Sandifer v. Sparks et al

Filing 96

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION: The undersigned recommends that Defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted and the complaint dismissed. Signed by Magistrate Judge John S. Bryant on 1/6/2016. (xc:Pro se party by regular and certified mail.)(DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(eh)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
COLUMBIA DIVISION
LANCE THOMAS SANDIFER,
Plaintiff
v.
ASHLEY SPARKS, BRAD MORTON,
Defendants
TO:

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No. 1:13-0138
Senior Judge Haynes/Bryant
Jury Demand

THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. HAYNES, JR.
SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pending in this case is the motion to dismiss and for

summary judgment filed on behalf of Defendants Ashley Sparks and
Brad Morton (Docket Entry No. 87). Plaintiff Sandifer, a prisoner
proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, has not filed a response
in opposition to Defendants’ motion.
For the reasons stated below, the undersigned Magistrate
Judge recommends that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment be
granted and the complaint dismissed.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff Sandifer, a prisoner confined at the South
Central Correctional Facility (“SCCF”) in Clifton, Tennessee, has
filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
alleging

that

Defendants

Sparks

and

Morton,

both

corrections

officers at SCCF, violated Plaintiff’s rights under the Eighth
Amendment to be free from cruel and unusual punishment (Docket
Entry No. 1). Defendants filed an answer denying liability and

asserting affirmative defenses (Docket Entry No. 38). Defendants
Sparks and Morton now have filed their motion for summary judgment.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A party may obtain summary judgment by showing “that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a); Covington v. Knox County School Sys., 205 F.3d 912, 914
(6th Cir. 2000). The moving party bears the initial burden of
satisfying the court that the standards of Rule 56 have been met.
See Martin v. Kelley, 803 F.2d 236, 239 n.4 (6th Cir. 1986). The
ultimate question to be addressed is whether there exists any
genuine dispute of material fact. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Covington, 205 F.3d at 914 (citing
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986)). If so, summary
judgment is inappropriate.
To

defeat

a

properly

supported

motion

for

summary

judgment, the nonmoving party must set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial.

If the

party does not so respond, summary judgment will be entered if
appropriate. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The nonmoving party’s burden of
providing specific facts demonstrating that there remains a genuine
issue of material fact for trial is triggered once the moving party
shows an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. A genuine issue of material fact exists
“if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In
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ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must construe
the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
drawing all justifiable inferences in its favor. See Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
SUMMARY OF PERTINENT FACTS
Plaintiff

Sparks

alleges

that

on

November

5,

2012,

Defendant Ashley denied Plaintiff and his cell mate permission to
take a shower. Plaintiff claims that Sparks told his cell mate that
the cell mate needed to “handle” Sparks and that if he did he would
get a shower.
Plaintiff further asserts that on November 20, 2012,
Defendant Sparks denied Plaintiff his dinner tray and slammed the
chute in the cell door on Plaintiff’s hand. Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant Morton, another corrections officer, came to his cell and
opened the chute, releasing Plaintiff’s hand. Plaintiff claims that
he asked for medical attention for his hand but that Defendant
Morton denied this request.
In support of her motion for summary judgment, Defendant
Sparks has filed her declaration in which she denies that she
denied Plaintiff a shower, denies that she instructed Plaintiff’s
cell mate to “handle” Plaintiff, and denies that she slammed
Plaintiff’s hand in the door chute (Docket Entry No. 90).
Similarly, Defendant Morton has filed his declaration in
support of his motion. Defendant Morton testifies that on November
20, 2012, he received a report from Defendant Sparks that Plaintiff
had refused his meal. Defendant Morton further testifies that he
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went to Plaintiff’s cell and again offered him his food tray, which
Plaintiff refused. Defendant Morton denies that Plaintiff’s hand
was stuck in the door chute when he went to Plaintiff’s cell, and
he further denies that Plaintiff reported to him that Defendant
Sparks had closed his hand in the door chute. Finally, Defendant
Morton

testifies

that

when

he

spoke

with

Plaintiff

on

this

occasion, Plaintiff had to discernable or obvious injury (Docket
Entry 91).
ANALYSIS
A district court cannot grant summary judgment in favor
of a movant simply because the adverse party has not responded. The
court is required, at a minimum, to examine the movant’s motion for
summary judgment to insure that he has discharged that burden.
Carver v. Bunch, 946 F.2d 451, 455 (6th Cir. 1991).
As stated above, Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that the court shall grant summary judgment if
the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material facts and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. In addition, a declaration used to support or oppose
a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that
would be admissible in evidence, and show that the declarant is
competent to testify on the matter stated. Rule 56(c)(4). Here
Defendants

Sparks

and

Morton

have

both

filed

their

sworn

declarations that explicitly deny the material allegations in the
complaint. Plaintiff Sandifer has filed no response in opposition.
In

absence

of

any

admissible

evidence
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to

the

contrary,

the

undersigned Magistrate Judge finds from the record that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material facts and that Defendant Sparks
and Morton are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned Magistrate
Judge finds that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Docket
Entry No. 87) should be granted and the complaint dismissed.
RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons stated above, the undersigned recommends
that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment be granted and the
complaint dismissed.
Under Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
any

party

has

14

days

from

receipt

of

this

Report

and

Recommendation in which to file any written objections to this
Recommendation with the District Court. Any party opposing said
objections shall have 14 days from receipt of any objections filed
in this Report in which to file any responses to said objections.
Failure to file specific objections within 14 days of receipt of
this Report and Recommendation can constitute a waiver of further
appeal of this Recommendation. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 106 S.
Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985), Reh’g denied, 474 U.S. 1111 (1986).
ENTERED this 6th day of January, 2015.
/s/ John S. Bryant
JOHN S. BRYANT
United States Magistrate Judge

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