 2010, by Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) William B. Churchill. TR 27.
Plaintiff and Vocational Expert, Dr. Terry Vandermolen, appeared and testified. Id.
On August 25, 2010, the ALJ issued a decision unfavorable to Plaintiff, finding that
Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act and Regulations. TR
13-25. Specifically, the ALJ made the following findings of fact:
1.

The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity
since March 25, 2008, the application date (20 CFR
416.971 et seq.).

2.

The claimant has the following severe impairments:
diabetes mellitus with early diabetic retinopathy; history of
kidney stones; bipolar disorder; and history of cocaine
abuse (20 CFR 416.920(c)).

3.

The claimant does not have an impairment or combination
of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the
listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1 (20 CFR 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).

4.

After careful consideration of the entire record, the
undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual
functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20
CFR 416.967(b) with the ability to sit for 6 hours, stand for
4 to 6, and walk for 4 to 6 hours in an 8-hour work day.
She can lift 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds
frequently as well as push or pull to that weight. She can
2

occasionally bend, climb, crawl, stoop, and squat but is
precluded from climbing ladders or being exposed to
unprotected heights and hazardous machinery. Mentally,
the claimant can maintain concentration for extended
periods and perform simple, routine tasks. She requires
limited contact and interaction with co-workers, the public,
and supervisors.
5.

The claimant has no past relevant work (20 CFR 416.965).

6.

The claimant was born on September 8, 1986 and was 21
years old, which is defined as a younger individual age 1849, on the date the application was filled (20 CFR 416.963).

7.

The claimant has at least a high school education and is
able to communicate in English (20 CFR 416.964).

8.

Transferability of job skills is not an issue because the
claimant does not have past relevant work (20 CFR
416.968).

9.

Considering the claimant’s age, education, work
experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs
that exist in significant numbers in the national economy
that the claimant can perform (20 CFR 416.969 and
416.969(a)).

10.

The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in
the Social Security Act, since March 25, 2008, the date the
application was filed (20 CFR 416.920(g)).

TR 15-25.
On October 20, 2010, Plaintiff timely filed a request for review of the hearing decision.
TR 7. On January 30, 2012, the Appeals Council issued a letter declining to review the case (TR
1-6), thereby rendering the decision of the ALJ the final decision of the Commissioner. This
civil action was thereafter timely filed, and the Court has jurisdiction. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). If the
Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, based upon the record as a

3

whole, then these findings are conclusive. Id.
II. REVIEW OF THE RECORD
The parties and the ALJ have thoroughly summarized and discussed the medical and
testimonial evidence of Record. Accordingly, the Court will discuss those matters only to the
extent necessary to analyze the parties’ arguments.
III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. Standard of Review
This Court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is limited to the record made in the
administrative hearing process. Jones v. Secretary, 945 F.2d 1365, 1369 (6th Cir. 1991). The
purpose of this review is to determine (1) whether substantial evidence exists in the record to
support the Commissioner’s decision, and (2) whether any legal errors were committed in the
process of reaching that decision. Landsaw v. Secretary, 803 F.2d 211, 213 (6th Cir. 1986).
“Substantial evidence” means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind would accept
as adequate to support the conclusion.” Her v. Commissioner, 203 F.3d 388, 389 (6th Cir. 1999)
(citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). “Substantial evidence” has been
further quantified as “more than a mere scintilla of evidence, but less than a preponderance.”
Bell v. Commissioner, 105 F.3d 244, 245 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Consolidated Edison Co. v.
N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 216, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938)).
The reviewing court does not substitute its findings of fact for those of the Commissioner
if substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s findings and inferences. Garner v. Heckler,
745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). In fact, even if the evidence could also support a different
conclusion, the decision of the Administrative Law Judge must stand if substantial evidence
4

supports the conclusion reached. Her, 203 F.3d at 389 (citing Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270,
273 (6th Cir. 1997). However, if the Commissioner did not consider the record as a whole, the
Commissioner’s conclusion is undermined. Hurst v. Secretary, 753 F.2d 517, 519 (6th Cir. 1985)
(citing Allen v. Califano, 613 F.2d 139, 145 (6th Cir. 1980) (citing Futernick v. Richardson, 484
F.2d 647 (6th Cir. 1973))).
In reviewing the decisions of the Commissioner, courts look to four types of evidence:
(1) objective medical findings regarding Plaintiff’s condition; (2) diagnosis and opinions of
medical experts; (3) subjective evidence of Plaintiff’s condition; and (4) Plaintiff’s age,
education, and work experience. Miracle v. Celebrezze, 351 F.2d 361, 374 (6th Cir. 1965).
B. Proceedings At The Administrative Level
The claimant carries the ultimate burden to establish an entitlement to benefits by proving
his or her “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). “Substantial gainful activity” not
only includes previous work performed by Plaintiff, but also, considering Plaintiff’s age,
education, and work experience, any other relevant work that exists in the national economy in
significant numbers regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which
Plaintiff lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists, or whether Plaintiff would be hired if he
or she applied. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
At the administrative level of review, the claimant’s case is considered under a five-step
sequential evaluation process as follows:
(1) If the claimant is working and the work constitutes substantial
5

gainful activity, benefits are automatically denied.
(2) If the claimant is not found to have an impairment which
significantly limits his or her ability to work (a “severe”
impairment), then he or she is not disabled.
(3) If the claimant is not working and has a severe impairment, it
must be determined whether he or she suffers from one of the
“listed” impairments2 or its equivalent. If a listing is met or
equaled, benefits are owing without further inquiry.
(4) If the claimant does not suffer from any listing-level
impairments, it must be determined whether the claimant can
return to the job he or she previously held in light of his or her
residual functional capacity (e.g., what the claimant can still do
despite his or her limitations). By showing a medical condition
that prevents him or her from returning to such past relevant work,
the claimant establishes a prima facie case of disability.
(5) Once the claimant establishes a prima facie case of disability,
the burden shifts to the Commissioner to establish the claimant’s
ability to work by proving the existence of a significant number of
jobs in the national economy which the claimant could perform,
given his or her age, experience, education, and residual functional
capacity.
20 CFR §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (footnote added). See also Moon v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1175, 1181
(6th Cir. 1990).
The Commissioner’s burden at the fifth step of the evaluation process can be satisfied by
relying on the medical-vocational guidelines, otherwise known as “the grid,” but only if the
claimant is not significantly limited by a nonexertional impairment, and then only when the
claimant’s characteristics identically match the characteristics of the applicable grid rule.
Otherwise, the grid cannot be used to direct a conclusion, but only as a guide to the disability
determination. Id. In such cases where the grid does not direct a conclusion as to the claimant’s
2

