Breaud v. Breaud et al

Filing 47

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: Pending before the Court are several Motions to Dismiss. (Docket Entries 10, 15, 24, and 30). Two of these Motions were filed in response to the Plaintiff's Original Complaint. (Docket Entries 10 and 15). Since the Pla intiff subsequently filed an Amended Complaint, the earlier Motions to Dismiss (Docket Entries 10 and 15) are DENIED AS MOOT. The remaining Motions to Dismiss (Docket Entries 24 and 30) are DENIED for the reasons stated herein. Signed by Magistrate Judge John S. Bryant on 1/21/16. (DOCKET TEXT SUMMARY ONLY-ATTORNEYS MUST OPEN THE PDF AND READ THE ORDER.)(af)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
COLUMBIA DIVISION
ANNE BREAUD,
Plaintiff,
v.
DARREN BREAUD; BRIANT HUNT;
OFFICER TOMMY S. McCLANAHAN;
CITY OF CENTERVILLE; HICKMAN
COUNTY, TENNESSEE; JOHN DOE;
and RICHARD DOE,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No. 1:15-cv-0053
Magistrate Judge Bryant 1
Jury Demand

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Pending before the Court are several Motions to Dismiss. (Docket Entries 10, 15, 24, and
30). Two of these Motions were filed in response to the Plaintiff’s Original Complaint. (Docket
Entries 10 and 15). Since the Plaintiff subsequently filed an Amended Complaint, the earlier
Motions to Dismiss (Docket Entries 10 and 15) are DENIED AS MOOT. The remaining
Motions to Dismiss (Docket Entries 24 and 30) are DENIED for the reasons stated herein.
I.

Statement of the Case

The Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint alleges the following facts. On June 14, 2014,
Defendant Hunt saw the Plaintiff’s vehicle in Lewis County, Tennessee. (Docket Entry 21 ¶ 7-8).
Defendant Hunt telephoned Defendant Breaud, the Plaintiff’s husband, and reported this
observation. (Docket Entry 21 ¶ 8). In an attempt to influence the Plaintiff’s and Defendant
Breaud’s ongoing divorce proceedings, Defendants Hunt and Breaud allegedly discussed having
the Plaintiff stopped and arrested for driving under the influence while the Plaintiff drove to
Centerville, Tennessee that same day. (Docket Entry 21 ¶ 9). The Plaintiff alleges that
1

Upon consent of the parties, this lawsuit is proceeding before the Magistrate Judge. (Docket Entry 40).

1

Defendants Hunt and Breaud made no attempt to call 911 or report any suspected criminal
activities to Lewis County law enforcement officers. (Docket Entry 21 ¶ 10).
Instead, the Plaintiff alleges, Defendant Hunt and/or Breaud contacted a John Doe in
Lewis County by telephone to obtain assistance in having the Plaintiff stopped and arrested.
(Docket Entry 21 ¶ 10). This John Doe allegedly contacted a Richard Roe in Hickman County to
obtain assistance in the stop and arrest. (Docket Entry 21 ¶ 11). According to the Plaintiff,
Richard Roe gave either John Doe or Defendant Breaud the cell phone number for Defendant
McClanahan, a police officer employed by the City of Centerville Police Department in Hickman
County. (Docket Entry 21 ¶ 2(a), 12). The Plaintiff alleges that John Doe, Richard Roe, or
Defendant Breaud called Defendant McClanahan’s cell phone and requested that the Plaintiff be
stopped and arrested once the Plaintiff reached Centerville. (Docket Entry 21 ¶ 13).
As soon as the Plaintiff drove within the Centerville City limits, Defendant McClanahan
stopped her and then arrested her for (1) driving under the influence based on his
communications with the other individual Defendants and (2) possession of a controlled
substance because the Plaintiff’s car contained Defendant Breaud’s prescription drugs. (Docket
Entry 21 ¶ 14-15). The Plaintiff alleges that this was done without reasonable suspicion, probable
cause, or any other legal justifications. (Docket Entry 21 ¶ 14). Additionally, the Plaintiff alleges
that Defendant McClanahan contacted the other individual Defendants using his cell phone to
confirm that he had stopped and arrested the Plaintiff. (Docket Entry 21 ¶ 14).
Once the Plaintiff was jailed at the Hickman County Jail, she was strip searched. (Docket
Entry 21 ¶ 17). Although the Plaintiff had made arrangements for bond within two hours of
arriving at the Hickman County Jail, she was kept in custody for almost eight hours. (Docket
Entry 21 ¶ 19). The Plaintiff alleges that in connection with her arrest, Defendant McClanahan

2

obtained arrest warrants by falsely stating that the Plaintiff had failed to complete field sobriety
tests and bore other signs of being under the influence as well as neglecting to note that the
prescription drugs in the Plaintiff’s car belonged to the Plaintiff’s husband. (Docket Entry 21 ¶
20). The charges against the Plaintiff were dismissed after Defendant McClanahan failed to
appear at the General Sessions Court on May 28, 2015. (Docket Entry 21 ¶ 21).
The individual Defendants are sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for conspiring to have the
Plaintiff stopped, detained, and arrested without probable cause in violation of her Fourth
Amendment rights. (Docket Entry 21 ¶ 23). 2 Defendants Hunt and Breaud moved to dismiss the
claims against them under the Original Complaint (Docket Entries 10 and 15) and under the
Amended Complaint (Docket Entries 24 and 30). The Plaintiff responded to the first batch of
Motions to Dismiss on July 24, 2015 (Docket Entry 19) and relies upon the same Response to
oppose the Defendants’ newer Motions to Dismiss (Docket Entry 33). No replies have been filed.
The Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (Docket Entries 24 and 30) are properly before the Court.
II.