The Listing of Impairments is found at 20 CFR, Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1.
6

disability, the Commissioner must rebut the claimant’s prima facie case by coming forward with
particularized proof of the claimant’s individual vocational qualifications to perform specific
jobs, which is typically obtained through vocational expert testimony. See Varley v. Secretary,
820 F.2d 777, 779 (6th Cir. 1987).
In determining residual functional capacity for purposes of the analysis required at stages
four and five above, the Commissioner is required to consider the combined effect of all the
claimant’s impairments; mental and physical, exertional and nonexertional, severe and
nonsevere. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(B).
C. Plaintiff’s Statement Of Errors
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ: (1) failed to accord appropriate weight to the opinions of
her treating mental health providers; (2) failed to properly weigh certain medical reports; (3) did
not properly evaluate her credibility; (4) failed to find Plaintiff’s generalized anxiety to be a
severe impairment, failed to state why it was not found to be a severe impairment, and failed to
consider all of Plaintiff’s severe impairments; and (5) did not make a RFC finding consistent
with the medical evidence. Docket No. 12-1 at 6-13. Accordingly, Plaintiff maintains that,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Commissioner’s decision should be reversed, or in the
alternative, remanded. Id.
Sentence four of § 405(g) states as follows:
The court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and
transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or
reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security,
with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.
42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3).

7

“In cases where there is an adequate record, the Secretary’s decision denying benefits can
be reversed and benefits awarded if the decision is clearly erroneous, proof of disability is
overwhelming, or proof of disability is strong and evidence to the contrary is lacking.” Mowery
v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 966, 973 (6th Cir. 1985). Furthermore, a court can reverse the decision and
immediately award benefits if all essential factual issues have been resolved and the record
adequately establishes a plaintiff's entitlement to benefits. Faucher v. Secretary, 17 F.3d 171,
176 (6th Cir. 1994). See also Newkirk v. Shalala, 25 F.3d 316, 318 (1994).
1. Weight Accorded the Opinions of Plaintiff’s Treating Mental Health Providers
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to accord appropriate weight to the opinions of her
treating mental health providers. Docket No. 12-1 at 6. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the
ALJ erroneously gave “little weight” to the opinion of Dr. Barr, her treating psychiatrist, and
further argues that the ALJ improperly omitted from his decision the portion of Dr. Barr’s June
25, 2010 Medical Source Statement opinion finding that Plaintiff was “markedly limited in
ability to respond appropriately to work situations and changes in a routine work setting.” Docket
No. 12-1 at 6-7; TR 644. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ therefore minimized her mental
impairments. Id. at 7.
Defendant responds that the ALJ “complied with the relevant law, regulations, and
rulings, and gave good reasons for not giving [Dr. Barr’s] conclusory opinion controlling
weight.” Docket No. 17 at 9. Specifically, Defendant responds that the ALJ explicitly explained
that Dr. Barr’s opinion was inconsistent with medical evidence, was “based solely on Plaintiff’s
unreliable subjective reports,” was not based on objective tests measuring Plaintiff’s cognitive
abilities, was inconsistent with Dr. Barr’s own treating notes, and conflicted with Plaintiff’s
8

ability to interact properly with her health providers. Id., citing TR 23. Defendant contends that
because Dr. Barr’s opinion was inconsistent with the record and the ALJ gave good reasons for
his findings, the ALJ properly accorded less than controlling weight to Dr. Barr’s opinion. Id.
With regard to the evaluation of medical evidence, the Code of Federal Regulations
states:
Regardless of its source, we will evaluate every medical
opinion we receive. Unless we give a treating source’s opinion
controlling weight under paragraph (d)(2) of this section, we
consider all of the following factors in deciding the weight we give
to any medical opinion.
(1) Examining relationship. Generally, we give more
weight to the opinion of a source who has examined you than to
the opinion of a source who has not examined you.
(2) Treatment relationship. Generally, we give more
weight to opinions from your treating sources, since these sources
are likely to be the medical professionals most able to provide a
detailed, longitudinal picture of your medical impairment(s) and
may bring a unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot
be obtained from the objective medical findings alone or from
reports of individual examinations, such as consultative
examinations or brief hospitalizations. If we find that a treating
source’s opinion on the issue(s) of the nature and severity of your
impairment(s) is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical
and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with
the other substantial evidence in your case record, we will give it
controlling weight. When we do not give the treating source’s
opinion controlling weight, we apply the factors listed in
paragraphs (d)(2)(i) and (d)(2)(ii) of this section, as well as the
factors in paragraphs (d)(3) through (d)(6) of this section in
determining the weight to give the opinion. ...
(3) Supportability. The more a medical source presents
relevant evidence to support an opinion, particularly medical signs
and laboratory findings, the more weight we will give that opinion.
The better an explanation a source provides for an opinion, the
more weight we will give that opinion. ...
9

(4) Consistency. Generally, the more consistent an opinion
is with the record as a whole, the more weight we will give to that
opinion.
(5) Specialization. We generally give more weight to the
opinion of a specialist about medical issues related to his or her
area of specialty than to the opinion of a source who is not a
specialist.
...
20 CFR § 416.927(d) (emphasis added). See also 20 CFR § 404.1527(d).
The ALJ must articulate the reasons underlying his decision to give a medical opinion a
specific amount of weight.3 See, e.g., 20 CFR § 404.1527(d); Allen v. Commissioner, 561 F.3d
646 (6th Cir. 2009); Wilson v. Commissioner, 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2004). The reasons
must be supported by the evidence and must be sufficiently specific so as to make clear to any
subsequent reviewers the weight the ALJ gave to the treating source medical opinion and the
reasons for that weight. SSR 96-2p.
The ALJ, in his decision, discussed Dr. Barr as follows:
With regard to concentration, persistence or pace, the claimant has
mild difficulties. There is no objective evidence that the claimant
has any deficit in concentration, persistence, or pace. Although the
claimant’s current psychiatrist opined that the claimant had
diminished cognitive functioning due to her anxiety disorder and
poor impulse control, his treatment notes consistently show that he
evaluated her as functioning at the average intellectual level
(Exhibit 21F; see generally Exhibit 20F). In addition, there is no
3

There are circumstances when an ALJ’s failure to articulate good reasons for the weight
accorded to medical opinions may constitute harmless error: (1) if a treating source opinion is so
patently deficient that the ALJ could not possibly credit it; (2) if the ALJ adopts the opinion or
makes findings consistent with the opinion; and/or (3) if the ALJ has complied with the goal of
20 CFR §1527(d), by analyzing the physician’s contradictory opinions or by analyzing other
opinions of record. See, e.g., Friend v. Commissioner, 375 Fed. Appx. 543, 551 (6th Cir. April
28, 2010); Nelson v. Commissioner, 195 Fed. Appx. 462, 470-72 (6th Cir. 2006); Hall v.
Commissioner, 148 Fed. Appx. 456, 464 (6th Cir. 2006).
10

evidence that he performed any of the standard tests for memory
and concentration during his mental status examinations of the
claimant, such as serial subtractions, suggesting that he did not
think the tests would reveal significant deficits (See generally
Exhibit 20F). Nevertheless, it is reasonable to conclude that the
claimant’s mental disorders could cause some limitation related to
her ability to initiate, sustain, and complete tasks. Accordingly, the
undersigned finds that the claimant has mild limitation in
concentration, persistence, or pace.
...
She underwent evaluation by Centerstone psychiatrist Ralph Barr,
M.D., on February 18, 2010 (Exhibit 20F/9-12). . . . Dr. Barr
initiated Abilify to control her mood, Xanax for her anxiety and
panic attacks, and trazodone to help her sleep (Exhibit 20F/9-12).
The claimant reported to Dr. Barr on March 10, 2010 that Abilify
seemed to help but trazodone kept her awake (Exhibit 20F/6-7).
Treatment notes show she had stable mood, depressed symptoms,
and decreased stressors with insomnia, mild paranoia and some
restlessness (Exhibit 20F/6-7). She exhibited anxious mood,
appropriate affect, normal speech, fair impulse control, and average
intelligence (Exhibit 20F/6-7).
On April 21, 2010, however, the claimant stated that she had had a
“couple of nervous breakdowns” as well as severe anxiety,
jitteriness, depressed mood, instability, poor impulse control,
paranoia, and risky behavior (Exhibit 20F/4-5). She acknowledged
that she had been arrested for a hit-and-run episode (Exhibit 20F/45). Dr. Barr increased her Xanax to three times daily, added
Vistaril to help with anxiety, and increased her Abilify dosage
(Exhibit 20F/4-5).
The claimant failed to show for her June 2, 2010 appointment.
Nonetheless, Dr. Barre opined on June 25, 2010 that the claimant
was moderately limited in her ability to understand, remember, and
carryout simple tasks, precluded from performing complex tasks,
moderately limited in her ability to interact with the public, and
markedly limited in her ability to interact with coworkers and
supervisors (Exhibit 21F). Dr. Barr noted that the claimant had
reduced cognitive functioning due to severe anxiety disorder, poor
impulse control, and inability to filter (Exhibit 21F). Dr. Barr also
indicated that she was easily agitated (Exhibit 21F). This
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assessment of the claimant’s ability to perform work-related mental
tasks appears to be based solely on her subjective reports regarding
her poor concentration, impulse control, and interactions with
others. In addition, the assessment is inconsistent with the medical
evidence in the record, including Centerstone treatment notes for
2010. For example, there is no evidence that Dr. Barr performed
any objective tests to measure the claimant’s cognitive abilities and
noted that she exhibited normal intelligence in the mental status
examinations of her (See generally Exhibit 20F). In addition, there
is no evidence that the claimant has ongoing difficulties relating to
or interacting with her providers. For this reason, the undersigned
gives Dr. Barr’s opinion little weight.
TR 16, 22-23 (underlining and italics original).
Plaintiff takes issue with the fact that the ALJ omitted Dr. Barr’s finding that Plaintiff
was “markedly limited [in her] ability to respond appropriately to work situations and changes in
a routine work setting.” Docket No 12-1 at 7; TR 644. Plaintiff cites no authority supporting the
proposition that the ALJ must discuss every finding from every evaluation. As can be seen, the
ALJ discussed Dr. Barr’s treatment of, and opinions concerning, Plaintiff, and credited Plaintiff
with appropriate limitations based on that treatment and those opinions, clearly demonstrating
that he was aware of the opinion at issue. As can also be also be seen, the ALJ discussed the
weight he accorded to Dr. Barr’s opinions and the reasons therefor.
As the ALJ explained, Dr. Barr’s opinion was based on Plaintiff’s subjective reports
rather than objective tests, and it was inconsistent with the evidence of record, including
Centerstone treatment notes. Id. Per the Regulations, the ALJ is not required to give controlling
weight to an evaluation when that evaluation is inconsistent with, or unsupported by, other
substantial evidence in the record. See 20 CFR § 416.927(d)(2) and 20 CFR § 404.1527(d)(2).
Instead, when there is contradictory evidence, the opinion is weighed against the contradictory