Standard of Review

“To survive a [Rule 12(b)(6)] motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). A motion to dismiss should be granted “when there is no reasonable likelihood that [the
plaintiff] can construct a claim from the events related in the complaint.” 16630 Southfield Ltd.
P’ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d 502, 504 (6th Cir. 2013). Legal conclusions, as
opposed to factual allegations, will not suffice. Bright v. Gallia Cty., Ohio, 753 F.3d 639, 652
(6th Cir. 2014). In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint in construed “in the light

2

While the Plaintiff has also filed additional claims against the City of Centerville and Hickman County, those
Defendants have not moved to dismiss, and the claims against these Defendants are not discussed herein.

3

most favorable to the plaintiff.” Laborers’ Local 265 Pension Fund v. iShares Trust, 769 F.3d
399, 403 (6th Cir. 2014).
III.

Analysis

Defendants Hunt and Breaud are sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged Fourth
Amendment violations. (Docket Entry 21 ¶ 23). To pursue a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege that (1) a defendant acting under the color of state law (a “state actor”) (2) violated the
plaintiff’s constitutional or other federal rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Bright, 753 F.3d at 653.
Defendants Hunt and Breaud contend that the § 1983 claims against them should be dismissed
because they are not state actors for purposes of § 1983. (Docket Entries 24 and 30).
In most instances where a private individual is sued under § 1983, whether the individual
should be considered a state actor is determined by three tests. Revis v. Meldrum, 489 F.3d 273,
289 (6th Cir. 2007); Memphis, Tennessee Area Local, Am. Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO v.
City of Memphis, 361 F.3d 898, 905 (6th Cir. 2004). However, these tests are not utilized when
the plaintiff has put forth “allegations of cooperation or concerted action between state and
private actors.” Memphis, Tennessee Area Local, Am. Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO, 361
F.3d at 905 (citations omitted). In these instances, state action may be grounded in allegations of
a civil conspiracy. Revis, 489 F.3d at 292. The Sixth Circuit has set forth the standards for
finding such a civil conspiracy:
A civil conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons to injure another
by unlawful action. Express agreement among all the conspirators is not necessary
to find the existence of a civil conspiracy. Each conspirator need not have known
all of the details of the illegal plan or all of the participants involved. All that must
be shown is that [(1)] there was a single plan, [(2)] that the alleged coconspirator
shared in the general conspiratorial objective, and [(3)] that an overt act was
committed in furtherance of the conspiracy that caused injury to the complainant.
Hooks v. Hooks, 771 F.2d 935, 943-44 (6th Cir. 1985); see also Bazzi v. City of Dearborn, 658
F.3d 598, 602 (6th Cir. 2011).
4

The Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint sets forth sufficient factual allegations of a civil
conspiracy to survive Defendants Hunt and Breaud’s Motions to Dismiss. Numerous individuals
are named in this alleged civil conspiracy: Defendants Hunt, Breaud, Doe, Roe, and
McClanahan. (Docket Entry 21 ¶ 23). As set forth in the Amended Complaint, the Plaintiff
alleges that the individual Defendants conspired to injure the Plaintiff through an unlawful stop
and arrest. (Docket Entry 21 ¶ 9, 23). The Plaintiff has alleged that this conduct was the result of
a single plan. (Docket Entry 21 ¶ 9). Additionally, the Plaintiff has alleged that the
coconspirators shared in this objective. (Docket Entry 21 ¶ 9-15, 20-21). For instance, Defendant
McClanahan, a police officer, is alleged to have participated in this conspiracy by stopping and
arresting the Plaintiff at a Defendant’s request and by falsifying applications for arrest warrants
in furtherance of the conspirators’ objective. (Docket Entry 21 ¶ 13-15, 20-21). Last, the Plaintiff
was indeed stopped and arrested by Defendant McClanahan, allegedly in furtherance of the
conspiracy. (Docket Entry 21 ¶ 14-15).
At this stage of the lawsuit, the Amended Complaint is read in the light most favorable to
the Plaintiff. The factual assertions in the Amended Complaint, if accepted as true, raise a
plausible claim of a civil conspiracy amongst the individual Defendants. This in turn suggests a
finding of state action on the individual Defendants’ parts. The Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss
(Docket Entries 24 and 30) are DENIED.
It is so ORDERED.
/s/ John S. Bryant
JOHN S. BRYANT
United States Magistrate Judge

5