12

evidence under the criteria listed above, and the final decision regarding the weight to be given to
the opinion lies with the Commissioner. Id., see also 20 CFR § 416.927(e)(2).
The ALJ explicitly discussed Dr. Barr’s treatment of, and opinions concerning, Plaintiff,
and explained the weight he accorded to Dr. Barr’s opinions and the reasons therefor. The ALJ’s
determination was supported by substantial evidence and the Regulations do not require more.
The ALJ’s evaluation of, and weight accorded to, the opinion of Dr. Barr was proper; Plaintiff’s
argument on this point fails.
2. Evaluation of the Evidence Regarding Plaintiff’s Mental Health Problems
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erroneously failed to properly consider her mental health
problems. Docket No. 12-1 at 7-9. First, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erroneously evaluated
her Clinically Related Group (“CRG”) assessments because, although her CRG assessments
found her to have moderate mental limitations in several regards, “a close reading of the
definition of Moderate on a CRG form equates to the Social Security Administration’s definition
of a Marked limitation,” such that the ALJ essentially should have considered them as “marked.”
Id. at 7-8. Plaintiff further contends that the ALJ erroneously assumed that her “lack of work
history was due to lack of motivation, rather than her long, well-documented history of mental
illness.” Id. Plaintiff asserts that her “mental illness manifests itself in self-destructive behavior
as well as violent behavior toward others” and argues that, “[i]t is particularly important to give
controlling weight to a treating psychiatrist when a claimant poses not only a threat to herself, but
a threat to co-workers and the public as well.” Id. Plaintiff maintains, “To attempt to put [her]
into the workforce would put not only [her] but those around her in danger as well.” Id. at 9.
Plaintiff additionally emphasizes that her Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”)
13

scores range from 40-50, “which indicate[s] severe mental impairments and limitations.” Id.
Plaintiff notes that “generally, it is considered by vocational experts that a person with a GAF
score of 50 or below is unemployable.” Id. Plaintiff adds that her history of substance abuse,
which she reports as “currently in remission,” is a symptom of her mental illness, and is therefore
not relevant to her inability to work. Id.
Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s comparison of the CRG and SSA standards is
inapposite because the definitions of “moderate” and “marked” are specific to their respective
institutions, and do not necessarily correspond to each other. Docket No. 17 at 11-12. Defendant
argues that it is the ALJ’s duty to assess Plaintiff’s ability to function given her alleged
impairments (not explain whether the CRG’s definition of “moderate” equates to the SSA’s
definition of “moderate” or “marked”), and that the ALJ in the case at bar properly did so by
analyzing, inter alia, the “moderate” and “marked” findings of the reports and the treatment
notes on which they were based. Id. Defendant notes that the ALJ’s decision turned, not on the
“moderate” CRG findings or the definition of “moderate,” but on the inconsistency of Plaintiff’s
treatment notes and functional limitations with Dr. Barr’s stated opinions, and on the fact that Dr.
Barr’s findings were not based on objective testing. Id. at 13.
Defendant also addresses Plaintiff’s contention that the ALJ erroneously assumed that her
lack of work history was due to lack of motivation, rather than mental illness. Id. at 14.
Defendant notes that the ALJ made this statement4 in the context of his credibility analysis of
4

The ALJ’s statement at issue is as follows:
In addition, the claimant has never engaged in work at or above
substantial gainful activity, which raises some questions as to
whether the current unemployment is truly the result of medical
14

Plaintiff’s statements, rather than in his assessing of Dr. Barr’s opinion. Id. Defendant argues
that the ALJ’s statement was accurate and supported by the evidence of record. Id.
Finally, Defendant responds to Plaintiff’s argument that persons with GAF scores of 50
or below are “unemployable.” Id. at 15. Defendant characterizes this contention as
“unsupported” and “ blatantly inconsistent with the law of the Sixth Circuit, which indicates that
a GAF score of 40 or 45 is not necessarily disabling.” Id., citing Deboard v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., No 05-6854, 2006 WL 3690637, at *4 (6th Cir. Dec. 15, 2006); Smith v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 482 F.3d 873, 877 (6th Cir. 2007). Defendant notes that “the GAF scale . . . does not have a
direct correlation to the severity requirements in [the SSA’s] mental disorder listings,” and
argues that the ALJ does not need to give much credence to GAF scores, but rather, must analyze
the medical evidence as a whole. Id. (citations omitted). Defendant contends that the ALJ
appropriately did just that. Id.
Addressing Plaintiff’s first contention - that the ALJ erroneously evaluated her CRG
assessments because the CRG’s definition of moderate essentially equates to the SSA’s
definition of marked, such that the ALJ should have considered the moderate limitations in her
CRG’s to be marked limitations for SSA purposes - Plaintiff cites no authority either for her
equation of the CRG’s definition of moderate to the SSA’s definition of marked, or for the
proposition that the ALJ must somehow interpret definitions from sources other than the SSA
and determine how those sources compare to those of the SSA, and the undersigned can find no
such authority. Absent such authority, Plaintiff cannot sustain this contention.

problems (Exhibit 5D).
TR 24.
15

Turning to Plaintiff’s next contention - that the ALJ erroneously assumed that her lack of
work history was due to lack of motivation, rather than mental illness - the ALJ discussed at
length Plaintiff’s mental illness and its prescribed medication, treatment, manifestation,
limitation, and effects, thereby demonstrating that the ALJ was acutely aware of Plaintiff’s
mental illness and resultant limitations. See TR 15- 24. In fact, after discussing Plaintiff’s
mental illness, its treatment, and its effects, the ALJ explicitly found that “the medical evidence
shows that the claimant has both bipolar disorder and anxiety disorder that require ongoing
medication management.” TR 23. As can be seen throughout the ALJ’s articulated rationale, he
was not only aware of, but properly considered, Plaintiff’s mental illness and resultant
limitations.
Moreover, the sentence about which Plaintiff takes issue (“In addition, the claimant has
never engaged in work at or above substantial gainful activity, which raises some questions as to
whether the current unemployment is truly the result of medical problems.”) was made during the
ALJ’s evaluation of Plaintiff’s credibility, and was given as an additional reason for discounting
her credibility; as will be discussed in greater detail below, it was not the sole reason for the
ALJ’s determination. Plaintiff’s assertion on this point does not provide grounds for reversal or
remand.
Plaintiff’s third contention - that it is particularly important to give controlling weight to a
treating psychiatrist when, as is the current situation, a claimant poses not only a threat to herself,
but to her co-workers and the public as well - is likewise unsupported by authority. The
Regulations set forth factors to be considered by an ALJ when reviewing the evidence and
determining, inter alia, the weight to be accorded to the medical opinions of record. As best the
16

undersigned can discern, none of the factors set forth in the Regulations is “consider if the
claimant poses a threat to herself, her co-workers, and/or the public,” and Plaintiff has failed to
cite to any authority to the contrary. Absent such authority, this point does not constitute grounds
for reversal or remand, particularly in light of the fact that, as was discussed above, the ALJ
properly evaluated Dr. Barr’s opinion.
Plaintiff’s final contention on this point5 - that she is unemployable because her GAF
scores range from 40-50 - is likewise unavailing, as GAF scores are not determinative of
disability for Social Security purposes. In fact, the SSA has declined to endorse the GAF scale
for “use in the Social Security and SSI disability programs,” and has indicated that GAF scores
have no “direct correlation to the severity requirements in [the] mental disorders listings.” See
Revised Medical Criteria for Evaluating Mental Disorders and Traumatic Brain Injury, 65 Fed.
Reg. 50746-01 (August 21, 2000). Although “the GAF is a test used by mental health
practitioners with respect to planning treatment and tracking the clinical progress of an individual
in global terms, the ALJ is not bound to consider its results at the exclusion of other medically
reliable evidence.” Alvarez v. Barhart, 2002 WL 31466411, at *8 (W.D.Tex. October 2, 2002).
Nor is a GAF score determinative of an individual’s RFC assessment. Id. (“A GAF score is not a
rating typically relied upon with respect to assessing an individual’s RFC under the Act.”); see
also Howard v. Commissioner, 276 F.3d 235, 241 (6th Cir. 2002)(GAF score is not essential in
assessing RFC).

5

Plaintiff also conclusorily states that her history of substance abuse is a symptom of her
mental illness and therefore not relevant to her inability to work. Docket No. 12-1 at 9.
Plaintiff’s statement is just that - a statement - and not an argument that the Court needs to
analyze.
17

For the reasons discussed above, the ALJ properly evaluated Plaintiff’s mental illness and
impairments. Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot prevail any of her contentions within this statement
of error.
3. Credibility of Plaintiff’s Statements
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to properly assess the credibility of her statements.
Docket No. 12-1 at 10. Specifically, Plaintiff maintains that the ALJ insufficiently made a
single, conclusory statement that he used the criteria outlined in SSR 96-7P in reaching his
decision, rather than specifically stating the weight he gave Plaintiff’s statements and the reasons
therefor. Id. Plaintiff additionally asserts that the ALJ addressed some of her statements, but not
others, and argues that the ALJ erroneously relied on the fact that she can perform some activity
on a minimal basis, because her ability to perform simple functions does not necessarily indicate
that she can perform substantial gainful activity. Id. at 11-12. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ
erroneously detracted from her credibility “based on the fact that she has been able to perform
some activity on a very minimal basis,” and that, “[b]y focusing on these few activities of daily
living, the ALJ ignored the medical evidence,” such that his decision is not supported by
substantial evidence. Id. at 12.
Defendant responds that, contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, the ALJ specifically discussed
Plaintiff’s credibility in two portions of his opinion. Docket No. 17 at 16-18, citing TR 17-18,
23-24. Defendant argues that the ALJ, in his decition, explicitly discussed the evidence upon
which he based his credibility finding, explained his rationale for discounting Plaintiff’s
credibility, and actually underlined his specific credibility finding. Id. Defendant contends that
the ALJ’s stated reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s credibility “are proper reasons for discounting
18

a claimant’s credibility and are supported by the record (as shown by the ALJ’s specific citations
to the exhibits).” Id. at 18.
The Sixth Circuit has set forth the following criteria for assessing a plaintiff’s subjective
allegations:
[S]ubjective allegations of disabling symptoms. . . cannot alone
support a finding of disability...[T]here must be evidence of an
underlying medical condition and (1) there must be objective
medical evidence to confirm the severity of the alleged pain arising
from the condition or (2) the objectively determined medical
condition must be of a severity which can reasonably be expected
to give rise to the alleged pain.
Duncan v. Secretary, 801 F.2d 847, 853 (6th Cir. 1986) (quoting S. Rep. No. 466, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 24) (Emphasis added); see also 20 CFR §§ 404.1529, 416.929 (“[S]tatements about your
pain or other symptoms will not alone establish that you are disabled....”); and Moon v. Sullivan,
923 F.2d 1175, 1182-83 (“[T]hough Moon alleges fully disabling and debilitating symptomology
the ALJ, may distrust a claimant’s allegations ... if the subjective allegations, the ALJ’s personal
observations, and the objective medical evidence contradict each other.”).
When analyzing subjective complaints, the ALJ must also consider the following factors
and how they relate to the medical and other evidence in the record: the claimant’s daily
activities; the location, duration, frequency and intensity of claimant’s pain; the precipitating and
aggravating factors; the type, dosage and effect of medication; and the other treatment or
measures to relieve pain. See Felisky v. Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1039 (6th Cir. 1994) (construing
20 CFR § 404.1529(c)(2)). After evaluating these factors in conjunction with the evidence in the
record, and by making personal observations of the claimant at the hearing, an ALJ may
determine that a claimant’s subjective complaints of pain and other disabling symptoms are not
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credible. See, e.g., Walters v. Commissioner, 127 F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir. 1997); Blacha v.
Secretary, 927 F.2d 228, 230 (6th Cir. 1990); and Kirk v. Secretary, 667 F.2d 524, 538 (6th Cir.
1981).
In the instant case, the ALJ ultimately found that “[t]he claimant’s testimony regarding
the nature, severity, and persistence of his [sic] symptoms is not fully credible.” TR 23. In so
finding, the ALJ articulated that:
The claimant alleges that her physical impairments interfere with
her ability to lift, sit, stand, walk, bend, reach, squat, kneel and see
(Exhibits 5E & 10E). She stated that fluctuations in her blood
sugar levels cause fatigue and weakness as well as poor vision and
concentration (Exhibits 5E & 10E). She acknowledged that she is
able to perform self-care and personal hygiene tasks but only when
she is motivated to do so (Exhibits 5E & 10E). She reported that
she relies on her mother to prepare meals and perform household
chores but that she shops for supplies and clothes for her daughter
on her own (Exhibits 5E & 10E). She stated that she drives about
twice each month and that she manages her own finances (Exhibits
5E & 10E). At the hearing, the claimant estimated that she is able
to stand for 15 minutes or walk for 15 minutes at a time.
In addition, she alleges that her mental impairments interfere with
her ability to remember, concentrate, complete tasks, understand,
follow directions, and get along with others (Exhibit 10E). She
reported that she frequently acts out, becomes easily angered,
damages property, has difficulty controlling her emotions, and
either sleeps too much or too little (Exhibits 5E & 10E). She stated
that she rarely completes chores or other tasks that she starts and
needs her mother’s assistance to care for her child (Exhibits 5E &
10E). She testified that she experiences panic attacks 2 or 3 times
each day, each lasting from 3 to 15 minutes. She explained at the
hearing that she sleeps for 15 hours each day and spends most of
each day in bed. At the hearing, she also described her history of
violent outbursts, such as hitting someone with rocks, running over
someone with her car, and hitting a coworker with a plate.
After careful consideration of the evidence, the undersigned finds
that the claimant’s medically determinable impairments could
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reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however,
the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and
limiting effects of these symptoms are not credible to the extent
they are inconsistent with the above residual functional capacity
assessment.
...
. . . At the hearing, the claimant acknowledged her extensive arrest
record. She was jailed for a few days in 2004 for assaulting an
officer, she was arrested in 2005 for sale and possession of
cocaine, she violated her parole in 2006 by selling cocaine, she was
arrested for conspiracy and attempted sale of oxycodone in 2008,
and she pled guilty on a charge of hit-and-run in 2010.
Significantly, she had a positive urine drug screen for cocaine on
September 23, 2009, suggesting that she may not have remained
drug-free for the entire period since her filing date (Exhibit 18F/1112).
In addition, the claimant has never engaged in work at or above
substantial gainful activity, which raises some questions as to
whether the current unemployment is truly the result of medical
problems (Exhibit 5D).
Further, claimant appears to have consciously attempted to portray
limitations than [sic] are not actually present in order to increase
the chance of obtaining benefits. For example, although she
explained at the hearing that she was unable to work because she
needs to see doctors 3 days each week, the record does not support
this claim. For example, in April 2010, the medical evidence
shows that she underwent a urological procedure on April 22, and
had an office visit with her psychiatrist on April 21 (Exhibit 20F/45; Exhibit 22F/3-4). In May 2010, she had office visits with her
primary care provider on May 7 and May 22 (Exhibit 19F/3-4). In
June 2010, she visited her gynecologist on June 5 and underwent a
pelvic sonogram on June 22, but failed to keep her June 2
psychiatric appointment (Exhibit 20F/3; Exhibit 23F/3-4). This
evidence reflects poorly on the claimant’s credibility.
TR 17-18, 23-24, citing TR 154-59, 192-202, 220-30, 486-90, 542-44, 602-03, 618, 619-20,
648-49, 654-55 (emphasis in original).
As can be seen, the ALJ’s decision specifically addresses not only the medical evidence,
21

but also Plaintiff’s testimony and her subjective claims, indicating that these factors were
considered. TR 17-18, 23-24. It is clear from the ALJ’s articulated rationale that, although there
is evidence which could support Plaintiff’s claims, the ALJ chose to rely on medical findings that
were inconsistent with Plaintiff’s allegations. This is within the ALJ’s province.
The ALJ, when evaluating the entirety of the evidence, is entitled to weigh the objective
medical evidence against Plaintiff’s subjective claims of pain and reach a credibility
determination. See, e.g., Walters, 127 F.3d at 531; and Kirk v. Secretary, 667 F.2d 524, 538 (6th
Cir. 1981). An ALJ’s findings regarding a claimant’s credibility are to be accorded great weight
and deference, particularly because the ALJ is charged with the duty of observing the claimant’s
demeanor and credibility. Walters, 127 F.3d at 531 (citing Villarreal v. Secretary, 818 F.2d 461,
463 (6th Cir. 1987)). Discounting credibility is appropriate when the ALJ finds contradictions
among the medical reports, the claimant’s testimony, the claimant’s daily activities, and other
evidence. See Walters, 127 F.3d at 531 (citing Bradley, 682 F.2d at 1227; cf King v. Heckler,
742 F.2d 968, 974-75 (6th Cir. 1984); and Siterlet v. Secretary, 823 F.2d 918, 921 (6th Cir. 1987)).
If the ALJ rejects a claimant’s testimony as not credible, however, the ALJ must clearly state the
reasons for discounting a claimant’s testimony (see Felisky, 35 F.3d at 1036), and the reasons
must be supported by the record (see King, 742 F.2d at 975).
After assessing all the objective medical evidence, the ALJ determined that “[t]he
claimant’s testimony regarding the nature, severity, and persistence of his [sic] symptoms is not
fully credible.” TR 23. The ALJ observed Plaintiff during her hearing, assessed the medical
records, and reached a reasoned decision; the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial
evidence and the decision not to accord full credibility to Plaintiff’s allegations was proper.
22

Therefore, this claim fails.
4. Consideration of Plaintiff’s Anxiety Disorder
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to consider whether her anxiety disorder was a severe
impairment, and therefore failed to consider all of her severe impairments. Docket No. 12-1 at
6. Regarding the severity of her anxiety disorder, Plaintiff argues that: (1) she testified to having
daily panic attacks lasting up to 15 minutes; (2) Centerstone records reveal a diagnosis of
generalized anxiety disorder; and (3) a Centerstone CRG noted panic attacks with increased
stressors. Id., citing TR 437, 389, 442. She notes that the ALJ did not find her generalized
anxiety disorder to be a severe impairment, and argues that he erred by failing to state his
reasoning for this finding. Id.
Defendant responds that the ALJ satisfied the step two requirements because he found
that Plaintiff did, in fact, have a severe combination of impairments. Docket No. 17 at 6.
Defendant contends that “once a claimant surpasses the step two threshold with at least one
impairment or a combination of several impairments, the evidence for all of her alleged
impairments (whether found to be individually ‘severe’ or not) will be considered.” Id.
Defendant notes that once the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had a severe combination of
impairments, he proceeded to consider (and discuss in detail) all of the evidence of record
(including Plaintiff’s anxiety) as he worked his way through the sequential evaluation process.
Id. at 6-8, citing TR 15-24.
Defendant contends that, under Sixth Circuit precedent, the ALJ’s failure to find
Plaintiff’s anxiety to be a severe impairment is harmless error because he found that Plaintiff
suffered from a combination of severe impairments, he considered all of the evidence of record
23

during the sequential evaluation process, and he completed the sequential evaluation process. Id.
Defendant notes that “the ALJ mentioned and discussed Plaintiff’s anxiety disorder in no fewer
than four places in his decision (Tr. 16, 21, 22, 23), and he analyzed whether Plaintiff met Listing
12.06 - the Listing for anxiety-related disorders (Tr. 15).” Id. at 8. Defendant argues that despite
the ALJ’s failure to find her anxiety disorder to be severe, Plaintiff received a thorough analysis
of her anxiety disorder and how it relates to her functional abilities, because the ALJ reviewed
and discussed all of her records concerning her anxiety disorder and other relevant impairments
at step three of the sequential evaluation and beyond, which led to a finding regarding a Listing
specific to anxiety disorders and an RFC that included relevant mental limitations. Id. at 8-9,
citing TR 15-18.
The Regulations require that the ALJ state “the findings of fact and the reasons for the
decision.” 20 CFR § 416.1453(a). As the Sixth Circuit has noted, “[t]o require a more elaborate
articulation of the ALJ’s thought processes would not be reasonable.” Gooch v. Secretary, 833
F.2d 589, 592 (6th Cir. 1987). The ALJ complied with the regulation; he specifically articulated
his findings of fact, and, using the information in the record, provided the rationale for his
decision. TR 15-18. While Plaintiff is correct that the ALJ did not specifically state that her
anxiety disorder was individually “severe,” the ALJ provided a thorough analysis of her mental
impairments (including her anxiety) and how they relate to her functional abilities:
The claimant’s mental impairment does not meet or medically
equal the criteria of listings 12.04, 12.06, and 12.09. In making
this finding, the undersigned has considered whether the
“paragraph B” criteria are satisfied. To satisfy the “paragraph B”
criteria, the mental impairment must result in at least two of the
following: marked restriction of activities of daily living; marked
difficulties in maintaining social functioning; marked difficulties in
24

maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace; or repeated
episodes of decompensation, each of extended duration. A marked
limitation means more than moderate but less than extreme.
Repeated episodes of decompensation, each of extended duration,
means three episodes within 1 year, or an average of once every 4
months, each lasting for at least 2 weeks.
...
With regard to concentration, persistence or pace, the claimant has
mild difficulties. There is no objective evidence that the claimant
has any deficit in concentration, persistence, or pace. Although the
claimant’s current psychiatrist opined that the claimant had
diminished cognitive functioning due to her anxiety disorder and
poor impulse control, his treatment notes consistently show that he
evaluated her as functioning at the average intellectual level
(Exhibit 21F; see generally Exhibit 20F). In addition, there is no
evidence that he performed any of the standard tests for memory
and concentration during his mental status examinations of the
claimant, such as serial subtractions, suggesting that he did not
think the tests would reveal significant deficits (See generally
Exhibit 20F). Nevertheless, it is reasonable to conclude that the
claimant’s mental disorders could cause some limitation related to
her ability to initiate, sustain, and complete tasks. Accordingly, the
undersigned finds that the claimant has mild limitation in
concentration, persistence, or pace.
There is no evidence that the claimant has experienced any
episodes of decompensation, which have been of extended
duration. The claimant required emergency care for a suicide
attempt on May 15, 2006, when she tried to cut her wrists (Exhibit
2F/23-31). At that time, she was referred for specialized mental
health care and apparently was place [sic] on suicide watch while
in jail (See Exhibit 4F/33-40). She initiated outpatient mental
health care on May 22, 2006, at which time she was diagnosed as
having mood disorder secondary to cocaine dependence (Exhibit
4F/22-40). She did not return for any subsequent appointments,
suggesting that she had no further symptoms (Exhibit 4F/6). She
was discharged from care on September 21, 2006 (Exhibit 4F/6).
This episode lasted for a week at the most and, therefore, was not
long enough to met the requirement for “extended duration.”
There is no other evidence that the claimant has experienced any
episodes of decompensation.

25

Because the claimant’s mental impairment does not cause at least
two “marked” limitations or one “marked” limitation and
“repeated” episodes of decompensation, each of extended duration,
the “paragraph B” criteria are not satisfied.
...
The limitations identified in the “paragraph B” criteria are not a
residual functional capacity assessment but are used to rate the
severity of mental impairments at steps 2 and 3 of the sequential
evaluation process. The mental residual functional capacity
assessment used at steps 4 and 5 of the sequential evaluation
process requires a more detailed assessment by itemizing various
functions contained in the broad categories found in paragraph B of
the adult mental disorders listings in 12.00 of the Listing of
Impairments (SSR 96-8p). Therefore, the . . . residual functional
capacity assessment reflects the degree of limitation the
undersigned has found in the “paragraph B” mental function
analysis.
...
In addition, she alleges that her mental impairments interfere with
her ability to remember, concentrate, complete tasks, understand,
follow directions, and get along with others (Exhibit 10E). She
reported that she frequently acts out, becomes easily angered,
damages property, has difficulty controlling her emotions, and
either sleeps too much or too little (Exhibits 5E & 10E). She stated
that she rarely completes chores or other tasks that she starts and
needs her mother’s assistance to care for her child (Exhibits 5E &
10E). She testified that she experiences panic attacks 2 or 3 times
each day, each lasting from 3 to 15 minutes. She explained at the
hearing that she sleeps for 15 hours each day and spends most of
each day in bed. At the hearing, she also described her history of
violent outbursts, such as hitting someone with rocks, running over
someone with her car, and hitting a coworker with a plate.
TR 15-17 (underlining and italics original), citing TR 192-202, 220-30, 253-341, 358-404, 61640, 641-45.
After addressing Plaintiff’s anxiety, the ALJ ultimately concluded:
In sum, the medical evidence shows that the claimant has both
bipolar disorder and anxiety disorder that require ongoing
medication management. She is routinely non-compliant with her
26

medication regimen, however, and frequently misses scheduled
appointments for medication management. Nevertheless, her
symptoms are not so severe that she is precluded from functioning
independently, appropriately, and effectively on a sustained basis,
so long as she is performs [sic] only simple mental work tasks with
limited contact and interaction with co-workers, the public, and
supervisors.
TR 23.
As can be seen, the ALJ assessed the medical evidence and testimony regarding
Plaintiff’s anxiety disorder and reached an explicit conclusion regarding Plaintiff’s mental
impairments and their effects on her functional capacity. TR 15-18. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s
argument fails.
5. Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) Determination
Plaintiff contends that, in making his RFC determination, the ALJ erroneously “. . .only
considered the limited parts of the evidence that supported a finding of not disabled.” Docket
No. 12-1 at 12. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ “failed to consider all probative evidence,”
considered only the evidence that supported his conclusion, and overlooked the evidence that
“fully established that the claimant was disabled on October 6, 2008.” Id. at 13.
Defendant responds that Plaintiff provides no “citation to the evidence or specific claim
about which portion of the RFC was incorrect” or which “‘probative evidence’ was ignored.”
Docket No. 17 at 20. Defendant further responds that Plaintiff “never argues why the evidence
supporting the ALJ’s decision was not proper.” Id. at 20-21. Defendant argues that the ALJ
“thoroughly discussed and analyzed the entire record, which is evidenced by the nine-page, indepth analysis of the medical evidence,” and notes that he “gave sound reasons for any evidence
he rejected.” Id., citing TR 15-24. Defendant reiterates that the ALJ’s decision was supported by
27

substantial evidence and should be affirmed. Id.
As explained above, “substantial evidence” means “such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support the conclusion,” Her, 203 F.3d at 389
(citing Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401), and has been further quantified as “more than a mere
scintilla of evidence, but less than a preponderance.” Bell, 105 F.3d at 245 (citing Consolidated
Edison Co., 305 U.S. at 229).
The record here contains much medical and testimonial evidence, all of which was
properly considered by the ALJ, and all of which constitutes “substantial evidence.”
Additionally, the ALJ’s decision demonstrates that he carefully considered the testimony of both
Plaintiff and the VE. While it is true that some of the testimony and evidence supports Plaintiff’s
allegations of disability, it is also true that much of the evidence supports the ALJ’s
determination that the claimant has not been disabled, as defined in the Social Security Act, since
the date her application was filed. TR 25. As explained above, the ALJ properly considered the
objective and testimonial evidence of record; he reached a reasoned decision regarding that
evidence, Plaintiff’s credibility, and Plaintiff’s disability; he explained his rationale for each
finding; and each finding was supported by substantial evidence.
As has been noted, the reviewing court does not substitute its findings for those of the
Commissioner if substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s findings and inferences.
Garner, 745 F.2d at 387. In fact, even if the evidence could also support a different conclusion,
the decision of the Administrative Law Judge must stand if substantial evidence supports the
conclusion reached. Her, 203 F.3d at 389 (citing Key, 109 F.3d at 273). The ALJ complied with
the Regulations, and his decision was properly supported by “substantial evidence;” the ALJ’s
28

decision, therefore, must stand.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff’s Motion for
Judgment on the Administrative Record be DENIED, and that the decision of the Commissioner
be AFFIRMED.
Under Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, any party has fourteen (14)
days after service of this Report and Recommendation in which to file any written objections to
this Recommendation with the District Court. Any party opposing said objections shall have
fourteen (14) days after service of any objections filed to this Report in which to file any
response to said objections. Failure to file specific objections within fourteen (14) days of
service of this Report and Recommendation can constitute a waiver of further appeal of this
Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1985),
reh’g denied, 474 U.S. 1111 (1986); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

________________________________
E. CLIFTON KNOWLES
United States Magistrate Judge

29